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ABSTRACT
Many critical issues in today’s international commercial arbitration are unsettled. The 
purpose of this research is to study how the New York Convention shall be reformed or 
evolved on a jurisprudential basis.
The New York Convention to a certain extent is a legal discourse with some 
crucial norms such as party autonomy and the split of powers (involving judicial review 
and sovereignty). Social, historical, economic and cultural factors affect the formation 
and application of norms in this discourse. With this in mind, the disciplines of law, 
sociology, and economics will be adopted occasionally. Darwinian legal theory and 
game theory are two major analytic approaches.
There are six chapters in this dissertation.
The purpose, task and methodologies of this research are outlined in Chapter 1.
No research on arbitration would be complete without some discussion of the 
historical context, which can help to explore the differences between different times and 
show the evolution of critical norms and theories. The discussion concerning Darwinian 
legal theory and the evolution of the New York Convention is in Chapter 2. The theory 
can be a tool to explain the future development of the New York Convention in a 
changing legal environment.
Game theory is often used to study such legal phenomena as jurisdictional 
competition and legal harmonisation. The basic idea is that states act in their self- 
interest like private parties in the game, which requires a “federalism” system in place 
to harmonise self-interest-oriented national rules. Under the New York Convention, the 
enforcement of vacated arbitral awards involve multiple states and naturally touches 
upon the actions these states may take. Game theory is used in Chapter 3 to study the 
possibility of harmonising national rules in the trend of de-localisation and globalisation.
The modem arbitration has become more legalistic. The business community 
desire applicable rules and procedures more business-oriented and simpler than those 
used by national courts. Instead of rigid national laws, the business community prefers 
the stability and predictability offered by law merchant or lex mercatoria. Historical and 
neo-economic studies of lex mercatoria are offered in Chapter 4 to demonstrate the 
necessity of recognising lex mercatoria in practice.
Public policy is a critical concept in the New York Convention. Apart from the 
arbitrability and public policy review in the enforcement procedure, Chapter 5 tries to 
explore the possibility of framing “normative” public policy on the basis of game theory. 
States are the key actor in implementing public policy. Thus, the role and function of
the states in the era of globalisation will be studied as well by reference to the neo- 
economic theories.
A conclusion is set out in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 1 FROM A JURISPUDENCE-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE
-  AN INTRODUCTION
There are numerous critical but unsettled issues in today’s international commercial 
arbitration, ranging from the enforcement of arbitral awards to the spectacular rise of 
both mandatory arbitration and arbitration without contractual relationships under 
investment treaties. It is then not a surprise to see so many published articles and books 
in this field addressing a large number of legal and practical issues. The purpose of this 
dissertation, nevertheless, is not to supplement a vast array of existing writings on 
international commercial arbitration, which may have easily convinced us that there is 
no such need to repeat this effort. Neither is this research intended to offer a day-to-day 
tool or a comprehensive manual to help professionals or experts who are faced with a 
specific issue relating to the application of the New York Convention and domestic 
arbitration laws. Therefore, I have been trying hard to avoid writing an endless-seeming 
dissertation merely concerned with the detail of arbitration in the light of the New York 
Convention or offering some insights to those topics frequently written by scholars and 
practitioners. The most frustrating experience which can be encountered in studying 
arbitration law is that so much devotion is placed on the practical topics that the subject 
is of little jurisprudential significance. In other words, very little discussion has been 
undertaken on arbitration, or more specifically, the New York Convention at a 
jurisprudential level.
Jurisprudence, and a jurisprudential analysis, while esoteric, has a role in legal 
research. Like philosophy, jurisprudence can also be practical, and can approach 
practical issues pragmatically. At first blush an attempt to approach something as 
mundane as institutional rules for arbitration from a jurisprudential perspective might 
seem somewhat presumptuous. However, beneath the surface of the rule-making and 
practice, there is a clear purpose which is future driven. Scholars have decried the extent 
to which arbitrations have increasingly become carbon copies (in their systemic design) 
of the traditional dispute resolution through judicial systems, rather than remaining true 
alternatives.1 For those reasons, while this research offers a reasonably concise 
explanation of several crucial academic issues involved in international commercial 
arbitration, more emphasis has been placed on the illustration of how a particular issue 
can be explored via some new jurisprudential tools. Rather than putting another spin on
1 Thomas IA Allen, ‘Institutional Rules: Straitjacket or Scaffold?’ in Martin Odams De Zylva and Reziya 
Harrison (eds), International Commercial Arbitration -  Developing Rules fo r  the New Millennium 
(Jordans, Bristol 2000) 54.
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received doctrine, the research is an attempt to explore whether what has been studied 
can be more convincingly presented with the help of new strands of theory; and 
moreover, treated in a way which is sufficiently forward-looking to meet the demands 
of the future developments. The research does not provide a machete to hack at the 
undergrowth along the way. What it does is to demonstrate the pathway of logics and 
the jurisprudential questions one ought to consider in search of common principles in 
the next few decades.
This is a study of how the New York Convention might be reformed or evolved 
on a jurisprudential basis. It is not a functional study, and cases on the application of the 
New York Convention are not as often referred to as other writings. There are several 
reasons for this. First, it would be premature to decide how the New York Convention’s 
framed legal discourse will be functioning in a new framework or how the New York 
Convention’s currently-designed legal discourse for the future is functioning in the 
existing framework. Second, functionalism is too narrow an approach to the 
jurisprudential study of law because it ignores or underestimates the power of legal 
course.2 Third, the practical difficulty with the New York Convention is that the courts 
of more than one hundred and forty jurisdictions are unlikely to come to the same, or 
even similar approaches, regardless of a uniform conclusion when they apply the New 
York Convention in real cases. The cases cited in this research therefore are key 
decisions which illustrate the ways in which other decisions in different jurisdictions or, 
more importantly, the jurisprudential development path of the New York Convention, 
might go.
The study of legal discourse is important because language, cultural values and 
political ideologies not only affect how law is formed and evolved but also suggest how 
law will be interpreted and applied. Legal discourse is also important due to its political 
function as it expresses ideas which constitute part of the ruling legal ideology and 
shape social behaviours. Legal discourse is the heart of law’s methodological 
autonomy3 which contributes to the fact that the legal order is “separate from any other 
identifiable set of non-legal beliefs or norms, be they economic, political, or religious”.4 
Take one classical example. The importance of legal discourse is illustrated by Alan
2 For a critique of this tension with legal realism and functionalism in comparative law, see George 
Fletcher, ‘The Universal and the Particular in Legal Discourse’ (1987) 2 B.Y.U. Law Review 335.
3 “Law is autonomous at the methodological level when the ways in which specialised institutions [for 
adjudication] justify their acts differ from the kinds of justification used in other disciplines or practices. 
This means that legal reasoning has a method or style to differentiate it from scientific explanation and 
from moral, political, and economic discourse.” See Roberto M. Unger, Law in Modern Society: Towards 
a Criticism o f  Social Theory (Free Press, New York 1976) 53.
4 Ibid at 52.
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Watson’s thesis that there are two primary features of Roman private law discourse 
which explain its historical domination of modem civil law systems.5 First, relying on 
Max Weber’s characterisation of Roman private law as a formally rational system of 
applying law to factual problems,6 Watson argues that Roman private law has an 
inherent authoritativeness with an emphasis on mles, not obscured by local interests, 
and set out independently of practical problems in real cases.7 Second, Roman private 
law became divided into discrete “blocks” of substantive legal institutions, such as 
categories of contracts, property rights and delicts, and was thus apt to be received in 
such blocks rather than as individual mles or as a whole theoretical system.8 This 
“block” effect allowed some institutions to be received without others though they 
related to one another, and individual mles could then be adapted to the host legal 
system.
Similarly, the New York Convention to a certain extent is also a host legal 
system, a discourse with some cmcial norms such as cost-effectiveness, efficiency, 
party autonomy, justice and the split of powers (involving judicial review and 
sovereignty). Social, historical, economic and even cultural factors also affect the 
formation and application of norms and mles in this discourse. The search for a 
developing direction of international commercial arbitration lies at the heart of this 
research. Do we have a direction? Why? What is the purpose of the direction? How is 
the navigation to be made? Whence is it best derived? Is it to be universal or particular 
to distinct contexts? These questions frame the structure of this research.
In determining the methodology to be used in this study, it is of great importance 
to ensure that the issues discussed here are studied in a pragmatically jurisprudential 
way. With this in mind, major objectives that have shaped the methodology of study are 
to find the path dependent on which the New York Convention may further evolve. The 
methodology also, ideally, can help to justify the space for some core norms such as 
public policy and lex mercatoria to survive or even revive and spread.
In recent years, with the realisation that law is no longer a closed system of 
mles9 but an instrument of social policy, the importance of other disciplines to the study 
of law has been noticed and some innovative responses have appeared in the legal
5 See generally Alan Watson, The Making o f  the Civil Law  (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1981).
6 See Max Weber, “Economy of Law” or “Sociology of Law” in Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich (eds), 
Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline o f  Interpretive Sociology, Vol. 2 (University o f California 
Press, Berkeley 1978).
7 Alan Watson, The M aking o f  the Civil Law, op cit, at 32.
8 Ibid at 14-22.
9 This line of thinking develops along with the recent resurgence of neo-systems theory such as Luhmann 
theory etc. See further discussion in Chapter Two.
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academy. This novelty in part is a consequence of the increasing influence of academic 
disciplines and intellectual traditions previously unconnected with the study of law. For 
the time being, the burden of these new methods of legal study has discouraged scholars 
from pursuing them. Some scholars have chosen to avoid moving in these directions 
altogether whilst others have chosen to specialise in one of the new forms and to neglect 
the others. As far as I am aware of, these interdisciplinary methodologies have rarely 
been adopted in studying international commercial arbitration. However, it is not my 
intention to base this research systematically on the disciplines of law, sociology, 
economics, literature,10 psychology and social policy,11 even though, from time to time, 
some of these approaches will be adopted. Among others, I adopt two major analytic 
approaches, that is, Darwinian legal theory and game theory, in this research where 
appropriate. The use of these theoretical resources is briefly discussed below.
No research on arbitration would be complete without some discussion of the 
historical context. Legal history can provide us with a good understanding of arbitration 
so that crucial reasons of development behind it can be scrutinised. A historical analysis 
can help explore the differences between different times and show the gradual 
development of critical theories. A historical analysis can also provide a full picture to 
the critical concepts and issues, e.g., arbitrability and de-localisation (lex loci arbitri). 
Arguing that the New York Convention needs new qualifications itself needs a strong 
theoretical basis. Chapter Two provides a full discussion of Darwinian legal theory and 
the New York Convention. The idea of Darwinian legal theory is that patterns of legal 
evolution are closely analogous to those which occur in the natural world as a result of 
the interaction between genes, organisms and environments. In this sense, Darwinian 
legal theory can be used to explain that the New York Convention has been out of step 
with the developing changes to the “environment.” Thus, a change of the “meme,” an 
equivalent term of gene in the legal sense, is necessary.12 The theory can be a tool for 
explaining the future development of the New York Convention in a changing legal
10 The Law and Literature movement instructs legal scholars in techniques of literary analysis for the 
purpose of interpreting laws and in the reciprocal use of legal analysis for the purpose of interpreting 
literary texts. According to the law-and-literature movement, law should be understood as an essentially 
literary activity. Judicial opinions should be read and evaluated not primarily as political acts or as 
attempts to maximise society’s wealth through efficient rules, but rather as artistic performances. The 
“contract reading” theory can characterise the role an arbitrator plays in construing an arbitration 
agreement and a judge plays in reviewing an arbitral award. A “contract reading” approach proposes a 
new calculus, that is, the contract (literature) analysis of party’s intention manifested in the arbitration 
agreement for determining the scope of review of awards.
11 The social analysis o f law is dedicated to the study of law in a social context. The emphasis is placed on 
both empirical research and the social development of the theoretical framework and legislative activities.
12 See generally Kate Distin, The Selfish Meme -  A Critical Reassessment (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2005).
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environment. Some driving forces such as globalisation and high technology, which will 
result in new changes to legal terms, will also be discussed.
One very influential analytical tool in current legal study has been the Law and 
Economics Movement.13 According to legal economists, law ought to consist of rules 
that maximise a society’s material wealth and abet the efficient operation of markets 
designed to generate wealth. Economic analysis has been extended to a wide range of 
human behaviours and interactions that had been traditionally considered outside the 
boundaries of this discipline. The theory-building potential of economic methods, 
however, has met with resistance from legal professionals, for the analytical models 
used by economists to generate predictions and propose reforms are often regarded as 
simplified and sometimes counterfactual assumptions about the empirical world. As a 
relatively new methodology, economic analysis can provide a new, pragmatic and 
empirical view and respond in particularly technical ways to legal issues in the 
regulatory environment. Although it could be argued that reduced expenses or cost- 
savings is not the essence of arbitration and the arbitration agreement determines the 
process, an economic approach to arbitration is useful to illustrate some critical issues in 
international commercial arbitration such as the relationship between arbitration 
institutions and courts and the cooperation among signatory states to the New York 
Convention. Among others, game theory has been utilised by legal scholars to study the 
legal phenomena such as jurisdictional competition and legal harmonisation in a number 
of legal areas such as corporation law, securities regulations, labour standards and 
environment protection rules. The basic idea is that the states act in their self-interest 
like private parties in the game, which requires a “federalism” system in place to 
harmonise self-interest-oriented national rules. Game theory has often been used to 
study the substantive law. Procedural rules in arbitration and litigation have rarely been 
tested. It will be interesting to see if game theory can be used in arbitration to study the 
possibility of harmonising national rules in the trend of de-localisation and, in a wider 
sense, globalisation.
13 There are several schools in the law and economic movement. I may largely side with the Chicago 
school theory in the analysis. Apart from that, there are “Austrian School” and “neo-classical” economic 
theory school. The Austrian school is an economic theory based on the idea that what economics needs to 
deal with is the actions of individuals, subjective goals in the face of shortages o f the goods, services and 
time needed to reach these goals. Important factors for economists o f this school are the influence of time 
on human action, and the fact that, in acting, people need to deal with the uncertainty regarding the effect 
of their actions due to their lack of precise knowledge regarding the present, past and future. This is to be 
contrasted with the more dominant “neo-classical” economic theory which is based on the idea o f a 
mainly mathematical model o f “perfect” competition and seeks to describe the behaviour o f a market in 
terms of equations.
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It has been argued that Darwinian legal theory and game theory are difficult to 
be used simultaneously because of their incomparable and incompatible natures. 
Darwinian legal theory is in essence a historical approach which studies the vertical 
development of biological or human behaviours in a chronological way whilst game 
theory focuses on the horizontal plane with a view of harmony.14 There seems a 
potential conflict in using different approaches in one research project. This requires 
some preliminary discussions about the nature of rules in the New York Convention.
The rules in one law or treaty differ in nature, that is, their values, structures, 
norms and processes. They vary in the extent to which their values, structures, norms 
and processes are contained in a hierarchy or legal discourse. They may differ in respect 
of those characteristics which are often associated with the application of the law 
including the reliance on case law, the use of precedent and the binding force of norms. 
They may also differ in their role or function in realising or serving the purpose of legal 
discourse. Different characteristics of various rules in one convention result in different 
ways in which they allocate risk or solve the problem and the different roles they play in 
this legal discourse or hierarchy. Besides, rules are interrelated, for example, in relation 
to institutional arrangements such as jurisdiction, copying or borrowing of norms, and 
the interconnection with outsiders.
The rules in the New York Convention, in my view, may be classified 
provisionally into two rough categories. Some mles are market-based, being generated 
by economic actors as part of the economic process, or polity-based, in that they form 
part of the established political structure. Other mles are more convention-based, 
deriving from their very origins from historical development. This classification 
distinguishes between different types of mles according to their origins and modes of 
functions. The basic allocation of tasks set out in the New York Convention is realised 
by utilising the functions of these two types of mles.
A variety of norms is contained in the New York Convention such as procedural 
autonomy, applicable law (the use of lex mercatoria or similar constructs), the remedies 
available to arbitral tribunals, and the recognition and enforcement of awards. The mles 
relating to the procedural autonomy and applicable law, inter alia, lex mercatoria, are 
convention-based mles and can be studied by using Darwinian legal theory. These mles 
attempt to maintain the basic features of arbitration. Other mles such as the grounds for 
refusing to recognise and enforce arbitral awards are more polity-based mles, which
14 Professor Simon Roberts at the London School of Economics and Political Science, my PhD supervisor, 
rightly pointed it out to me in 2003 when we first discussed what approaches can be taken in this 
dissertation.
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recognise the differentials between signatory states but also attempt to harmonise local 
practices to a certain extent. Since the polity-based rules inevitably involve human 
players (i.e., the agency), game theory is appropriate to be used as a methodological tool. 
The classification scheme distinguishing convention-based and polity-based rules in the 
New York Convention is convincing in the sense that Darwinian legal theory and game 
theory can be adopted simultaneously in one research project because they can be used 
to solve different legal problems.
In view of all the developments that have occurred since 1958, the application of 
the New York Convention in arbitral tribunals, the courts of the forum of the arbitration 
and courts of third States may no longer be sound and is in need of a revision or new 
qualification. This is the core purpose of my research.
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CHAPTER 2 NEW YORK CONVENTION AND 
DARWINIAN LEGAL THEORY
The aim in bringing Darwinian evolutionary theory into a legal context is to unite the 
legal and biological evolution and then account for processes of cultural transmission 
and legal change with a conception of “genetic metaphor”. The Darwinian evolutionary 
theory provides a mechanism to understand the legal evolution. The patterns of cultural 
and legal evolution are closely analogous to those which occur in the natural world as a 
result of the interaction between the gene, organism and environment.1 This chapter 
explores the significance of discovery and development of legal evolutionary theory 
which is associated with the notion of Darwinian evolutionary theory and its specific 
application in the field of international commercial arbitration.
1. D a r w in ia n  E v o l u t io n a r y  T h e o r y
Charles Darwin first proclaimed the biological evolutionary theory2 in The Origin o f  
Species in 1859,3 the objective of which was to show how speciation occurs 
spontaneously through natural selection in the natural world. Due to the scarcity of 
resources, species struggle for life in a competitive environment. “Owing to this 
struggle for life, any variation, however slight and from whatever cause proceeding, if it 
be in any degree profitable to an individual of any species, in its infinitely complex 
relations to other organic beings and to external nature, will tend to the preservation of 
that individual. The offspring, also, will thus have a better chance of surviving”.4 It is 
the organisms that inherit traits or characteristics from their parents. Traits which are 
advantageous in aiding the survival and reproduction of speciation accumulate across 
successive generations and have more chances to be passed on to the next generation. A 
selective pressure is therefore applied invisibly.
The core of Darwinian evolution is natural selection. As Darwin pointed out:
1 In this chapter, “culture” is broadly defined to include human practices such as law in a social context. 
See generally Henry Plotkin, ‘Culture and Psychological Mechanisms’ in Robert Aunger (ed), 
Darwinising Culture - The Status o f  Memetics as a Science (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000); and 
Roger Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society -  Legal Ideas in the Mirror o f  Social Theory (Ashgate, 
Aldershot 2006).
2 As surprising as it sounds, Darwin never uses the term of evolution in The Origin o f  Species. Rather, he 
speaks of “descent with modification”. For Darwin, the process of modification is, in principle, 
continuous. The difference between these terms is not merely semantic. Darwin realised that evolution is 
a teleological term. To say that something evolved is to say that it has evolved toward something. Darwin 
eschews such teleological thinking.
3 Charles Darwin, On the Origin o f  Species by Means o f  Natural Selection or the Preservation o f  
Favoured Races in the Struggle fo r  Life (John Murray, London 1859).
4 Charles Darwin, ‘The Origin of Species’ in Duncan M. Porter and Peter W. Graham (eds), The Portable 
Darwin (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth 1993) 147.
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“natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinising, throughout the world, every 
variation, even the slightest; rejecting that which is bad, preserving and adding 
up all that is good; silently and insensibly working, whenever and wherever 
opportunity offers, at the improvement of each organic being in relation to its 
organic, and inorganic, conditions of life”.5
This suggests that natural selection is a two-step process consisting of, first, 
mutations and rearrangements of the germ-line that are random with respect to the 
future of organism and species; and second, sorting and selecting by the environment of 
the most adaptive organisms produced by the mutations.
For Darwin, change is a universal characteristic of the organic world and results 
from the “natural selection”, a blind and automatic process by which species adapt to 
environmental changes by weeding out variations that jeopardise their survival. In 
Darwin’s viewpoint, nature is intrinsically mechanistic and responds to external forces 
of chance and necessity. The environment, in the Darwinian sense, consists of two 
major factors: the physical features of the natural world, i.e., weather, and the activities 
of other organisms. The changes in the landscape or the migration or the separation of 
the members of a single species can lead over time to the emergence of new species as 
each group adapts to new conditions. This process will result in a greater diversity due 
to the possibility of combination of two separate lines of descent. The emergence of 
distinctive forms of species are all “fitted” in or “adapted” to the environment by 
possessing features which co-evolved with those of the surroundings.
Darwinian evolution theory may have a three-fold distinction among genotype 
(“code”), phenotype (“organism”) and environment. The first element vitally explains 
the nature of the links between the other two. The environment’s past, in the form of 
information and code, is embedded in the organism. In this sense, the organism and 
environment are “fitted” to each other. The pressures from the environment gradually 
lead to the changes in the composition of the code which then in turn influences the 
structure of the organism. Nevertheless, this does not happen to all individual organisms 
but only to those which carry the code and make it feasible for it to be reproduced. The 
process is dependent upon the differential survival rates of individual organisms. The 
“data” contained in the code is transmitted through the incremental processes of inter- 
generational development and selective retention. The change of the structure of the 
code may be non-teleological or blind.
5 Ibid. at 162.
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The contribution of modem genetics to the evolutionary theory has been to 
identify the precise way in which inheritance and variation occur. Inheritance takes 
place through the copying of the genetic code from the parent to offspring. The genetic 
code, the “genotype”,6 is a “replicator” or self-replicating entity and contains the genetic 
material which is “encoded” in the sense of embodying previous adaptations or 
successful “survival strategies”. Genetic material is a form of stored and coded
n
information, and has a peculiar chemical composition (DNA) which makes this cross- 
generational copying possible. The DNA “code” transmits information to proteins so as 
to enable them to “build” the organism which then becomes the carrier or vehicle for the 
replication of the genetic material through reproduction. Along with this process, the 
effect of natural selection is expressed through shifts in the genetic composition of 
particular species. This has been summarised as “the process of ... extracting useful
o
information from the environment and encoding it in the genes”. Meanwhile, it is 
through random mutations in the genetic composition of individual organisms and their 
recombination through reproduction that variation in inherited traits takes place.9
The variations in the characteristics of different organisms do not represent the 
impact of immediate environmental pressure. Rather, they are the consequence of the 
inherited, cumulative effects of environmental change over successive generations or 
the result of random mutations in the genetic code. According to Darwinian theory, 
variation precedes selection. From the perspective of mutation, variations are “errors” in 
the copying process. However, it is the “errors” that help those individual organisms to 
survive and reproduce because variations make them more possible to adapt in a 
challenging environment. To copy the “errors” or variations in the code is a process of 
genetic change. This observation seems different from the Lamarckian accounts of 
evolutionary change.10 According to the Lamarckian theory, individual organisms
6 The term “genome” is used to refer to a complex o f genes.
7 See Kim Sterelny and Paul Griffiths, Sex and Death: An Introduction to the Philosophy o f  Biology 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1999) and Matt Ridley, Genome: The Autobiography o f  a Species 
in 23 Chapters (Harper Perennial, London 2000).
8 Matt Ridley, Genome: The Autobiography o f  a Species in 23 Chapters, op cit.
9 Mutations have both bright and dark sides. They are essential to natural selection because they provide 
genetic variability which results in new phenotypes for the environment to sort out, the bountiful 
speciation presently observed, and the minor variations that embellish the basic design o f lineages.
An outline of Lamarck’s theory is available at www.ucmp.berkelev.edu/historv/lamarck.html. The 
Lamarckianism or Lamarckism is now often used in a rather derogatory sense to refer to the theory that 
acquired traits can be inherited. As a matter o f fact, Lamarck theory is more complicated. The theory is 
that organisms are not passively altered by their environment. Instead, a change in the environment causes 
changes in the needs of organisms living in that environment, which in turn causes changes in their 
behaviour. Altered behaviour leads to a greater or lesser use o f a given structure or organ; use would 
cause the structure to increase in size over several generations, whereas disuse would cause it to shrink or 
even disappear. The rule that uses or disuses causes structures to enlarge or shrink is called “first law” by 
Lamarck in his book Philosophie Zoologique. Lamarck’s “second law” stated that all such changes were
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respond with varying degrees of “mutation” to the changing conditions of environment.
In order to ensure that the more efficient characteristics endure, more successful
individuals “acquire” traits that can be passed on to their offspring.11
In brief, Darwinian evolutionary theory has three basic building blocks, which
are the code, organism and environment. The functional and adaptive nature of codes
persists through time. This theory is not specific to biology, and can be applied in a
social science context where it is feasible to substitute “social system” for “organism”,
10and the “institutional” or “cultural” environment for nature. In addition, the 
“evolutionary algorithm” of natural selection can also be expressed at a general or 
specific level applicable to the social sphere. The algorithm predicts that where four 
conditions are observed: (i) self-replicating entities, (ii) a mechanism of variation, (iii) a 
mechanism for inheritance, or the inter-generational transmission of entities, and (iv) 
differential survival rates brought about through environmental pressures, a process of 
cumulative evolution, leading to the emergence of complex and diverse forms, will 
occur.
2. L e g a l  E v o l u t io n a r y  T h e o r y 1 3
The process of development or growth is not only one of the most important processes 
in the biological world but also occurs universally among modem, higher, multicellular 
and complex animals. The theory of evolution is more than a scientific theory or 
paradigm.14 It has become the philosophical foundation of the naturalistic view of the
heritable. The result of these laws was the continuous, gradual change of all organisms, as they became 
adaptable to their environments; the physiological needs o f organisms, created by their interactions with 
the environment, drive Lamarckian evolution. Lamarckian inheritance, at least in the sense Lamarck 
intended, is in conflict with the findings of genetics and has now been largely abandoned. Lamarck’s 
theory was accepted by some scholars. For instance, Herbert Spencer was convinced by Lamarck’s 
arguments for evolution and began to see the possibility o f constructing a synthesis that would unite all 
aspects o f natural and human evolution under the same laws. See generally Richard Hoftstadter, Social 
Darwinism in American Thought (Beacon Press, Boston 1955) and Mark Francis, Herbert Spencer and 
the Invention o f  Modern Life (Acumen, Stocksfield UK 2007)
"  See Geoffrey Hodgson, ‘Is Social Evolution Lamarckian or Darwinian?’ in John Laurent and John 
Nightingale (eds), Darwinism and Evolutionary Economics (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK 2001).
12 Ruth Adler (tr), Gunther Teubner and Anne Bankowska, Law as an Autopoietic System (Blackwell, 
Oxford 1993).
13 The last few decades of the 20th century saw a climate of uncertainty surrounding the social science. 
Scholars tried to rebuild the theoretical framework for legal history. Among others, Marie Theres Fogen 
adopted a radical approach and similar terms to describe the change and development o f social world. For 
instance, she used autopoesis to replace the hierarchy and domination, the key terms in politics and 
history. As a result, a “system of communication” constitutes social world without human actors. This 
extreme theory, although is criticised by other scholars, effectively means that the legal history can be 
collaborated by adopting new elements and philosophical ideas. See Simon Roberts, ‘Against a Systemic 
Legal History’ (unpublished paper on file with the author).
14 E.g., Edward O. Wilson popularised evolutionary psychology or socio-biology and interpreted all 
human behaviours in light o f the evolutionary process, such as the origins and ends of every human 
behaviour and institution. See Marc D Guerra, ‘The Delusion of Darwinian Natural Law’ (2001) 11(4)
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universe that has replaced the Judeo-Christian worldview which once dominated the 
Western culture.15 Darwinian theory then offers at least a new perspective to the social 
development of life of human beings. Social Darwinism attempts to utilise the 
evolutionary theory of Darwin to describe society or prescribe for its best constitution, 
and culturally transmitted behavioural information exhibits and supports a Darwinian 
evolutionary dynamic.16 By analogy to its biological counterpart, social Darwinism 
argues that the struggle for survival among humans may be expected to yield social 
progress, just as the struggle among biological communities produces evolutionary 
adaptive results.17 Social behaviours and legal systems and institutions came into 
existence as evolutionary responses to “species-threatening” changes in human being’s 
environment.
In order to apply Darwinian theory to the legal sphere, a key aspect of social 
evolution or development, it is critical to identify the specific dynamics of the upstream 
replicative process. This requires a medium corresponding to the “gene” in the 
biological evolutionary process so that the three basic blocks in the Darwinian theory 
can be built up in the legal context. The term “meme” is created as an analogue to the
1 ftgene in the social sphere. One flavour focusing on the evolution of the cultural 
elements is sometimes called “memetics”.19 However, its diffusion owes much to the
philosophical work of Darwin’s Dangerous Idea by Daniel Dennett.20 Antecedents of
91memetics have been found in the theory of cultural inheritance.
As a matter of fact, a “meme” is used as a replicating entity and a unit of social, 
cultural or legal information, a concept that is shared in a population of individuals 
through social transmission. A meme is made of information, which can be carried in
Religion & Liberty. Marx and Engels were much interested in Darwin’s work, and used his theory to 
underpin their notion of the historical evolution of class struggle.
15 It is widely agreed that international law was the product o f European civilisation dominant nations that 
are Christian, capitalist and imperialist. See Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy 
(2nd edn Columbia University Press, New York 1979) 121.
16 See Robert Aunger (ed), Darwinising Culture: The Status o f  Memetics as Science (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2001); Susan Blackmore, The Meme Machine (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999); 
Ward H. Goodenough, ‘Outline of a Framework for a Theory o f Cultural Evolution’ (1999) 33 Cross- 
Cultural Research 84; Mark R. Flinn, ‘Culture and the Evolution of Social Learning’ (1997) 18 Evolution 
and Human Behaviour 23-67; William H. Durham, ‘Advances in Evolutionary Culture Theory’ (1990) 19 
Annual Review of Anthropology 197.
17 Herbert Spencer, an English sociologist and philosopher, was the pioneer o f this approach even though 
he was not a convinced Darwinist. In the social science, social Darwinism is also called “social 
Spencerism”, which proclaimed a progressive view of human society.
18 The notion is originated by the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins in his works The Selfish Gene 
(2nd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 1989) and The Blind Watchmaker (Penguin, London 2006).
19 See Susan Blackmore, The Meme Machine, op cit.
20 See Daniel C. Dennett, D arwin’s Dangerous Idea (Simon & Schuster, New York 1995).
21 See Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza and Marcus W. Feldman, Cultural Evolution and Transmission: A 
Quantitative Approach (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1981); Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson, 
Culture and the Evolutionary Process (University o f Chicago Press, Chicago 1985).
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any physical medium. A meme is also subject to similar Darwinian principles of 
heredity, variation and selection as applicable to a gene. Thus, cultural norms or legal 
concepts develop in a cumulative evolution process, through which incremental changes 
occur over time in a manner which reflects surrounding environmental pressures. The 
basic evolutionary “algorithm” can be applied to the emergence of complicated social or 
legal institutions. Individual meme, as a unit or entity equivalent to the gene, must be 
able to copy itself with accuracy. Errors in the self-copying process are recognised as 
random mutations which occur in the memetic code along with the transmission through 
inheritance. Similarly, changes in memetic material must not occur as a consequence of 
the volition of individual agents, even though it is difficult to envisage that this process 
may be blind or spontaneous. Memes are also identified as memory items stored in the 
human brain, such as fashions, tunes, catch phrases or others. In terms of this wide 
coverage, memes are more complex verbal formulas mainly transmitted through 
imitation.24 This definition also prefers a behavioural account of memetics to a purely 
neural one.25 The problematic aspect of this memory-like definition is that cultural 
evolution would possess few features of the biological evolution. For instance, the 
change would be probably rapid rather than being slow and incremental. The copying 
process through imitation would be inaccurate and threaten the integration of the 
“memetic code”. Individual volition would replace the collective one to play a major 
part in the transmission process. Last but not the least, the cultural change will lack the 
dominant feature of genealogical character in the biological evolution, which leads to
9 f%the impossibility of recombining different lines of descent once they have separated. 
However, this discouraging speculation does not stand well in the current emergent
97discipline of memetics.
As rightly described, the genome is “an information-processing computer that 
extracts useful information from the world by natural selection and embodies that 
information in its design... the human genome [is] four billion years’ worth of
22 See Daniel Dennett, D arwin’s Dangerous Idea, op. cit. 352-30.
23 See Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker, op. cit. 194.
24 See Susan Blakemore, The Meme Machine, op cit., and Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Software: A Theory o f  
Ideology (Yale University Press, New Haven 1998) Chs 3 and 4.
25 See Dan Gatherer, ‘Why the thought contagion metaphor is retarding the process o f memetics’ (1998) 3 
Journal o f Memetics -  Evolutionary Mechanisms o f Information Transmission, (available at 
www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit. 1998/vol 12/gatherer_d.htlm.)
26 See Robert Aunger, ‘Introduction’ in Robert Aunger (ed) Darwinising Culture: The Status o f  Memetics 
as a Science (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000) 305.
27 This problematic aspect stands in contrast to associations which have long been made between the 
Darwinian evolution and processes akin to lineal descent within legal doctrine.
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accumulated learning”.28 One account of cultural evolution argues that human imitative 
processes can be classified into three categories -  non-linguistic transmission (uncoded), 
stories (partially coded) and formulas (fully coded).29 The replication is of a formula of 
context and action: a recipe, recommendation, or rule. The authority for these formulas 
for action can be varied: observational, parental, religious or legal. Legal concepts or 
terms, the linguistic formulas which supply the basis for systematising legal materials, 
can be regarded as embodying in shorthand form information about the social (legal) 
world which is filtered through the processes of legal argument, debate, consultation, 
litigation, arbitration and exposition. Like the genetic code, legal concepts develop 
slowly, compared to the more rapid rate of change in the substance of legal rules. In 
addition, the change of a legal concept is apparent in retrospect, reflecting the non- 
teleological and path dependent aspect of the genetic change. Same as the genome, a 
legal concept or term also has the ability to copy itself (i.e., largely its critical feature) 
faithfully so that the necessary condition for inheritance of information contained in the 
genetic code can be satisfied. Therefore, the memetic information in the legal concept 
can be vertically transmitted. This process is similar to the relative continuity of the 
genetic code. Legal evolution is only possible if there are sufficiently powerful 
information-processing devices capable of storing information and reliably transmitting 
it to or replicating it in other information-processing devices.30
In the legal context, a legal doctrine can be thought of as a particular mechanism 
of cultural transmission which works through coding information into a conceptual form, 
thereby assisting its inter-temporal dissemination. This mechanism is a “Darwinian” 
type of process, in the sense of operating through a cycle of inheritance, variation and 
selection, which results in temporal sequences and patterns of morphological changes. 
Legal discourse possesses basic elements of autonomy and self-reference which provide 
it with the capacity for self-replication, while it is linked to wider social and biological 
processes through co-evolution. Legal concepts are the equivalent of genetic replicators, 
with substantive rules or legal doctrines or norms operating as interactors.31
28 See Matt Ridley, Genome: The Autobiography o f  a Species in 23 Chapters, op. cit. 220.
29 Non-linguistic, uncoded transmission depends upon the direct observation. In its simplest form, an 
action by person A in a particular context is observed by person B. The action and the context for it are 
stored in the brain of B, waiting for the context to reoccur for B. Once the language enters the human 
repertoire, it can be used to tell a story. The third mode, the “fully coded” transmission through linguistic 
formulas, uses language to transmit abstracted behavioural information.
30 See Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Software: A Theory o f  Ideology, op. cit. 55.
31 See Ruth Adler (tr), Gunther Teubner and Anne Bankowska, Law as an Autopoietic System , Ibid. 51. 
Teubner ascribes to Luhmann the idea that ‘in the legal system norms take over the function of variation, 
institutional structures (particularly procedures) that of selection, and dogmatic conceptual structures that 
o f retention’, referring to Niklas Luhmann, ‘Evolution des Rechts’ (1970) 1 Rechtstheorie 3. See
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This chapter argues in favour of an evolutionary theory of legal change which 
rests on three related propositions. First, the legal evolution operates in a process 
analogous to inheritance in the biological sphere, which involves the vertical 
transmission of memetic code. In this sense, legal terms and concepts evolve in the 
social sphere as the gene does in the biological one. Second, memes store legal 
information in the code, the process of which parallels to that of the genetic code. 
Memes are also adaptive to social changes and only those memes which adapt to a 
changing social environment can survive. Information in the code may reflect an 
internal dynamic of change; but the stored information must be transmitted and shaped 
by social conditions. Third, the legal evolution is cumulative: incremental mutations in 
legal forms, when coupled with the selective effect of environmental pressures, can give 
rise to complex, multi-functional legal institutions.
In the social realm, memetic material, i.e., shared values, assumptions and 
heuristic categories, is embodied in the practice of institutions, being regarded as 
assemblages of rules, norms and conventions. There are corresponding units in 
biological, social and legal evolution.
Table 2-1: Units in Biological, Social and Legal Evolution
Evolution Replicator In terac to r Environm ent
Biological Gene Organism Natural world
Social Meme (corporate 
culture)
Institution (e.g., legal entity) Society or social 
community
Legal Legal concept (e.g., 
arbitration)
Rule or norm (i.e., party 
autonomy arbitrability)
Normative world (legal 
environment)
The co-existence of cultural and genetic evolution results in a special theory of 
“meme-culture co-evolution” or dual inheritance. To explore this theory, a genetic 
basis for certain human behavioural traits and social institutions must be identified.33 
The below chart illustrates that the relationship between the genetic and cultural spheres 
is co-evolution rather than a linear cause and effect.34
generally Michael King and Chris Thornhill (eds), Luhmann on Law and Politics -  Critical Appraisals 
and Applications (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2006).
32 See Kevin Laland, John Odling-Smee and Marcus Feldman, ‘Niche Construction, Biological Evolution, 
and Cultural Change’ (2000) 23 Behavioural and Brain Sciences 131.
33 It has been argued that human brain evolved to meet the conditions of the “environment of evolutionary 
adaptiveness” of the Pleistocene era. However, human psychology is ill-fitted to the very different social 
environment o f today. See Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, John Tooby, The Adapted Mind. 
Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation o f  Culture (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1992).
34 Ibid, 131.
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Table 2-2: Factors and Algorithm in Biological and Legal Evolutions
Biological evolution Legal evolution
M ain factors •  Organism (phenotype)
•  Code (genotype)
• Natural environment
• Legal rule or institution
• Legal concept, norm or doctrine 
(meme-type)
• Social or economic environment
Evolutionary
algorithm
•  Self-replicating entities
•  A mechanism of variation and 
mutation
•  A mechanism of inter- 
generational transmission of 
genetic information
• Various survival rates through 
environmental pressures
• Repeated interpretive practice of 
legal doctrine
• Legal rules are modified or 
developed by legal “players”
•  Coding and decoding legal 
information in and from legal 
concepts
•  Various survival rates through 
selection pressure: litigation, 
legislation, social change, 
lobbying
Social or economic environment is a vague term, which may include 
information about attitudes, beliefs and values of members in a society or community in 
which conventional or “reasonable” behaviour is passed along.35 A full description of 
cultural processes also needs mechanisms of variation and selection. The key to the 
cultural transmission is provoking the imitation of action by orders. In the legal context, 
the unit of inheritance is an abstract term, “legal meme”, which is carried forward at the 
point when one legal rule or doctrine succeeds another. This process also allows 
variation, which is a result of the experimentation by legal players when they 
encountered the necessity to adapt an existing rule into new circumstances. The unit of 
selection is the legal rule and the mechanisms through which the selection operates are 
legal or legislative processes which Luhmann and Teubner refer to in a generic sense. 
Such mechanisms are “Darwinian” in that variation precedes selection. Variation in 
legal rules (the “phenotype”) is possible within the constraints posed by the search for 
coherence and continuity within legal doctrine (the “genotype”). The rules which 
emerge from this process are subject to the selective pressures. Lobbying, interest group 
activities, litigation strategies, and other forms of concerted intervention in the law­
making process all have a potential role to play.
There may be many controversial issues surrounding the adoption of genetic 
metaphors in social sciences. Biological and legal evolutions may possess very different
35 To start with evolution as the major force and then try to insert human development into it may 
encounter the insurmountable problem of explaining logically and biologically how the fundamentally 
autonomous, exquisitely regulated and intrinsically ordered social development is close to or compatible 
with the essentially unordered, unpredictable process o f mutational variation, directed by opportunistic 
extrinsic environmental conditions.
36 See Niklas Luhmann, ‘Evolution des Rechts’ (1970) Rechtstheorie 3; and generally Michael King and 
Chris Thornhill (eds), Luhmann on Law and Politics -  Critical Appraisals and Applications, op. cit.
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characteristics, which may indeed conflict with each other, even though both 
evolutionary processes move away from an existing, inherited set of capabilities, rather 
than moving towards a predestined, optimal state.37 In addition, the biological and 
cultural evolutions also have various approaches to mutations. However, a wide 
meaning has to be ascribed here to the term of “memetics” so that the potential 
differences between gene-culture co-evolution theory and certain versions of memetics 
can be ignored. Also, a memetic point of view does not say that all human institutions 
are shaped directly by genetic transmission.39
Table 2-3: Comparison of Characteristics and Variations
in Biological and Legal Evolutions
Biological evolution Legal evolution
C haracteristics •  Non-teleological
• Not necessarily efficient
•  Quasi teleological
•  Towards the most efficient and 
economic norms
•  Implies the kind o f purposeful 
change by which something unfolds 
according to a prearranged plan
V ariation • The result of random errors in 
copying the genetic code
• “ Smart” change guided by the 
experience and precedent
Social development is genomic, internally determined, hierarchically regulated, 
end-directed, and holistically organised; in stark contrast to the basically unpredictable, 
mindless, environmentally-directed process of biological evolution.
Variations in genetic and cultural evolutions are different in terms of the force 
driving the change. Small variations in the genetic evolution are largely regarded as the 
result of random errors in copying the genetic code, which in turn changes the inherited 
characters of organisms. However, the variation may be less obviously random in 
cultural evolution. The driving force behind the variation in the inherited characters of 
legal concept or term can be “smart” because it is guided by experience, precedent,
37 See Stephen Jay Gould and Elizabeth Verba, ‘Exaptation: A Missing Term in the Science of Form’ 
(1981) 8 Paleobiology 4; Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin, ‘The Spandrels o f San Marco and the 
Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme’ (1979) B205 Proceedings o f the 
Royal Society 581; Stephen Jay Gould, The Structure o f  Evolutionary Theory (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge 2002) Ch 11, and The Individual in Darwin’s World (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 
1990); and Daniel Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, op cit. 267-82.
38 See Kevin N. Laland and Gillian R. Brown, Sense and Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human 
Behaviour (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002).
39 Memetics opposes this type of genetic reductionism by raising the possibility that there are 
evolutionary mechanisms which are specific to the cultural realm. See Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson, 
‘Memes: Universal Acid or A Better Mousetrap?’ in Robert Aunger (ed) Darwinising Culture: The Status 
o f  Memetics as a Science, op. cit.
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experimentation and comparison.40 The major reason for the cultural evolutionary 
process being “smart” is that legal concepts are replicated through the means of human 
agency. In this process, key legal actors include but are not limited to judges, legislators, 
lawyers, legal enforcement officers and a large number of lobby groups. The selective 
effect of legal procedures ensures that in the case of litigation, only certain disputes are 
litigated, only a fraction of these come before a court for judgment, and only a further 
small fraction in turn are reported and analysed in such a way as to establish precedents. 
The comparison helps explain the possibility of mutation through experimentation or 
error in the copying process.
The involvement of legal “actors” in the legal evolution determines its nature 
being not non-teleological41 The options available to the judge or legislator are both 
informed and constrained by the existing “meme pool” of legal forms, norms and 
doctrines. On the other hand, the transplant and comparative studies also provide the 
possibility of change. The aim of adjudication or legislation is not only to reproduce the 
concept as such; but also to develop a workable and better rule. Nevertheless, the legal 
evolution is not totally free from environmental pressures. Instead, it still has the effect 
of being influenced by the environment. At every stage, legal norms which do not “fit” 
with the environment are implicitly selected against. Therefore, the basic characteristic 
of legal evolution must be quasi teleological. The non-teleological aspect guarantees the 
innovation in the content of substantive rules whilst the teleological aspect maintains 
the continuity of the abstract legal concept. Due to its teleological nature, legal system 
can also transmit information back to the society in the form of legal norms. Thus, there 
is a powerful “feedback loop” operating between the legal order and wider economic 
and social environment. It is in this sense that the legal system and the wider institutions 
of economy and society become ‘fitted’ to one another through co-evolution.
Can legal terms develop on its own without any influence from society? The 
systems theory expressed the separation of the legal and social systems in a radical form: 
the law is operatively closed to the external environment, while being “cognitively
40 These guiding forces exist at both national and international levels. For instance, necessary changes 
may be brought in the context o f successive statutes and judicial precedents. This is a vertical 
transmission of legal terms. Similarly, a horizontal transmission takes place between various jurisdictions. 
A comparative study between domestic and foreign jurisdictions can illustrate the necessity o f 
transplanting foreign legal terms into domestic legislation or judiciary. See Ann-Marie Slaughter, 
‘Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks’ in M. Byers (ed), The Role o f  Law in 
International Politics (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000).
41 The neo-systems theory does not recognise human actors’ role in the social world. In the view of Marie 
Theres Fogen, human actors disappear altogether as the social world is represented as consisting of 
“systems of communication”. Central elements o f political and social theory such as domination and 
hierarchy are replaced by self functional reproduction and change by the process o f autopoesis. See 
Simon Roberts, ‘Against a Systemic Legal History’ (unpublished paper on file with the author).
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open”. The theory regards the operative closure as the consequence of law’s autonomy 
and self-referentiality; without it, the legal system would lack the capacity for 
evolutionary change. Meanwhile, cognitive openness implies the possibility that events 
occurring outside legal systems can impact upon it if they are first translated into 
juridical language and processed through distinctively legal acts and procedures. This 
means that legal order cannot be expected to respond directly to shifts in the social and 
economic environment.42
Social Darwinism certainly disagrees with the radical theory separating legal 
norm from die social context. William G. Summer, a leading social scientist, viewed the 
capitalism system with great favour because it allowed the free play of the “competition 
of life”. Andrew Carnegie held the view that individualism, private property, the law of 
accumulation of wealth and the law of competition promoted the highest and best in 
human achievements. Their views obviously support the inter-relation between the legal 
system and environment. A more correct observation may be drawn from the fact that to 
insulate the genetic code from external influences would lead to its dilution and 
disintegration. The “boundary conditions” and “rules of recognition” perform the same 
function in the legal system. As Teubner rightly observed, while justifying the 
“boundaries of law are one among many structures”, “law itself produces under the 
pressure of its social environment” 43
3 . T h e  A p p l ic a t io n  o f  D a r w in ia n  T h e o r y  in  t h e  L e g a l  S p h e r e  
The link between legal and biological evolutionary theory has been in existence for a 
remarkably long time,44 which predates the writings of Charles Darwin. The modem 
legal evolutionary theory emerged in the mid-nineteenth century 45 and originated in the 
intellectual climate contributed by the legal doctrinal thought and political economy. 
Henry Maine,46 Oliver Wendell Holmes47 and Arthur Corbin48 were pioneers on this
42 This implies a degree of “asynchronic” evolution at the level of the law-economy relation which goes 
beyond the predictions of path dependence theory that only suggests the cases of true “strong-form path 
dependence”, in which sub-optimal legal forms persist in the face of external environmental change, will 
be rare. See Mark Roe, ‘Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics’ (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 
641.
43 See Gunther Teubner, ‘The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism’ (1992) 13 Cardozo Law 
Review 1443.
44 See E. Donald Elliott, ‘The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence’ (1985) 85 Columbia Law Review 
38; ‘Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?’ 41 St. Louis University Law Journal (1997) 595; and ‘The 
Tragi-Comedy of the Commons: Evolutionary Biology, Economics and Environmental Law’ (2001) 20 
Vermont Environmental Law Journal 17.
45 See Peter Stein, Legal Evolution: The Story o f  an Idea (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1980).
46 See generally Henry James Sumner Maine, Ancient Law  (John Murray, London 1894).
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subject who used Darwinian theory of natural selection to explain the maturation of 
legal concepts and selective survival of legal precedents.
The first well-known evolutionary legal thinking appeared in Henry Sumner 
Maine’s Ancient Law,49an enormously influential book written in 1861.50 In Maine’s 
view, it is the history that shed the light on the content of law, which always contains 
historical deposits of institutions, principles and distinctions.51 Like many 19th century 
intellectuals, he was preoccupied with the difference between ancient and modem 
societies. Maine attempted to lay out the difference between the legal conceptions found 
in “ancient communities” and those in a “modem” society. In support of his own 
patriarchal theory that an initial stage of kinship organisation must have been patrilineal, 
he cited Darwin’s Descent o f Man. Maine also intended the major legal themes in 
Ancient Law to identify the characteristic movement of “progressive societies” from the 
archaic condition to the modem one.53
The first several pages of Holmes’s The Common Law in 1881 also reflected an 
evolutionary legal thinking. Holmes’s major concern was the disjuncture between form 
and substance in the common law and the different speeds the two appeared to evolve. 
Holmes argued that legal forms or concepts tend to persist long after the justification for 
them has been lost, a process which he thought required “ingenious minds” to discover 
new rationales for their existence. Once a new ground of policy was found, “the rule 
adapts itself to the new reasons which have been found for it, and enters upon a new 
career. The old form receives a new content, and in time even the form modifies itself to 
fit the meaning which it has received”.54 Although Holmes wrote at a time when the
47 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, (first published in 1881, Courier Dover 
Publications, New York 1991); also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., ‘Law in Science and Science in Law’ 
(1899) 12 Harvard Law Review 433.
48 Arthur Corbin, ‘The Law and the Judges’ (1914) 3 Yale Law Review 234; Friedrich Kessler, ‘Arthur 
Linton Corbin’ (1969) 78 Yale Law Journal 571; E Donald Elliot, The Evolutionary Tradition in 
Jurisprudence, Ibid. 38; Michael S Fried, ‘The Evolution of Legal Concepts: the Memetic Perspective’
(1999) 39 Jurimetrics 291-316.
49 Maine’s other relevant books include Henry James Sumner Maine, Village Communities in the East 
and West (Henry Holt and Company, New York 1876), Early History o f  Institutions (John Murray, 
London 1890), On Early Law and Custom (John Murray, London 1890).
50 Maine’s theory recently caused many debates. Criticism of Maine’s theory began in 1950 when it was 
called into question by the anthropologist Robert Redfield. See Philippe Planel (tr), Norbert Rouland and 
Philippe Planel, Legal Anthropology (Stanford University Press, Los Altos Hills 1994) 228-9.
51 J.W. Harris, Legal Philosophies (2nd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997) 237.
52 To study Maine’s writings, we must recognise the time in which he lived. His Ancient Law  was written 
roughly more than a century after de Secondat, Charles, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit o f  the Laws, 2 
Vols (originally published anonymously in 1748; Crowder, Wark, and Payne, 1777), and only a few 
decades before the emergence of anthropology as a formal academic discipline.
53 They are from sentiment to contract as the basis of social cohesion; from family to territory as the basis 
o f the polity; from collective family property to private individual property; from tort to crime; from 
status to contract, from kinship to the individual as the basis of rights.
54 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, op cit. 8.
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nature of genetic processes of transmission was not fully understood, the process he 
described in The Common Law is not dissimilar to those aspects of the modem neo- 
Darwinian synthesis in its account of “blind” legal evolution occurring in an 
incremental, cumulative fashion as the result of selective inheritance. Nevertheless, 
Holmes’s work, like much of the early evolutionary thoughts about human society, 
shared in the flaws of social Darwinism which helped lead to an eclipse of such 
approaches.55
In the last several decades of the twentieth century, this line of thinking 
resurfaced based on memetics,56 along with the popularity of the “law and economics”
en c o
movement. Some have continued at the level of metaphor, and others have drawn on 
the complexity theory as well as evolution.59 Most recently, evolutionary terms such as 
the notions of autopoiesis60 and path dependence61 have merged as a new version.
Law is a fruitful field to test Darwinian evolutionary theory and the notion of 
memetics. This, however, is not a simple transplantation of theories from biological to 
social sciences. More precisely, there is a possibility of developing a genuinely cross-
fi)disciplinary exchange and synthesis of ideas. As a matter of fact, legal evolutionary 
theory also provides terminology to the biological evolution theory. For instance, the 
opportunistic adaptation of existing legal forms to new ends which Holmes highlighted
55 See Albert W. Alschuler, Law Without Values: The Life, Work, and Legacy o f  Justice Holmes 
(University o f Chicago Press, Chicago 2000). See generally Oliver R. Goodenough, ‘Biology, Behaviour 
and the Criminal Law: Seeking a Responsible Approach to an Inevitable Interchange’ (1997) 22 Vermont 
Law Review 263.
56 See Michael Fried, ‘The Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic Perspective’ (1999) 39 Jurimetrics 
291; Jeffrey E. Stake, ‘Are We Buyers or Hosts? A Memetic Approach to the First Amendment’ (2001) 
52 Ala. L. Rev. 1213; Sam Vermont, ‘Politics and Literature: New Perspective: Memes and the Evolution 
of Intellectual Dishonesty in Law’ (1998) 22 Legal Study Forum 655.
57 Among others, major contributions include Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis o f  Law  (Little 
Brown, Boston 1972); Paul Rubin, ‘Why Is the Common Law Efficient?’ (1977) 5 Journal of Legal 
Studies 51; and George L. Priest, ‘The Common Law Process and the Selection o f Efficient Rules’ (1977) 
6 Journal o f Legal Studies 65.
58 See William H. Rodgers, Jr., ‘Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: O f Pandas, Thumbs, 
Statutory Sleepers and Effective Law’ (1993) 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 25.
59 See J.B. Ruhl, ‘Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A 
Wake-up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modem Administrative State’ (1996) 45 Duke Law 
Journal 849; J.B. Ruhl, ‘The Fitness o f Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law 
and Society and its Practical Meaning for Democracy’ (1996) 49 Vanderbilt Law Review 1407; Thomas 
E. Geu, ‘Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of Law, Management Theory, and Law Related 
Services at the Millennium’ (1998) 65 Tenn. Law. Rev. 925.
60 Ruth Adler (tr), Gunther Teubner and Anne Bankowska, Law as an Autopoietic System (Blackwell, 
Oxford 1993).
61 Mark Roe, ‘Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics’ (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 641.
62 The widely adopted notions of bounded rationality and conventions, which were derived from the 
organisation theory and the economics of law, are often used by biologists to explain the persistence of 
behavioural traits and regularities.
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has parallels in the concept of “bricolage” which has entered into the biological 
literature from social anthropology.63
The ontological dimension concerns the status of legal norms, concepts, and 
processes as the objects of study and the nature of legal reality. A purely internal legal 
perspective does not offer a viable account of how norms operate in the social or 
economic realm.64 The law’s self-descriptive nature does not provide a secure 
foundation for a socio-legal understanding of how law and society inter-relate.65 The 
evolutionary approach sees social structures in general and legal systems in particular as 
“emergent” orders with distinctive evolutionary dynamics of self-reproduction and 
replication.66 It is the emergence that creates “a relationship between two features or 
aspects such that one arises out of the other and yet, while perhaps being capable of 
reacting back on it, remains causally and taxonomically irreducible to it”. The 
evolutionary theory offers us a means of studying law as emerging from the interactions 
of individual agents. Moreover, the pattern and path of legal change and development 
may be subject to evolutionary mechanisms which share elements in common with 
those governing biological evolution.
By way of example, legislation encodes information about solutions to 
coordination problems. The legislative process collects information through the 
processes of parliamentary debate, interest-group lobbying, and public investigation. 
Like litigation, it contains elements of spontaneous order and is subject to the selective 
process by which certain rules are taken up and persisted with while others are 
discarded. In addition, legal rules derived from the legislation change over time without 
necessarily being formally repealed, thanks to judicial interpretations of statutes and
63 “Bricolage” implies that the innovation in design, rather than involving the construction of a new model 
from scratch, tends to make use of structures or devices which lie immediately to hand. When a design 
feature is adapted from one use to another in this way, it remains embodied in the relevant structure long 
after its original function has disappeared. It is also possible that a design feature which is an essentially 
accidental by-product of an earlier adaptation finds a new use in a changed environment. See John 
Weightman and Doreen Weightman (trs), Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage M ind  (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago 1966). Also Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, Ibid. 225-6.
64 Attempts to describe law run the risk of imposing an inappropriate conceptual framework which denies 
the distinctive social reality o f legal phenomena.
65 Law’s self-description is o f interest in its own right, from both an internal, doctrinal and an external, 
sociological points o f view.
66 The evolutionary approach may push the theory to an extreme form of reductionism in which legal 
forms are seen as driven by a sub-individual unit, a “selfish meme”, and in which biological laws dictate 
the nature of social institutions.
67 See Tony Lawson, Economics and Reality (Routledge, London 1997) 63; see also Geoffrey Hodgson, 
‘Is social evolution Lamarckian or Darwinian?’ in John Laurent and John Nightingale (eds), Darwinism 
and Evolutionary Economics (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2001).
68 Memetic structures such as information, code, convention and culture cannot exist without human 
agency. The legal order represents more than the sum total o f these interactions. Once the legal order is 
established, it frames the conditions for the exercise of human agency, just as much as it is framed by 
them.
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codes. The widely-held misconception of the role of legislation among adherents of 
spontaneous order owes much to the belief that statutory rules are the product of 
conscious or planned intervention, while those of the common law derive from the 
“blind” interplay of litigation and adjudication. In both cases, the conscious human 
agency acts with the elements of evolution. Legislation, in many respects, provides a 
form of information retrieval which is more broadly-based and open to a plurality of 
influence than the judge-made law merely available through litigation.69
The evolutionary approach also sheds some light on the methodological 
implications. The approach is a functionalist one, a link between the function and form. 
The basic rule is that existing forms contain significant elements of adaptation to past 
environments. Like the genetic information, the memetic information encoded in 
memes is information of the structure-building which was adaptive in environments 
encountered by our ancestors. This may lead us not to easily adopt the optimality 
approach to observed institutions on the basis of their persistence. In the social 
institution context, the fitness or survival of the fittest only refers to the institution that 
has become “fitted” to the environment over time. In this sense, there may not be the
7ftbest available institution. It is not accurate to conclude that the existing form of social 
institution or legal rules is a near-complete norm and is fully functional in the current 
environment.71 A genealogical methodology requires a close inspection of the historical 
record, with the aim of reconstructing the line of descent of institutional forms from an 
examination of the circumstances of their origins. The reconstruction shows that the 
development of forms is dependent upon contingencies and chance configurations of 
events.72
69 A good example is the world-wide discussion of the use of land-mines and the proposed international 
treaty banning such weapons. The movement that launched this new rule of international law was surely 
innovative, and must have involved deliberate foresight, but the process by which such potential 
innovation was transformed into international practice was one of extended social selection, involving 
information companies, social organisations and coalition-building, conference bargaining and 
negotiation, and has been and will be followed by voting in national assemblies and, ultimately, in 
national selection (an election campaign is the paradigmatic social-political selection process)... The fact 
o f origin of such memes in individual or collective experience does not preclude the operation of social 
selection processes that ultimately add to, or subtract from, the world stock o f memes. See George 
Modelski, ‘An evolutionary theory o f culture?’ (1999) 3 Journal of Memetics -  Evolutionary Models of 
Information Transmission, available at http://jom-emit.cfiDm.org/1999/vol3/modelki_g.html.
70 As there is not a best available institution, once the effect of interaction between the institution and 
environment has been amplified, other paths may be closed off.
71 The existing forms have been inherited as a result o f past adaptations. These forms may possess 
functionality to survive, but unnecessarily have acquired the features which they newly obtained by way 
o f adaptations to current conditions.
72 As a matter o f fact, the study of cultural evolution is more likely to be more empirically orientated than 
their biological counterparts because “a fossil record o f cultural change exists for our species that puts the 
biological fossil record to shame”. See David Sloan Wilson, ‘The Challenge of Understanding
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Normative issues are related to this reconstruction issue. Selection can only 
work through the feedback mechanism between the code and system or environment. 
Horizontal and vertical transmissions exist in the social context or process. As the long 
tradition of comparative law illustrates, the legal models are often diffused by direct
7*^copying of concepts as well as the content of rules. This, however, does not undermine 
the basic observations that the vertical transmission of coded information through the 
legal system and the inheritance of the adaptive knowledge contained in the legal norms 
are subject to Darwinian theory. Also, the capacity of the code to assimilate new 
information is limited by the need to ensure a high consistency in the copying process. 
The relative stability and continuity of legal concepts suggest that legal evolution is out 
of synch with the process of social and economic change.
Memetic theory has been widely adopted in legal research. For instance, R. 
Williams reasons that the application of memetics and business offer potential 
explanations as to “why some theories take off and come to dominate in our culture for 
periods of time, perhaps even when there is a lack of empirical evidence to support 
them”.74 J. Frank applies memetics to financial markets by asking the question of “do 
markets evolve toward efficiency?” Based on the memetic theory, he reasoned that “if 
there are many possible competing financial memes and only a small percentage of 
those memes are economically sound, chances are that the most psychologically 
appealing memes are not the most economically sound”. 75 It has also been 
constructively diagnosed and claimed 76 that prevalent anti-takeover defence 
mechanisms that occur frequently in the commercial world such as “poison pills”, 
“lock-up” strategies, “pac man” defences, “supermajority” amendments, “scorched 
earth” strategies, “shark repellent” defences, are the results of the groupings of memes 
(or meme-plexus)77 which aid survival.78
The evolutionary theory has been adopted to rationalise the policy making 
process as well. The use of evolutionary theory to “mememise” the policy-making is
Complexity, Commentary on Laland et al: ‘Niche Construction’ (2000) 23 Behavioral and Brain Sciences 
165.
73 See Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British law, or How Unifying Law Ends Up in 
New Divergencies’ (1998) 61 Modem Law Review 11.
74 See Russell Williams, ‘The Business of Memes: Memetic Possibilities for Marketing and Management’
(2000) 38(4) Management Decisions 272-279. See also Betsy D. Gelb, ‘Creating “Memes” Whilst 
Creating Advertising’ (1997) 37(6) Journal of Advertising Research 57-9.
75 Joshua Frank, ‘Applying Memetics to Financial Markets: Do Markets Evolve Towards Efficiency’ 
(1999) 3(2) Journal of Memetics -  Evolutionary Models o f Information 87-99.
76 See Ed Vos and Ben Kelleher, ‘Mergers and takeovers: A Memetic Approach, (2001) 5(2) Journal of 
Memetics: Evolutionary Models of Information and Transmission 1-15.
77 See Susan Blackmore, The Meme Machine, op. cit.
78 This theory makes sense because the grouping of memes can decrease the chance of outside memetic 
attacks thus enhancing its replicative ability.
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based upon the understanding that the environment is exogenously determined and that 
existing forms must have adapted themselves efficiently too. The rationale of this view 
is that the relationship between the environment, system and code is not linear but 
cyclical.79 In other words, the environment is constituted by the presence of the systems 
within it, and coevolves with them. In the case of memetic or cultural evolution, this 
implies that there is a complex relationship among conscious attempts to shape or 
construct the environment, the selective pressures, and unpredicted and unintended 
outcomes. It also means to get away from a deterministic “meme’s eye view” of the 
world, in favour of a focus on the complex, multi-causal relations between the system 
and environment. In evolutionary biology, such idea is associated with the concept of 
niche construction, which “occurs when an organism modifies the functional 
relationship between itself and its environment by actively changing one or more of the 
factors in its environment, either by physically perturbing these factors at its current 
address, or by relocating to a different address, thereby exposing itself to different
o/\
factors”. In the legal debate, the development of techniques which seek consciously to 
shape the environmental framework, with the aim of inducing desired “second-order 
effects” on the part of social and economic actors. This so-called “reflexive law” has 
increasingly come to the fore in the context of economic regulation over the past 
decade.81 A technique which involves the legal rule “thinking about” the conditions for 
its own application marks an advance on more traditional “command and control” 
mechanisms. It would seem that in the social sphere, as in the biological one, 
“evolvability”, or the capacity of systems to co-evolve in line with their environment, is 
itself an emergent property. With the advent of reflexive law, the possibility arises that 
learning about evolution itself will become a property of the legal code.
4 . N e w  Y o r k  C o n v e n t io n  a n d  D a r w in ia n  E v o l u t io n a r y  T h e o r y  
To fit Darwinian theory into the New York Convention seems to be novel to most 
scholars and practitioners. The fundamental questions here are (i) whether the New 
York Convention itself has any inherent meme which may need Darwinian theory to 
interpret; and (ii) whether Darwinian theory truly provides a new perspective to study
79 See Richard Lewontin, ‘Gene, Organism and Environment’ in D.S. Bendall (ed) Evolution from  
Molecules to Men (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1983).
80 See Kevin Laland, John Odling-Smee and Marcus Feldman, ‘Authors’ Response: Niche Construction 
Earns Its Keep’ (2000) 23 Behavioral and Brain Sciences 166.
81 See Ralf Rogowski and Ton Wilthagen (eds), Reflexive Labour Law  (Deventer, the Netherlands 1994); 
Julia Black, Rules and Regulators (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1998); Simon Deakin and Alan 
Hughes, Economic Efficiency and the Procedualisation of Company Law (1999) 3 Company, Financial 
and Insolvency Law Review 169.
34
the New York Convention more convincingly or, in a broad sense, the international 
commercial arbitration. This section explores the answers to such questions.
The answer to the first question involves a philosophical concern of separation 
of litigation and arbitration, and historical discussion of the New York Convention or, in 
a wider sense, the international commercial arbitration. The historical review of the 
development of international commercial arbitration may illustrate the core meme of 
arbitration. A recurring question in jurisprudence -  and, indeed, much of philosophy 
concerns the separation of litigation and arbitration. This distinction in all likelihood 
reflects different processing pathways in human history. The distinction may also reflect 
different transmission pathways at the cultural level. Our arbitration picture may be 
formed through direct observation and through stories, while litigation may be explicitly 
more formulaic, language based rules. One of the strengths of the common law system 
may be a cross-fertilisation between these two normative streams.
4.1 The Origin o f Arbitration and Core Memetic Code
Many social sciences involve historical patterns and therefore are revealed and 
explained in narratives. Law including arbitration is also a historical narrative. 
Arbitration arises not only in history82 but also in mythology.83 Arbitration is not a 
feature of modem age even though only in the modem age has it been officially 
recognised and codified.84
It is usually thought that the origins of contemporary private arbitration lie in 
mediaeval Western Europe.85 In its origins, the concept of arbitration as a method of 
resolving disputes was a simple one:
82 It is said that arbitration was established in some of the most refined system o f law ever almost three 
thousands years ago, which shows that arbitration has accompanied mankind along its history.
83 In the classic literature, the Greek myth of the golden apple, a golden apple was found by the three 
goddesses Aphrodite, Hera and Athena. The apple was labelled ‘to the most beautiful’. Each goddesses 
claimed the precious prize (out of vanity and not because they were interested in the intrinsic value o f the 
golden object). The dispute as to whom the golden apple should be awarded could not be decided by Zeus 
whose wife is Hera. In order to maintain independence and neutrality, the dispute was referred to Paris, a 
young shepherd believed to have great appreciation of beauty. Paris made a choice in favour of Aphrodite.
4 The Jay Treaty of 1794, promoted by the United States to resolve boundary and compensation issues, 
gave birth to the modem method o f public arbitration. The landmark commissions that the treaty 
established to deal with the north eastern boundary of the United States with Canada, compensation for 
American citizens during the pre-Napoleonic wars, are an important precedent for dispute settlement 
without resorting to war. It is said that public arbitration existed in North Italy in the 12th and 13th 
centuries, cited in Derek Roebuck, ‘Sources for the History o f Arbitration -  A Bibliographical 
Introduction’ (1998) 14(3) Arbitration International 270.
85 Michael Mustill, “Is It a B ird...” at 209 of Liber Amicorum Claude Reymond, Editions du Juris- 
Classeur, Paris (2004). The history of public arbitration can be traced back to the ancient Greece. S.L. 
Ager, ‘Interstate Arbitrations in the Greek World 337-90 BC’ cited by Derek Roebuck, ‘Sources for the 
History of Arbitration -  A Bibliographical Introduction’ (1998) 14(3) Arbitration International 237, 243.
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“The practice of arbitration... comes... naturally to primitive bodies of law; and 
after courts have been established by the state and a recourse to them has become 
the natural method of settling disputes, the practice continues because the parties 
to a dispute want to settle it with less formality and expense than is involved in a 
recourse to the courts”.86
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, at the time of its first Arbitration 
Act, the word “arbitration” had recently come to have the meaning it still has in the 
Dictionary:
“the settlement of a dispute or question at issue by one to whom the conflicting 
parties agree to refer their claims in order to obtain an equitable decision”.
The first citation under this meaning (from 1634) confirms this concept of an
0*7
informal proceeding “to mediate in a friendly manner in a way of arbitration”. The 
German word for “arbitrator” is “Schiedsrichter”, which is the same word as a referee, 
umpire or judge in a sporting contest. The standard wording for many international 
arbitration clauses still uses the word “settle” rather than “determine”. What all these 
definitions had in common, then, was a quick and less expensive, but nonetheless final, 
disposal of disputes pursuant to a voluntary submission. These objectives contained in 
the definitions have failed over time to provide the desired means of dispute resolution, 
at least in the sense that we are still trying today to solve the same problems of delay 
and cost.
Two thousand years ago, Confucius was advocating ADR over litigation. A
good public judicial service could become the victim of its own success by increasing
the burden on the state. This thought reflects the Chinese greater concern for order in
the community than for individual rights88 and no doubt at the forefront of the mind of
the 18th century Chinese Emperor Kang Xi when he issued the following decree:
“The Emperor, considering the immense population of the empire, the great 
division of territorial property and the notoriously litigious character of the 
Chinese, is of the opinion that lawsuits would tend to increase to a frightful extent 
if people were not afraid of the tribunals and if they felt confident of always 
finding in them ready and perfect justice... I desire, therefore, that those who have 
recourse to the courts should be treated without any pity and in such a manner that 
they shall be disgusted with law and tremble to appear before a magistrate. In this 
manner... the good citizens who may have difficulties among themselves will 
settle them like brothers by referring them to the arbitration of some old man or
86 William Searle Holdsworth et. al., A History o f  English Law  (Methuen, MA 1964) Vol.XIV, 187.
87 The word “arbitration” first came into the language with Chaucer in about 1386 with the now obsolete 
meaning: “a deciding according to one’s will or pleasure; uncontrolled or absolute decision”. This 
meaning persists in the word “arbitrary”.
88 Derek Roebuck, ‘Sources for the History of Arbitration -  A Bibliographical Introduction’ (1998) 14(3) 
Arbitration International 237, 256.
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the mayor of the commune. As for those who are troublesome, obstinate or
QQ
quarrelsome, let them be ruined in the law courts”.
Arbitration was common in medieval England and was important in municipal
life.90 Arbitration was used as a means of dealing with the most important and
intractable dispute of the time.91 During the period between 16th and 18th centuries,
arbitration appeared at every level of society and in a wide range of matters. More
salutary still is to consider that arbitration has been conceived as means of replacing
litigation as an expeditious and fair means of dispute resolution for an equally long time.
Mr Manson’s City of London Chamber of Arbitration was to be:
“... expeditious where the law is slow, cheap where the law is costly, simple 
where the law is technical, a peacemaker instead of a stirrer up of strife... there is 
really no reason why they should not be attained under a summary system of 
rough-and-ready arbitration.. .”93
The key here is that a dispute among people belonging to a well-defined 
community being referred to an independent person in possession of special expertise 
on the subject matter. It was rightly observed that “arbitration ... was not primarily to 
ensure the rule of law but rather to maintain harmony between persons who were 
destined to live together”.94 On the one hand, the modem arbitral process has become 
more complex, legalistic, and institutionalised. This line of development shows the trait 
of evolution. Most of the characteristics present in the early age still exist in today’s 
arbitration. Impartiality, independence and great skills of the arbitrator in a particular 
industry are now accompanied by the speed, confidentiality, flexibility and easier 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. More particularly, the parties to the 
dispute grant power to arbitrators or an arbitral panel instead of a court. As we have 
seen from reviewing the origin of arbitration, although the content of legal rules in 
different places may shift considerably from one period to another, there is a 
surprisingly high degree of conceptual continuity. This simple survey from the 
dictionary to Confucius teaching and from the City of London to Far East China 
demonstrates some core memetic codes in arbitration in a historical context. The 
conceptual substance of a legal term maintains a continuing presence while the form of
89 Frank Johnson Goodnow, ‘The Geography of China: The Influence of Physical Environment on the 
History and Character o f the Chinese People’ (1927) 51 National Geographic Magazine 661-62.
90 Holdsworth and Attreed’s writings, cited in Derek Roebuck, ‘Sources for the History of Arbitration -  A 
Bibliographical Introduction’ (1998) 14(3) Arbitration International 237, 259.
91 Rawcliffe’s writings, Ibid. 260.
92 Writings of Burdick and Comish as well as Guy, Ibid. 261.
93 The City of London Chamber o f Arbitration (1893) 9 LQR 86
94 Rene David, Arbitration in International Trade (Kluwer Law & Taxation, Deventer 1985) 29.
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the rules themselves has in many cases been completely transformed. This seems 
consistent with Darwinian legal theory.
Power is a cultivator through which thought contagion breeds, evidenced by 
various ideas that spread in a society by those that hold power, reverberating the notion 
of memetic transfer. “Memes are ideas that propagate themselves around the world by 
jumping from brain to brain, memes are stored in human brains and passed on by 
imitation, individuals learn from society by imitation instruction. Ultimately, human life 
is permeated through with memes and their consequences”.95 Historically speaking, 
arbitration can be used as an example of thought contagion (memetic transference), with 
large groups sharing beliefs in alternative dispute resolution. In the past, arbitration that 
promoted dispute resolution was successful because it affected more people to adopt the 
faith from their own experience. This example draws resemblance from the memetic 
advantages of arbitration activity, with faiths very much likened to business ideas and 
practices, both of which are spread by one person copying another, creating large 
fellowship and beliefs.
As discussed, the way that we see and understand the world is guided by thought 
contagion (or the replication of memes). Certain characteristics enable thoughts or ideas 
to enhance their replicative ability. As Dawkins pointed out, the criterion for a 
successful replicator, in the sense that they create multiple duplicates, consists of three 
elements: fidelity, fecundity and longevity.96 When examining arbitration on this three 
factor success scale, the theme remains that the greater market strength places 
arbitrators in a position where they are further able to supply the market with their ideas. 
Logically, arbitration allows this to happen as they have the enhanced power and 
distribution channels to make a vast number of exact copies (fidelity and fecundity), 
with the pooled research, design and marketing capabilities to defend against 
competitors and ensure continued expression (longevity).
Clarifying the relationship of thought contagion and power, arbitration can be 
regarded as a type of activity in which the judicial power is transferred, where the 
arbitrators hold the power and in turn memetic transference ensures that the story is 
replicated. In a biological term, Mokyr states that “the environment into which seeds are
07sown is of course the main determinant of whether they will sprout”. Whether or not 
comparisons between evolution and cultural or legal progress are valuable has been the
95 See Susan Blackmore, The Meme Machine, op. cit. 6.
96 See Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (2nd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 1989).
97 See Joel Mokyr, The Lever o f  Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress (Oxford 
University Press, US 1990) 299.
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focus of a substantial and spirited debate in the literature. As Mokyr said, the parallels 
are inevitably incomplete and do not provide the researcher with sharp analytical 
conclusions.98 Arbitration with power has the stronger ability to dictate the flow of 
information and resources ultimately shaping the services, systems and ideas that the 
arbitration maintains.
The power of history to shape the direction of evolution is also captured by the 
theory of “path dependence” which derives from new institutional economics. This 
stresses the sense in which structural features of an “exapted” technology or practice 
may be “locked in” by the high costs of switching to what appears to be a more efficient 
or effective alternative.99 The widespread and unavoidable practice of providing after- 
the-event rationalisation to doctrinal innovations often obscures the historical process 
by which they were formed. A “genealogical” analysis, by revealing this process, can 
shed some light not only on the inherited constraints, but also on the capabilities, of 
legal concepts. An analysis of the origins of the concept of arbitration indicates what is 
possible from this kind of methodology.
4.2 The Hostility towards Arbitration by Courts in Common Law Jurisdictions 
By way of an example, the legal continuity and inheritance can be found in the hostile 
attitudes of the courts towards arbitration in most common law jurisdictions.100 The 
perspective from which we can understand these narratives is what we can call the 
intentional stance: the strategy of analysing the flux of events into agents and their 
rational actions and reactions.
Arbitration has been recognised as a viable dispute resolution mechanism in the 
mercantile community since the 17th century. 101 The Civil Procedure Act 1833 
modernised the procedures for enforcing awards and authorised arbitrators to take 
sworn statements from the parties, at a time when they were not admissible in the 
common law courts. The Common Law Procedure Act 1854 improved the procedure
98 Ibid at 275.
99 See Paul David, ‘Clio and Economics of QWERTY’ (1985) 75 American Economic Review  332; Brian 
Arthur, ‘Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events’ (1989) 99 
Economic Journal 116; Douglass Cecil North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic 
Performance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990); Mark Roe, ‘Chaos and Evolution in Law 
and Economics’ op. cit.
100 The study revealed that the civil law countries were also hostile to arbitration as being “too primitive” 
a form of justice. In France, for instance, arbitration was described as an “apparently rudimentary method 
of settling disputes”. See Fouchard, L ’Arbitrage Commercial International (1965) at 1-31.
101 See Statute 9 & 10 William III c 15, discussed in Michael J. Mustill and Steward C. Boyd, Law and 
Practice o f  Commercial Arbitration in England (2nd edn Butterworths, London 1989) 432. Also see 
Robert B. Ferguson, ‘The Adjudication of Commercial Disputes and the Legal System in Modem 
England’ (1980) 7 British Journal of Law and Society 141-57.
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whereby a submission was made a rule of court. However, courts, as the agent through 
their actions and reactions, did not give full recognition to this consensual form of
109dispute resolution based on party autonomy until very recently in England. Such 
agents -  courts, in our case -  do things for reasons, and can be predicted up to a point 
by cataloguing their reasons, beliefs and desires, and calculating what would be the 
most rational course of action. For instance, the relatively recent growing importance 
and increased recognition of arbitration can contribute to more realistic considerations 
such as efficiency and cost effectiveness which the courts are seeking at a certain point.
Until well into the 20th Century, US courts were hostile towards arbitration.103 
Like English courts, American judges refused to grant specific enforcement of 
arbitration agreements, and permitted their revocation at any time. This grudging 
approach towards arbitration agreements reflected a variety of factors, including the 
concern about private agreements “ousting” the courts of jurisdiction, scepticism about 
the adequacy and fairness of the arbitral process, and suspicions that arbitration 
agreements were often the product of unequal bargaining power. The parties to disputes 
in the US courts concerning an international arbitration are often confronted with a 
procedural and substantive mase of applicable laws that is some distance away from the 
often-repeated promise that international arbitration provides a simple, efficient and 
predictable dispute-resolution mechanism.104
Historically, Canada adopted a more hostile stance towards arbitration than 
England. For instance, most provincial courts exercised broad latitude in refusing to 
stay court proceedings or enforce arbitral awards even in the presence of ex ante 
agreements to arbitrate. UK courts generally refuse to compel proceedings or enforce 
awards only in egregious cases such as arbitrator’s misconduct or unconscionability.
102 See the leading decision in Scott v Avery (1856) 5 HL Cas 811 which upheld a clause making it a 
condition precedent to any litigation that arbitral proceedings be first instituted to resolve any dispute, and 
no right of action should arise until after an award had been made. Recent scholarship shows that there 
was a continuous working relationship between judges and arbitrators in the medieval period. Derek 
Roebuck, ‘Sources for the History of Arbitration -  A Bibliographical Introduction’ (1998) 14(3) 
Arbitration International 260.
103 By the 20th century, the US’ willingness to allow an impartial third party outside of its jurisdiction to 
settle its international disputes began to wane. The United States never joined the League o f Nations that 
arose out of World War I; it did join the United Nations that grew out o f World War II, but at least twice 
the US Congress restricted conditions that would allow US participation in cases before the UN’s 
International Court of Justice.
104 The young and weak United States during the 19th century was generally willing to mediate 
international disputes rather than go to war over them. For example, the United States and Britain nearly 
went to war over the case o f the British-built Confederate battleship Alabama. They avoided war through 
the agreement to an arbitrated claims settlement in which Britain paid $50 million in gold to the United 
States. The blank spot on that shining record of the 19th century came when the United States confirmed 
the Monroe Doctrine, which drew an American boundary around the Americas, and the US Senate 
claimed the right to oppose arbitration to settle international disputes.
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Canadian courts have refused to compel arbitration in far less egregious circumstances. 
Before Canada enacted arbitration legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law in 
1986, Canadian arbitration law largely adopted the 19th century English doctrines and 
rendered the arbitration process unattractive to disputants even though it in principle 
allows arbitration in almost all contexts.105
A brief comparison between English and Australian laws illustrates a historical 
link between common law jurisdictions. The commercial arbitration legislation of 
Australian States has been modelled on the successive Arbitration Acts of the UK. In 
1979, following the demands by the commercial community, the UK Commercial Court 
Committee recommended for the reaching reform which was implemented by the 
Arbitration Act 1979 (UK). The 1979 UK Act replaced all pre-existing remedies against 
arbitral awards with two means of recourse, namely, an appeal to the High Court against 
an award and an application to the High Court with respect to questions arising in the 
course of arbitral proceedings. This reform was intended to drastically curb the number 
of arbitrations which end up in a court, a factor which the business community once 
feared making London arbitration less attractive. The provisions of this Act were copied 
into the Australian statutes such as ss 38 and 39 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 
1984 until that Act was amended in 1990. The Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 retains 
the remedy of setting-aside which is limited to the grounds of misconduct of the arbitral 
tribunal, misconduct of the arbitral proceedings or the improper procurement of the 
arbitration agreement or the award.106 The court’s power to remit matters also survives 
in a very restricted form in s 43. Indeed, even a prima facie mistake of fact or law does 
not constitute sufficient grounds for judicial intervention. The 1979 UK Act was later 
superseded by the Arbitration Act 1996.107 Australia has also been undergoing a 
complete transition by leaving behind its ties to the 19th century common law tradition 
on arbitration.108
The traditional model used by historians and anthropologists to explain the 
cultural evolution uses the intentional stance as its explanatory framework. These 
theorists regard culture as composed of goods, possessions of people. Accordingly, 
people preserve their traditions of justice and trade cultural items as they trade other
105 John J. Kerr, Jr., ‘Arbitrability of Securities Law Claims in Common Law Nations’ (1996) 12(2) 
Arbitration International 176-77.
106 Sec 22 of the Arbitration Act 1950 (UK).
107 The 1996 Act consolidates all the previous Acts and was meant to simplify the law of arbitration in the 
UK and to further limit the powers of courts to intervene in arbitral proceedings or outcomes. Peter 
Gillies and Gabriel Moens, International Trade and Business: Law, Policy and Ethics (Cavendish 
Publishing Pty Limited: Australia 1998) 747.
108 John J. Kerr, Jr., ‘Arbitrability of Securities Law Claims in Common Law Nations’ op. cit. 178.
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goods. It is clear from this perspective in our context that there will be a competitive 
market where agents both “buy” and “sell” legal wares. If a method of dealing with 
arbitration sweeps through the common law jurisdictions, it may be because courts 
perceive advantages to such novelties. This perspective is typical Richard Dawkins’s 
meme’s-eye point of view which recognises the possibility that cultural or legal entities 
may evolve according to selectional regimes. Due to the common law tradition, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the “hostile” memetic code was inherited (or more precisely, 
spread) from one jurisdiction to the other providing that the basic legal tradition is 
compatible in these jurisdictions.
The hostile attitudes of the courts towards arbitration exist in most developing 
countries for various reasons. In Latin America, for example, the long-standing policy 
such as the Calvo doctrine would render an arbitration clause not enforceable, which 
was a natural reaction to the “gunboat diplomacy” that was prevalent in the Western 
Hemisphere for many decades.109 The anti-arbitration policy in Latin America was 
enhanced by a variety of obstacles such as a broad range of grounds for attacking the 
validity of an arbitral award, non-acceptance of the competence-competence doctrine, 
the imposition of rigid formalities on the arbitral process including the prohibition of 
non-nationals from serving as arbitrators.110 In the Middle East,111 due to the lack of 
clear arbitration rules in the Koran, some countries do not have detailed and codified
119arbitration laws. Although the hostility towards arbitration in these countries may be 
caused by different ideological reasons, the hostile memetic code does exist. There has 
been a perception that international commercial arbitration was developed by, and was 
biased in favour of, Western commercial interests, and is loaded with traps for the 
unwary. The underlying rationale behind the hostility is a distrust in the impartiality of 
Western judicial systems, and the fear that arbitration would be prejudiced against 
national interests. There certainly is an exception to this general perception. For instance, 
some Arab legislation on international arbitration is more advanced than the New York 
Convention in that they made enforcement of foreign arbitral awards even easier. This is 
the case in Lebanon and Algeria whose international arbitration acts were strongly
109 Robert Layton, ‘Changing Attitudes Toward Dispute Resolution in Latin America’ (1993) 10(2) 
Journal o f International Arbitration 123, 125.
110 Houston Putnam Lowry, ‘The United States Joins the Inter-American Arbitration Convention’ (1990) 
7(3) Journal of International Arbitration 83-5.
111 This geographic description usually includes Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Some of these countries can be categorised as Arab 
countries. Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, ‘Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the Arab Countries’ (1995) 11(2) 
Arbitration International 230.
112 Samir Saleh, Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2006) 20.
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influenced by French law in this field.113 These phenomena illustrate that the memetic 
code can not only be inherited vertically (from one generation to the other) but also 
spread horizontally (in the same generation but in various species) in the legal sphere. 
From the perspective of mutation, the exceptional case made by Lebanon and Algeria 
can be regarded as an “error” in the copying process. Such variation is the consequence 
of the random mutations in the genetic code. In general, this hostility has waned 
somewhat over the past decade, with many states acceding to the New York Convention 
and enacting “pro-arbitration” legislation.
What is to account for the conceptual continuity of this kind? It appears that the 
mechanism of inheritance is the legal system’s self-imposed rule of internal conceptual 
order, which requires new legal norms to refer back to the already-known conceptual 
forms. The conceptual content of the norm endows it with legitimacy in the context of 
the “self-referential” operation of the legal order. There are many illustrations of this 
principle of legal consistency, the most obvious being the rules of precedent which 
confine the scope of legitimate judicial interpretations, and which are monitored, 
modified and enforced by the appellate courts. It is precisely such principles that similar 
cases should be decided alike, and that ensure faithful copying most of the time, while 
also allowing certain scope for variations to emerge in response to novel factual 
situations.
4.3 Long Journey to the New York Convention
Yet no state can stand back and be willing to allow a system of private justice, which 
largely depends on the goodwill of the participants to regulate commercial activities. 
The sovereignty reason would at some stage force the national state to step in and 
regulate arbitration.
The first English Statute was the Arbitration Act of 1698 although in Vyniors (8. 
Co. 80a, 81b) the Court ordered the defendant to pay the agreed penalty for refusing to 
submit to arbitration as he had agreed to do. In France, an Edict of Francis II 
promulgated in August 1560 made arbitration compulsory for all merchants in disputes 
arising from their commercial activities. During the French Revolution, arbitration came 
back into favour as “the most reasonable device for the termination of disputes arising 
between citizens”.114 The right to arbitration was guaranteed by the French Constitution
113 Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, ‘Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the Arab Countries’ op. cit. 169, 175.
1,4 Rene David, Arbitration in International Trade, op. cit. 89-90.
43
of 1792.115 The French Code of Civil Procedure in 1806 turned arbitration into the first 
stage of a procedure which would lead to the judgment of a court.116
International commercial arbitration does not stay within national boundaries. 
The national law of one state alone could not deal with all problems arising from cross­
boarder arbitration. What the international community needed was an international 
treaty or convention which would link national laws together and provide a uniform 
solution on arbitration. The development of international conventions is “the most 
effective method of creating an international system of law governing international 
commercial arbitration”.117 In the long journey of arbitration through the history of 
mankind, the New York Convention stands as a landmark between the ancient and 
modem world. Thanks to the New York Convention, arbitration has overcome the 
uncertainty of the past.118 The New York Convention obliges member states to 
recognise and enforce both international commercial arbitration agreements and awards, 
subject to limited exceptions. Prior to the New York Convention, intergovernmental 
efforts to unify arbitration law began under the League of Nations, which produced two 
Geneva treaties after World War I.119 They removed a number of obstacles then facing 
international arbitration,120 and provided conditions governing the enforcement of 
arbitral awards. These two treaties remain of some relevance as they led the 
international community to undertake a formal appraisal of common values in 
arbitration later on.
The Geneva Protocol o f 1923
The Geneva Protocol of 1923 on Arbitration Clauses in Commercial Matters was the 
first modem and genuinely international treaty, which was drawn up by the ICC under 
the auspices of the League of Nations, entered into force on 28 July 1924. Thirty-three 
countries ratified or acceded to the Protocol.121 Although the Protocol is brief, with
115 Derek Roebuck, ‘Sources for the History of Arbitration -  A Bibliographical Introduction’ op. cit. 267.
116 In 1791, the judges were abolished and replaced by “public arbitrators”.
117 Alan Redfem and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit. 
64.
1,8 See Domenico Di Pietro and Martin Platte (eds), Enforcement o f  International Arbitration Awards - 
The New York Convention o f  1958 (Cameron May Limited, Ltd., International Law Publishers, London 
2001) 13.
119 In modern times, the first was the Montevideo Convention, the Treaty concerning the Union of South 
American States in respect of Procedural Law, signed at Montevideo on 11 January 1889. It was made 
and provided for the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements between certain Latin 
American States. See Register o f  Texts o f  Conventions and other Instruments concerning International 
Trade Law  Vol II (United Nations, New York 1973).
120 See Giorgio Balladore Pallieri, L'arbitrage prive dans les rapports internationaux, in Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, Vol 51 (1935-1) 291.
121 It also applied to those former dependent territories to which it had been extended.
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merely four articles covering the validity and effect of arbitration clauses, it had a
1 99decisive impact on the future of arbitration throughout the world. In France, the 
signing of the Protocol promoted the legislature to make arbitration clauses valid in 
commercial transactions.123
The Protocol’s main objective was to ensure the international enforcement of 
arbitration agreements. It laid a foundation for the worldwide development of 
international arbitration, which is dependent on the effectiveness of arbitration 
agreements in international contracts. The Protocol’s subsidiary objective was to ensure 
that arbitral awards made pursuant to such arbitration agreements would be enforced in 
the territory of the states in which they were made. The Protocol’s approach to 
differentiate between the enforceability of arbitration agreements and awards124 was 
inherited by the New York Convention.
The Geneva Protocol is certainly limited in its range and effect even though 
some terms can be found in the New York Convention. For instance, it was intended to 
apply to submission agreements and arbitration clauses concluded “between parties 
subject respectively to the jurisdiction of different contracting states”, whether by their 
nationality, domicile, registered office or principal place of business, and hence to 
proceedings and awards resulting from such agreements.125 It also left the parties free to 
determine the arbitral procedure126 and obliged states and national courts to ensure that 
arbitration agreements127 and the resulting awards128 could be enforced.
From a technical viewpoint, of all these states, only Albania, Brazil, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, the Gambia, Guyana, Iraq, Jamaica, Malta, Myanmar 
(formerly Burma), Pakistan and Zambia have yet to accede to the New York 
Convention. In their relations with each other and with other countries bound by both 
the Protocol and the New York Convention, they remain bound by the terms of the
190Protocol. This effectively means that the Protocol, as the role and function of a 
disappearing “specie” in the legal evolutionary process may not have disappeared
122 Philippe Fouchard, Emmanuel Gaillard and Berthold Goldman, International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law International, the Netherlands 1999) 121.
123 Article 631 (last paragraph) o f the Commercial Code (Law of Dec 31 1925)
124 The former were to be recognised and enforced internationally, the latter however only in the state 
where the award was made.
125 On ratifying or acceding to the Protocol, many countries implemented the “commercial reservation” 
provided for in Art 1, para 2, whereby “each contracting state reserves the right to limit the obligation 
mentioned above to contracts which are considered as commercial under its national law”.
126 See Article 2.
127 See Article 4.
128 See Article 3.
129 See the New York Convention Art VII(2). Philippe Fouchard, Emmanuel Gaillard and Berthold 
Goldman, International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit. 120. It is said that “two forerunners are no 
longer relevant, except in relations between countries which are not bound by the New York Convention”.
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entirely even though it has been out of the scene and has been replaced by a new 
generation of “specie” for a while.
The Geneva Convention o f 1927
The Geneva Protocol of 1923 was soon superseded by the Geneva Convention of 1927 
on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards that came into force on 25 July 1929.130 
The scope of the 1927 Geneva Convention is on the basis of that of the 1923 Protocol, 
with certain unsatisfactory restrictions.131 This seems consistent with our idea that the 
development of a new generation meme is based on the old generation’s. On the other 
hand, the aim of the Geneva Convention of 1927 was to widen the scope of the 1923 
Protocol and to provide for international enforceability of the Protocol awards within 
the territory of contracting states (and not merely within the territory of the state in 
which the award was made). In this sense, the 1927 Geneva Convention moves one step 
further. Moreover, the states which have adhered to the 1927 Geneva Convention are 
mostly those states which adhered to the Geneva Protocol with some notable omissions
1 39such as Brazil, Norway and Poland. From this perspective, the core memetic code of 
extending the enforceability of arbitration awards is inherited from the 1923 Protocol to 
the 1927 Convention.
The 1927 Convention contains uniform conditions for the recognition and 
enforcement of “foreign” arbitral awards, and excludes any review of the merits of the 
award. Some of the terms in the 1927 Convention are presented in the form of 
substantive rules which constitute universal conditions governing the international 
validity of awards. These include the parties’ right to a fair hearing and the respect of 
the limits of the arbitrator’s brief. Unfortunately, these conditions are expressed in 
obscure and restrictive terms.133 Some problems still remain unsolved in the 1927
130 It has been ratified or acceded to by 27 countries, and also applied to countries to which, as former 
dependent territories, the Convention had been extended. For a text o f the Convention as well as a table of 
member States, see www.asser.nl/ica/eur.htm.
131 The Protocol only applies to awards made “in the territories o f any high contracting party... between 
persons who are subject to the jurisdiction of one of the high contracting parties”.
132 Alan Redfem and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit. 
67 note 55. Similarly, of all these states, only the Democratic Republic o f Congo, Guyana, Jamaica, Malta, 
Myanmar (formerly Burma), Pakistan and Zambia have yet to accede to the New York Convention. In 
their relations with each other and with other countries bound by both the 1927 Protocol and the New 
York Convention, they remain bound by the terms of the 1927 Protocol (the New York Convention Art 
VII(2)). Philippe Fouchard, Emmanuel Gaillard and Berthold Goldman, International Commercial 
Arbitration, op. cit. 120.
133 See Articles 1 to 4. Assessing the validity of the various stages of arbitration involves the reference to 
a number o f national legal systems, and the courts in the host country can only grant enforcement if it has 
been established that the award is “final” in its country of origin. In practice, this amounts to requiring 
two enforcement orders.
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Convention. It has the disadvantage of confining the scope of the 1927 Convention to 
awards made in a contracting state and, in particular, to awards between the parties both 
of which are contracting states. The conditions of location and nationality hardly 
represent a realistic approach to international commercial arbitration. A party seeking 
enforcement had to prove the conditions necessary for enforcement. Another problem of 
the 1927 Convention was the so-called “double exequatur” requirement. The successful 
party in arbitration, prior to commencing enforcement of an award in the courts of the 
place of enforcement, needs to show that the award had become final in the country of 
origin by seeking a declaration in the courts of the country where the arbitration took 
place to the effect that the award was enforceable in that country. The Convention also 
imposes the requirement that the award shall not be contrary to “the principles of the 
law of the country in which it is sought to be relied upon” also posed problems. This 
requirement suggests that an award be open to attack not only on the grounds of public 
policy but also on the grounds that it offended the legal principles of the forum state. 
These problems are part of the target issues in the 1958 New York Convention. The 
double exequatur problem was later dealt with by the draftsmen of the New York 
Convention in Article V, and the “principles of the law of the country in which it is 
sought to be relied upon” was not carried through to the New York Convention. Overall, 
the Geneva Protocol of 1923 and Geneva Convention of 1927 were unsuccessful and 
failed to attract much support outside Europe due to their limitation in aim and 
objective.134 However, theoretically, they should have had a well-deserved place in the 
history of international commercial arbitration as they represented an early generation 
of effort on the road towards harmonisation of commercial arbitration.
The New York Convention o f 1958
The ICC proposed a “Draft Convention” governing international commercial arbitration 
in 1953.135 The proposal was taken up by the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council but its panel of experts produced a second draft which was more conservative 
than the ICC text.136 An international conference was then held in New York beginning 
on May 20, 1958 under the UN banner. The text adopted on June 10, 1958 was
134 Rene David and Andre Tunc, ‘The International Unification of Private Law’ in Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr 
(Paul Siebeck) (ed), International Encyclopedia o f  Comparative Law. Volume II, The Legal System o f  the 
World; Their Comparison and Unification (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, Boston and London 
1972) 130-3.
135 ICC, Enforcement o f  International Arbitral Awards -  Report and Preliminary Draft Convention (ICC 
Publication No. 174 1953), reprinted in (1998) 9(1) ICC Bulletin 32.
136 Ibid.
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considerably more liberal than that put forward by the panel of experts and came closer
to the ideas, if not to the wording, of the ICC text.137
The New York Convention is “perhaps ... the most effective instance of
1international legislation in the entire history of commercial law” and the most 
important international treaty relating to international commercial arbitration. It can be 
regarded as a major driving force in developing arbitration as a means of resolving 
international commercial disputes in the modem world. The New York Convention has 
been ratified by more than 142 states, including all major trading nations.139 A 
resounding success came gradually because it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that a 
number of key countries ratified the Convention: the US in 1970, the UK in 1975, 
Canada in 1986, China in 1987, and in the late 1980s and 1990s ,more developing 
countries ratified the Convention: Algeria and Argentina in 1989, Saudi Arabia in 1994, 
Venezuela and Vietnam in 1995, Lebanon in 1998, Brazil in 2002, Pakistan in 2005 and 
United Arab Emirates in 2006. Among others, the accession of Argentina, Brazil, Saudi 
Arabia, Venezuela and Vietnam are particularly significant, as those signatory countries 
have traditionally, for various political or legal reasons, been hostile towards 
international arbitration.140 The number of member states is so great that it is now easier 
to point out a few “conspicuous absences”. There are no longer any in the world. In this 
sense, the Convention in substance has become the universal instrument that its 
proponents intended it to be.
The New York Convention is a considerable improvement compared to the 
Geneva Protocol of 1923 and the Geneva Convention of 1927. One feature of the New 
York Convention is its recognition of the parties’ freedom in the constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal and the determination of arbitral procedure. These two aspects need 
only be “in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, ... 
[and] the law of the country where the arbitration took place”.141 This reflects the 
primacy of party autonomy in the Convention and the purely subsidiary role of national 
law which, unless the parties have stipulated otherwise, will be that of the seat of
137 On the legislative history o f the Convention, see United Nations Economic and Social Council Docs. 
E/Conf. 26/2 to E/Conf.26/7 and E/Conf.26/SR.l to E/Conf.26/SR.24, reprinted in G. Gaja (ed), 
International Commercial Arbitration -  New York Convention -  Part III -  Preparatory Works (1978), 
cited in Katherine Lynch, The Forces o f  Economic Globalization: Challenges to the Regime o f  
International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, the Netherlands 2003) 130 note 21.
138 Michael Mustill, ‘Arbitration: History and Background’ (1989) 6 Journal o f International Arbitration 
43; Stephen Schwebel, ‘A Celebration of the United Nations’ New York Convention’ (1996) 12 
Arbitration International 823.
139 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited 
on August 11, 2007)
140 Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, Enforcement o f  Arbitral Awards in the Arab Countries, op. cit.
141 See Article V(l)(d) of the New York Convention.
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arbitration.142 As a result, the influence of the seat of arbitration and, more generally, 
that of national laws on the arbitral procedure, is substantially reduced. As the New 
York Convention also confirms the existence and legitimacy of institutional 
arbitration,143 in the absence of a specific agreement between the parties as to the 
procedure, the rules of arbitral institutions are considered to be the principal source of 
rules governing arbitral proceedings.
The scope of the New York Convention is not limited by reference to the 
nationality of the parties to the arbitration agreement or the award. This is a significant 
progress compared to the 1927 Convention, which only applies where the parties were 
subject to the jurisdiction of one of the contracting parties. This change indeed detaches 
arbitration from the national regime and paved the way for globalisation or de­
localisation, which is more popular nowadays. The change itself seems a variation of 
the memetic code inherited from the old generation, that is, the Geneva Protocols of 
1923 and the Geneva Convention of 1927. The application of the New York Convention 
is not restricted to international arbitration as well. The text contains no 
“intemationality” requirement. Article I of the Convention provides that, in principle, a 
“foreign” award is an award made in a country other than that in which its recognition 
and enforcement are sought. This effectively means that whether the dispute involves 
the interests of international business is not a relevant issue. One or more foreign 
components in arbitration is also of little relevance. In order for the Convention to apply 
in a contracting state, all that is necessary, in principle,144 is for an award in question be 
made in another country. The award may have been made in a purely domestic dispute 
following an arbitration in which all elements were connected to that country. The 
arbitration would then be national, but the award becomes foreign when enforcement is 
sought outside the country where it was made. The concept of a “foreign” award, as 
mentioned in the title of the Convention, still suggests a national connection. The 
criterion adopted by the New York Convention is in the middle ground between 
“national” and “international”, which is the same as the development route of 
international treaty in international arbitration, from the 1923 Protocol with a rather 
“national” standard to the 1958 New York Convention with a quasi-international
142 See Pieter Sanders, The New York Convention, in Peter Sanders (ed) Union International Des Avocats, 
Arbitrage International Commercial -  International Commercial Arbitration, Vol I I  (1960) 293, cited in 
Philippe Fouchard, Emmanuel Gaillard and Berthold Goldman, International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law International, the Netherlands 1999) 159 note 452.
143 See Article 1(2).
144 That is, except where the reciprocity reservation has been made.
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standard. This route may suggest that the next action, if taken, may go one step further 
by completely erasing the “national” trace and adopting a truly “international” criterion.
Although the title of the Convention does not suggest it, the Convention gives a 
much wider effect to the validity of arbitration agreements than the Geneva Protocol of 
1923. In order to enforce arbitration agreements, the New York Convention adopts the 
technique ground in the Geneva Protocol of 1923. For instance, the Convention requires 
the courts of contracting states to disallow a dispute that is subject to an arbitration 
agreement to be litigated before its courts, if an objection to such arbitration is raised by 
any party to the arbitration agreement. The New York Convention, instead, provides for 
a more effective and simple method of obtaining recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards and makes significant progresses in three areas as compared to the 1923 
and 1927 Protocols. First, the burden of proof is reversed. Once the award and 
arbitration agreement have been submitted by the party applying for recognition and 
enforcement of the award,145 the party opposing enforcement must prove why the award 
should not be enforced against it.146 Second, there are fewer grounds on which an 
application resisting enforcement will be admissible, and such grounds are defined in 
more restrictive terms, which preclude the judicial power to review the award on its 
merits. For example, it is no longer necessary that the award should be “final” in its 
country of origin but the award must simply be “binding”. Although that term may 
create difficulties of interpretation in some countries, the setting-aside procedure no 
longer prevents enforcement abroad. Third, under the New York Convention, the 
requirement for a “double exequatur” is precluded. An arbitral award is entitled to 
enforcement without the need for any order of any court in the country of origin.147 The
t  A Q
procedure governing recognition and enforcement is still determined by each 
contracting state, although the contracting states agree not to impose on the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign awards more onerous conditions than those imposed on the 
enforcement of domestic awards.
Despite its apparent simplicity, the criteria governing the application of the New 
York Convention have raised a number of difficulties. Some are the results of courts in
145 See Article IV.
146 See Article V.
147 Under the Geneva Convention of 1927, a party seeking enforcement had to prove the conditions 
necessary for the enforcement. This was known as the problem of “double-exequatur”. In order to show 
that the award had become final in its country of origin, the successful party was often obliged to seek a 
declaration in the courts of the country where arbitration took place to the effect that the award was 
enforceable in that country, before it could go ahead and enforce the award in the courts of the place of 
enforcement.
148 See Articles III and IV.
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the host jurisdiction, without a uniform approach on the interpretation of the Convention, 
taking into account other factors connecting arbitration with that jurisdiction, has led 
them to exclude the Convention and to exercise their discretionary power to set aside an 
award which they consider to be “national”. Published case law contains very few 
examples of this kind of confusion: one example is the much criticised decision of the 
Indian Supreme Court, which in 1992 held that the substance of the dispute before it 
was governed by Indian law and, on that basis, allowed an ICC award made in London 
to be set aside in India.149
Another difficulty stems from how to define the country where the award is 
made. For example, prior to the 1996 UK Arbitration Act, the mere fact that an award 
was signed by a sole arbitrator in Paris, whereas the arbitration had been held in London, 
led the English courts to exercise their power to review the award under the New York 
Convention.150 The 1996 Arbitration Act ensures that such a decision cannot recur.151 
This is an obvious practical difficulty because there has not been a uniform approach to 
interpreting the New York Convention by the courts in various contracting states. In 
practice, the detachment of an arbitration award from the national regime caused 
problems in application of the rules set out in the New York Convention.152 Thus, in 
France, the Rouen Court of Appeals had no hesitation in applying the New York 
Convention to an award made in Switzerland, in the context of an application for 
enforcement, as both Switzerland and France had ratified the Convention. It was 
irrelevant that Yugoslavia, which was a party to arbitration, had only ratified the 
Convention on condition that it would not apply to awards made prior to such 
ratification, because “the parties’ nationality does not affect the application of the 
Convention”.153 Likewise, in another French case, the Paris Court of Appeals and the 
Cour de cassation applied the New York Convention to the enforcement in France of an 
arbitral award made in Vienna, rightly disregarding the fact that the award was in favour
149 ‘Supreme Court, 7 May 1972, Civil Appeal No. 1978 of 1992 National Thermal Power Corporation 
(India) v. The Singer Corporation’ (1993) XVIII Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers, Deventer & Boston) 403-414; also V.S. Deshpande, ‘“Foreign Award” in the 1958 
New York Convention’ (1992) 9(4) J Int’l Arb 51.
m  His cox v. Outhwaite (No.l) [1992] 1 A.C. 562; [1991] 3 All E.R. 641; [1991] 3 W.L.R. 297; [1992] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 435; ‘House of Lords, 24 July 1991, Richard Henry Moffit Outhwaite v. Robert Ralph 
Scrymgeour Hiscox’ Hiscox v. Outhwaite’ (1992) XVII Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law 
and Taxation Publishers, Deventer & Boston) 599-609.
151 See Section 3. The English legislature adopts a definition of arbitration based on legal rather than 
purely geographical criteria in the provision.
52 More detailed discussion would be made in the second chapter o f this paper.
153 CA rouen, Nov 13, 1984, SEEE  v. Republique de Yougoslavia, XI Yearbook 491 (1986); Georges R. 
Delaume, ‘Introductory Note: France: Court o f Appeal of Rouen Decision in Societe Europeane D’etudes 
Et D’Enterprises v. Yugoslavia, et al. (Recognition of Arbitral Award) (November 13, 1984)’ (1985) 
24(1-3) International Legal Materials 345-47, 349.
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of a Turkish company and that, at that time, Turkey was not bound by the 
Convention.154
The chronological study of the development of the New York Convention
matches our discovery of the core memetic code and evolutionary theory. We may also
look back to older times in order to trace the origin of the core provisions of the New
York Convention. The first English Arbitration Act of 1698 contained just two
provisions, which foreshadowed the mainstays of the New York Convention: a stay of
court proceedings in favour of a valid arbitration clause, and a right to enforcement in
the absence of misconduct or fraud.
“Now for promoting trade and rendering the awards ... the more effectual in all 
cases for the final determination of controversies referred to them by merchants 
and traders or others concerning matters of account or trade or other matters ... it 
shall and may be lawful for all merchants and traders and others desiring to end 
any controversies suit to the award or umpirage of any person or persons should 
be made a rule of any of His Majesties courts of record”.155
The example of the 2-key-provision indicates the “qualified efficiency” or sub- 
optimal nature of opportunistic adaptations and exaptations,156 There is a potential cost 
in making do with what lies in hand. It may also show the potential for what in biology 
are called “frosen accidents”. 157 These are structural features which are difficult to 
explain by reference to existing environmental conditions, but which can be regarded as 
adaptations to previous environmental conditions. The functional approach of 
Darwinian theory implies that the persistence of certain traits at the expense of others is 
a product of adaptation to environmental change. In principle, “any functioning 
structure carries implicit information about the environment in which its function 
works”.158
154 Norsolor v. Pabalk Ticaret Sirketi XI Yearbook 484 (1986); Dennis Thompson, ‘Court Decision: Soc. 
Pabalk Ticaret Ltd Sirketi v. Soc. anon. Norsolor’ (1985) 2(2) Journal o f International Arbitration 67-76; 
Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Introductory Note: France: Court o f Cassation Decision in Pabalk Ticaret v. 
Norsolor (Enforcement of Arbitral Awards; Lex Mercatoria) (October 9, 1984)’ (1985) 24(1-3) 
International Legal Materials 360-64; XXI Yearbook 617 (1996); and ‘Luxembourg Cour Superieure de 
Justice [Court of Appeal] 24 November 1993, Kersa Holding Company Luxembourg v. Infancourtage et 
al.’ (1996) XXI Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer & 
Boston) 617-626.
155 See Robert Hunter, ‘Anticipating Trends in Dispute Resolution’ in Martin Odams De Zylva and 
Reziya Harrison (eds), International Commercial Arbitration: Developing Rules fo r  the New Millennium 
(Jordans, Bristol 2000) 10.
156 The evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould coined the term “exaptation” to convey the feature in 
the biological evolution that a design feature which is an essentially accidental by-product o f an earlier 
adaptation finds a new use in a changed environment. See generally Stephen Jay Gould, The Individual in 
Darwin's World (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1990).
157 Francis Crick, ‘The Origin o f the Genetic Code’ (1968) 38 Journal o f Molecular Biology 367 and 
Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, op. cit. chs 7-8.
158 Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, op. cit. chs 7-8.
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What is striking is the continuity of concept throughout this period as a point of 
reference when a series of mutations occurred in the relationship between the courts and 
arbitration organisations. Through shifts in the conceptual form, the notions of the 
finality of arbitral awards emerged by way of a response to the rise of the independence 
of arbitration and the tolerance of arbitration by the state courts. Mutations in legal 
forms were therefore the result of a complex interplay of social, economic and political 
forces. Long periods of relative stasis alternated with intervals of rapid innovation, often 
triggered by legislative intervention in a pattern reminiscent of “punctuated 
equilibrium”. 159 Uneven rates of development and discontinuities brought about by 
exogenous shocks, rather than continuous, linear adjustment to an external environment, 
characterised the path of legal change. Certainly, the New York Convention itself also 
begins to show its age.
4.4 Mutation and the New York Convention
A simple historical survey of the 1923 Geneva Protocol, the 1927 Geneva Protocol, and 
the 1958 New York Convention demonstrates that a core memetic code was inherited 
from one generation to the other. Nevertheless, the memetic code has varied along with 
time as well. A question may then arise naturally. Why did the New York Convention 
appear in the 1950s? Why didn’t it appear in 1920s? The birth of the New York 
Convention may be a consequence of the environmental changes in the 1950s, when 
there were some factors which were mature enough to bring new changes to the 
international law regime of commercial arbitration.
In the economy of the world as a whole, there are convincing social and 
economic reasons in favour of an increased role for private dispute resolution in the 
1950s. Dispute resolution was increasingly seen as a part of a continual process of 
conflict management from the inception of the business community. After World War II, 
business perspectives and strategies have become transnational to an unprecedented 
degree in response to the development of international markets and infrastructures that 
serve them. The multinational corporations emerged to be a principal steward of wealth
159 On punctuated equilibrium, see Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould, ‘Punctuated equilibria: an 
alternative to phyletic gradualism’ in Niles Eldredge, Time Frames: The Rethinking o f  Darwinian 
Evolution and the Theory o f  Punctuated Equilibria (Heinemann, New York 1986); and Niles Eldredge, 
Reinventing Darwin: The Great Evolutionary Debate (Phoenix Giant, London 1995); Stephen Jay Gould, 
The Structure o f  Evolutionary Theory (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 2002) Ch 9. The 
evidence for punctuated equilibrium in the social or cultural evolution can be taken to mean that social 
evolution and biological evolution are subject to distinct evolutionary processes; alternatively, its 
presence in the social sphere may be used to cast light on biological processes, on the assumption that 
they share some common elements with social evolution, but to do so would be beyond the scope of this 
chapter.
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and a potent force in the financial markets, and remain the cardinal vehicle for global 
development. Recognising that reality; even most developing countries welcome such 
enterprises. Obstacles to free trade have been under attack for years. The main 
supranational vehicle for these initiatives has been the GATT. At the same time, the 
globalisation of trade was to promote a harmonisation of commercial law and practice, 
since a globalised commercial community is entitled to expect that obligations should 
be construed similarly in different jurisdictions and legal cultures. Following the 
subsequent growth of international trade, the weakness of the 1927 Geneva Protocol, 
which neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had ratified, became very apparent. 
It needed to be raised if arbitration was to become an efficient means of resolving 
international disputes. These environmental changes also gave a birth of a number of 
regional conventions on international commercial arbitration, which impose comparable 
obligations on the member states with respect to particular categories of disputes or with 
respect to particular bilateral or regional relationships. Although no conventions since 
1958 has had the same impact on international commercial arbitration, a brief 
examination of later conventions is a worthy exercise for the direction of development 
they indicate and the approach they take.
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration o f 1961m  
The European Convention was signed in Geneva in 1961 under the aegis of the Trade 
Development Committee of the UN Economic Commission for Europe as a supplement 
to the New York Convention.161 It does not confine itself to the membership of 
European States.162 In other words, it applies to international arbitrations to settle trade 
disputes between parties from different states, whether European or not. However, it is 
designed mainly for disputes arising out of contracts between European parties, in 
particular East-West disputes. Unlike the New York Convention, the European 
Convention only applies when the parties to arbitration reside in contracting states. 
Several key features of the European Convention include (i) the limitation of grounds 
on which awards can be set aside; and (ii) an express recognition of the capacity of the 
state or other public body to enter into an arbitration agreement even though the 
Convention allows the contracting state to reserve this recognition. However, the 
Convention failed to realise its objectives since (i) the approach taken in the Convention
160 The European Convention has been ratified by only 26 states and lacks the significance of the New 
York Convention.
161 The European Convention does not deal with recognition and enforcement of awards, which is left to 
other treaties, such as the New York Convention, for handling.
162 For a text o f the Convention as well as a table o f member States see www.asser.nl/ica/eur-a.htm
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is not practical; and (ii) it does not deal with the recognition and enforcement of awards 
but leaves this to the New York Convention.
Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement o f Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters 1968
As its title suggested, the Convention excludes the enforcement of awards since the 
definition of judgment for recognition and enforcement purposes embraces decisions 
that is made by the courts of a contracting state,163 and arbitral awards are not entitled to 
enforcement under the Convention.164 Nevertheless, by merger of the award into a court 
judgment, an arbitral award can indirectly fall into the scope of the Convention. In the 
contracting states, the award creditor may find an interest in relying upon the judgment 
absorbing the award rather than on the award itself because the enforcement scheme 
under the Convention achieves more uniformity than does the New York Convention as 
the Convention’s aim is to increase the mobility of judgments in the European Union.165 
Unlike the New York Convention which does not regulate but leaves the procedure for 
enforcing awards in the sphere of competence of national law, the Convention sets out a 
two-tier enforcement procedure166 which is uniform to all contracting states, and 
national law only governs the procedure for making the application.167 It has been stated 
that the enforcement of the claim granted in the award would be considerably facilitated 
if the claim is incorporated in the judgment which is enforced under the more effective 
Convention regime.168
Moscow Convention o f 1972
The Moscow Convention was signed in 1972 as part of the process implementing the 
“socialist economic integration” of those East European States, which formed the 
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance.169 The Convention provides that arbitral 
awards are to be enforced voluntarily by the parties, failing which they are to be
163 Article 25 of the Convention.
164 Schlosser Report, on the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Association of the Kingdom of 
Denmark and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in the Civil and Commercial Matters and to the Protocol 
on its Interpretation by the Court of Justice, OJ No. C59, 5.3.79.
165 Dominique T. Hascher, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitration Awards and the Brussels 
Convention’ (1996) 12(3) Arbitration International 233, 234, 248.
166 Brussels Convention, Articles 34 and 36.
167 Brussels Convention, Article 33.
168 Peter Schlosser, ‘The 1968 Brussels Convention and Arbitration’ (1991) 7(3) Arbitration International 
227, 234.
169 Some former member states have either ceased to exist or have withdrawn their membership for 
obvious reasons after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
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enforced like court judgements of the country where the enforcement is sought. The 
grounds on which enforcement can be denied closely resemble those set out in the New 
York Convention, namely, the lack of jurisdiction, lack of due process and that the 
award has been set aside at the place where it was made.
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama 
Convention o f1975)
Latin American countries were “rather secluded in their world outlook” and “trust 
global organisations less than they trust themselves”. 170 As a consequence, these 
countries were once reluctant to ratify the New York Convention for their long- 
established distrust over American and European business interests and treated the New 
York Convention as a result of Western influence. Therefore, the member states of the 
Organisation of American States strongly preferred to have their own treaty regime. The 
Panama Convention was signed at the conclusion of the Inter-American Conference on 
Private International Law in 1975 by twelve south American States.171 The Convention 
represents an important change of attitude away from wariness and even hostility 
towards arbitration. Arguably, this Convention is key to opening Latin America, a vital 
market for arbitration now.
It is said that the Panama Convention “was carefully drawn up so as to be fully 
compatible with the New York Convention”,172 and “the New York Convention and the 
Inter-American Convention are intended to achieve the same results, and their key 
provisions adopt the same standards...”173 Nevertheless, the discrepancy between the 
New York Convention and Panama Convention is also obvious in that the latter does 
not contain provisions regarding its field of application,174 the referral by a court to
1 7Sarbitration, and the conditions to be fulfilled by the party seeking enforcement of the
170 J. Lliteras, The Panama Convention Strengthens Arbitration in the Americas, in IACAC, Inter- 
American Arbitration, IACAC (1975 2nd quarter) 2.
171 For a text of the Convention as well as a table of member States see www.asser.nl/ica/iaci.htm
172 Charles Robert Norberg, ‘General Introduction to Inter-American Commercial Arbitration’ in Pieter 
Sanders (ed), International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer, The Netherlands 1987 Suppl. 
7)3 .
173 The House Report by the Judiciary Committee accompanying the bill implementing the Panama 
Convention in the United States, H.R. Rep. 101-501, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990), reprinted in 1990 US 
Code Cong. & Adm. News 675, 678.
174 The New York Convention adopts reciprocity and commercial reservations to define the scope of 
application. The Panama Convention does not provide for any express definition o f its field of application.
175 One basic action o f the New York Convention is the referral by the court to arbitration. Article 11(3) 
imposes the obligation on the courts in the Contracting State to stay their proceedings and to refer the 
parties to arbitration. This mandatory requirement is absent in Panama Convention.
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award.176 In addition, if the parties fail to agree upon the arbitral procedure, the Inter- 
American Commercial Arbitration Commission Rules of Procedure will apply.177 In 
cases of concurrent applicability, no major conflict between both Conventions would 
seem to arise, except with respect to the applicability of the IACAC Rules. Such 
conflicts may be resolved by the rule of conflicts of treaties of maximum efficacy. In 
sum, the Panama Convention can be considered to constitute a bridgehead to 
international arbitration in general and the New York Convention in particular.
Riyadh Convention on Arab Judicial Cooperationm
The Riyadh Convention is a regional multilateral convention among a variety of Arab 
States concerning enforcement of arbitral awards and court judgments. The Convention 
affirms the executory character of arbitral awards made in a contracting state, without 
taking into account the nationality of the successful party. The Convention is a step 
backwards for those Arab States which ratified the New York Convention since it 
requires the enforcing party to obtain leave for enforcement from the judicial authority 
of the country in which the award was made in order to grant leave for enforcement in 
another Arab State. This implies that the Convention requires two leaves for 
enforcement whereas the New York Convention only requires that of the enforcement 
country. The enforcing court can only accept or refuse enforcement but is not allowed to 
examine the substance of the dispute when the judgment or award is referred to it for 
enforcement. Like the New York Convention, the Convention imposes some restrictions 
on the refusal of enforcement such as the arbitrability, validity of arbitration clause, lack 
of jurisdiction, due process, breach of public order, Moslem Shari’a good moral or 
Constitution.179 To those Arab States which did not sign the New York Convention,180 
the Convention is a step forward because it provides a multiple regime for cross-border 
enforcement of arbitral awards in this region. In this sense, the Convention is a 
supplement to the New York Convention.
I Q I
Amman Convention on Commercial Arbitration
176 Article IV of the New York Convention imposes a minimum condition to be fulfilled by the party 
seeking enforcement. The Panama Convention does not contain any provisions similar to Article IV.
177 These are now the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
178 This Convention was ratified by Iraq, Yemen, Mauritania, Jordan, Syria, Somalia, Tunisia and Libya.
179 Article 30 of the Convention.
180 These countries are Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Libya, The United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Sudan.
181 This Convention was ratified by Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, Palestine, Lebanon and Sudan.
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This Convention was signed in 1987 and is open to all the Arab States.182 It is modelled 
after the 1965 ICSID Washington Convention and created the Arab Centre of 
Commercial Arbitration with the seat in Rabat. The Convention provides that the High 
Court of each country has jurisdiction to grant enforcement of arbitral awards. Arbitral 
awards made by the Rabat Centre are executory and the High Court must grant leave to 
enforce and the award can be rejected if it is contrary to public order, which has not 
been uniformly defined. The Convention further provides that an award made by the 
Rabat Centre can only be set aside by the Centre and is not subject to appeal before the 
judicial authorities of the country where enforcement is sought. The Convention is of 
limited interest in international business, which, given the importance of the Arabic 
States, is unfortunate. This demonstrates a proper trend towards a purposive 
construction of contracts less bound to esoteric national rules of interpretation, no 
longer just defining legal relationships but also containing the machinery to ensure a 
continuing mutuality of interest and effective communication.
These regional arbitration conventions are largely modelled on the New York 
Convention for the similar purpose of promoting the convergence of national arbitration 
laws of member states in the region. In particular, like the New York Convention, they 
provide a clear platform for member states to recognise and enforce foreign arbitral 
awards. The environmental factors connecting to the emergence of these regional 
conventions are similar to those for the New York Convention. The economic and 
political convergence and regional legal harmonisation perhaps play a much more 
important role in the promulgation of these regional conventions due to the fact that 
regional convergence developed much earlier and faster than the harmonisation in the 
globe. Functionally, these regional conventions may fairly be seen as a supplement the 
New York Convention if the critical norms established in the New York Convention 
were not spread to these regions.
The Model Law
In spite of various international and regional treaties, international commercial 
arbitration still suffers from a lack of uniformity in the state laws applicable to other 
aspects in arbitration, which, however, are not the main subject of the New York 
Convention and other treaties. The United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) has attempted to provide a solution to the widely shared concerns 
relating to the actual quality of national arbitration laws. The Model Law began with a
182 For a text of the Convention as well as a table of member States see www.asser.nl/ica/eur-a.htm
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proposal to reform the New York Convention. This led to a report183 from UNCITRAL 
to the effect that the harmonisation of state arbitration laws and clarification of some 
uncertainties surrounding them could be achieved more effectively by reference to a 
model. The technique adopted by UNCITRAL to deal with die discrepancy among state 
arbitration laws was to encourage states to adopt the rules of the Model Law into their 
own laws of arbitration. As an inducement to inception, states were not obliged to do so. 
Rather, the states may depart from it to the extent they considered necessary to 
accommodate important elements of their own law or policy which would otherwise be 
in conflict with it. The final text of the Model Law was adopted by resolution of 
UNCITRAL in June 1985, and a recommendation of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations commending the Model Law to member states was adopted in 
December 1985. The soft law approach facilitates the Model Law to achieve its great 
success as “it is a text that any state proposing to adopt a modem law of arbitration is 
bound to take into consideration”.184 Many states modernised their arbitration laws in 
recent years by modelling national laws on the Model Law. The Model Law certainly 
represents a new generation of international rules on commercial arbitration.
5. E n v ir o n m e n t a l  C h a n g e s  a n d  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  C o n v e n t io n
The foregoing discussion of the interaction between Darwinian evolutionary theory and 
the New York Convention may provide a platform to answer the second question, that is, 
whether Darwinian evolutionary theory may give us a new perspective to look at the 
New York Convention in the 21st century. What are the new environmental changes in 
the 21st century? A quick answer is globalisation and new technology. We will review 
their respective impact on international commercial arbitration.
5 .1 Globalisation and its Impact on Arbitration Law
The discussion of the emergence of a global regulatory framework for international
1 RSbusiness transactions is not new. The governance of global economic activities and
183 “Study on the Application and Interpretation of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
o f Foreign Arbitral Awards” UN Doc. A/CN 9/168.
184 Alan Redfem and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit. 
70.
185 See e.g., John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2000); Loukas Mistelis, ‘Regulatory Aspects: Globalisation, Harmonisation, Legal 
Transplants and Law Reform’ (2000) 34(3) The International Lawyer 1055-69; Klaus-Peter Berger, ‘The 
New Law Merchant and the Global Market Place: A 21st Century View o f Transnational Commercial 
Law’ (2000) Int A. L. R. 91-102; Alex Y. Seita, ‘Globalisation and the Convergence of Values’ (1997) 30 
Cornell Int’l L.J. 429-91; Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, Dealing in Virtue -  International Commercial 
Arbitration and the Construction o f  a Transnational Legal Order (University o f Chicago Press, Chicago
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networks requires a concept of globalisation, which refers to an aggregate of 
multifaceted economic, political, social and cultural processes. While globalisation in
1 RAthe aftermath of 11 September is no longer fashionable, the main premise, that as far 
as the international commercial relations are concerned one could observe the 
incremental organic creation of an autonomous system and increasing homogeneity in 
the political and legal ideas, which operate on the basis of the rule of law, are 
increasingly appealing. The world appears to be marching towards a new version of the 
rule of law with some 21st century characteristics, which does have an impact on legal 
practice; in particular, on international commercial arbitration. According to Maine,
1 87contractual obligationships are characteristic of modem societies. If this is the case, 
contract-based arbitration shall become dominant in modem societies and the new 
century needs and seems able to nurture such developments.
It is now common to begin every discussion of globalisation with the definition 
although the term is used in multiple, often contradictory ways. In line with the settled 
expectations, globalisation is defined as the processes of convergence in the economic, 
political, cultural and legal realms around the world as evidenced in rules, institutions, 
norms and practices. The emphasis on the processes of globalisation captures both the 
active and resultant dimensions by bridging cause and effect,188 while also drawing 
attention to the dynamic, multifaceted and proactive nature of the globalisation. In terms 
of commercial arbitration, the role of globalisation is to facilitate the convergence of 
substantive and procedural rules.
Law is widely defined as “a body of mles for human conduct within a 
community”,189 or “a coercive order”.190 Law in a global world shall bring about social 
conduct of human beings through a common interest, economical, social or cultural. 
This is particularly true in a decentralised international community, where enforcement 
of law is accomplished through the application of the principle of co-operation and self­
1996) and Richard P. Appelbaum, William LF Felstiner and Volkmar Gessner (eds), Rules and Networks, 
The Legal Culture o f  Global Business Transactions (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001). The issue of 
globalisation o f law pertaining to international business is approached from the perspective o f legal 
theory, empirical sociology, economics, relational anthropology and formal law and legal reasoning.
186 The World Trade Organisation Doha Ministerial Declaration (November 2001) makes no reference to 
globalisation, which seems to have been put on hold for the time being. Instead, harmonisation at a 
regional level is encouraged. See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01_e.htm
187 “We may say that the movement o f the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from status 
to contract” . See Maine, Ancient Law, op. cit. 1861, 1894:170.
188 Globalisation is both a cause of convergence and a measure o f the degree to which convergence has 
occurred.
189 Jennings, R. and Watts, A. Oppenheim's International Law  (Longman, London 1992) 10, para 5.
190 Hans Kelsen, Principles o f  International Law  (Rinehart, New York 1952) 5; and Guenther 
Roth and Claus Wittich (eds), Max Weber, Economy and Society (University o f California Press, 
Berkeley 1978) 311-14.
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compliance.191 Besides, a global world also contains an autonomous community of 
merchants, which is governed by a separate set of rules or moral postulates, inter alia, 
the general assent or tolerance of the community. Legal systems to both communities
1 09are community-minded kind of law.
We may have to set a scene by locating the impact of globalisation on 
international commercial arbitration within the general context of globalisation in the 
economic, political and legal realms. Globalisation can be measured in many ways. 
Indeed, whether one finds convergence or divergence, depends on the particular 
indicators that one chooses. Market, democracy, human rights and rule of law are broad 
standards, and each is capable of causing variations in theory and practice. Assessing 
the impact of globalisation requires these broad standards to be refined and 
supplemented by other measures. The effect of globalisation is most noticeable in the 
economic realm, where the world economy becomes increasingly integrated in global 
and regional spheres. By contrast, political and cultural convergence has been much 
slower.193 Legal convergence falls in the middle.
Culture is one of “the elementary forms of social unanimity” 194 or the 
“traditional authority”.195 The globalisation of business and finance increased the range 
and depth of inter- and intra-national cultural conflicts, major causes of which are the 
cultural misunderstandings and an increased resistance to new forms of cultural 
imperialism. Globalisation has implied the emergence of a new global culture and 
helped transform some, if not many, cultural elements. Nevertheless, the globalisation 
of culture is much more difficult to capture because it is hard to tell the impact of 
globalisation on more fundamental modes of values that are more constitutive of a 
community, people or nation. On the other hand, culture is so pervasive that it shapes 
the way the forces of globalisation operate and their ability to affect change in the
191 Friedmann has called “the international law of co-operation”. See Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law  
(Yale University Press, New Haven 1956) 15-16.
192 Among the nations, there is also a development of the international law of human rights and 
international environmental law which are particularly community-minded kind of law.
193 For instance, China has resisted the trend toward Western like democracy and challenged the 
universality o f human rights by stressing the right for economic development. This comment was made 
by Chinese Premier Wen Jianbao in an interview on November 21, 2003 by the Washington Post 
Executive Editor Leonard Downie Jr., Assistance Managing Editor for Foreign News Philip Bennett and 
Washington Post Correspondents John Pomfret, Philip P. Pan and Peter S. Goldman prior to his state visit 
to the United States of America in December 2003. (‘The interview with Premier Wen Jiabao on Nov 21, 
2003’) See www.washingtonpost.com/wp.dvn/articles/A6641-2003Nov.22.html (last visited on 29 
November 2003).
194 Karen E. Fields (tr), Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms o f  the Religious Life (Simon & Schuster 
Ltd, New York 1997)
195 Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, Max Weber Economy and Society (University o f California Press, 
Berkeley 1978) 226-40
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aspect of economic, political and legal reforms. In this case, culture is a key factor 
shaping the legal map. Today, when the cultural difference is offered as a legitimation 
for and explanation of legal difference, the cultural context often comes up as an aspect 
of a consciously mobilised collective identity in the midst of a political struggle, and it 
arises in relation to constitutions, collective inequalities, and other aspects of law. While 
legal convergence has become a response to the forces of globalisation today, such as 
WTO rules and the demands of foreign investors, the main driving force behind it may 
be a reaction to the highly diversified business and/or regulatory environments, which 
calls for a more law-based order; a global governance for the convenience of doing 
business; an economic efficiency world-wide with supports of local governments; and 
an increasing demand from the reality that the rights recognised in one jurisdiction can 
be enforced in the other as well.
Globalisation has shaped developments in all legal areas, not only commercial 
law and international law but also some theoretical subjects such as jurisprudence and 
law and economics, although the degree of impact differs from one to the other. In the 
area of international commercial arbitration, some widely accepted notions such as party 
autonomy, independence of arbitration, finality of arbitral awards have found their 
viability in most major economic powers. The discrepancy among jurisdictions has been 
diminished to a certain extent. In the economy of the world as a whole, there are 
convincing social and economic arguments in favour of an increased role for private 
dispute resolution. The globalisation of trade will promote a higher level of 
harmonisation of commercial law and practice since a globalised commercial 
community is entitled to expect that obligations should be construed similarly in 
different jurisdictions and legal cultures. This may form a trend towards a purposive 
construction or operation of arbitration less bound to esoteric national rules. Dispute 
resolution will come to be seen increasingly as part of a continual process of conflicting 
management from the inception of a project to its completion and the resolution of 
residual claims.
The future of arbitration lies not in mimicking assisted settlement processes but 
rather in harnessing itself to assist the process of voluntary dispute resolution. Its 
function should therefore be two-folded. First, it is to act as an ultimate determinant of 
the rule of law, for which purpose the determination must result from an acceptably 
rigorous factual investigations. Second, it is to act, flexibly and according to the parties’ 
needs, in response to promote the materials for a successful settlement. Based on the 
foregoing discussion, the current “environmental” factors in the world-wide commercial
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world such as global electronic commerce, standard-development organisations and 
“informational regulation”, we can then explore what changes towards the New York 
Convention may be brought by environmental changes.
5.1.1 Lex Mercatoria
A sense of legality and modernity in the trend of globalisation requires us, with a neo­
system theory, to understand law by embracing “legal pluralism”. Legal pluralism, as 
Teubner put, is defined “no longer as a set of conflicting social norms in a given social 
field but as a multiplicity of diverse communicative processes that observe social action 
under the binary code of legal/illegal”.196 Early formulations of legal pluralism reveal a 
movement in the environment of a system as metaphors of “turbulence” or “noise” 
implying a restricted view of the interchange and penetration taking place across
i q  n
boundaries but bringing about an internally shaped response from the system. Global 
legal pluralism involves a variety of institutions, norms, and dispute resolution
1 Qftprocesses located, and produced, at different structured sites around the world. In this 
sense, “pluralism” can be referred to as “societies which incorporate a diversity of 
institutionally distinct collectivities”, 199 or “an exclusive, systematic and unified 
hierarchical ordering of normative propositions”.200 There are different approaches to 
eliminate the effect of cultural and legal differences that may hinder the globalisation of 
international business. In particular, unification or harmonisation of law or more 
appropriately the organic global convergence of law is distinguished from less formal 
mechanisms (soft law or less rigid law201) which also aim at increasing predictability; 
lex mercatoria and international arbitration.
196 See Gunther Teubner, ‘The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism’ (1992) 13 Cardozo Law 
Review 1451.
197 Martin Albrow (tr), Niklas Luhmann, A Sociological Theory o f  Law  (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London 1985).
198 Snyder defines the “site” as states, regional and international organisations, and a diversity of other 
institutional, normative, and processual sites, such as commercial arbitration, trade association and so on. 
The totality of these sites can be described as a network to represents a new global form of legal pluralism. 
See Francis Snyder, ‘Governing Economic Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralism and European Union 
Law’ (1999) 5(4) European Law Journal 334. According to Pospisil’s theory, law could be generated 
from the multiple sites. Every social sub-group such as families, clans, and communities had its own 
internal “law”. See Leopold Pospisil, Anthropology o f  Law: A Comparative Theory (Harper & Row, New 
York 1971) Pospisil said: “We have to ask whether a given society has only one consistent legal 
system ... or whether there are several such systems” .
1 9 See generally Stanley J. Tambiah, Leveling Crowds, Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective 
Violence in South Asia (University of California Press, Berkeley 1996).
200 John Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1- 
55.
201 Rene David, Arbitration in International Trade, op. cit. 29.
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The perception proclaimed by exponents of the neo-systems theory in the social 
science is helpful to understand the universality of law. Luhmann asserted that “all 
collective human life is directly or indirectly shaped by law. Law is, like knowledge, an 
essential and all pervasive fact of the human condition”.202 Fogen took one step further 
by saying that “law is everywhere” and “there has been and there still is law without 
jurisprudence, even law without laws and without legal doctrine and without 
lawyers”. These view effectively suggest that human societies may not necessarily 
involve only binary coding marking right/wrong, lawful/unlawful, state/non-state.204 
Exponents of neo-systems theory have seen that the category of normative discourse is 
not peculiar to the state law only.205
The evolution of differentiated legal order and an ideology of pluralism have 
been closely associated, in a global and multi-cultural context, with human being’s 
activities of establishing the non-state legal structure. In formulating law in 
globalisation, the real “modernity” exists in a broad evolutionary trajectory, that is, a 
global legal order’s containing an autonomous natured, self-determined, internally 
shaped, functionally differentiated, and non-state legal structure. A multi-dimensional 
approach relating human action or practice to the global structure or environment206 
inevitably leads to a multi-layered legal system, in which, apart from the States, the 
inter-state system, extra-state system, regional legal system and sub-systems for smaller 
groupings, an autonomous lex mercatoria all play a unique role through a system of 
informal, non-official, negotiated settlements. Weber characterised the non-state (or 
extra-state) system as “[the] non-violent means of coercion which may have ... even 
greater effectiveness than the violent ones” 207
It is obvious that arbitration of the post-classical mercantile world were 
conducted within, and drew their strengths from, communities consisting either of 
participants in an individual trade or of persons enrolled in bodies established under the
202 See Martin Albrow (tr), Niklas Luhmann, A Sociological Theory o f  Law  (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London 1985) 1.
203 See Simon Roberts, ‘Against a Systemic Legal History’ (unpublished paper on file with the author) 2.
204 Max Weber adopted a binary coding state/extra state law in Guenther 
Roth and Claus Wittich (eds), Max Weber, Economy and Society (University of California Press, 
Berkeley 1978) 311-14.
205 See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, ‘The Two Faces of Legal Pluralism’ op. cit. 1451.
206 See Richard Nice (tr), Pierre Bourdieu, Outline o f  a Theory o f  Practice (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1977) and Anthony Giddens, The Constitution o f  Society (University o f California, Berkeley 
1986).
207 See Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds), Max Weber Economy and Society (University of 
California Press, Berkeley 1978) 311-14.
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auspices and control of geographical trading centres.208 On the other hand, the 
geographical separation of the global commercial community needs widely recognised 
governing norms. Thus, the real authority of lex mercatoria resides in the fact that some 
communities gave birth to the implicit expectations and peer-group pressures which 
both shaped and enforced the resolution of disputes by an impartial and other 
prestigious personage; and, more recently, the international society’s recognition of it as 
a system that ipso factor binds nations and global commercial community as members 
(or players) of the whole international society, regardless of their individual wills and 
roles. It also has to be pointed out that external formal legal sanctions would have been 
largely redundant in such communities even if a legal framework had been available to 
bring them into play. More importantly, within a particular trade or market, a trader’s 
concern for his reputation -  or the risk of sanctions being imposed by a trade association 
such as the Grain and Feed Trade Association -  would probably be sufficient to ensure 
compliance. In a global world, cultural, religious or other non-legal coercive measures 
are available and may be even better than the coercive apparatus of the political and 
legal community.
International law has been classified as a branch of ethics rather than of law.209 
If this classification can be agreed upon, lex mercatoria can be defined as a branch of 
values, which is more than international morality. Lex mercatoria contains two-layers of 
values. One is an economic test, judging the “feasibility” of an act; and the other a 
moral test, judging the “rightness” of an act. Every business entity habitually commits 
acts of selfishness which are often gravely injurious to other business players, and yet 
are not contrary to national or international law. Nevertheless, we do not on that account 
necessarily judge them to have been “right”. Lex mercatoria exists in the form of the 
customary law system, upon which it has been erected over several centuries and mainly 
consolidated within the last several generations. Unlike international law, it is a 
superstructure of “traditional” law rather than the treaty-made law. This view is 
consistent with a wider sense of law which includes a set of ideas, materials, and 
institutions that were being used as a resource by people pursuing their own interests.
The paradox of the international society is that its spiritual cohesion is 
vulnerable even though the material side is much more than primitive, and thus needs a 
corresponding refined system of law for the regulation of the clashes to which the
208 See Michael Mustill, “Is It a B ird...” at 209 of Liber Amicorum Claude Reymond, Editions du Juris- 
Classeur, Paris 2004.
209 See Humprey Waldock, General Courses on Public o f  International Law, 106 “Recueil des Cours” 54 
(1962-11) (6 edn, Leyde 1963) 41-42, 68-76.
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material interdependence of various business entities from different states is constantly 
giving rise. The most serious shortcoming of the current system is the rudimentary 
character of the institutions which exist for the making and application of the uniform 
commercial law at the global level. There is no legislature to keep the law abreast of 
new needs in the international society; no authoritative law-making machinery; no 
executive or judicial power to enforce the rules of lex mercatoria; no compulsory 
character of international business rules; no wide range of action of a limited number of 
dispute resolution mechanisms.
The phenomenon of “globalisation” reflects not only an increase in the extent to 
which business is done internationally but also the emergence of entirely new markets
911and new ways of doing business. Inherent in this process is the emergence of new 
demands for a system of international dispute resolution that is responsive to issues and 
expectations previously unknown. Globalisation may require an autonomous arbitration 
system, which is more compatible with the rules of many of the major international
919arbitration institutions. This autonomous system requires lex mercatoria, which has a 
significant role to play in trade facilitation and commercial dispute settlement. A 
possible advantage of such a system may be that it is culturally neutral. When it 
expresses a legal culture this may not be universally acceptable and practically feasible. 
However, one can argue that to the extent that lawyers and law firms are ultimate users 
of this autonomous system, those who participate in major business dispute resolution 
share the same culture, irrespective of their place of work. Effectively one could speak
9 1 o
of a lex arbitralis materialis which consists of transnational substantive rules, general 
principles of law and practice as generally expressed in the work of leading arbitration 
institutions and international firms. Autonomous rules, largely, the new lex mercatoria
210 The majority o f rules of lex mercatoria are generally unaffected by the weakness of its system of 
enforcement because of voluntary compliance which prevents the problem of enforcement from arising 
altogether. The rules o f lex mercatoria may not recognise sanctions, such as the adoption of reprisals and 
other counter-measures. In this sense, lex mercatoria obviously is another kind of law.
211 The quest for predictability and certainty as well as an economically based “time-space” compression 
invariably lead to a set o f rules o f amorphous and irregular character. Conflicts amongst existing 
constituencies are not necessarily detrimental.
2,2 See e.g., AAA International Rules Art 28, ICC Art 17, LCIA Art 22.3; Stockholm Art 24. Also see the 
traditional UNCITRAL Rules Art 33.
213 See e.g., Klaus Peter Berger, The Creeping Codification o f  Lex Mercatoria (Kluwer, The 
Hague/Boston 1999); Thomas Carbonneau (ed), Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion o f  the 
New Law Merchant (revised edn Kluwer and Juris Publishing, Dobbs Ferry, New York 1998); Roy 
Goode, ‘Usage and Its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law’ (1997) 46 ICLQ 1-36; Martin J. 
Hunter, ‘Publication o f Arbitration Awards and Lex Mercatoria’ (1988) 54 Arbitration The Journal o f the 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators 55; Ole Lando, ‘The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial 
Arbitration’ (1985) 34 ICLQ 747; Andreas F Lowenfeld, ‘Lex Mercatoria'. an Arbitrator’s View’ (1990) 6 
Arbitration International 133; Michael Mustill, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria -  the First Twenty-Five Years’ 
(1988) 2 Arbitration International 86.
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and self-regulations such as the rules of arbitration institutions, are becoming more and 
more important. This trend may challenge the scope of the New York Convention, 
which usually only recognises and enforces an arbitral award in a national framework 
rather than an autonomous regime.
5.1.2 Sovereignty and De-nationalisation
Law is said to exist in a society, and there can be no society without a system of law to 
regulate the relations of its members with one another.214 The only essential conditions 
for the existence of law are the existence of a political community, and recognition by 
its members of settled rules binding upon them in that capacity.215 The construction of 
national governments is not a process that can be divorced from transnational matters. If 
we speak of the “law of globalisation” or “law in a global world”, we assume that a 
“society of global world” exists, and further presume that the entire world constitutes a 
single community or society. In the trend of globalisation, there has been an immense 
growth of the factors that makes states mutually dependent on one another. What we are 
witnessing today is a powerful micro-globalism, in which states or other sub-groups in 
the world assert their distinctiveness and compete for recognition and control over some 
part of the polity. The interdependence of states would lead to a strengthening of the 
feelings of community. In general terms, this interdependence is not sufficient to 
maintain material bonds without a common social consciousness. The necessary force 
behind a corresponding legal system is some sentiment of shared responsibility for the 
conduct of a common interest. Globalisation and its surrounding institutions require a 
unique process of norm-setting, the standardisation of practices, the rationalisation of 
claims that are attached as part of the discourse, the interaction of multiple power 
structures.
Darwinian perspectives of law at the transnational and national levels have 
become more de-centralised. Decentralised institutional arrangements seem to be the 
crux of the matter. From a political standpoint, globalisation has witnessed the rise of 
new political actors such as multinational firms, non-governmental organisations and 
social movements. The emergence of multi-players tended to weaken, fragment, and 
sometimes even restructure the state. In the last quarter century, the increasing 
globalisation of trade and finance has resulted in a wholesale transformation of
214 See Humprey Waldock, General Courses on Public o f  International Law, op. cit. 41-42, 68-76.
215 See Frederick Pollock, First Book o f  Jurisprudence fo r  Students o f  the Common Law  (MacMillan and 
Co. Ltd., London 1896) 28.
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traditional markets, a State’s political or sovereign function, and the relationship 
between governance and territory. Particularly significant is an awareness of the many 
sites of regulation and sources of ideas and standards that are in play. This requires an 
investigation of “the connections between policy, power, subjectivity and changing 
form of government”.217 Business has become increasingly international in nature and 
scope. In virtually every major field of commerce, transnational contracts have 
proliferated, together parties from far-flung regions and widely divergent cultural and 
legal backgrounds. Therefore, “alternative spaces and spheres of power may indeed be
<7 1 Q
emerging, notwithstanding the overwhelming weight of Western legal norms”. 
Globalisation blurred the boundaries between the domestic and external spheres of 
nation-states, fostered the articulation of systems of multi-level governance and 
interlocked politics and policy networks. The discourse on this topic gets mixed with 
arguments about current transformations of the state through the empowerment of sub­
national collective entities. Through “globalism”, the state acknowledges diverse social 
fields within the society and represents itself ideologically and organisationally in 
relation to them; and that the law may depend on the collaboration of non-state social 
fields for its implementation. Inside the state, the internal diversity of the state 
administration, the multiple directions in which its official subparts struggle and 
compete for legal authority are all consistent with the de-centralisation. Externally, the 
state is interdigitated with non-government, semi-autonomous social fields which 
generate their own (non-legal) obligatory norms to which they can induce or coerce 
compliance.
Another trend, which is recorded, is that legislators are often forced to change 
their laws and attitudes in order to attract foreign investment. The use of legal rules is 
inevitable and often, despite its pitfalls, the only alternative. Traditional private and 
commercial laws and rules have been in the process of reform under the pressure of 
global transactions. The international order plays an important role in driving the 
changes of state laws. On the other hand, in the 1970s a curious test of informal 
institutions appeared when informality was officially embraced by the American 
judicial system. The US courts added alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to options
2,6 Along with this trend is the fact that the conceptions and practices of the West are spreading globally 
together with its economic power. The legal aspects o f Westernisation are sometimes conceived of in a 
positive light as steps toward greater justice, economic/technical modernisation and political 
democratisation. Others, however, may see it as pernicious domination.
217 See Cris Shore and Susan Wright (eds), Anthropology o f  Policy (Routledge, London and New York
1997) xiii.
218 See Eve Darian-Smith, ‘Structural Inequalities in the Global Legal System’ (2000) 34(3) Law and 
Society Review 826.
68
open to litigants. ADR was publicised as a response to the needs of the poor and of 
those who had minor claims that would otherwise have gone unheeded. Alternatives to 
the courts were sought in many countries.
The emerging globalisation departs from the traditional global liberal values of 
generality, clarity and prospectiveness. The new global environment of business 
transactions needs a low portfolio of sovereignty and law in a denationalised world. 
Some of the roles of states have been delegated or diffused to post-national 
constellations of statehood.220 The twentieth century experienced an important change, 
that is, the dilution, dissipation, and, in some extreme cases, disappearance of state 
power. This shift in the locus of authority reflects a widespread popular realisation but a 
critical controversy that the collective public responsibility of the state cannot fully 
substitute on a broad basis for individual responsibility privately exercised. So far a 
four-tiered global system, consisting of private adjudication under agreed rules, 
supported by national laws and soft law necessary to ensure its integrity, and an 
international exercise of state power to the extent required to guarantee enforcement of 
the results, has been set up. The dilution of the state power strengthens a system 
whereby the parties of different nationalities agree to mandatory and binding arbitration 
of disputes between them pursuant to a particular set of arbitration rules before an 
arbitration panel. The growth in private adjudication is matched stride for stride. Indeed 
it is made possible by the concomitant convergence of relevant national laws and the 
elaboration of facilitative international agreements, resulting in the internationalisation 
of adjudicated commercial dispute resolution. Statutes in major industrial jurisdictions 
have been modernised so as to minimise state or judicial intervention in the arbitral 
process, while offering judicial review to the extent merely necessary to ensure the 
integrity of the process by which the arbitral tribunal arrived at its award. For example, 
the procedural aspect of the French legal reform relating to the enforcement and means 
of recourse was seen as a way to harmonise domestic and international arbitration. 
There are many rules of law with national and international origins which are shaped by 
techniques, habits and customs of national or regional characters. The social regulation
2,9 See Mauro Cappelletti and B. Garth (eds), Access to Justice: A World Survey (2 Vols.) (Siftoff & 
Noordoft, London/Boston/Milan 1978-9); Mauro Cappelletti and Denis Tallon, Fundamental Guarantees 
o f  the Parties in Civil Litigation (Milan/Dobbs Ferry, NY, Giuffre/Oceana, 1973). Less felicitously, some 
judges remarked that they wanted to get garbage cases out of courts. See Laura Nader, ‘From Legal 
Processing to Mind Processing' (1992) 30(4) Family and Conciliation Courts Review 468-73.
220 The correlation between denationalisation and globalisation in light o f the new architecture of 
statehood and the role of non-state actors is always a hot issue in theory and practice. As far as the 
international commercial arbitration is concerned, the denationalisation may give arbitration more 
flexibility and autonomy than before.
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of economic activities and how private governance and decentralised law can emerge 
are evident in a variety of settings. Business people increasingly prefer and embrace 
more flexible “general principles” of contract law. These soft law principles operate 
within the limits set by public law. Major countries, to a certain extent, concocted for 
themselves a jurisprudential corpus that either is divorced from its own original system 
of law or combines certain rules from international conventions. This trend goes well 
along with the global legislation of international commercial arbitration. The relative 
reduction in the role of states today necessarily requires the unification of state laws in 
most aspects, which has spawned an explosion in the development of international 
commercial arbitration. The international community has adopted a series of 
conventions and treaties ensuring mutual and uniform enforcement of agreements to 
arbitrate, and also of the resulting awards, of which the New York Convention of 1958 
is the most prominent. In this regard, we also have seen tremendous achievements made 
by international organisations, for example, the International Center for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, International Chamber of Commerce, International Institute for 
the Unification of Private Law, etc. All these legislative efforts result in important legal 
consequences. For example, the distinctions between the civil law and common law 
traditions are gradually fading.
5.1.3 Harmonisation of Arbitration Law
A global economy ideally requires a global system for defining rights and obligations 
and providing for their determination. Despite this, differences in the legal systems of 
countries, even within the Europe Union or among common law jurisdictions, are still 
substantial. The most obvious differences are on both substantive and procedural 
levels.221 For instance, there is an Anglo-Saxon belief in the innate superiority of an 
“adversarial” judicial process and a corresponding mistrust of a possible superficiality,
999or at least lack of pragmatism, of an “inquisitorial” process. These procedural
221 Northcote Parkinson’s satire o f the English parliamentary system could equally have been o f our legal 
system: ‘the British instinct is to form two opposing teams, with referee and linesmen, and let them 
debate until they exhaust themselves ... [The individual Member’s] training from birth has been to play 
for his side, and this saves him from any undue mental effort...But the British system depends entirely on 
its seating plan. If the benches did not face each other, no one could tell truth from falsehood, wisdom 
from fo lly ...’ C. Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson's Law or The Pursuit o f  Process (John Murray, London 
1958).
222 ‘The changes [in the civil justice system] ... would assimilate the role of the judge in this country to 
that of his brethren in continental Europe. But there is no reason to fear that judges would not continue ... 
to bring to their task an invaluable practical experience of the law; professional distinction; integrity; 
independence; and a sense of fairness which is the great distinguishing feature o f the common law.’ Sir 
Thomas Bingham, ‘The Price of Justice’ (1994) 60 JCIArb 247, an address proposing reforms to the civil 
justice system.
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differences reflect underlying cultural differences in approaches to the application of the
00 ^substantive law. It must be recognised that it is an over-simplification to see the 
differences in terms of “common law” and “civil law” systems. Beyond the superficial 
similarity of a system based on precedent or on a codified law, there are innumerable 
differences between the legal systems of the countries which fall within one or other 
broad description.
One effect of the globalisation of business is to force the pace of change towards 
harmonisation. Just as globalisation need not be the only reason for convergence, 
neither need globalisation mean one-size-fits-all. Convergence is a matter of degree. 
Arbitration law is one area in which there is tremendous variety among legal systems 
around the world. Simply put, there is not a single correct way to deal with common 
arbitration problems. Thus, while all states rely on generally applicable laws to limit 
abuses of discretion and provide predictability and certainty, they may differ on how 
much judicial and legislative discretion is desirable. For example, the East Asian 
developing states tend to favour a larger, more flexible role for the executive in 
managing the economy than western liberal states, in part because the rapidly changing 
economic environment requires a certain level of flexibility. In light of the diversity 
among arbitration laws, the lack of a single blueprint for success, and the presence of a 
distinctive set of institutional, cultural, economic and political constraints, the 
development of a world-wide unified arbitration law regime inevitably will be 
determined primarily by its own contingent, context-specific conditions.
There is an increasing degree of co-operation between national legislatures to 
harmonise both substantive and procedural law. There are many examples particularly 
within the European Union. The national arbitral laws of many European countries have 
been reformed in the last decade of the 20th century: England, Germany, Sweden and 
Belgium enacted new, or amended existing, arbitration laws. Jurisdiction, recognition 
and enforcement of judgments, and governing law have all been addressed by 
European-wide Conventions. Various directives are driving forward the process of 
harmonising substantive law in the realm of contractual relationships. On a macro level,
223 ‘The historical fact that common lawyers have been reared on a diet o f case law has had a profound 
effect on our judicial method. Common lawyers tend to proceed by analogy, moving gradually from case 
to case... We tend to reason upwards from the facts o f the cases before us, whereas our continental 
colleagues tend to reason downwards from abstract principles embodied in a code... It is this fundamental 
distinction between the English and the continental European cultures which... lies at the heart o f the 
misunderstanding about the possible creation of a federal Europe. Continental Europeans love to proclaim 
some great principle, and then knock it into shape afterwards. Instead, the boring British want to find out 
first whether and, if  so, how these ideas are going to work in practice’. Lord Goff, ‘The Future of the 
Common Law’ (1997) 46 ICLQ 745.
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the Treaty of Amsterdam (signed in July 1997) contains amendments to the European 
treaties of potentially far-reaching significance in the area of procedural and substantive
994law. The whole process may justify the belief in the ultimate possibility of a 
harmonisation of European national laws, a Darwinian exercise of the survival of the 
fittest.225
In relation to arbitration, in the area of substantive law, there is an increasing 
willingness among English judges to undertake comparative legal exegesis. The most
99 f \notable example has been Lord Hoffmann’s judgment in Kleinwort Benson, which 
was based in part on a comparative analysis of the law of unjust enrichment in other 
countries as an aid to deciding whether the public policy required the maintenance of 
the rule against the recovery of money paid under a mistake of law. Judicial techniques 
of construction of statutes and contracts start to lose some of their previous unique
997harshness, and foreign concepts (such as “gross negligence”) begin to enter the law. 
Another profound change is in the area of procedural law. The English judicial process 
has recently been reformed by the adoption of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.228 The 
reforms introduced a shift in the balance of procedural determination from the parties’ 
advocates to the judge.229 The importance of this shift should not be underestimated in 
terms of the European harmonisation because this will be much easier for English 
procedure to gradually take on elements of continental procedure. In this sense, the 
reform should be regarded as a first but the greatest step taken in the transition to an 
“inquisitorial” system. Besides, the dilution of specialist advocates will gradually 
demystify and simplify the procedure.
224 Article 65 of the resulting draft amended Consolidated Version of the European Treaty defines the 
measures which the Council must adopt progressively over five years in the field of judicial co-operation 
in civil matters for the purpose of progressively establishing an area of freedom, security and justice. The 
scope of these measures is very wide and may include improving and simplifying the recognition and 
enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial cases, including decisions in extrajudicial cases; 
promoting the compatibility o f the rules applicable in the Member States concerning the conflict of laws 
and of jurisdiction; and eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedings, if  necessary by 
promoting the compatibility o f the rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member States. Following 
the Tampere conference in Oct 1999, the European Council has invited the Council and the Commission 
to prepare new procedural legislation in cross-border cases and has requested the Council to report on the 
need to approximate Member States’ legislation in the area of substantive law by 2001.
225 Lord Goff, ‘The Future o f the Common Law’ op. cit. 745.
226 Kleinwort Benson Limited v Lincolnshire County and Ors [1998] 4 All ER 513
227 P er Mance LJ in Red Sea Containers v Papachristidis & Ors, The ‘Hellespoint Ardent' [1997] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 547, 586
228 The reform is known as the ‘W oolf Reforms’ as o f 26 April 1999. See The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 
(Sweet & Maxwell 1999)
229 ‘One of the most radical features of the Rules is that the reactive judge  (for centuries past at the heart 
of the English common law concept of the independent judiciary) will go. Instead, we shall have a 
proactive judge, whose task will be to take charge o f the action at an early stage and manage its conduct 
in a way we have never seen before in this jurisdiction.’ Master Turner in Foreword o f  The Civil 
Procedure Rules 1998 (Sweet & Maxwell 1999).
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The globalisation of international trade, finance and investment has seen a 
progressive change in the global legal field. WTO, WIPO and other inter-governmental 
organisations respond to the needs of international commerce, and harmonise the cross- 
border trading and business environment by distilling operative common principles. 
With the comfort of a huge bureaucracy and in view of serving the needs of corporate 
entities, the inter-governmental bodies can implement and enforce these rules. It is 
reasonable to expect such a trend to continue, along with the increased number of 
contracts among private parties before arbitral tribunals and courts. In the global 
marketplace, the private dispute resolution system has proved popular and workable 
over time. Parties are afforded the flexibility to choose a set of rules that best suits their 
commercial needs in a given context. Arbitration institutions are more specialised and 
service-oriented and their rules are moving ever closer. The New York Convention and 
the Model Law230 are adopted by more countries and arbitration institutions. There has 
been an increasing trend towards the time of “flu of modernisation” of arbitration. 
Since the economic globalisation aims at minimising the state interference in cross- 
border transactions, 232 the liberalisation of the private justice system through 
modernised international commercial arbitration is considered to be vital and 
constructive in this regard. International commercial arbitration is believed to
230 See the text at www.uncitral .org/en-index.htm. As discussed above, the objective of the Model Law is 
to globally harmonise the law and practice in international commercial arbitration. As of November 2003, 
legislation based on the Model Law has been enacted in Australia, Azerbajian, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Belarus, Bermuda, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, India, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, Macau, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Nigeria, Oman, Paraguay, Peru, Korea, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Ukraine, UK and 
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Oregon, Texas of the United States, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See 
www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm.
231 The “flu of modernisation” o f arbitration is obviously driven by the global economy. For instance, in 
tune with the global phenomenon of modernisation of international commercial arbitration, Bangladesh 
has recently enacted a new arbitration law, known as the Arbitration Act 2001. The Act is principally 
based on the Model Law and consolidates the law relating to both domestic and international commercial 
arbitration. The new legislative step was urgently taken in the face o f increasing foreign investment in 
Bangladesh in various sectors, especially in natural gas and power and its ever-growing export trade with 
the rest of the world. This modernisation gives Bangladesh a facelift as an attractive place for dispute 
resolution in the field of international trade, commerce and investment. Since the new Act embodies the 
modem practices of arbitration, it is considered to help build confidence in prospective foreign investors 
in Bangladesh. In today’s highly competitive world, since Bangladesh is keen to maintain its current 
momentum of economic growth and to improve its image as a rapidly developing economy, it expects to 
see the new Act as a boon in that respect.
232 See Gunther Teubner (ed), Global Law Without a State (Dartmouth, Aldershot 1997); Jarrod Wiener, 
Globalisation and the Harmonisation o f  Law (Pinter, London and New York 1999); Michael Likosky 
(ed), Transnational Legal Process: Globalisation and Power o f  Disparities (Butterworths/LexisNexis, 
London 2002).
233 See Katharine Lynch, The Forces o f  Economic Globalisation -  Challenges to the regime o f  
International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
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contribute to market integration by safeguarding and improving the efficiency and 
fairness of international private transactions.234
5.2 New York Convention and New Technology
Science has had considerable impact on law. For example, it has added at least several 
new territorial areas -  outer space and the deep seabed -  for which international law 
theories and rules are required to be developed. Law reflects societal and technological 
concerns. The impact of new technology has extended to various legal spheres.235 As 
rightly observed, “in this age of science we must build legal foundations that are sound 
m science as well as in law”. Legal doctrine and process have to be adapted to the use 
of new technology. Also, new technology has been widely used in legal proceedings. 
One example of using modem means of communication in the legal process is using 
video conferences which took place in the United States237 and Germany238 as well as 
the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.239 In this sense, new 
technology has brought us into a new legal era. Along with globalisation, new 
technology such as the Internet has a deep impact on society and drives the rapid 
development and diversity of international commercial arbitration. There has been a 
range of developments suggesting that new technology may not only facilitate 
international commercial arbitration but also bring new challenges to the New York 
Convention.
5.2.1 New Technology, Commerce and Law
Internet is listed as one of the ten forces that “flattened” the world.240 The non- 
traditional e-commerce has not grown merely by replicating offline patterns of 
commerce but has experienced extraordinarily rapid growth. By the end of 2000, the 
number of items offered for sale online increased to more than 5,000,000 and the
234 See Alessandra Casella, ‘On Market Integration and the Development o f Institutions: The Case of 
International Commercial Arbitration’ (1996) 40 European Economic Review 155.
235 New technology obviously brings a lot of new legal issues such as Internet, freedom of speech and 
privacy, nanotechnology and intellectual property law, network effects and antitrust law, sustainability, 
trade and environment,
236 Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Stephen G. Breyer at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/stl
237 See Eugene Volokh, ‘Technology and the Future of Law’ (1995) 47 Stanford Law Review 1400.
238 Some Lawyers in Germany Agitate fo r  the Cyber Trial, International Her. Trib, 26 October 1995, at 
A10.
239 See Dusan Tadic Case No.IT-94-I-T.
240 For a general picture as to how Internet changed the world, see Thomas L. Friedman, The World is 
Flat -  The Globalised World in the Twenty-First Century (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth 2006).
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number of transactions per week had increased to over 2,000,000.241 U.S. online retail 
sales will grow from $40.4 billion in 2002 to an estimated $112.5 billion in 2006.242 
Disputes often occur in such new environments where the established practices, 
understandings and behaviours have not been solidified. The emergence of online 
dispute resolution is likely to occur much more quickly than we can expect.
Like fax transmission, email communication increases efficiency and flexibility 
but also affects the commercial and legal environment. In addition to being more 
authenticated than faxed documents, email communication can serve widely dispersed 
parties throughout the world in a more efficient way. The increasingly routine use of 
email was adopted in the Microsoft antitrust case. Before US District Court Judge 
Thomas Penfield Jackson issued his ruling that Microsoft had violated the antitrust laws, 
he appointed Federal Court of Appeals judge Richard Posner to try to mediate a 
settlement. In late March 2000, it was reported that Judge Posner “peppered both sides 
with faxes, emails and phone calls about proposals and counterproposals. The parties 
have not dealt face to face, but instead have been working through Posner, who has 
been acting in the role of an electronic shuttle diplomat”.243 Email, therefore, becomes 
the document manager for place-independence dispute resolution. The use of email in 
any dispute settlement process may be a value-worthy means. When email is the only 
use of the network and only occasionally used, we would not even suggest that our 
figurative “fourth party” is present. The “fourth party” begins to appear as network- 
based tools and resources acquire a larger role, one in which the network does 
something more than the telephone or some other means for exchanging communication.
5.2.2 New Technology and E-based Arbitration
Changes in the communications technology have often been heralded as “revolutionary”. 
Transactions such as facsimiled contracts, credit-card transactions made via static or 
mobile telephony, on-line television sales, e-financial transactions such as automated 
clearing house and electronic funds transfer share the same problem as internet-based 
transactions have: the lack of certainty regarding the place where the contract is 
concluded. The parties in Internet-based transactions will more often be located in 
different jurisdictions. Therefore, Internet-based transactions can more likely be 
subordinated to one national domestic legal system. It is also unclear at which point the
241 Ethan Katsh & Janet Rifkin, Online Dispute Resolution: Resolving Conflicts in Cyberspace (Jossey- 
Bass: A Wiley Co., San Francisco 2001) 4-5.
242 http://www.machrotech.com/services/ecommerce-marketsise-statistics.asp
243 See Grimaldi, J.V., Microsoft, Justice Remain Far Apart; Sources Say Pact Unlikely by Tuesday, 
Washington Post, March 25, 2000, pg. E l.
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contract becomes binding upon the parties. National laws and their legal doctrines have 
already been adapted to the use of new technology in a commercial world. For instance, 
doctrines such as the declaration theory, expedition theory, mail-box rule (or reception 
theory), information theory, and Entores rule244 are adopted in contract laws to 
determine the moment of formation of contract via telefax, electronic data interchange 
(EDI), or, more recently, email. Many countries have restructured consumer banking 
and payment systems as well as private international law for financial transactions via 
ATM machines.
As a response to the rise of e-commerce, various supranational organs are 
devoting significant time to the resolution of the problems. By way of example, the 
European Union has proposed a regime for digital signatures245 and distance contracts246, 
and the United Nations Trade Commission has proposed a law on electronic 
commerce.247 In the UK, the DTi is seeking to introduce measures248 to give legal 
recognition to the UNCITRAL Model Law and electronic signatures, which however 
specifically excludes tax, convergence and content issues249 and consumer protection. 
New technologies have been widely utilised in international commercial arbitration. For 
instance, applications for arbitration and arbitral awards may be often delivered by fax 
or email. Internet no doubt has substantially changed the traditional features of 
commercial arbitration. A number of recent projects which seek to encompass dispute 
resolution in the virtual marketplace are worthy of note: The Virtual Magistrate, the On­
line Ombuds Office,250 and the Internet Good Faith Code E-arbitration™ scheme 251
5.2.3 Impact of New Technologies on the New York Convention
New technologies have already brought many special difficulties into the legal sphere 
such as international commercial arbitration, 252 and the New York Convention.
244 Entores Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corp. [1955] 2 Q.B.. 327 CA. Also see Benjamin Wright, The Law o f  
Electronic Commerce: EDI, Fax and E-mail, Supplement (Little, Brown & Company, Boston 1996) 
15:14.
245 Proposal for a Directive on a Common Framework for Electronic Signatures, Directive 98/0191 of 13 
May 1998.
246 Directive on the Protection o f Consumers in Respect o f Distance Contracts, June 1997, 97/7/EC OJ R 
144/19.
247 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Law 1996.
248 Report o f 19 Oct 1998 in which OFTEL is proposed as the regulator for the virtual marketplace.
249 Such as materials of a pornographic and/or obscene nature.
250 www.ombuds.org
251 www.e-goodfaith.com
252 E-commerce or e-based disputes usually require special legislation or regulatory regime. For instance, 
in relation to the telecoms industry, the EU has a Directive 2002/21 on a common regulatory framework 
for electronic communications and services (Framework Directive); Directive 2002/20 on the 
authorisation o f electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive); Directive 
2002/19 on access to, and interconnection of electronic communications networks and associated
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Questions are being raised about how e-based arbitration is operated and how different 
the arbitration agreement, arbitration process, and arbitration award will be in such an 
arbitration. Arbitration conducted through the Internet would seem to challenge the New 
York Convention regime in various aspects.
The New York Convention requires an “agreement in writing”. This writing 
requirement is reflected in three perspectives. An arbitral clause shall be signed and 
included by the parties in a contract or an arbitration agreement. Alternatively, an 
arbitral clause in a contract or arbitration agreement shall be contained in an exchange 
of letters or telegrams.254 In addition, an award is enforceable only if it is presented as a 
duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy, together with an agreement to 
arbitrate furnished in the same form.255 The reason for imposing the writing 
requirement is mainly to ensure the existence of an arbitral clause or agreement which 
will eventually exclude the jurisdiction of national courts and allow a private method of 
dispute resolution. Nevertheless, the “writing” requirement creates difficulties for 
arbitration clauses in contracts evidenced by certain brokers’ notes, bills of lading, sales 
confirmations, charterparty recaps and other instruments granting rights to non-signing 
parties. Similar difficulties may arise in contracts which include standard written terms 
with an arbitration clause only by reference.256 In addition to the practical difficulty, the 
writing requirement has also given rise to judicial difficulty and multiplicity. Italy is a 
particular illustration for its unduly formalistic approach to the “writing” requirement
9 S7requiring the formal signature of an arbitration provision as a separate agreement. 
The English view seems to support that “the definition is not exhaustive and [is] wide 
enough to cover contracts made by reference to the conditions of sale of the London 
Commodity Markets, provided the contract or an arbitration agreement is signed by the 
parties”.258 A US court parsed Article 11(2) to separate “an arbitral clause in a contract”
facilities (Access Directive); Directive 2002/22 on universal service and users’ rights relating to 
electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive).
253 Article 11(2) of the New York Convention.
254 The requirement o f writing is also contained in Article 7(2) o f UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration, which is described as “contained in a document signed by the 
parties or in an exchange” of communications.
55 Article IV(1) of the New York Convention.
256 Neil Kaplan, ‘Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York Convention and the Model Law 
out of Step with Commercial Practice?’ (1996) 12(1) Arbitration International 27.
257 Michael Kerr, ‘Concord and Conflict in International Arbitration’ (1997) 13(2) Arbitration 
International 121, 135, 139.
258 Explanatory Note in the Fifth Report of the Private International Law Committee (Cmnd. 1515) 26.
77
from an arbitration agreement “signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of 
letters.259 This approach was also adopted by other countries.260
At the first glance, the wide use of email and other modem methods of 
communications has made this “writing” requirement distinctly old-fashioned. Is an 
agreement formed by the exchange of emails an “agreement in writing”? Some 
commentators expressed doubts on this, but more recent writings have suggested that 
email shall not be treated differently from more tangible forms since the essential 
features of an exchange of telegrams may be reproduced via email even though critical 
technical differences between telegrams and emails do exist. Obviously, there is not a 
uniform approach to interpret the “writing” requirement. Because of various 
interpretations of the “writing” requirement, it is questionable whether all courts of the 
enforcement regime would accept the printout of an email message as an “agreement in 
writing” by virtue of Article 11(2) of the New York Convention. The exchange of emails 
to form an arbitration agreement may deserve some special considerations in practice. 
The interpretation of the writing requirement in the New York Convention needs to take 
into account the legislative history of the New York Convention, the purpose of 
enacting such a requirement, the state of technology at the time of drafting the provision, 
and the general trend in defining the “writing” requirement in recent international 
conventions.
It is obvious that the drafters of the New York Convention wished to exclude the 
oral or tacit acceptance of a written proposal to arbitrate. There is evidence that the 
drafters of the New York Convention may have intended the term “agreement in 
writing” to have a uniform interpretation and rejected including unsigned documents 
where the assent of one of the parties had to be implied from its failure to object.263 
However, in view of travaux prepatoires, the drafters did not want to impose on all
259 Sphere Drake Ins. v. Marine Towing 16F. 3d 666 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 155 US Sup. Ct. 195 (1994), 
reprinted in ‘United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 23 March 1994, No. 93-3200, Sphere Drake 
Insurance Pic (UK) v. Marine Towing, Inc. et al.’ (1995) XX Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague/London/Boston) 937-942
260 ‘Supreme Court o f India, 7 October 1993, Renusagar Power Co., Ltd. (India) v. General Electric Co. 
(US)’ (1995) XX Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague/London/Boston) 681-738.
261 Richard Hill, ‘On-line Arbitration: Issues and Solutions’ (1999) 15(2) Arbitration International 199, 
200 .
262 Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation, op. cit. 196.
263 See generally Neil Kaplan, ‘Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York Convention and the 
Model Law out o f Step with Commercial Practice?’ (1996) 12(1) Arbitration International (1996); Ibid, 
Albert Jan van den Berg 172-73.
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parties to the Convention as new principles of contract formation has not been widely 
accepted.264
It seems reasonable to interpret Article 11(2) in a facilitative manner by 
supporting and recognising international contracts concluded by the exchange of 
correspondence. The flexibility of communicating means will facilitate and enhance 
greater chances of international trade 265 The most advanced communication technology 
at the time of drafting and passing the New York Convention was the telegram, which 
was obviously considered and adopted by the delegates of signatory countries. However, 
the New York Convention did not give an exhaustive list of communication 
technologies, which effectively means that future developments in ways to transmit 
written words may be acceptable under the New York Convention. There has been a 
revolution in communications since 1958 when the New York Convention was drawn 
up. Telegrams, a frequent method of communicating a message in writing at that time, 
were largely replaced by telex, and later by fax and now by email. Courts have applied 
Article 11(2) to telexes in several cases and some authorities hold the view that it should 
be extended to facsimiles as well. Technically speaking, an email seems to be much 
more secure than a telegram, which cannot show the identity of its sender. By contrast, 
an email easily displays a sender’s email address and the delivery time. There is no 
technical reason to speculate that the New York Convention would not recognise an 
arbitration clause or agreement made by a more reliable communication technology 
than by telegram.
From a legislative perspective, national laws and international treaties usually 
attempt to accommodate new technologies in commercial activities. The 1986 
Netherlands Arbitration Act requires that the arbitration agreement be proven by an 
instrument in writing expressly or impliedly accepted by the parties.267 The 1988 
Unidroit Convention on International Factoring adopted a broad definition of notice 
which includes but is not limited to “telegrams, telex, and any other communication 
capable of being reproduced in tangible form”. 268 The Swiss Law requires “an 
agreement to be made in writing by telegram, telex, telecopier or by any other means of 
communication which permits it to be evidenced by a text”.269 Unlike the approach to
264 Fothergill v. Monarch Air Lines Ltd [1981] A.C. 251.
265 See Neil Kaplan, ‘Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York Convention and the Model 
Law out o f Step with Commercial Practices?’ op. cit. 27-43.
266 P. Fouchard, E. Gaillard and B. Goldman, Traite de l’arbitrage commercial international (Litec 1996) 
392, no. 618; and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce.
267 The Netherlands Arbitration Act 1986 Article 1021.
268 Article l(4)(b) of the Unidroit Convention on International Factoring.
269 Swiss PIL Act 1987 Article 178(1).
79
define the writing requirement only by reference to the mode of imposition of the 
medium, the UK Arbitration Act 1996 seems to extend the “writing” requirement to
97  ncover “anything being written or in writing ... being recorded by any means”. This 
seems to suggest that arbitration clauses may be in all forms of enforceable written 
contracts. The US Uniform Commercial Code provides that “written or writing” 
includes “printing, typewriting, or any other presentational reduction to tangible
971form”. The common law in the US is also moving in the same direction by accepting 
that an email is a “writing” for contractual matters.272 The national legislation appears to 
be moving towards the relaxation of the formal writing requirement273 In these modem 
laws, there has in effect been a triumph of substance over form. As long as there is some 
written evidence of an agreement to arbitrate, the form in which that agreement is 
recorded is immaterial.274 Due to its flexibility, it is urged that local statutes be adopted 
to expand the definition of arbitration agreements in “writing” for the purpose of
9 7 c
harmonising the “writing” requirement.
The practical trend appears to be that drafters of national laws are willing to
97*
make allowances for the use of new technologies, or to define the writing requirement 
as widely as possible.277 Therefore, it is reasonable to recognise the exchange of email 
messages as a written form for the purposes of conclusion of arbitration agreements. 
However, the legislative flexibility towards email and other modem means of 
communications technology does not guarantee that courts in these jurisdictions will 
recognise and enforce arbitration agreements that are not in a written document signed
270 Section 5(6) of UK Arbitration Act 1996.
271 UCC Section 1-201(46).
272 Richard Hill and Ian Walden, ‘The Draft UNCITRAL Model Law for Electronic Commerce: Issues 
and Solutions’ (1996) 13(3) The Computer Lawyers 18.
273 Landau, “The requirement o f a written form for an arbitration agreement. When “written” is “oral”. 
16th ICCA Congress, May 12-15, 2002 London. It should be pointed out that there remain states such as 
Argentina and Uraguay in which special requirements o f form are imposed in respect of agreements to 
arbitrate. In these two countries, for example, a clause to submit future disputes to arbitration is not 
operative until a submission agreement (or “compromise ”) has been executed. National laws still need to 
be examined to ensure that there is no special requirement imposed on the form of arbitration agreement. 
See Nigel Balckaby, David Lindsey and Alessandro Spinillo, International Arbitration in Latin America 
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003) 12, 31-32 and 73.
274 Kaplan J. ‘Hong Kong: Supreme Court o f Hong Kong, High Court 2 February 1994, Oonc Lines Ltd  v. 
Sino-American Trade Advancement Co. Ltd.’ (1994) 3 Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Law Journal 
291-295; and Kaplan J. ‘Hong Kong: Supreme Court of Hong Kong, High Court 18 August 1994 Aster- 
Reiniger Joint Venture v. Argos Engineering Co. Ltd.' (1995) (4) Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Law 
Journal 41-51.
275 Neil Kaplan, ‘Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York Convention and the Model Law 
out o f Step with Commercial Practice?’ op. cit.
276 Richard Hill & Ian Walden, ‘The Draft UNCITRAL Model Law for Electronic Commerce: Issues and 
Solutions’ (1996) 13(3) Computer Lawyer 18.
277 For example, the English Arbitration Act o f 1996 defines the “writing” as to include an agreement 
made orally, provided that there is reference to a written form which itself contains an agreement to 
arbitrate.
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by the parties or otherwise contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams,278 even 
though it has been argued that courts are usually able to find a way to modernise the 
judicial interpretation and there is no need to cure the problem at the legislative level.279 
The practical difficulty often arises when an arbitral agreement that is regarded as valid 
by an arbitral tribunal or a court in one country (the place of arbitration) may not be 
treated as a valid one by the court in the enforcement country.280 This uncertainty 
justifies a “legislative” solution that the New York Convention be amended to 
overcome the judicial multiplicity.281 For the time being, the Model Law maintains the 
requirement for an arbitration agreement to be “in writing” but sets out a more modem 
definition of this term. It recognises agreements made by any means of 
telecommunication “which provides a record of the agreement”; an exchange of 
statements of claim and defence in which “the existence of an agreement is alleged by 
one party and not denied by another”.282 Therefore, for the purposes of the Model Law, 
the requirement for writing may be satisfied by any means of telecommunication that 
provides “a record of the agreement”.
The writing requirement is always accompanied by the requirement for 
signatures. The function of a signature is the key point of understanding the “writing” 
requirement. A signature no doubt helps identify the parties in the transaction and 
specify the date of documents in the final form. The New York Convention expressly 
requires the signature of both parties where arbitration is conducted on the basis of an 
arbitral agreement or clause.283 This requirement for signature has given rise to 
problems in some states284 because several courts’ decisions have strictly requested the 
signature in the arbitration agreement or clause.285 The arbitration clause or agreement
278 See the decision of the Second Circuit Court o f Appeals in Kahn Lucas Lancaster Inc. v. Lark 
International Ltd  186 F.3d 210 (1999); the US District Court o f the Southern District of California’s 
decision in Chloe Z  Fishing Co. Inc. v Odyssey Re (London) L td  109 F.Supp. 2d 1048 (2000) and the US 
District Court o f the Western District of Washington’s decision in Bothell and Bothell v. Hitachi Zosen 
Corp. 97 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (2000).
279 Gerold Herrmann, ‘Does the World Need Additional Uniform Legislation on Arbitration? The 1998 
Freshfields Lecture’ (1999) 15(3) Arbitration International 211, 215.
280 ‘Halogaland Court o f Appeal, 16 August 1999, Charterer v. Shipowner’ (2002) XXVII Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York) 519.
281 Neil Kaplan, ‘Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York Convention and the Model Law 
out of Step with Commercial Practice?’ op. cit. 44-45.
282 Model Law Article 7(2).
283 Article 11(2) of the New York Convention.
284 Michael Marks Cohen, ‘Arbitration “Agreements in Writing”: Notes in the margin of the Sixth Goff 
Lecture’ (1997) 13(3) Arbitration International 273.
285 William Laurence Craig, William W. Park and Jan Paulsson, International Chamber o f  Commerce 
Arbitration (Oceana Publications and ICC Publishing, New York 1990) 76; Alan Redfem & Martin 
Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit. 135; Albert Jan van den Berg, 
‘Court Decisions on the New York Convention’ in M. Blessing (ed), ASA Special Series No.9 (Zurich 
1996).
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may be problematic if it is concluded by the exchange of email messages or electronic 
data interchange. In reality, notarisation, or authentication and authoritative dating of 
documents now can easily be implemented by using digital signatures and “digital 
notary” services available in the network. Digital signatures can be employed if desired, 
and agreements should also be allowed by clicking on a “submit”, “transmit”, or 
“accept” button on a web site. Modem cryptography can also provide very secure 
methods of authentication. These new technologies may satisfy the signature 
requirement where there is exchange by other means of communications. In the modem 
laws of arbitration the traditional signature requirement will disappear.
According to the doctrine of party autonomy, the parties to arbitration are 
entitled to the use of electronic means for the conduct of arbitral proceedings, which, 
however, brings legal difficulties to the “place of arbitration”. Most legal systems attach 
great importance to the place of arbitration, the connecting point to the governing law of 
arbitration. The arbitration laws of most countries recognise that some hearings, 
testimony of witnesses, meetings of arbitrators, or even actual signature or publication 
of award must occur in the “place of arbitration”. The importance of the “place of 
arbitration” is also reflected in determining the law governing the arbitral procedure. 
The parties to arbitration often fail to specify the governing law of arbitration. In some 
cases, the governing law of arbitration chosen by the parties to arbitration may not 
necessarily cover all aspects of the arbitral procedure. The lack of clear rules on the 
arbitral procedure will require the law of the arbitral seat to govern such issues as the 
validity of the arbitration agreement and the composition of the arbitral panel. The law 
of the arbitral seat is also critical in the setting-aside and enforcement of arbitral awards 
because only a foreign arbitral award can be enforced under the New York Convention. 
In this sense, the place of arbitration or arbitration seat will become extremely important 
if the governing law of arbitration is not specified. In an arbitration case in which each 
party in the hearing is located in different countries, and arbitrators conduct their 
deliberations from three different continents and an award is a multimedia report 
collectively stored in cyberspace, it seems impossible to administer the network from 
any particular country and any judicial intervention on the network will lead to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. The use of email to conduct the proceeding may pose a 
problem as to where the arbitration takes place because of the lack of an identifiable
286 The academic circle has different views on to what extent the parties to arbitration may derogate from 
the law of the arbitral seat as the governing law of arbitral procedure. Filip De Ly, International Business 
Law and Lex Mercatoria (Elsevier Science, North-Holland, Amsterdam, London 1992) 103-05.
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physical seat of arbitration,287 which may essentially result in an unseated, stateless or 
free-floating award.288 The argument has been made that the physical place of hearings 
or other proceedings is of little relevance as the seat of arbitration is often the seat 
chosen by the parties or arbitrators in accordance with applicable arbitration law and 
rules.289 The courts seem to support this view by placing little significance on the seat of 
arbitration in setting aside an arbitral award.290 This line of argument is consistent with 
the long-held judicial viewpoint that arbitration can take place anywhere and the seat of 
arbitration would be the seat specified by the parties in the arbitration agreement or 
determined in accordance with the applicable arbitration rules regardless of the location 
of hearings or exchange of writings.291 More controversially, the use of emails in 
conducting arbitral proceedings may also result in the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over international commercial arbitration, which is contrary to the principles 
of the New York Convention to encourage the contractual freedom and party autonomy 
outside of the national judicial system. The use of networks and other modem 
telecommunication technologies will necessarily lead to the dissolution of national legal 
boundaries, which may inevitably result in more forum shopping. 292 Due to the 
uncertainty of online arbitration, the suggestion was made to amend the New York 
Convention and national arbitration laws.293
The fact that deliberations take place exclusively online or through a 
combination of communications media would interfere with the designation of a “seat 
of arbitration”. Designating a formal place of arbitration can be achieved through one 
traditional solution, that is, lex loci arbitri. The place of arbitrator or arbitral panel will
287 Alan Redfem and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit. 
(1991) 95 note 89; Jasna Arsic, ‘International Commercial Arbitration on the Internet’ (1997) 14(4) 
Journal o f International Arbitration 219.
288 Gerold Herrmann, ‘Does the World Need Additional Uniform Legislation on Arbitration?’ (1999) 15(3) 
Arbitration International 232.
289 Richard Hill, ‘The Internet, Electronic Commerce, and Dispute Resolution: Comments’ (1997) 14 (4) 
Journal o f International Arbitration 103.
290 Bundesgericht, I. Zivilabteilung, TAG  v. H  Company (24 March 1997) in [1997] ABA Bulletin 2, 329- 
30.
291 Philippe Fouchard, Emmanuel Gaillard and Berthold Goldman, Traite de 1‘Arbitrage Commercial 
International (Litec, Paris 1996) 785; Lord Justice Saville, ‘1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill’ (1997) 
13(3) Arbitration International 281.
292 Advanced telecommunication facilities allow a meeting of people for the “live” exchange of 
arguments and testimony. For instance, chat rooms, virtual spaces created by computer software, allow 
each party working at network-connected computer to type messages that are broadcast to all other parties 
in the chat room. All parties can read whatever is typed by each party and can make contributions to the 
conversation by typing his own transcript. “Video conferencing” software further permits multi-parties to 
hear audio signals and see photos or full motion video.
293 Frank A. Cona, ‘Internet Arbitration o f International Commercial Disputes’ (1996) available at 
http://www.ipwarehouse.com/IP_Library/general_articles/arb_art.htm, and ‘Application of Online 
Systems in Alternative Dispute Resolution’ (1997) available at 
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be regarded as the place of arbitration. Regardless of the floating/movable nature of the 
arbitrator or arbitral panel,294 e-arbitration may increase the difficulty in applying the 
principle of lex loci arbitri. In e-arbitration, the place of arbitration can be determined 
by the rule of “lex loci s e r v e r the geographical location of the computer server through
9QSwhich arbitration takes place. Nevertheless, the rule of lex loci arbitri or lex loci 
server may not guarantee the certainty of jurisdiction. In Hiscox v. Outhwaite, the 
House of Lords accepted the fact that the arbitral award was signed in Paris constituted 
the basis for finding that the whole arbitral procedure took place in Paris even though 
the hearing was held in London.296
Along with the popularity of e-commerce, it is foreseeable that the parties in 
international business will prefer their disputes to be arbitrated through the same media 
as which they do their business. Due to the obvious advantages of e-arbitration, arbitral 
awards made on the Internet will eventually become more common. The purpose of law 
is not only to regulate the current situation but also to provide feasible solutions to 
future developments. The traditional “writing” requirement and the long established 
territorially based principles such as lex loci arbitri will be no longer suitable for the
907critical changes brought out by email and/or Internet. We need to adapt territorially 
based arbitration rules into a virtually based environment. A feasible solution may be to 
re-invent traditional arbitration rules to fiction type of rules (e.g., rule of fiction place) 
under the auspices of UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT or other international institutions. The 
recognition of such rules will lead to a wider or even uniform adoption and better 
facilitation of international trade and business in cyberspace. Without new-generation 
rules adaptable to cyberspace, a new wave of forum shopping (or cyber-shopping) will 
naturally emerge.
6. N e w  D ir e c t io n  o f  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  C o n v e n t io n
When the New York Convention was signed in 1958, shortly after the end of World 
War II, it represented a great step in the direction of international co-operation. The 
Convention has served the international community well since then. Almost 60 years
294 There are several factors which can be used to determine the location o f arbitrator such as the place at 
the commencement of arbitration procedure, place of domicile or residence of arbitrator, the place of 
chairman of arbitral panel, the place of arbitral organ, etc.
295 Technically speaking, it may not be desirable to use the choice o f “server” as the connecting factor 
because multiple servers can be used in the process of arbitration and can be anywhere on the globe.
296 [1991] 3 W.L.R. 297; ‘House of Lords, 24 July 1991, Richard Henry Moffit Outhwaite v. Robert 
Ralph Scrymgeour Hiscox’ Hiscox v. Outhwaite’ (1992) XVII Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer & Boston) 599-609.
297 Matthew Burstein, ‘Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational Cyberspace’ (1996) 29(1) 
Vanderbilt J. Trans. L 75-116.
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later, some adjustments to new developments, legal, technological, political and 
economic, seem to be more than necessary. Immense commitment needs to be made so 
that the sensible solutions to difficult problems would be found. In the 21st century, it is 
fair to expect, with great excitement, that current projects of UNCITRAL including the 
extensive work on the writing requirement will produce good results.
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CHAPTER 3 ENFORCEMENT OF ANNULLED AWARDS, 
DELOCALISATION AND GAME THEORY
This chapter explores the issue as to whether it is desirable to enforce an award under 
the New York Convention even though the award has been set aside in the state where it 
is rendered. This issue is an important one in the context of the New York Convention, 
other similar conventions1 and national arbitration laws2 modelled on the New York 
Convention. A thorough analysis of this issue requires an in depth review of Articles V 
and VII of the New York Convention.
Part 1 of this chapter involves a detailed analysis of the two most well-known 
cases on this topic. The cases of Hilmarton and Chromalloy provide an overview of the 
legal issues involved in this debate, from perspectives of both the state of origin and the 
state of enforcement. Part 2 discusses the technical and doctrinal sides of the New York 
Convention, inter alia, Articles V and VII. An innovative analysis of legal and policy 
issues on this topic is contained in Part 3 by reference to game theory, which has been 
widely adopted in other legal areas such as environment protection. For this purpose, a 
theoretical introduction of game theory is first provided. Game theory is useful to 
illustrate in Part 4 the doctrinal issue of the degree of independence of arbitral 
proceedings from the law of the arbitral situs. Part 5 touches upon the issue of 
“delocalisation” which has been partially addressed in Chapter 2. Before concluding this 
chapter, Part 6 reviews the goals of the New York Convention. A summary follows at 
the end.
1. F r o m  H il m a r t o n  t o  Ch r o m a l l o y : C a s e  L a w  S t u d y
In relation to enforcement of foreign awards which have been set aside in the country of 
origin on the basis of the New York Convention, Belgium took an early step. In respect 
of an award rendered in Algiers which an Algerian court had declared to lack force and 
effect, the Court of First Instance in Brussels held that the New York Convention did 
not apply to the lack of retroactive effect but granted enforcement, as in its view the
1 For instance, the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama, 30 
January 1975); UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as well as some 
bilateral treaties such as the Convention concerning the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judicial Decisions, Arbitral Awards and Authentic Acts in Civil and Commercial Matters (between 
Belgium and Austria).
2 UK Arbitration Act (1996).
3 See ‘Tribunal de premiere instance [Court o f First Instance] of Brussels, 6 December 1988, Societe 
National pour la Recherche, le Transport et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures (Sonatrach) (Algeria) 
v. Ford, Bacon and Davis Inc.’ (1990) XV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, Deventer, Boston) 370-377; Cour d’Appeal of Brussels, 9 January 1990, cited in William W. 
Park, ‘Illusion and Reality in International Forum Selection’ (1995) 30 Texas Int’l L J 135, 180, n. 274.
86
decision by the Algerian court was not a decision relating to the setting aside of the 
award.4
In a decision of 26 May 1994, affirmed on 26 July 1995 by the Court of Appeal 
of Zurich, the Court of First Instance of Affoltem am Albis, Switzerland, refused to 
grant recognition and enforcement to an award issued in Ankara after an action to set 
aside the award had been rejected by the Turkish Supreme Court on 14 July 1992. The 
Court of First Instance noted that the arbitral clause in the underlying contract violated 
Swiss public policy and rejected the application to enforce the award pursuant to Article 
V(2)(b) of the New York Convention. The Court reasoned that, under Swiss law, the 
principle of independence and impartiality of the arbitrator pertains to the fundamental 
requirements of legal protection and public policy. The Court opined that the fact that (i) 
the underlying contact contained a clause referring all disputes to Dr E. as a sole 
arbitrator when Dr E. himself was the drafter of the contact and had been the claimant’s 
lawyer for many years; and (ii) the contract provided that the sole arbitrator could not be 
removed under any circumstances otherwise subject to a penalty of Swiss Francs 1 
million, violated bonos mores.5
There is no uniform practice of enforcing an annulled award in major 
jurisdictions. The “traditional approach” is that a vacated award is not enforceable in 
another jurisdiction. Germany adopts this approach whereby the courts usually refuse 
the recognition and enforcement of awards in a manner that is responsive to the review 
process by national courts of the situs.6 Enforcement can be granted under English law 
where the award has in fact been annulled in the country in which it was made. Under 
French law, arbitral awards shall be recognised if their existence is proven by the party
o
relying on it and the award satisfies French standards of enforcing arbitral awards. The
4 ‘Tribunal de premiere instance [Court of First Instance] of Brussels, 6 December 1988, Societe National 
pour la Recherche, le Transport et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures (Sonatrach) (Algeria) v. Ford, 
Bacon and Davis Inc.’ (1990) XV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, Deventer, Boston) 370-377
5 ‘Switzerland-Bezirksgericht [Court of First Instance], Affoltem am Albis, 26 May 1994, (1998) XXIII 
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, The Hague/London/Boston) 
754-763.
6 See Erica Smith, ‘Vacated Arbitral Awards: Recognition and Enforcement Outside the Country of 
Origin’ (2002) 20 B. U. Int’l L.J. 355. Also see Zivilprozebetaordnung [German Code of Civil Procedure], 
Section 1061 of which states that “i f  the award is set aside abroad after having been declared enforceable, 
the application for setting aside the declaration of enforceability may be made”. An unofficial translation 
by the German Institute of Arbitration (DIS) and the German Federal Ministry of Justice is available at 
http://www.dis-arb.de (last visited 21 November 2002).
7 Article 103(2) of the English Arbitration Act 1996; Jason C.T. Chuah, Law o f  International Trade 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London 1998) 413.
8 Article 1498 of the new Code o f Civil Procedure. See also ‘Cour de Cassation [Supreme Court], 23 
March 1994, Hilmarton Ltd. (UK) v. Omnium de traitement et de valorization -  OTV (France)’ (1995) 
XX Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer & Boston 1996)
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existence of an arbitral award is established by the production of its original text 
together with the arbitration agreement, or by copies of the said documents 
accompanied by proof of their authenticity.9 As a general rule, sophisticated commercial 
parties have the certainty that enforcement in France is a possibility regardless of 
annulment elsewhere.10
1.1 Hilmarton Saga in France
The Hilmarton case is unprecedented in the sense that various court judgments led to 
two contradictory arbitral awards between the same parties being recognised in 
France.11
The Hilmarton case began with an ICC arbitration in Geneva by Hilmarton Ltd., 
a UK company, against Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation (“OTV”), a French 
company. Hilmarton initiated the arbitration proceeding in order to recover a fee 
allegedly owed by OTV under a consultancy agreement between the parties for 
Hilmarton’s services to assist OTV in obtaining a contract in Algeria. In the arbitral
663-665 (enforcing an award in France that was vacated in Switzerland); Arab Republic o f  Egypt v. 
Chromalloy Aeroservices, Inc. (Cour d ’Appel Paris 14 January 1997) in ‘United States District Court, 
District o f Columbia, 31 July 1996, Civil No. 94-2339 (JLG) Chromalloy Aeroservices Inc. (US) v. The 
Arab Republic o f Egypt’ (1997) XXII Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, Deventer, Boston) 1001; Pabalk Ticaret Sirketi v. Norsolar S.A. (Cour de cassation 9 
November 1984) in Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Introductory Note: France: Court o f Cassation Decision in 
Pabalk Ticaret v. Norsolor (Enforcement o f Arbitral Awards; Lex Mercatoria) (October 9, 1984)’ (1985) 
24(1-3) International Legal Materials 360-64 (enforcing in France an award vacated in part in Austria); 
SEEE  v. Yugoslavia (Cour d’Appel Rouen 13 November 1984) in Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Introductory Note: 
France: Court o f Cassation Decision in Pabalk Ticaret v. Norsolor (Enforcement of Arbitral Awards; Lex 
Mercatoria) (October 9, 1984)’ (1985) 24(1-3) International Legal Materials 360-64 (enforcing in France 
an award vacated in Switzerland); Ministere Tunisien de I Equipment v. Societe Bee Freres (Cour 
d’Appel 24 February 1994) (enforcing in France an award vacated in Tunisia), cited in David W. Rivkin,
‘The Enforcement o f Awards Nullified in the Country o f Origin: The American Experience’ in Albert Jan
van den Berg (ed), Improving the Efficiency o f  Arbitration Agreement and Awards: 40 Years o f  
Application o f  The New York Convention (Kluwer Law International, the Netherlands 1999) 528, 534 
n.38; see also Sonatrach v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc. (Tribunal de Premiere Instance of Brussels 6 
December 1988) in ‘Tribunal de premiere instance [Court o f First Instance] o f Brussels, 6 December 
1988, Societe National pour la Recherche, le Transport et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures 
(Sonatrach) (Algeria) v. Ford, Bacon and Davis Inc.’ (1990) XV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer, Boston) 370-377 (enforcing in Belgium an award 
vacated in Algiers). See Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Enforcement of Awards Set Aside in the Country of Origin: 
The French Experience’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed) Improving The Efficiency o f  Arbitration 
Agreement and Awards: 40 Years o f  Application o f  the New York Convention, op. cit. 505; Bruno Leurent, 
‘Reflections on the International Effectiveness of Arbitration Awards’ (1996) 12 ARB. INT’L 269, 270; 
see also Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘New York Convention of 1958 Consolidated Commentary Cases 
Reported in Vol. XVII (1992) -  XIX (1994)’ (1994) 19 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law 
& Taxation Publisher, Deventer & Boston) 475, 592 (“If  an award is set aside in the country o f origin, a 
party still can try its luck in France”).
Article 1499 of the new Code of Civil Procedure.
10 See P Fouchard, L’Arbitrage International en France aprds le Decret du 12 mai 1981, 109 J.D.I. (1982) 
374, 419. That level o f certainty should be acceptable for planning business contracts decisions. See 
Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Routledge Press, UK 1944) Ch. VI; Joseph Raz, ‘The Rule of 
Law and its Virtue’ (1977) 93 L Q Rev 195, 198, 204, 210.
11 The two decisions of the Court of Appeal of Versailles of 29 June 1995, Rev. Arb., 1995, 639.
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proceedings under ICC Rules in Geneva, the sole arbitrator issued an award which 
denied Hilmarton’s claim for payment against OTV on the ground that the contract was 
contrary to bonos mores and, hence, unenforceable. OTV then tried to bring the award 
to France for its exequatur. Prior to the French court’s ruling on OTV’s application, the 
award was annulled on 17 November 1989 by the Canton of Geneva Court of Justice
19(Cour de Justice du Canton de Geneve), an appellate court, for “arbitrariness”. The 
annulment was later confirmed on 17 April 1990 by the Swiss Federal Tribunal 
(Tribunal federal Suisse), the Swiss supreme court.13
Notwithstanding these annulment procedures, the Paris Tribunal of First 
Instance (Tribunal de grande instance de Paris) on 27 February 1990 granted OTV’s 
application for exequatur of the award. The Court of Appeal in Paris (Cour d’appel de 
Paris) upheld the enforcement by rejecting Hilmarton’s appeal of the exequatur. This 
decision was confirmed on 23 March 1994 by the Court of Cassation (Cour de 
Cassation), which held that, as the annulment of an international arbitral award in its 
country of origin, unlike under Article V of the New York Convention, is not a ground 
for refusing its enforcement in France under French law,14 OTV was entitled to avail 
itself of the more favourable internal law in France and hence obtain the enforcement of 
the award pursuant to Article VII of the New York Convention.15 France eventually 
enforced a Swiss award previously vacated by a Swiss court.16 In summary, the French 
court’s approach was that a vacated award is nonetheless enforceable in France
17provided it satisfies French standards of enforcing arbitral awards.
After the annulment of the ICC award by the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the dispute 
was resubmitted by Hilmarton to a new arbitration panel against OTV in Geneva for the 
same claim. A new award was rendered on 10 April 1992 but in favour of Hilmarton
1 ftthis time. Contrary to the finding of the first arbitrator, a different arbitrator decided
12 Judgment o f 17 November 1989, Rev. Arb., 1993, 214.
13 Judgment o f 17 April 1990, Rev. Arb., 1993, 315.
14 Article 1502 of the New Code of Civil Procedure.
15 Article VII of the New York Convention states that: “[t]he provisions o f the present Convention shall 
not ... deprive any interested party of any right he may have to avail him self o f an arbitral award in the
manner and to the extent allowed by the law ... o f the country where such award is sought to be relied
upon”.
1 Societe Hilmarton v. Societe O. T. V.
17 See Hilmarton Ltd. v. Omnium de traitement et de valorization (OTV) (Cour de cassation 23 March 
1994), in ‘Cour de Cassation [Supreme Court], 23 March 1994, Hilmarton Ltd. (UK) v. Omnium de 
traitement et de valorization -  OTV (France)’ (1995) XX Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 
Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer & Boston) 663-665 (enforcing an award in France that was 
vacated in Switzerland).
18 See Hamid G. Gharavi, ‘A Nightmare Called Hilmarton’ (1997) Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep 22 and Hamid 
G. Gharavi, ‘Enforcing Set Aside Awards: France’s Controversial Steps Beyond the New York 
Convention’ (1996) 6 J. Transn Law & Pol 93.
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that the contract in question was enforceable and Hilmarton was entitled to its fee from 
OTV. Hilmarton then went with the new award to France to request its exequatur, 
which was granted by a court of first instance in Nanterre, notwithstanding the existing 
order of exequatur in respect of the first award. OTV then filed an appeal in respect of 
the new order of exequatur before the Versailles Court of Appeal and argued that the 
second order of exequatur was inconsistent with the first one, which had already 
acquired res judicata effect. Moreover, the recognition of two contradictory decisions 
would be contrary to French international public policy. The Versailles Court of Appeal 
rejected the appeal.19 The second order of exequatur was left intact. The French 
approach to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards precluded 
consideration of the revised status of the first award, and left Hilmarton with no 
possibility of recovery in France on the second, arguably “correct” award.
1.2 Chromalloy Case: a Dilemma
The US District Court for the District of Columbia in In the Matter o f the Arbitration o f 
Certain Controversies between Chromalloy Aeroservices and the Arab Republic o f  
Egypt allowed the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award set aside in its country of 
origin. The decision is often described as “a major victory for supporters of binding 
international arbitration”.21
The dispute arose out of a contract between Egypt and Chromalloy Aeroservices, 
Inc., a US company, as to the supply, maintenance and repair of a fleet of Sea King 
Commando helicopters owned by the Egyptian Air Force. The total contract price was 
US$ 32 million, with a commencement date of 3 December 1988 and a three-year term. 
On 2 December 1991, the Egyptian Air Force informed Chromalloy that it regarded the 
contract as terminated because the three-year term had expired. Chromalloy, however, 
responded to the Egyptian Air Force that it did “not accept the notice of cancellation” 
(attributing the delay of performance to obstruction by the Air Force) and commenced
99arbitration proceedings. The contract contained an arbitration clause according to 
which the dispute shall be submitted for arbitration pursuant to “Egyptian laws” and 
“Cairo is the seat of court of arbitration”. Furthermore, the parties agreed that the 
decision shall be final and binding and cannot be made subject to any appeal or other 
recourse. Chromalloy initiated the arbitration proceeding against Egypt for damages
19 See two decisions of the Court of Appeal o f Versailles of 29 June 1995, Rev. Arb., 1995, 639.
20 Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic o f  Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996)
21 See Gary H. Sampliner, ‘Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards after Annulment in their Country of 
Origin’ (1996) 11 Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep 22.
22 Chromalloy Aero-Services v. Arab Republic o f  Egypt (1996) 11(8) Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep C-l note 32.
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caused by the alleged improper termination of the contract. The arbitral tribunal on 24 
August 1994 rendered an award in favour of Chromalloy,23 and a majority of the arbitral 
tribunal found Egypt to be liable for the breach of contract to Chromalloy for 
approximately US$16 million plus interest. Although the Egyptian party participated 
without objection in the arbitration proceeding, it subsequently applied to the Court of 
Appeal of Cairo to set aside the award under Article 53(1) of the Egyptian Law of 
Arbitration 1994 which was largely modelled on the UNCITRAL Model Law.24
According to Article 53(1) of the Egyptian Law of Arbitration 1994, Egypt 
argued that the arbitral tribunal had mistakenly “applied the rules of the Egyptian Civil 
Code to the exclusion of the administrative law” of Egypt,25 although the contract in 
question was allegedly an administrative contract. The Court of Appeal in Cairo agreed 
with that contention and later set aside the award in December 1995 on the grounds that 
the arbitral tribunal “failed to apply the law agreed upon by the parties to govern the 
subject matter in dispute”. The court opined that the tribunal should have applied 
Egyptian administrative law, which was agreed upon by the parties when entering into 
an arbitration clause. The parties’ agreement that the award was not subject to appeal 
did not preclude the action to vacate the award in Egypt because under Egyptian law the 
grounds for vacating awards are mandatory rules.26 Regardless of the annulment of the 
award by the Court of Appeal in Cairo, Chromalloy sought to enforce the award against 
assets of Egypt in France and the United States. The US District Court for the District of 
Columbia decided to enforce the arbitral award. So did the French court.27
The District Court reasoned that:
“Under the New York Convention, ‘recognition and enforcement of the award 
may be refused’ if Egypt furnishes to this Court ‘proof that ... the award has 
been set aside ... by a competent authority of the country in which, or under 
the law of which, that award was made”.28
23 The arbitration in Cairo was conducted by a prestigious international arbitral tribunal under the 
chairmanship of Dr Robert Briner, a former President o f the Iran-US Claims Tribunal.
24 Egypt added as a possible ground for the annulment of an international award made in Egypt, that is, 
the arbitrator’s failure to apply the law that the parties had agreed to the dispute. See Article 53(l)(d).
25 The arbitration panel held that it did not need to decide whether the contract was governed by Egyptian 
civil or administrative law. ‘Final Award in the Arbitration o f Chromalloy Aero-Services and Arab 
Republic of Egypt’ (1996) 11(8) Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep C -l, 17.
26 Law No. 27 Concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters (Egypt), Art. 54(1), in Egypt, I 
International Council for Commercial Arbitration, International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration, at 
Annex 1-1, 1-14 (“The admissibility o f the action for annulment shall not be prevented by the applicant’s 
renouncement of the right to request the annulment of the award prior to the making of the arbitral 
award”).
27 The Paris Court o f Appeal allowed the enforcement in France of the arbitral award in Chromalloy 
notwithstanding its annulment in Egypt (judgment o f 14 January 1997) (1997) 12(4) Mealey’s Int’l Arb 
Rep B-3.
28 New York Convention Articles A (l) and V(l)(e).
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Of particular importance to our discussion here, the District Court continued that:
"... the award was made in Egypt, under the laws of Egypt, and has been 
nullified by the court designated by Egypt to review arbitral awards. Thus, the 
[District] Court may, at its discretion, decline to enforce the award. While 
Article V provides a discretionary standard, Article VII of the Convention 
requires that, ‘the provisions of the present Convention shall not ... deprive 
any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral 
award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law ... of the country 
where such award is sought to be relied upon’. 9 U.S.C. §201. In other words, 
under the New York Convention, Chromalloy maintains all rights to the 
enforcement of this arbitral award that it would have in the absence of the New 
York Convention. Accordingly, the Court finds that, if the New York 
Convention did not exist, the US Federal Arbitration Act would provide 
Chromalloy with a legitimate claim to enforcement of this arbitral award. See 
9 U.S.C.§§ 1-14”.29
The Court noted that “the parties agreed to apply Egyptian Law to the arbitration, 
but, more important, they agreed that the arbitration ends with the decision of the 
arbitral panel”.30 This seems to suggest that the Court considers the arbitral award final 
and binding and therefore valid under US law.31
As to Egypt’s request to grant res judicata effect, the Court’s analysis of the 
relevant US law is confined to an examination of the grounds for vacating an award in 
the US under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, although, on its face, Section 10 
has nothing to do with the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Section 10 merely 
sets out the grounds upon which an award made in the United States may be vacated, 
which are not the same as the grounds for refusing enforcement.32 The Court therefore 
concluded “that the award is valid as a matter of US law”. The Court further concluded 
that it “need not grant res judicata effect to the decision of the Egyptian Court of 
Appeal at Cairo”.33 As a result, the Court granted Chromalloy’s petition to recognise 
and enforce the arbitral award.
The right to appeal is one aspect of Chromalloy that calls for analysis. In 
refusing to recognise the judgment of the Egyptian Court, the US District Court held 
that the parties were precluded from applying to the Egyptian courts for the award’s
29 ‘United States District Court, District o f Columbia, 31 July 1996, Civil No. 94-2339 (JLG) Chromalloy 
Aeroservices Inc. (US) v. The Arab Republic of Egypt’ (1997) XXII Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer, Boston 1998) 1001.
30 939 F. Supp. at 912.
31 See the decision in 939 F. Supp. 907 and in Arthur T. von Mehren, Tibor Varady and John J. Barcelo, 
International Commercial Arbitration: A Transnational Perspective (West Group, St. Paul 1999) 784.
32 It is doubtful that a US court would have had any authority to vacate the arbitrators’ award as the award 
was made in Egypt under Egyptian law. See International Standard Electric Corporation v. Bridas 
Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial Commercial, 745 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
33 939 F. Supp. at 914.
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annulment and that, in making such an application, Egypt repudiated “its solemn 
promise to abide by the results of the arbitration”. The District Court observed that the 
parties had provided in the arbitration clause that the award could not “be made subject 
to any appeal or other recourse”. The Court then brought the public policy issue into 
consideration. In the District Court’s view, “the US public policy in favour of final and 
binding arbitration of commercial disputes is unmistakable, and supported by treaty, by 
statute, and by case law. The Federal Arbitration Act and the implementation of the 
Convention in the same year by amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act, demonstrate 
that there is an emphatic federal policy in favour of arbitral dispute resolution, 
particularly in the field of international commerce. A decision by this Court to recognise 
the decision of the Egyptian court would violate this clear US public policy”.34
In Chromalloy, the District Court enforced the award even though it had been 
vacated in Egypt. However, other courts in the United States have not followed its lead. 
In two subsequent cases,35 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
and the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York refused to 
enforce vacated awards and distinguished Chromalloy on the grounds that in neither 
case did the parties violate any promise not to appeal the arbitration award.36 Therefore, 
enforcement of a vacated award, or the Chromalloy approach, is not the entirety of the 
US approach. Rather, the Chromalloy ruling was conditional upon (i) the arbitration 
clause explicitly providing that any award “cannot be made subject to any appeal or 
other recourse”; and (ii) by having the award vacated, Egypt failed to abide by the 
arbitral award. The other two cases, however, did not contain such elements.37 In this 
sense, the Chromalloy approach, indeed, treats vacated awards as unenforceable in the 
US, unless the award satisfies American standards for enforcing arbitral awards and the 
parties agreed in their contract that the arbitral award would not be subject to appeal.38
34 9 39 F. Supp. at 913.
35 Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999); Spier v. Calzaturificio 
Tecnica, S.p.A., 71 F. Supp. 2d 279, on reargument, 77 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
36 In Baker Marine, the court o f appeals also distinguished Chromalloy on the grounds that “Baker 
Marine is not a United States citizen, and it did not initially seek confirmation of the award in the United 
States” . These distinctions seem unimportant. The court emphasised that the agreement language in 
Chromalloy, prohibiting appeal o f the arbitral award, was not present in Baker Marine. Also, the parties’ 
agreement did not mention US arbitration law, which shall play no role in the resolution of the dispute. 
Without better reasons than those given by Baker Marine, the Court was unwilling to apply US law under 
Article VII. 191 F.3d at 197 n.3.
37 Baker Marine, 191 F.3d at 197 n.3; Spier, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 287 and 191 F.3d at 197 n.3.
38 See In re Chromalloy Aeroservices, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996); Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. 
Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999); Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica, S.p.A., 71 F. Supp. 2d 
279, on reargument, 77 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) 
Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999); Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica, S.p.A., 71 F. Supp. 2d 279, on 
reargument, 77 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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In substance, the Chromalloy approach recognises party autonomy to solve their 
disputes through the contractual arrangement. Accordingly, the parties can choose either 
to contract for judicial supervision of the arbitral award at the arbitral situs or to opt for 
a rule of enforceability in the enforcement situs.
2. A r t ic l e s  V a n d  VII o f  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  C o n v e n t io n  
The US District Court which decided to enforce the Chromalloy award notwithstanding 
its annulment by the Egyptian courts based its decision upon Articles V and VII of the 
New York Convention acting in tandem. One critical issue here is how to interpret 
Articles V and VII of the New York Convention, which requires various approaches.
Article V(l)(e) of the New York Convention reads:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused ... only if the 
party against which the award is invoked furnishes to the competent 
authority where the recognition and enforcement are sought, proof that:
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside 
or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under 
the law of which, that award was made ...
At first glance, Article V(l)(e) of the New York Convention does not seem to be 
compatible with the whole regime of the New York Convention. Subsections (a) to (d) 
lay down grounds for refusal of enforcement which are intrinsic to the awards or 
proceedings and authorise the court in the enforcement forum to examine afresh the 
regularity of the awards. They work in tandem and form a semi-integrated legal regime. 
Subsection (e), however, refers to an extrinsic factor, annulment by a court in the 
jurisdiction in which or under the law of which the award is rendered. The finality of an 
award is the major concern of this subsection, which indirectly or potentially opens the 
door for judicial review over the content of the award or the arbitral proceeding. The 
court may guard against lack of due process, fraud, corruption or other improper 
conduct on the part of the arbitral tribunal. However, the New York Convention has not 
make it clear how far this judicial control should go and whether it should be limited to 
the first grounds in subsections (a) to (d). On the other hand, if one takes the view that 
the New York Convention authorises a judge to exercise his discretion to grant 
enforcement of an award when one (or more) of the grounds listed in Article V(l)(a) to 
(d) is/are present, then it must be appreciated that the Convention also authorises a 
judge to exercise his discretion to grant enforcement of an award that has been set aside
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on the ground of Article V(l)(e).39 The text of the Convention may not justify treating 
ground (e) any differently from grounds (a) to (d). If Article V, as a whole, is read as 
leaving a discretion to the court for granting enforcement to foreign awards 
notwithstanding the presence of one (or more) of die grounds listed therein, 
enforcement of annulled awards would also be permissible and warranted by the virtue 
of Article V.
Technically speaking, Article V(l)(e) is a lex specialis on res judicata. Its logic 
is premised on some specifics. First, the courts of the country of rendition and/or of the 
country of the law under which arbitration is conducted and the courts of the country of 
enforcement are internationally competent. These two countries must adopt similar 
substantive and/or procedural standards in the field of international commercial 
arbitration. The similarity or compatible levels of the court systems, even though in 
different jurisdictions, may facilitate the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 
of each other. Second, the annulment proceeding has a collateral effect under Article 
V(l)(e),40 which has to be reflected in another jurisdiction where an award is sought to 
be enforced so that the refusal of enforcement of an annulled award can be legitimised. 
Third, the realisation of the collateral effect depends on the exertion of the discretionary 
power by the enforcing court according to its own standards. The collateral effect would 
not be given in an enforcement forum to a decision of the courts contemplated by 
Article V(l)(e) if the enforcement forum uses its “may” discretion under Article V(l), 
or Article VII if Article V(l) fails to apply in part or in its entirety,41 to grant 
enforcement.
A collateral effect needs a margin of residual discretion to be given to an 
enforcing court. It has been argued that Article V leaves discretion to the judge in the 
country where enforcement of an arbitral award is sought even when one (or more) of 
the grounds listed in Article V(l) are present42 The discussion that has been and is still 
intense among commentators focuses on whether the word “may” really means the 
enforcing judge has a discretionary power to grant enforcement notwithstanding the 
presence of one or several grounds listed in Article V(l), or whether it actually means
39 Albert Jan van den Berg holds a different view. See Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Enforcement of 
Annulled Awards?’ (1998) 9(2) The ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin 18.
40 This is consistent with the scope defined in Article I o f the New York Convention.
41 See Adam Samuel, The Jurisdictional Problems in International Commercial Arbitration (Schulthess, 
Zurich 1989) 307-308.
42 Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, the Netherlands 1981) 265 and Jan Paulsson, 
‘Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding a Local Standard Annulment’ (1998) 9(1) The ICC 
International Court o f Arbitration Bulletin 14-17.
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“shall” and leaves the enforcing judge no discretionary power at all. The argument 
arises because Article V is not formulated in the same way in all of the equally authentic 
versions of the New York Convention. Among five languages, the Russian, Chinese and 
Spanish versions are non-conclusive first-hand evidence for or against the English 
version.43 There is an obvious linguistic discrepancy between English and French 
versions of the New York Convention 44 The English version provides in Article V(l) 
that “recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused” so that the competent 
courts of the state in which enforcement is sought are not obliged to refuse enforcement 
if the provision of subsection (e) or any other item of Article V is fulfilled, but leaves 
the discretion with the enforcing court. The French text reads as “La reconnaissance et 
Vexecution de la sentence ne seront refuses ... que s i...” which neither excludes nor 
includes any discretion 45 One argument is that the word “may” indeed enables but does 
not mandate the enforcing court to use its own discretion in enforcing or refusing to 
enforce an annulled award, if one of those grounds is found to be in existence in a case. 
Although the English and French versions differ from each other, to some extent they 
are compatible. As the text stands, a margin of discretion is accommodated, which is 
reflected in its indicative mode and negative formulation 46 Paulsson also argued that in 
four of five authentic versions of the New York Convention, a textual interpretation 
leads to the conclusion that the discretion is given and can be exerted under Article V.47 
The counter argument, however, is that the English text “may be refused only if ...” is 
the same as “may not be refused unless”, which exactly resembles the French version. 
Therefore, this leaves no room for discretion as it addresses exclusively the situation
43 The Russian and Spanish versions, like the English version, use the expressions “may be refused". The 
Chinese version on this point is relative neutral and the term can be interpreted as either “may be” or “can 
be”.
44 Another well-known linguistic discrepancy in the New York Convention is Article 11(2). The English 
version reads that “the term ‘agreement in writing’ shall include certain forms of agreement” whilst the 
French text apparently limits the valid forms of agreement in writing to those enumerated in Article 11(2) 
by providing that “On entend par ‘convention ecrite’ [those forms]”. The Spanish and Chinese versions 
are closer to the French version. Russian version sides the line with the English version.
45 In the French version, Article V provides that “enforcement will not be refused ... unless . ..”, from 
which it might be inferred that enforcement will be refused if one of the stated grounds applies. On other 
occasions, the English and French versions seem to be close. For instance, the English text of Article V(2) 
reads that “recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused;” while the French text 
o f Article V(2) reads: “La reconnaissance et l’execution d’une sentence arbitrale pourront aussi etre 
refuses s i...”, which literally means that “recognition and enforcement o f an arbitral award may also be 
refused if .. .”
46 The French term did not provide “auxquels cas elles seront refuses” at the end of Article V (l). This 
way of interpretation is also supported by Article 27 of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement o f Judgment in Civil and Commercial Matters, the English version o f which similarly reads 
“shall not be recognised i f ’ while the French text adopted “ne sont pas reconnues si”.
47 Jan Paulsson, ‘Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding a Local Standard Annulment’ op. cit.
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where none of the grounds exists whereby the judge must or shall enforce an arbitral 
award.48
The New York Convention did not explicitly state that the discretion conferred 
upon the courts to enforce awards notwithstanding the presence of one (or more) of the 
grounds listed in Article V(l) did not apply to the ground in Article V(l)(e). The 
reading of the New York Convention itself cannot demonstrate the drafters’ intention as 
to the enforceability of the annulled awards. It may be reasonable to assume that there 
was no such intention in the first place.49 A very early draft of the New York 
Convention produced by the ICC used the word “shall”50 which was later replaced by 
the word “may” in the version prepared by the UN Economic and Social Council.51 The 
Federal Republic of Germany then recommended that “shall” be re-introduced in the 
draft Article IV.52 A joint French-German-Dutch working group further re-phrased 
Article IV to its current wording.53 This brief historical overview may help confirm the 
intention of the parties in incorporating the word “may” in the draft so that a 
compromise can be made among various parties. In this case, there is no room to 
dismiss it pro non scripta. The travaux preparatoires of the Convention are of limited 
help in that they only indicate that the inclusion of the word “may” was not accidental. 
Even though various understandings arise from five language versions, a linguistic 
analysis may lead to a conclusion that a margin of discretion is allowed under the New 
York Convention because four out of five versions adopt the word “may” in the context 
and the French version did not clearly and directly contradict this interpretation.54 This 
proposition seems consistent with the rule of interpretation of customary law contained 
in Article 33(4) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.55 The rule requires 
that the interpretation of the meaning “which best reconciles the texts” prevail, if an 
application of Articles 31 and 32 do not resolve the difference as in the present situation.
48 Gerold Herrmann, ‘Does the World Need Additional Uniform Legislation on Arbitration? The 1998 
Freshfields Lecture’ (1999) 15(3) Arb Int’l 211, 235.
49 In the drafting process no one actually discussed and even less thought the question, as it was obvious 
that refusal of enforcement would follow if  any of the V (l) grounds for refusal was proved.
50 See ICC, Enforcement o f International Arbitral Awards (Brochure No. 174, 1953). Also see UN 
Doc.E/C.2/373 (1955): Preliminary Draft Convention (1953), Article IV, reproduced in (1998) 9 ICC 
International Court o f Arbitration Bulletin 35.
51 See Draft Convention, UN Doc.E/2704 and Corr.l (1955, Original: English) at 7, Article IV. The heart 
motivation behind the New York Convention was to do away with the requirement o f finality. See Albert 
Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation, op. cit. 333-334.
52 See UN Doc.E/Conf.26/L.34 (28 May 1958).
53 See UN Doc.E/Conf.26/L.40 (2 June 1958, Original: French).
54 There is no other discrepancy between the English and French texts where the Convention provides for 
some discretion. Article VI reads “may” or “peut”.
55 The Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties is the foundational legal source in interpreting any 
international law issues in relation to the treaties.
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The word of “may” in Article V(l) invites the judge in the country of 
enforcement to form his own view and make a decision on the elements that have or 
should have been reviewed and decided upon by the court of rendition that decided on 
the action to set aside the award. It also preserves the discretion of the court to defer 
enforcement in certain circumstances in addition to those contemplated in Article V and 
where such deferral would warrant the quality of foreign judgments or domestic 
awards.56 The principle of “maximal efficiency” and the generally accepted standpoint 
that the New York Convention favours enforcement of foreign arbitral awards also 
support such “discretionary” interpretation. A large number of cases increasingly
57support the view that the discretion is granted to the court to a certain extent. The High 
Court in Hong Kong has had opportunities to apply the “residual” discretion in several 
cases.58 Nevertheless, the New York Convention contains no guidance as to when and 
how the discretion should be used. The enforcement forum may encounter difficulty in 
circumscribing its obligations and prescribing limits for its exercise.59 As Paulsson 
recognised,60 this uncertainty may require a court to confront a number of “vexatious 
questions” in deciding how to exercise its discretion.
Article VII gives some guidance in this regard. The material part of this Article
reads:
The provisions of the present Convention shall not ... deprive any interested 
party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the 
manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where 
such award is sought to be relied upon.
56 See Far Eastern Shipping Co. v. AKP Sovcomflot [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 520, ‘Queen’s Bench Division 
(Commercial Court), 14 November 1994 Far Eastern Shipping Co. v. AKP Sovcomflot’ (1996) 21 
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law & Taxation Publisher, Deventer & Boston) 699-707; 
Hewlett-Packard Inc v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 1995), vacating 867 F.Supp. 1126 (D Mass. 1994). See 
Richard Allan Homing, ‘Deferral o f Enforcement o f New York Convention Awards for Prudential 
Reasons’ [1997] 1 Int’l Arb L Rev 3.
57 See China Agrobusiness Development Corporation v. Balli Trading [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 76, 79.
58 See ‘Supreme Court of Hong Kong, High Court, 5 January 1993, No. MP 1150, Qinhuangdao Tongda 
Enterprise Development Company, et al. v. Million Basic Company’ (1994) 19 Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law & Taxation Publisher, Deventer & Boston) 675, 676. For a general discussion 
of “residual discretion,” see Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Residual Discretion and Validity of the Arbitration 
Agreement in the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards under the New York Convention of 1958’ in K.T. 
Sood et al. (eds), Current Legal Issues in International Commercial Litigation (Faculty of Law, National 
University o f Singapore, Singapore 1997) 327, 330-336.
59 An equivalent example is the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4 November 1959) (1955) 213 U.N.T.S. 221), which 
contains such general guidelines in the second paragraph of Articles 7-11. Such paragraph has been held 
by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights to provide a “margin of appreciation”, 
reviewed by the European institutions, in favour of the domestic implementing authorities.
60 See Jan Paulsson, ‘Rediscovering the New York Convention: Further Reflections on Chromalloy’, op. 
cit. 20.
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This is the “most favourable right” provision in the New York Convention, 
which has a wider ratione personae scope of application than Article V(l) in that it 
applies to “any interested party” rather than merely the award creditor.61 Article VII 
grants the beneficiary of the award an option to elect the more favourable course of 
action for the purpose of enforcement of arbitral awards. Accordingly, the award 
creditor or any interested party is able to rely upon a more favourable domestic law or 
international treaty, instead of relying upon the New York Convention, for enforcement. 
Article VII has been cited by some courts such as the German Supreme Court in 
enforcing some arbitral awards.62
It is logical to assume that if the word “may” in Article V were to mean “shall,” 
leaving no discretion to the court in the country of enforcement, Article VII could not 
have been included in the New York Convention as it stands. In other words, if a court 
was compelled to refuse enforcement of an award in the presence of one of the grounds 
listed in Article V, these grounds listed in Article V are of such importance that awards 
so affected by any ground must never be enforced in any jurisdiction. Therefore, the 
New York Convention would not have authorised any interested party to take advantage 
of Article VII to bypass the requirements of Article V. Rather, a provision may have 
been included in Article VII to the effect that it could not be used to circumvent the 
requirements of Article V since these requirements were mandatory.63 The New York 
Convention would be better understood as a discretionary authority allowing the court 
to enforce an award even if one of the grounds in Article V appears since, under Article 
VII, the enforcement forum may enforce an annulled award if its law does not include 
the ground of Article V(l)(e) as a ground for refusing enforcement.64 This line of 
thinking is consistent with the judicial opinions in some countries such as the US 
District Court for the District of Columbia in Chromalloy and the Hong Kong High
61 A closer reading o f Articles I and III may indicate that the scope may not be that broad. See Albert Jan 
van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation, 
op. cit. 82-83 which is o f view that “any party” in practice is only the party seeking enforcement. The 
drafting of Article VII appears to be a product of a copy-and-paste exercise from Article 5 of the 1927 
Geneva Convention. See Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Geneva, 26 
September 1927) (1929) 92 L.N.T.S. 301.
62 Jacob Boss v. Sohne KG , judgement o f 14 April 1988, Bundesgerichtshof, Ger., 1988 RIW 642.
63 It may be more incoherent if  the New York Convention set mandatory rules requiring that enforcement 
of awards must be refused in the presence of certain grounds (listed in Article V), and then further accept 
enforcement o f awards (according to Article VII and the law or the treaty o f the country where 
enforcement is sought) despite the presence of the same grounds.
64 See French and Belgian law as well as Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile, Article 1502 (France), Code 
Judiciaire Article 1723 (Belgium).
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Court’s Paklito decision.65 At this juncture, the Convention does not provide for a 
partial application of its provisions. If an award falls into the category of an “arbitral 
award” as defined in the Convention, then all provisions of the Convention apply to that 
award. It is legitimate for a contracting state to grant enforcement to all Convention 
awards provided that they do not violate the public policy rule in Article VII of the 
Convention. Annulled awards, like any other awards, shall benefit from the most 
favourable rule provision in Article VII. This rule refers the enforcement court to the 
more favourable provisions in its domestic law or the treaty its state belongs to, and 
further makes those domestic provisions prevail over the New York Convention.66 
Therefore, survival of an annulled award in one domestic legal system is legally 
sensible.
3 . N a t u r e  o f  a n  A n n u l l e d  A w a r d
One critical issue here is what exactly the nature of an annulled award is. There are two 
approaches. First, it can be examined by defining the existence of an annulled award. A 
more liberal interpretation of Article V does not solve this problem, which was raised at 
the outset, namely, the award’s continued existence after it has been annulled. Does an 
annulment by the courts of the state of rendition leave behind a truncated award? It has 
been argued that an arbitral award that has been set aside is no longer in existence 67 
The second approach is an analysis of the text of the New York Convention which may 
furnish an answer.
A fundamental difference between a judgment and an arbitral award is that, 
while the former results from the legal order of a country where it is rendered, the latter 
is a private act, chosen by private parties, and is a product of the procedure decided by 
the agreement reached by the parties to arbitration in solving their dispute through 
arbitration. Hence, whereas the root of a judgment is in the legal system of a specific 
country, the root of arbitration lies in the agreement of participating parties to arbitration. 
Logically, the court in a given case has exclusive jurisdiction to confirm judgments 
rendered by lower courts of the same state, thereby making a judgement final and 
binding. In this sense, it is rather doubtful whether the courts of any state have
65 See ‘Hong Kong, Supreme Court of Hong Kong, High Court, 15 January 1993, No. MP 2219, Paklito 
Investment Limited v. Klochner East Asia Limited’ (1994) XIX Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer & Boston) 664-674.
66 Article V(2)(b) directly grants courts the power to refuse enforcement o f an award if  it would be 
contrary to the public policy o f the enforcement forum.
67 Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Enforcement of Annulled Awards?’ op. cit. at 15 - 16.
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jurisdiction to grant an international effect to a decision setting aside an award rendered 
in international arbitration merely because that award is rendered in its territory.
In the framework of international commercial arbitration, an award is foremost a
/ r o
national award drawing its legal existence from a national judicial monopoly. This is 
apparent if arbitration is viewed from the standpoint of its effectiveness. It has been 
rightly observed that “arbitration cannot exist outside of a legal context. An agreement 
to arbitrate, the rules governing the arbitral process, and the arbitral award itself can be 
given effect only by reference to some body of law prescribing such effect”.69 In 
Chromalloy, the award formerly drew its legal existence from a concession by the 
Egyptian judicial monopoly. Being deprived of such existence under Egyptian law, the 
award may freely float through time and space until one jurisdiction shows respect and 
mercy and grants enforcement. Then, an award may have not existed from the 
beginning if it is annulled in its home jurisdiction. Paulsson, however, disagrees with 
this view. Instead, in his opinion, “as long as the courts of country X have properly 
established their jurisdiction in a given case, they may conclude -  and have indeed done 
so for generations, as any glimpse of a textbook on conflicts of law will confirm -  that a 
contract or a marriage or an adoption is valid and produces effects in country X, even if 
the relevant act had its origin in country Y and has been annulled there. The same is true 
for arbitral awards”. Parallels drawn between contracts, marriages or adoptions and 
arbitral awards, or more specifically, arbitral agreements, are actually less convincing. 
Legal relationships such as contracts, marriages or adoptions are mainly based on 
reciprocal promises or subject to state regulations whilst arbitration derives its 
effectiveness mainly from consent of the parties, and concessions of the national 
judicial monopoly. Therefore, the nature of a vacated award must be considered in a 
unique context, a home jurisdiction where an independent arbitration regime and a 
national judicial system co-exist. Due to its independence and the judicial scrutiny 
available in the national court system,70 the jurisdictional role of the arbitration panel 
which renders an arbitral award needs to be respected and recognised. This seems to 
suggest that an annulled award is a truncated award ceasing to exist because the court 
ultimately vacates it.
A simple review of the New York Convention, however, may lead to an 
opposite conclusion. The term “award” as defined by Article 1(2) of the New York
68 See Eric A. Schwartz, ‘A Comment on Chromalloy: Hilmarton a l ’Americaine’ (1997) 14(2) J Int’l Arb 
128.
69 See Hans Smit, ‘A-National Arbitration’ (1989) 63(3) Tul L Rev 629, 631.
70 See William Laurence Craig, ‘Uses and Abuses o f Appeal from Awards’ (1988) 4(3) Arb Int’l 174, 180.
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Convention, not only includes awards made by arbitrators but also refers to awards 
made by permanent bodies to which the parties have submitted. Neither Article I nor 
any other articles in the New York Convention exclude annulled awards from the 
category of awards for the purpose of the Convention and to which the Convention 
applies. Rather, the Convention applies to all awards as defined in Article I. The only 
article in the Convention dealing with annulled awards is Article V(l) under which an 
annulled “award” is regarded as not being different from other awards which may have 
a defect listed in Article V(l). For this provision to make any sense, it must be read to 
apply to annulled awards, which are regarded as an “award” within the ambit of the 
New York Convention, otherwise the second part of Article V(l)(e) could not have been 
part of Article V.
The foregoing discussion seems to have left a critical issue unsolved, that is, 
whether an annulled award actually amounts to a continuing award recognizable in 
other contracting states to the New York Convention. The Chromalloy Court failed to 
address the issue of an award’s continuing legal existence.71 Some commentators have 
tried to insinuate that the New York Convention itself may breathe new life into the
79body of an annulled award. The argument is that Article V of the New York 
Convention allows but does not require a rejection of foreign arbitral awards that fall 
under any of its five sub-paragraphs due to the language that “recognition and 
enforcement may be refused ... only i f ’ one of the subparagraph applies.73 Enforcement 
notwithstanding annulment elsewhere is a matter left to the State members to the 
Convention. The same discretionary power is passed on to judge(s) of a state that 
incorporates the rules of the New York Convention into its own law.74 Chromalloy 
appears to also adopt this view. In the same vein, it appears that the annulment does not 
bring an award to a definite end in the New York Convention regime. Instead, an 
annulled award may still be “alive” or revive and is effective in other jurisdictions 
except its home jurisdiction. To a certain extent, the New York Convention saves a 
“dead” award and creates a new legal foundation for it. In any event, the New York 
Convention merely deals with an existing and effective award but does not create a
71 See Eric Schwartz, ‘A Comment on Chromalloy: Hilmarton a l’Americaine’ (1997) 14(2) J Int’l Arb 
131.
72 See Pierre Lastenouse, ‘Why Setting Aside an Arbitral Award is not Enough to Remove it from the 
International Scene’ (1999) 16(2) J Int’l Arb 25, 31.
73 See Article V o f the New York Convention.
74 See Jan Paulsson, ‘Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding a Local Standard Annulment’ op. cit. 
20; and Gary H. Sampliner, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards After Annulment in Their Country 
o f Origin’ (1996) 11 Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep 22.
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brand new award. It is only the home jurisdiction that grants a raison d ’etre in the field 
of monopolised judicial powers.
The process by which the Court arrived at its decision in Chromalloy was 
relatively straightforward. First, the Court observed that it was not obliged under Article 
V of the New York Convention to refuse enforcement of an award that had been set 
aside. Rather, Article V permitted, but did not require, the Court to do so. The Court 
then noted that, under Article VII of the Convention, it was required to enforce the 
award if Chromalloy had a legitimate claim for enforcement under the US Federal 
Arbitration Act. The Court drew this conclusion via a detailed comparison of the 
grounds for vacating an award under the FAA and the reasons for the award’s 
annulment by the Egyptian Court. Finally it considered whether the Egyptian Court’s 
annulment decision, which it assumed to be proper under Egyptian law, should be 
recognised as a valid foreign judgment in the United States. Nevertheless, the Court 
decided that it should not recognise the judgment because US public policy favours 
enforcement of the award made in Egypt and the Court would violate “its solemn 
promise to abide by the results of the arbitration” if it recognises the Egyptian judgment 
to vacate the arbitral award. The Court then concluded that the award was “valid as a 
matter of US law” and should be enforced in the United States. All that the District 
Court established was that the award would not have been set aside under US law if it 
had been made in the US. The line of reasoning indicated that the Court did not touch 
upon the residual issue, i.e., the nature or existence of an annulled arbitral award. 
Instead, it focused on the legal effect of an annulled award in rendering and enforcing 
jurisdiction. This approach is obviously innovative in light of its extraterritorial nature. 
The Chromalloy case shows the possibility of enforcing an annulled award, which may 
revive and become re-existent if some other jurisdictions never regard it dead in its 
home jurisdiction according to domestic laws. The annulled award is therefore 
furnished with legal effect deriving from the monopoly embodied in the US 
Constitution’s Article III. Ultimately, the award became a US title and, arguably, is 
outside of the scope of the New York Convention.
The conclusions drawn from different analytical angles seem contradictory to 
each other. The nature of arbitration and arbitral awards may emphasise the fact that an 
award is always effective in a specific jurisdiction and has some legal effect locally. 
Accordingly, an award may no longer be effective once it is set aside. On the other hand, 
it makes more sense if the nature of arbitral awards can be recognised in the 
international framework under the New York Convention, which effectively brings an
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award, even though vacated, into a multiple-jurisdiction regime. An award annulled in 
its home jurisdiction may still be effective in another jurisdiction which follows the 
route set by the New York Convention. Nevertheless, the New York Convention only 
refers to or governs effective awards. An ineffective award may not fall into the New 
York Convention regime at all. Moreover, the Convention is silent on the continuing 
existence of an award. Even though international commercial arbitration is now firmly 
based on the New York Convention, which, as a matter of fact, has changed the whole 
landscape of arbitration, the effect of an arbitral award may still be restricted in a 
domestic boundary. Therefore, an annulled award may have not existed from its 
beginning.
4 . G a m e  T h e o r y
4.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma and Strategic Behaviour
Game theory is a set of tools describing and predicting strategic behaviour.75 Strategic 
settings are various scenarios in which two or more decision-makers are involved and 
one party takes account of the counterpart’s behaviour in order to make its own decision. 
Accordingly, one decision may be linked to another decision, and vice versa. 
Oligopolistic industries are normally natural settings for strategic interactions. For 
instance, in the aviation industry, whether Virgin Airline will cut fares may depend on 
how British Airways will take action, and vice versa.
A simple example of game theory is a widely discussed Prisoner’s Dilemma76 in
which there are two players {i.e., prisoners) and several sets of choices or strategies
(usually two contrasting options, i.e., either to be silent or to confess). The outcomes of 
the game would be in four different strategy pairs as demonstrated in the simplified 
diagram below.
Diagram 3-1: Prisoner’s Dilemma
Prisoner 2 
Silent Confess
Prisoner 1 Silent 
Confess
75 See generally Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis o f  Law  (5th edn Aspen Publishers, Inc., New York 
1998)21-24.
76 The Prisoner’s Dilemma was originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950. Albert W. 
Tucker formalised the game with prison sentence payoffs and gave it the name o f “Prisoner’s Dilemma”. 
See generally William Poundstone, Prisoner's Dilemma (Doubleday, New York 1992).
-2, -2 - 10,0
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In this scenario, two prisoners both have committed a serious crime. However, 
the prosecutor cannot convict either of them of this crime without extracting at least one 
confession. The prosecutor is likely to convict them both on a lesser offense without the 
confession of either. The prosecutor tells each prisoner that both of them will be 
convicted for the lesser offence and each will go to prison for two years if neither 
confesses. This outcome is represented in the upper left cell. However, if one of them 
confesses but the other does not, the prisoner who confesses will go free but the other 
will be tried for the serious crime and given the maximum penalty of ten years in prison. 
This applies to both prisoners and is represented in the lower left and upper right cells. 
Alternatively, if both confess, the prosecutor will prosecute both for the serious crime, 
but not ask for the maximum penalty and both prisoners will go to prison for six years. 
This is the lower right cell.77
Obviously, each prisoner wants to spend as little time as possible in prison. It is 
also clear that each is indifferent as to how much time the other will spend in prison.78 
Without any communication in advance, each prisoner must make a decision as to his 
confession strategy without knowing what the counterpart would do. In such a game, it 
is known to both prisoners that each is better off confessing regardless of what the other 
does. Likely, each prisoner may presume that he may better off confessing if the other 
prisoner decided to keep silent. This strategy would avoid his two year time in prison. 
The other possibility is that one is also better off confessing if the other prisoner 
confesses. As unpleasant as serving a six-year sentence may be, serving a ten-year 
sentence is even worse. Whatever the other person does, one would be better off 
confessing. It is very likely that both prisoners will follow this line of thinking. In other 
words, the chance to see both prisoners confess is very high.
The outcome of the Prisoner’s Dilemma seems counterintuitive because the 
prisoners would have been better off if both had remained silent. The underlying 
rationale of the game is that the players are both selfish. Even if each prisoner 
erroneously believed that the other was altruistic and would confess, the same outcome 
will arise, given the assumption that the prisoners care only for themselves. If a prisoner 
believes the other would remain silent, confessing is one way of avoiding prison 
altogether, the best outcome will be the same. The result is not at all odd once it is 
recognised that the prisoners lack a means of committing themselves to remaining silent. 
As long as the two prisoners cannot reach any agreement and as long as their only
77 For details, see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/: and 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner’s dilemm
78 A simplified case ignores any factors such as altruism.
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concern is their own interest (i.e., time spent in prison), their individual interests will 
lead them to confess even though they are jointly better off remaining silent.
The fundamentals of the Prisoner’s Dilemma originate from the incongruence 
between private benefit and collective good. Individually rational decision-making 
possibly results in a collective disaster. It is generally accepted that individuals attempt 
to maximise utility or profits subject to constraints. The fundamental strategic 
interdependence that game theory tries to address is that rational actors need to be 
concerned about the actions of others in a game-theoretic setting. It is also seen as one 
of the main theoretical rationale for government intrusion into private decision-making. 
In a legal context, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is adopted as a theoretical basis for 
legislation and judicial co-operation. A sizable amount of legal literature has grown out 
of applying the discipline of the microeconomist’s marginal analysis to legal issues in a 
range of regulatory domains such as securities regulations, corporate governance, 
banking supervision, labour standards and insolvency and bankruptcy regimes. Many 
legal settings can be represented as normal form games and can be solved by identifying 
dominant interests and strategies. One of the topics more relevant in the context of the 
New York Convention is the inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition, which could 
trigger a welfare-reducing “race to the bottom”.
4.2 Race to the Bottom and Environmental Protection -  An Example involving the 
States
The race-to-the-bottom label has been applied in a wide variety of regulatory contexts
70such as races to the bottom caused by interstate competition over corporate and
o n  o t  o n  on
banking charters, securities regulations, labour standards, anti-trust rules and, in a 
broader sense, over programs of economic redistribution.84 In addition to commercial
79 See Elisa Westfield, ‘Globalisation, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise Responsibility: 
Corporate Code o f Conduct in the 21st Century’ (2002) 42 Va J Int’l 1075.
80 The major cause for this race is that, in a federal system, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) charges banks a deposit insurance premium that is independent of the bank’s risk of default. See 
Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, ‘The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System’ (1988) 
73 Cornell L Rev 680, 714.
81 See Norman S. Poser, ‘The Stock Exchanges of the United States and Europe: Automation, 
Globalisation, and Consolidation’ (2001) 22 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 497; John C. Coffee, Jr., ‘Racing 
Towards The Top? The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International 
Corporate Governance’ (2002) 102 Colum L Rev 1757.
82 See John Hancock, ‘Finding A Solution: How To Have Free Trade While Upholding International 
Labour Standards’ (2002) 11 MSU-DCL J Int’l 23.
83 See Karl M. Meessen, ‘Competition of Competition Laws’ (1989) 10 NW. J. Int’l. & Bus. 17-30; Anu 
Piilola, ‘Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case Study o f International Antitrust Regulation’ 
(2003) 30 Stan J Int’l L 207.
84 See Richard Revesz, ‘Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities’ (1996) 144 U Pa L Rev 
2341; Richard Revesz, ‘Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race to the Bottom”
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laws, game theory has also been utilised in the research of public law areas such as 
environment protection, which is of more relevance to our topic given the involvement 
of state governments in regulating commercial arbitration. Under public laws, the 
fundamental issue is how to regulate self interests among states and to allocate 
responsibilities between various states to deal with related social and policy issues such 
as protection of ecology (i.e., numerous classes of terrain, wildlife and plant life) and 
natural resources, control of air quality and waste, soil and energy preservation, water 
regulation, attraction of tourism, promotion of leisure business, agriculture, population, 
industrial, transportation, culture and sustainable development policies.85 The analysis 
here indeed has a more general application whenever states impose costs on the physical 
assets or even intangible lawful rights of individuals and firms in order to promote the 
welfare of their citizens.
The underlying theory of the effects of interstate competition over economic 
redistributions, principally welfare programs, relies heavily on the mobility of 
individuals and firms across jurisdictions. The idea is that wealthy individuals or firms, 
who would bear the burden of paying the cost of economic redistribution, are likely to 
move to jurisdictions with lower taxes and business costs, and consequently lower 
welfare payments. By contrast, welfare beneficiaries would move to jurisdictions that 
imposed higher taxes in order to finance generous welfare programs. Such mobility of 
human capital is phased as “voting with the feet”.86 Ultimately, the jurisdiction with 
higher tax rates would lose all its wealthy residents or firms, its tax base would be 
shrinking or even be destroyed, and there would be no funds for welfare recipients.87 
Migration patterns in the United States have revealed that the states with the lowest tax, 
spending and regulatory burdens are the winners in the contest for the human capital.88 
This phenomenon constitutes a picture of the race-to-the-bottom game.89 In reality,
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation’ (1992) 67 NYU L Rev 1210; Richard Revesz, 
‘Federalism and Environmental Regulation: Lessons for the European Union and the International 
Community’ (1997) 83 Va L Rev 1331; and Richard Revesz, ‘The Race to the Bottom and Federal 
Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics’ (1997) 82 Minn L Rev 535.
85 See Casey J. Caldwell, ‘The Black Diamond o f Harmonisation: The Alpine Convention as a Model for 
Balance Competing Objectives in the European Union’ (2003) 21 B U Int’l L J 137.
86 Arthur Laffer and Stephen Moore, ‘The (Tax) War between the States’ in The Wall Street Journal 
December 11, 2007, 19.
87 See Paul E. Peterson, The Price o f  Federalism (Brookings Institution, Washington, DC 1995) 108-28; 
Jacques LeBeouf, ‘The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power’ 
(1994) 31 San Diego L Rev 555, 579; Sheryll D. Cashin, ‘Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority 
Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities’ (1999) 99(3) Colum L Rev 552, 598-99.
88 Arthur Laffer and Stephen Moore, ‘The (Tax) War between the States’ op. cit.
89 See Steven G. Calabresi, ‘The Era of Big Government Is Over’ (1998) 50 Stan L Rev 1015, 1019; 
Anne L. Alstott, ‘Federalism and U.S. Social Welfare Policy: Fundamental Change and New 
Uncertainties’ (1996) 2 Colum J Eur L 441, 452; Thomas S. Ulen, ‘Economic and Public Choice Forces 
in Federalism’ (1998) 6 Geo Mason L Rev 921, 935-36; Jerry L. Mashaw and Dylan S. Calsyn, ‘Block
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consumers are free to choose according to the quality and price of what is offered by 
suppliers of a product or service. This simple proposition is also applied to the supply of 
legal systems or laws amongst the competitive states. The empirical research in the 
United States has indicated that the states with the highest taxes and spending and the 
most intrusive regulations may attract less population and create less job growth than 
those more economically and legally free states.90 This was the same case in France and 
Germany in the last two decades of the twentieth century.91 In globalisation, free 
movement in goods and services matches free movement in legal rules. A state seeking 
to attract investors to set up businesses there, and thereby obtaining chartering fees and 
service business and increasing social welfare and benefits to local labourers and 
residents, will offer a regulatory regime most attractive to investors, shareholders or 
managers, who will naturally prefer to make risk choices that are unconstrained by a 
rigid regulatory regime. Accordingly, states may have incentives to set sub-optimally 
lax regulatory regimes.
In the area of environmental protection, states usually use air or water quality 
standards or waste control standards as a tool to control pollution. Occasionally a state 
could meet ambient standards but export a great deal of pollution to downwind states 
(through tall stacks or location near the interstate borders). As a matter of fact, a state 
might meet its ambient standards exactly because it exports a large proportion of its 
pollution. The problem of interstate externalities arises because of a combination of 
inadequate information, public process bias and traditional economic externalities. In 
most instances of economic externality, costs and benefits are not directly priced by the 
market system and therefore not necessarily considered by a market actor.92 In this 
setting, the benefits of the polluting activity are realised by one actor but the costs are 
externalised on other actors or societies as a whole.93 For instance, Country A 
unilaterally takes protective measures to protect the environment in order for its citizens 
to enjoy clean water and air. Country B sends pollution to State A and obtains the 
labour and fiscal benefits of the economic activity that generates the pollution but does 
not suffer full costs of the activity. Country A, with regulation, indeed pays for a public 
good enjoyed by the non-regulating states. Country A tries to get Country B to make
Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism: A Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain’ (1996) 14 Yale L & 
Policy Rev 297, 321.
90 Arthur Laffer and Stephen Moore, ‘The (Tax) War between the States’ op. cit.
91 Ibid.
92 See Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, ‘Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for 
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority’ (1996) 14 Yale L & Pol’y Rev 29.
93 See Daniel C. Esty, ‘Environmental Protection in the Information Age’ (2004) 79 NYU L Rev 115, 154.
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similar efforts on the basis that B’s citizens should not free ride off of Country A’s 
efforts.94 This scenario gives rise to the proposition that, in an effort to induce 
geographically mobile firms to locate or relocate within their jurisdictions, states may 
lower environmental standards so as to bring in other benefits such as additional jobs 
and more tax revenues.95 Such a “race to the bottom” scenario calls for federal 
governance and adjudication, a regulatory mechanism with the aim to internalise 
externalised costs, 96 balance competing interests, and vest the responsibility of 
environmental regulation among states.
Compacts or treaties can serve an indicative and binding function, which can 
change Country B’s law and governance behaviour so as to effectively redistribute the 
costs of providing clean water and air or innovative technologies. By increasing the
07efficiency and distributive justice and lowering transactions costs, co-ordinated 
standards such as those for air quality and emission can be used as the primary policy 
tools to facilitate the cross-jurisdictional trade and investment. It then follows that co­
ordinated standards are essential to address public policy problems that span political 
boundaries and to control interstate externalities. This has been a particularly important 
motivation for passing international treaties (i.e.t environmental protection conventions), 
whose main purpose is to address problems that exist amongst multiple jurisdictions and 
that cannot be adequately ameliorated without centralised policies binding more than 
one political jurisdiction. Although international compacts, treaties or conventions 
would involve transaction costs due to the fact that the uniform ratification and approval 
process by the national legislative bodies is a political obstacle course, they are useful to 
overcome self-interests of the national states.
More recently, advocates of centralised regulation have devoted considerable 
attention to the public choice rationale for federal intervention, which notes that the US- 
or EU-like cooperative horizontal regulation is a must because state political processes 
lead to the systematic imperfect public governance problems such as local protectionism 
at the state level. For example, pro-environmental interests can be under-represented or
94 See Adriana Lieders, ‘A New Chapter in Brazil’s Oil Industry: Opening the Market While Protecting 
the Environment’ (2001) 13 Geo Int’l Envt’l L Rev 781, 797.
95 See R. van den Bergh, M. Faure and J. Lefevere, ‘The Subsidiarity Principle in European 
Environmental Law: An Economic Analysis’ in E. Eide and R. van den Bergh (eds), Law and Economics 
o f  the Environment (Juridisk Forlag, Oslo 1996) 121; Ludwig Kramer, E.C. Treaty and Environmental 
Law  (2d edn. Sweet & Maxwell, London 1995) 62.
96 See Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, ‘Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for 
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority’ (1996) 14 Yale L & Policy Rev 23, 29.
97 See Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Problems of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 J L & Econ 1; Guido Calabresi and A. 
Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 
85 Harv L Rev 1089.
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anti-environmental interests are over-represented at the state level. Therefore, the 
centralised regulation promotes the harmonisation of environmental rules and standards 
and further encourages the establishment of a common market or even a uniform legal
QO
regime. The centralised regulation model has some force in the era of globalisation. 
The harmonisation of environmental standards creates the effect of removing a 
competitive advantage from such states with lower and non-harmonisable standards" 
and of protecting states from the outside pressure to impose sub-optimally lax 
environmental standards as a means of attracting jobs and tax revenues.100 Regional 
agreements to protect environment and natural resources can help facilitate cooperation 
and produce positive results without having to expect states to renege on commitments. 
Nevertheless, the European Union’s efforts to control interstate externalities by 
adopting various standards such as emission standards are criticised. This is largely 
because primary tools of environmental policy such as standards do not effectively 
combat the problem of interstate externalities as these standards do not regulate the 
number of sources within a state or the location of the sources.101 Very often, regional 
and international integration may lead regions, nations, sub-national authorities or even 
private organisations to compete with one another by enacting or implementing less 
stringent environmental regulations. Likely, environmental standards may not 
necessarily function well in reality because the costs of compliance with stricter 
regulatory standards have not been sufficient to force relatively affluent nations or sub­
national governments to choose between competitiveness and environmental protection. 
In addition, centralised protective regulations may produce public benefits. Therefore, 
in some respects, economic openness, capital mobility and liberal trade policy have 
actually encouraged states to take advantage of other states’ environmental protection
98 A real example is the Convention on the Preservation of the Alps (1991), which was passed by the 
European Community to recognise the dual threat posed by increasing transport-related pollution and 
unsustainable levels of tourism to the ecology of the Alpine region. The Convention imposes a series of 
general obligations on the signatory states to “maintain a comprehensive policy of protection and 
preservation of the Alps, taking into account in an equitable way the interests o f all Alpine States and 
their Alpine regions, as well as those of the European Economic Community in using resources wisely 
and exploiting them in a sustainable way” as the Convention clearly stated.
99 In a perfect competition scenario, the state environmental regulations would be optimal. However, in an 
imperfect competition model, these regulations could either be overly stringent or overly lax.
100 See R. van den Bergh, M. Faure, and J. Lefevere, ‘The Subsidiarity Principle in European 
Environmental Law: An Economic Analysis’ in E. Eide and R. van den Bergh (eds), Law and Economics 
o f  the Environment (Juridisk Forlag, Oslo 1995) 121; Ludwig Kramer, EC Treaty and Environmental Law 
(2nd edn Sweet and Maxwell, London 1995) 62.
101 For instance, federal ambient air quality standards are not well targeted to address the problem of 
interstate externalities since they are over inclusive in the sense that they require a state to restrict 
pollution that has only in-state consequences.
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measures and policies by avoiding adoption and implementation of higher standards 
than they would have in the absence of increased economic interdependency.
Other critical questions are how to deal with the problem of interstate 
externalities, and what is the appropriate level of effective public (i.e., environmental) 
governance. The problem is not simply that competitive pressures will force some 
jurisdictions to lower their standards due to their fear of being competitively 
disadvantaged. In the international community, the effectiveness of the centralised 
regulation and economic integration are different, due to the extreme differences in 
wealth and economic development in the international community. The presence of 
inter-jurisdictional externalities has pushed for and justified centralised intervention or 
even sanctions in the globe, for example, the increased level of centralisation in the 
environmental protection policy-making within a federal-type framework such as the 
United States or a common market like European Union. Co-ordinated standards or 
sanctions may be appropriate and necessary if costs of pollution abatement are 
perceived as seriously burdening domestic producers vis-a-vis their competitors in other 
political jurisdictions. As a result, there is a need for a viable centralised enforcement 
mechanism at the “federal” level in the international community.
5 . G a m e  T h e o r y , E n f o r c e m e n t  o f  A n n u l l e d  A w a r d s  a n d  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  
C o n v e n t io n
Economic analysis of law has strong explanatory and predictive power. Game theory 
helps generate counterintuitive insights into legal problems. Law, as often recognised,
107should be criticised and evaluated by reference to the principle of utility. There has 
been a tendency to treat law-making authority as a matter of political legitimacy, 
appealing to a version of social contract theory as an explanation of the authority of the 
legislature to enact laws. In a contractual context, game theory may help solve 
collective action problems between the parties. Can issues relating to the New York 
Convention such as enforcement of annulled awards involving both courts in the 
countries of rendition and enforcement, be solved in the game theory context as well?
102 Legal writers such as Blackstone and Rawls represented the law as enforcing natural rights. The 
systematic classifications they employed, and the principles they extracted, were based upon a theory of 
natural rights. See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws o f  England Vol. I  (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1765-1769) Intro., s. 2. Unlike Blackstone and Bentham (whose maxim is “the greatest happiness 
o f the greatest number”), I adopt the term “utility” in a sense o f economic analysis, which parallels the 
utilitarian approach. For instance, where Bentham spoke of the greatest happiness o f the greatest number, 
the economic analyst speaks o f the “efficient” solution.
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The environmental, corporate, banking, and redistribution races to the bottom 
scenarios, respectively, have the following distinct elements: (1) divergence of interests 
over locational decisions among competitors; (2) coherent defects in the interstate 
competitive process; (3) interstate externalities such as the relationship between 
principals and their agents; and (4) mobility of wealth and wealthy players in the market, 
either individuals or firms. These elements also appear in the context of arbitration.
In international commercial arbitration, judicial competition exists among 
various jurisdictions and arbitral sites due to divergence of interests. Such competition 
is both jurisdiction-oriented and market-oriented.103 In England, the court decisions 
which concern choice of forum clauses all involved a competition between jurisdiction 
of English courts and jurisdiction of foreign courts.104 First, there is a market which is 
expanding with more involvement of arbitration institutions, judges, businessmen and 
lawyers in more arbitration cases. “International arbitration has become a serious 
industry ... for the proliferating institutions that seek to maintain, increase, or establish 
a caseload of important arbitrations”. 105 The expansion of the arbitration industry 
indicates a demand for arbitration that sets the price and need for services, information, 
arbitration infrastructure and judicial assistance. This demand triggers supply. Second, 
“if international commercial arbitration is regarded ... as a service industry ... in the 
field of economic activities, it becomes natural in each truly free market economy to 
treat it as being subject to the same standards and exigencies as those which govern the 
business community ... notably in terms of competence and cost-effectiveness”.106 The 
user-unfriendly arbitration law and regime inevitably influences the choice of the 
business community in arbitration services. In 1960s and 1970s, members of 
international commercial community once viewed international arbitration held in 
England with much disfavour because it was not only considered slow and expensive 
but also as making a nonsense of the notions of finality and certainty in arbitration
107proceedings and awards. As a consequence, very few foreign businesses or
103 A market-oriented way of discussing the law can be generally referred to in Robin Paul Malloy, Law 
in a Market Context -  An Introduction to Market Concepts in Legal Reasoning (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2004).
104 Andrew Rogers, ‘Forum Non Conveniens in Arbitration’ (1998) 4(3) Arb Int’l 240, 251.
105 Paulsson, Jan, ‘Introduction (to the first issue of Arbitration International, a quarterly journal published 
by The Chartered Institute o f Arbitrators, London)’ (1985) 1(1) Arb Int’l 2.
106 J. Gillis Wetter, ‘The Conduct o f the Arbitration’ (1985) 2(2) J Int’l Arb 7.
107 E. J. Cohn, ‘The Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce’ (1965) 14(1) Int’l & 
Comp L Q 132, 152; Mark Littman, ‘England Reconsiders “The Stated Case’” (1979) 13 Int’l Lawyer 
253, 256; Michael Kerr, ‘International Arbitration v. Litigation’ (1980) J Bus L 164; Michael Kerr, ‘The 
Arbitration Act 1979’ (1980) Modem L Rev 45, 47; The Lord Hacking, ‘The “Stated Case” Abolished: 
The United Kingdom Arbitration Act o f 1979’ (1980) 14 Int’l Lawyer 95, 98; William Park and Jan 
Paulsson, ‘The Binding Force of International Arbitration Awards’ (1983) 23 Va J Int’l 253, 272-73; J.
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enterprises chose England as a venue for the settlement of their disputes by arbitration. 
This resulted in a considerable loss of income in the form of invisible earnings to the 
various professions concerned in England.108 Latin American countries have been 
hostile towards arbitration for a long time. In these countries, foreign awards will be 
ordinarily tested under the same standards as are applied to foreign court judgments. For 
example, enforcement of foreign awards needed to satisfy the reciprocity requirement. 
These unnecessary requirements served as a deterrent to foreign investors otherwise 
inclined to enter into international commercial agreements with Latin American 
opposite contracting parties. The inhibition to foreign investment is one of the prices 
these countries paid for such a hostile policy.109 Third, with the changes in national 
legislations to keep pace with the developments in international arbitration, states began 
a quest for more visibility and expansion of their services in the field of international 
commercial arbitration to satisfy the market demand. Some states have tirelessly pushed 
and prodded to shape the infrastructure and to increase the popularity of arbitration in 
the jurisdiction. For instance, New York hosts several experienced arbitration 
institutions: the American Arbitration Association’s Headquarters and the New York 
Regional Office, the IACAC’s US National Office, the US Council for International 
Business for ICC Court of Arbitration, the Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc. for 
maritime arbitration, and specialised arbitration under the rules of the stock and 
commodity exchanges. In addition to “hard” facilities, the US and New York law make 
an effort to package New York as a well-equipped and hospitable forum. For example, 
the US courts will apply a restrictive notion of sovereign immunity110 and the 
conclusion of an arbitration agreement by a foreign state is considered to be a waiver of 
sovereign immunity.111 Another example is that the New York State Legislature 
amended the New York arbitration statute in 1985 by adding a new paragraph entitled 
“provisional remedies”, the goal of which was to make pre-award attachments available 
in New York arbitrations and to allow the Supreme Court to grant such remedies if
W 0)
arbitration may otherwise be rendered “ineffectual”. The developing or emerging 
countries have also joined this champion. Romania, for example, acceded to the New
Kodwo Bentil, ‘Judicial Intervention and International Commercial Arbitration’ (1986) 130 Solicitors’ J 
191.
108 Anthony Thornton, ‘Appeals in Construction Arbitrations’ (1984) 1 Construction L J 103.
109 Robert Layton, ‘Changing Attitudes Toward Dispute Resolution in Latin America’ (1993) 10(2) J Int’l 
Arb 123, 126-7.
110 Section 1602 o f the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act reads: under international law, states are 
not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned”.
111 Gabriel M. Wilner, Domke on Commercial Arbitration (revised edn West Group 1984) § 18:02.
112 Joseph M. McLaughlin, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & Rules § 7502: 
4 (Cum. Ann. Pocket Part, McKinney, New York 1990).
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York Convention, the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration 
1961, the ICSID Convention 1965 and other bilateral treaties in order to achieve a 
climate of confidence appealing to foreign investors and commercial partners.113 Fourth, 
the competition among international arbitration sites may well be considered as a good 
and healthy sign as it is likely to lead to improvements in arbitration procedure and 
modernisation and harmonisation of arbitration statutes. Ultimately the competition 
among various arbitration sites may benefit market players by providing greater choice 
for the “arbitration cake” with varied contents in both legal and geographical terms. For 
instance, given the fact that England became a less attractive centre for the settlement of 
transnational commercial disputes by arbitration in the 1960s and 1970s, the British 
legislature passed the Arbitration Act of 1979 which was a legislative response to the 
dissatisfaction of the business community with “too much interference by the [English] 
courts with the finality of the arbitral awards”.114 The Arbitration Act of 1979 granted 
the parties to international arbitration agreement the right to oust the jurisdiction of the 
English superior courts in determining any question of law arising from arbitration 
proceedings or from an arbitral award. In addition, the Arbitration Act of 1979 
manifested Parliament’s intention to promote greater finality in arbitral awards115 by 
discouraging or removing judicial intervention or supervision in England so as to make 
England a more attractive arbitration situs to the international commercial community. 
From the international business or commercial standpoint, the Arbitration Act of 1979 
was a welcomed legislative reform which restored the confidence on the arbitration 
regime in England.116
The generalisation of the race-to-the-bottom arguments indicates that states are 
able to promote the interests of their citizens by imposing costs on the physical assets or 
intangible rights, through tax and other regulatory programs and/or economic means. 
Similarly, it is natural to assume that if the New York Convention is a response to a 
common pool problem (i.e., a pool of international arbitration awards), then the content 
of the procedure “supplied” by different judicial systems, i.e., national laws and court 
precedents, will immediately affect the efficiency of the process. This assumption relies 
upon a third limitation of the common pool model: it neglects the role played by re-
113 Grigore Florescu, ‘The Evolution of Commercial Arbitration in Romania’ (1993) 10(1) J Int’l Arb 95, 
103.
114 [1987] 2 All E.R. 751.
1,5 [1987] 2 All E.R. 743.
116 The Lord Hacking, ‘Where We Are Now: Trends and Developments since the Arbitration Act (1979)’ 
(1985) 2(4) J Int’l Arb 7, 14.
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negotiation, given a unified procedure.117 In most cases national courts retain some 
supervisory authority over arbitral awards. A court in the arbitral situs has the authority 
to vacate an award under standards set out in its national arbitration laws. Meanwhile, 
when the prevailing party seeks to enforce the award in another jurisdiction, the court 
where the enforcement is sought is also entitled to exert its judicial authority to decline 
enforcement under the standards set out in its national arbitration law, which may be 
constrained by international conventions. Due to differences between the grounds for 
vacating awards and the grounds for non-enforcement of awards, an award may be 
vacated by a court in the arbitral situs, yet nonetheless be enforceable under the national 
arbitration law of the enforcement situs. In such a case, the conflict inevitably arises 
between two states’ judicial interests, or even commercial interests. Without a uniform 
enforcement standard, there may be no ground - other than that the award was vacated 
in the situs - for declining to enforce a vacated arbitral award. The existence of a 
centralised or superior power among contracting states affecting a collective action or 
transformation of some sort is probably far more important, in terms of efficiency, than 
the content of the procedure which will thereby be invoked. If the content of the 
procedure is inefficient, then the award creditors may well be better off by arranging a 
solution amongst the states’ and private parties’ “right” distress without initiating 
formal proceedings.
5.1 Legitimate Expectations o f  Private Parties in Arbitration 
Unlike litigation in courts, arbitration is not a default means of resolving disputes. 
Assuming that both parties are sophisticated and are well informed of the costs and 
benefits of their dispute resolution options, it seems sensible in the context of 
international commercial arbitration that parties will agree to arbitrate if the marginal 
benefits of arbitration over litigation exceed the marginal costs. The parties to 
arbitration show their preference towards a specific jurisdiction by submitting their 
disputes to a specific place for arbitration. The preference represents trust and high 
expectation of the fairness and neutrality of a legal system as well as its court system.
Although it may be true that one party takes advantage of its stronger bargaining 
power to persuade or force the other side to accept the arbitration venue, the counter 
party may well have compromised on the situs of arbitration as well as the governing 
law in anticipation of reciprocal concessions or benefits from the other party. In addition,
117 The existence of the legal procedure “in the shadows” means that the prisoner’s dilemma problem is 
no longer one of the obstacles to re-negotiation.
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the parties look forward to the simplicity and predictability of the proceedings, which is 
a criterion or factor in assessing the feasibility of the approach in dealing with the 
annulled awards. The place of arbitration is in a better position than any other places to 
determine the regularity of the arbitration proceedings due to its close connection to the 
dispute. On the other hand, the parties to the dispute do not expect unnecessary 
complexity of the arbitration proceedings. If a vacated award is regarded as a 
completely dead one, then no party will even try to seek enforcement of the award in 
another jurisdiction because parties are aware of the impossibility of having the award
I 10
recognised by any court anywhere. Therefore, the game is over. This is the rationale 
of the “traditional approach”, that is, a vacated award is a nullity and shall not be 
enforced in any jurisdiction.119
Besides its intervening side-effect, the annulment procedure obviously is an 
effective means adopted by the home jurisdiction to guarantee the quality and regularity 
of arbitration. The annulment process, however, is time-consuming and costly. The 
judicial review of an arbitral award does not leave the parties significantly worse off 
with respect to time than would litigation. As a matter of fact, parties may even be better 
off because they can enjoy the benefits of arbitration along with court-provided 
assurance of basic fairness in the arbitral process. Does enforcement of an annulled 
award by a court defeat the legitimate expectation of the parties who instead choose the 
seat of arbitration? At first glance, it seems that the parties’ autonomy and their choice 
of arbitration have not been respected if an annulled award is enforced by an overseas 
court because, without an “invitation” from the parties, courts in another country extend 
the jurisdiction to the dispute. In Chromalloy, the place of arbitration was chosen by the 
parties and the courts in France and the United States were incidentally involved in the 
arbitration proceeding simply because one party’s assets were located in these two 
countries. In practice, however, it is not a general rule that a choice of the seat of 
arbitration is freely or mutually decided by the parties to a dispute. This may effectively 
mean that the courts in the seat of arbitration may not necessarily have any material 
relationship with the dispute or parties. In other words, the fairness or neutrality to the 
parties or the dispute is not only dependent on the seat of arbitration. The involvement 
of another jurisdiction is practically possible and justifiable and would not necessarily 
severally affect the parties’ interests.
118 Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Enforcement o f Annulled Awards?’ op. cit. 15.
119 W. Laurence Craig, ‘Uses and Abuses of Appeals from Awards’ op. cit. 177 n. 6 (“in practice it would 
be extraordinary that an enforcement court abroad would give effect to an award annulled in its home 
jurisdiction”).
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It has been argued that a full-scale protection of the parties to arbitration requires 
that an annulled arbitral award not be enforced in any country. To grant an international 
legal effect to an annulled award would effectively allow the party in whose favour the 
award is rendered to seek to have that award enforced all over die world until one 
flexible jurisdiction accepts the application for enforcement of the award.120 The 
international legal effect granted to an annulled award may create a new regime or 
mechanism by which the winning party in arbitration may take advantage of this 
situation. The finality of the arbitration proceeding and award which is a well- 
established and widely accepted arbitration norm, will be severally undermined. This 
reasoning makes sense provided that the award is set aside for proper or fair reasons, 
which are adopted by most, if not all, jurisdictions to set aside an award in similar 
situations. In this case, an annulled award shall not be lawfully effective anywhere, not 
only its home jurisdiction but also any other foreign countries. Logically, an award 
which is set aside for any well-recognised reason, i.e., any serious substantive or 
procedural defects, may not be enforced by a court in any event. If so, the control at the 
rendering stage is sensible such that a party would not bear any risk to perform a 
defective award. However, in the real world, arbitral awards may be set aside for 
improper or unfair reasons. For instance, the ground for annulling an award is not a 
ground universally accepted or adopted in most jurisdictions. The annulment of an 
arbitral award on a “bad” ground is not fair and just to the parties. The protection of 
parties’ interests requests a very narrow legal effect of such awards so that their interests 
would not be damaged throughout the entire world. Therefore, the control at the 
enforcement stage is necessary and enforcement of an annulled award may become the 
last resort to protect a winning party’s legal interests and eventually save the reputation 
and legitimacy of arbitration. There exists no internationally accepted category of unfair
or improper grounds for annulment of arbitral awards. Some grounds can easily be
121classified as “bad” in terms of general norms in international commercial arbitration. 
An award may be set aside in one jurisdiction merely for a typically local ground 
specific to that jurisdiction where the award is rendered. It is then unreasonable to 
subject the parties to an international dispute in respect of a specific local ground
120 That jurisdiction must have some means such as assets owned by the party which loses the case to 
enforce the award. In other words, there much be some connections between the enforcing jurisdiction 
and the parties or parties’ assets. This view has won some support in the international arbitration 
community. For instance, Albert van den Berg said that: “In the case of a questionable award, a party 
cannot stop around the world in order to find a flexible court somewhere which is willing to enforce such 
an award” . See Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Enforcement of Annulled Awards?’ op. cit. 15.
121 See Jan Paulsson, ‘Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding A Local Standard Annulment (LSA)’ 
(1998) 9(1) The ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin 14.
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outside the national boundaries. To recognise and enforce an award annulled on that 
basis no doubt exports very local, likely very low, standards to other jurisdictions. Such 
practice may in turn lower the well-established international arbitration standards. The 
interdependence of various jurisdictions with respect to the legal effect of a specific 
arbitral award will result in a “race to the bottom” and the international arbitration 
regime would be undermined.
To misapply local laws to an award and to subsequently set aside an award by a 
local court is another “bad” reason in this context. The Court of Appeal of Cairo made a 
mistaken judgment in Chromalloy}22 The Court set aside an award issued in Cairo on 
the basis of Article 53(l)(d) of Egyptian Law No.27 of 1994 on Arbitration,123 and held 
that the arbitral penal, by applying Egyptian civil law (rather than administrative law) 
indeed failed to apply the law agreed upon by the parties to govern the subject matter in 
the dispute.124 The Court also re-characterised, if not mis-characterised, the nature of the 
disputed contract so that the so-called appropriate laws can be applied.125 This departed 
from the usual practice because the Court then had to review the merits of the case and 
revise the award.126 In international commercial arbitration, it is well established that the 
court is only entitled to “open the box” under very limited circumstances and is 
restricted to review the substance of the dispute and award. Enforcement of an award 
annulled by a court which breaks this “golden” rule, in effect, raises the review level by 
inviting the court to intervene in the arbitration proceeding and ultimately diminishes 
the creditability of the arbitration panel.
To grant the legal effect to an annulled award on a worldwide basis would truly 
put an award into an end since the international effect attached to an annulled award
122 See Ministry o f  Defence v Chromalloy Aero Services Company, in Revue de l’arbitrage, No. 4, 1998, 
p.723, a note by Leboulanger.
Article 53(l)(d) o f Egyptian Law No.27 for 1994 promulgating the law concerning arbitration in civil 
and commercial matters provides (English translation appearing in the ICCA International Handbook on 
Commercial Arbitration): “An arbitral award may be annulled only ... if the arbitral award failed to apply 
the law agreed upon by the parties to govern the subject matter in dispute”.
124 The contract provided that: “it is ... understood that both parties have irrevocably agreed to apply 
Egyptian Laws and to choose Cairo as the seat of the court of arbitration”. In its case, the arbitral tribunal 
held that the legal issues in dispute were not affected by the characterisation of the contract, and applied 
the rules o f Egyptian civil law to the contract. See ‘Final Award in the Arbitration o f Chromalloy Aero- 
Services and Arab Republic of Egypt’ (1996) 11(8) Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep C -l, 17.
125 The Court was widely criticised. See Fouchard (1997): La portee intemationale de l’annulation de la 
sentence arbitrale dans son pays d’origine, Revue de l’arbitrage, No.3, 330 at 349; Albert Jan van den 
Berg, ‘Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards after Annulment in Their Country of Origin’ (1998) 9(2) 
Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep 15, 18.
126 It was also argued that the re-characterisation of the contract made the Court surpass the powers 
conferred upon it by Egyptian Law No.27 of 1994 on Arbitration, which clearly prohibited any review on 
the merits o f awards. See Leboulanger, Revue de l’arbitrage, No.4, 330, 349. Also see Albert Jan van den 
Berg, ‘Enforcement o f Annulled Awards?’ op. cit. at 27.
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197would prevent that award from being enforced on a worldwide basis. This is a 
substantial risk to the parties in the sense that any non-existing or future grounds for 
setting aside an award in the home jurisdiction may eventually make the winning party 
lose its rights entirely. The parties’ interests cannot justify merely leaving unrestricted 
discretion to a jurisdiction where an award is rendered. In contrast, the rule which does 
not grant international legal effect to an annulled award would discourage the court in 
the arbitral situs to adopt any “bad” ground for setting aside an award. As far as the 
enforcement of arbitral awards is concerned, permitting the prevailing party in 
arbitration to enforce a vacated award in another jurisdiction serves as a potential 
constraint on the prevailing party’s risk of losing rights on a worldwide basis. Non­
enforcement of arbitral awards, on the basis of any ground, bad or good, would not 
finally “kill” an award but still leave the possibility with the winning party to seek 
enforcement of an award in other jurisdictions. This will become an effective 
competitive policy tool to limit the arbitral situs’s motivation to adopt “bad” grounds for 
setting aside arbitral awards.
As a matter of fact, the parties’ legal interests and legitimate expectations need a 
mechanism through which judicial powers can be balanced among various jurisdictions. 
Apart from judicial or arbitral systems, the parties should be allowed to resolve the 
dispute through contracts or contractual arrangements. As economic analysis has 
suggested, the parties are more likely to maximise their joint utility if they must choose 
prior to the conduct triggering the problem. Ex ante choice can create mutual benefits 
while ex post choice is a zero-sum game. In economic models of choosing the dispute 
resolution forum, the parties will be driven by economic incentives to choose an arbitral 
forum when the benefits of that forum net of its costs exceed those from a judicial 
forum.128 The “contract” approach allows the parties to reduce potential risks in 
arbitration by contracting for certain judicial supervision in the arbitral situs. The 
selection of the arbitral situs subjects the parties to the national arbitration law of the 
situs, including its standards for vacating awards, which sets out the degree of court 
supervision in the situs. The “contract” approach also allows the parties to agree with a
127 Fourchard (1997): La portee intemationale de l ’annulation de la sentence arbitrate dans son pays 
d’origine, Revue de l ’arbitrage, No.3, 330, 348 (noting that “it is not legitimate to grant to the judges of a 
State the power to annihilate on a worldwide basis an award which they dislike”).
128 See Keith N. Hylton and Christopher R. Drahozal, ‘The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An 
Application to Franchise Contracts’ (Boston University Working Paper No. 01-03) (2001); Keith N. 
Hylton, ‘Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis’ (2000) 8 Sup Ct 
Econ Rev (2000) 209; Steven Shavell, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis’ (1995) 
24 J Legal Stud 1.
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greater or lesser degree of court supervision129 such as de novo review of legal issues by 
courts.130 At least some parties to arbitration prefer more court supervision on arbitral 
awards than otherwise provided by law.131 The “contract” approach can further allow 
the parties to agree that a vacated award would be enforceable. Under the French 
approach, vacated awards are enforceable without regard to the agreement of the parties. 
Under the “traditional” approach, vacated awards are unenforceable no matter how the 
parties have agreed in the contract. Only under the Chromalloy approach do courts look 
to what the parties agreed in deciding whether to enforce a vacated award. Such an 
agreement would not be the same as an agreement to limit judicial review in the country 
of arbitral situs as the courts would continue to review the award and any decision in the 
arbitral situs would continue to determine the domestic enforceability of the award. 
However, a decision by the court in arbitral situs to vacate the award would not preclude 
the prevailing party from enforcing the award elsewhere, therefore providing the parties 
with greater flexibility in choosing the situs of their arbitration. In the interests of 
legitimacy and future development of international commercial arbitration, the 
international legal effect to an annulled award shall be upheld but limited, if not 
eliminated, to a certain extent. The appropriate legal framework should facilitate and 
respect the parties’ choice of the level or degree of judicial supervision by the courts in 
arbitral situs while respecting the mandatory nature of the grounds for vacating awards 
under most national arbitration laws.
5.2 Public Interests o f  Nations in Enforcing Annulled A wards
As far as public interests of states involved in enforcement of annulled awards are 
concerned, two perspectives can be explored: the specificity of the arbitral process and 
the nature of an arbitral award.
A court in the state hosting arbitration has a desire to create and maintain a 
reputation of hosting fair arbitration. The court has great incentives to ensure that the 
arbitration process meet the parties’ expectations and conform to procedural regularities 
so as to guard against manifest miscarriages of justice. This judicial objective can be 
achieved through the annulment mechanism where an award may be annulled by the
129 For example, the English arbitration law allows parties to contract out o f court review o f legal issues in 
arbitration. The Swiss and Belgian arbitration laws authorise foreign parties to contract out of court 
supervision in the situs. Several American courts have upheld agreements specifying a greater degree of 
court supervision than otherwise provided in the Federal Arbitration Act.
130 Christopher R. Drahozal, ‘“Unfair” Arbitration Clauses’ (2001) U 111 L Rev 695, 731.
131 See Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997); Gateway Techs., Inc. v. M CI 
Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
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court under certain circumstances. To that end, the court, as often claimed, possesses the 
ultimate competence to invalidate an award by setting aside the award where any 
ground enumerated in Article V of the New York Convention or similar ground listed in 
national arbitration laws appears. This will stop a defective award from coming into 
force in its own legal order. Similarly, the state can adopt legislation to the effect that an 
annulled award would not be enforced somewhere else when its own legal order has 
treated the award as a defective or invalid one.
Furthermore, the home jurisdiction has a legitimate claim to protect its image in 
the international community as an arbitration-friendly country where the party 
autonomy is fully respected as a founding principle in international commercial 
arbitration and any arbitral award would not be easily set aside even though the award 
may be defective or may result from arbitration in violation of some well-established 
norms. There are two limbs to this policy concern. The first limb is that the home 
jurisdiction needs to maintain a certain level of judicial control over arbitral awards. The 
second limb puts the onus on the necessity for the court to balance its secondary role in 
resolving legal issues in arbitration. Accordingly, an appropriate level of involvement in 
the award review in the arbitral situs needs to be tailored. Overly extensive judicial 
review and local control of arbitral awards is not ideal and will encourage parties to 
arbitrate elsewhere and possibly discourage investment by those parties who will be 
deterred by the thought of likely national court resolution of future disputes despite an 
agreement to arbitrate.132 A limited level of judicial control in the arbitral situs is 
appropriate.
It is one of the prerogatives of the state where a judgment is issued to set aside 
an arbitral award if it is found that the award is rendered in an objectionable manner. 
The interests of the home jurisdiction is to ensure that, according to its own legal 
standards, a defective award in its territory would not come into force and become 
enforceable elsewhere. In this case, the home jurisdiction is allowed to enjoy the 
discretion or flexibility as to the substantive and procedural standards to be followed for 
the annulment within its own boundaries. This is in line with the New York Convention 
which leaves the signatory countries some discretion to set aside awards for reasons the 
courts see appropriate.133 The Model Law also contains a separate list of grounds in
132 See William W. Park, ‘Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration’ (1999) 93 Am J Int’l L 805, 
823 (claiming that “should commercial actors find a country’s review standards burdensome or 
inadequate, the market will direct their next arbitration to a place more compatible with the desired level 
of judicial control”.)
133 Fouchard, La portee intemationale de l’annulation de la sentence arbitral dans san pays d ’origine, 
Revue de l’arbitrage, No.3 (1997) 330, 349.
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Article 34 by which an arbitral award can be set aside by the court in the country of 
rendition. Obviously, such interest of arbitral situs requires international recognition to 
the legal effect of an annulled award. Nevertheless, the worldwide legal effect cannot be 
granted where an award is set aside by a court for any unfair or improper grounds. This 
will cause potential negative impacts to a company incorporated or an individual 
resident in the home jurisdiction. For example, let us assume an award is rendered in 
Country A against a company incorporated in Country A for payment of a significant 
amount to a foreign entity which is another party in arbitration. In the international 
arbitration regime, the final say cannot belong solely to the court in the seat of 
arbitration or home jurisdiction as this would strike an imbalance between the rendering 
and enforcing jurisdictions. The serious consequence caused by this imbalance would 
be that the home jurisdiction would take advantage of its earlier position in the chain of 
arbitration proceeding to set aside an arbitral award first according to its local standards 
so that its local interests can be protected if the court in the country of enforcement must 
accept this annulment decision as the status quo. It is likely that the enforcing 
jurisdiction may be reluctant to support cross-border arbitration because of the obvious 
unfairness and partiality arising out of its disadvantageous “secondary” position in 
arbitration. The side effect would be that a dispute may ultimately end up in a 
jurisdiction where the impartiality and fairness are problematic. Of more concern is the 
fact that the international arbitration regime would collapse because of the lack of trust 
and confidence between rendering and enforcing states.
The court in arbitral situs is legitimately entitled to possess judicial power and 
discretion to set aside arbitral awards issued in its jurisdiction. However, such judicial 
power does not justify a full-scale international effect or worldwide recognition, offered 
by courts in other jurisdictions, to the annulled award. In addition, the court in the 
arbitral situs has no effective means to compel courts in other jurisdictions not to 
enforce the annulled award. The home jurisdiction is a separate regime independent 
from other jurisdictions which enjoy their own judicial independence and powers, 
though secondary to the foremost powers enjoyed by the courts in the country of 
rendition. Therefore, the next question is whether enforcement of an award outside the 
territory of the country of rendition constitutes a threat to the legal order of the home 
jurisdiction. The enforcement of an annulled award in other jurisdictions may not 
necessarily bring substantial damages to the home jurisdiction of the award. This is 
because the award has been neutralised after it was annulled by the court in the home 
jurisdiction. Further actions taken by courts in other jurisdictions would not revive this
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award in the home jurisdiction or bring any accountability or discredit to the home 
jurisdiction. Therefore, enforcement of an annulled award abroad should not become a 
concern to the home jurisdiction or damage the legitimacy and reputation of the legal 
order in the home jurisdiction. This line of argument is consistent with the territorial 
conception of arbitration.
The role or function of the courts is to protect the legal order in one jurisdiction
as a representative of the interests or sovereign of the country. Through its initial review,
the court in the arbitral situs ensures that arbitral awards leaving its borders for
recognition or enforcement have a certain level of national approval and international
acceptability, i.e., due process or substantive fairness. However, the court in the arbitral
situs cannot replace the role of courts in the enforcement regime by playing a judicial
role in its legal order. The judicial scrutiny by courts at the arbitral situs cannot avoid
repetition of review by the court in the enforcement forum even though the situs court’s
judicial review may have provided the parties and the enforcement forum courts with a
level of confidence on the fairness and justice in the arbitral award. When an annulled
award floats to an enforcement forum, international comity also encourages the court in
the enforcement forum to conduct a constrained level of judicial review over the award
in order to ensure that there is no reason to refuse enforcement under the New York
Convention standards enumerated in Article V. It is hard to centralise the court review
merely in the arbitral situs because the situs courts are not capable of interpreting and
applying the national laws in the enforcement forum. In addition, Article V of the New
York Convention itself is clear in granting a discretion whether or not to recognise the
award to courts in the country of enforcement.134 Therefore, the courts in the
enforcement forum play a role as a gatekeeper approving the arbitral awards regardless
of the local or global legal effect of those awards. The enforcement forum is usually
1connected to the dispute only because one or two parties’ assets are located there. 
This connection also supports a policy of reviewing an award rendered abroad so that 
investments and assets in the enforcement forum will be protected against unripe claims
134 If the text is read literally, that “recognition and enforcement will not be refused... unless” the award 
has been annulled or suspended, it appears that the reviewing court is not required to refuse enforcement 
o f the award in all cases. Put differently, there would still be no affirmative obligation to enforce the 
nullification decision. See Jan Paulsson, ‘Rediscovering the New York Convention: Further Reflections 
on Chromalloy’ op. cit. 22 (noting that Article V “does not command a refusal to enforce when there has 
been an annulment”); Gary B. Bom, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States: 
Commentary and Materials (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer and Boston: 1994) n.23 at 
649 (noting that French version o f Article V is equally authoritative as English in providing that “Article 
V ’s exceptions permit, but do not require, non-recognition”).
135 See David L. Shapiro et al. (eds), W. Michael Reisman, W Laurence Craig, William Park and. Jan 
Paulsson, International Commercial Arbitration (Foundation Press, New York 1997) 1099.
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raised abroad. The legal effect of a decision by a foreign court to enforce an annulled 
award is theoretically limited to its own territory.136 Given such limitations, it was 
proposed to reduce the “secondary” court’s control in the enforcement forum,137 which 
can be achieved with respect to the individual grounds for refusal set out in Article V of 
the New York Convention such as Article V(l)(e).
It is generally accepted in Europe that the 1961 European Convention limited 
the effect of the setting aside of an award in a contracting state to the Convention when 
seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award in other contracting states. The 
approach is “conventional” rather than “revolutionary” in terms of its underlying 
territorial conception of arbitration. According to Article IX of the European 
Convention, the setting aside of an award in a contracting state only constitutes a 
ground for refusal for recognition and enforcement in another contracting state where 
the setting aside took place in a state in which or under the law of which the award has 
been made for one of the reasons listed in Article IX of the Convention.138 These 
reasons are close to the grounds listed in Article V(l)(a)-(d) of the New York 
Convention.139 Nevertheless, the annulment of an award for violation of public policy of 
the state in which or under the law of which the award has been rendered does not 
constitute a ground for refusing recognition and enforcement of such an award in other 
contracting states. The Austrian Supreme Court applied Article IX of the European 
Convention in Radenska,140 An arbitral tribunal rendered an arbitral award in Belgrade, 
Yugoslavia in 1988. The panel applied Yugoslav law and ordered DO Zdravilisce 
Radenska, a Yugoslav company, to pay Kajo-Erzeugnisse, Essenzen GmbH, an 
Austrian company around 30 million shillings and interest for Radenska’s breach of a 
manufacturing and distribution contract of a non-alcoholic beverage in Yugoslavia. The 
award was set aside by the Slovenian Supreme Court in July 1992 on the ground that 
the contract was in a monopolistic form which was against public policy. Radenska 
requested the Austrian Supreme Court not to enforce the award for the annulment in the 
country of rendition. Nevertheless, the Austrian Supreme Court rejected this request
136 In practice, it is possible that a court may recognise a judgment rendered in a foreign country which 
had granted enforcement o f an award in its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, this is entirely that court’s decision 
to recognise such a judgment.
137 Gerold Herrmann, ‘Does the World Need Additional Uniform Legislation on Arbitration? The 1998 
Freshfields Lecture’ (1999) 15(3) Arb Int’l 211, 215, 235.
138 As Albert Jan van den Berg pointed out, this provision has been only tested once. See Albert Jan van 
den Berg, ‘Enforcement o f Annulled Awards?’ op. cit. at 20.
139 Article IX(1) of the European Convention.
140 See ‘Oberster Gerichtshof [Supreme Court] 20 October 1993, Radenska v Kajo’ (1995) XX Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/Boston) 1051-1056; Revue de 
l’arbitrage, No.2/1998, p.419, with note by Senkovic and Lastenouse; Austrian Supreme Court, February 
23, 1998, Revue de l’arbitrage, No.2/1999, with note by Senkovic and Lastenouse.
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according to Article IX(2) of the European Convention, which limited the effect of 
Article V(l)(e) of the New York Convention. The Austrian Supreme Court held that, 
according to Article IX of the European Convention, the setting aside of an award in 
Slovenia on the grounds of public policy cannot justify the refusal of the enforcement of 
an award in Austria. Thereafter, Radenska started fresh proceedings to oppose the 
enforcement decision made by the court in Austria. Nevertheless, the Austrian Supreme 
Court turned down Radenska’s request and confirmed the lower court’s decision and 
reasoning. The European Convention is not an exceptional case to the principle of 
limiting the legal effect of annulment. Rather, it provides a platform for the home 
jurisdiction to claim the region-wide legal effect of an annulment under enumerated 
circumstances. The European Convention also excludes the potential incorporation of 
particularities for setting aside an award contained in the arbitration law of the country 
of origin into the grounds for refusal of enforcement under the Convention.141 This 
effectively avoids a confusing circumstance where an enforcement regime may be 
subject to the Convention as well as the local law of another contracting state. It seems 
that the lawmakers of the European Convention intend to restrict the regional legal 
effect of an annulled award to a limited degree. This may explain why the New York 
Convention does not seem to function effectively in this regard. The New York 
Convention still maintains the territorial concept by leaving more discretions in 
annulling an award to courts in the arbitral situs. Meanwhile, it gives some leeway to 
the enforcing courts by allowing them to have more favourable legislation for enforcing 
an annulled award. In substance, the New York Convention does not grant any judicial 
power to a jurisdiction so as to represent the entire international community. This 
approach makes sense in a large picture since member states may not reach any 
agreement as to the unified or common meaning and understanding of the ground for 
setting aside an award.
5.3 Dual Control Mechanism, Delocalisation and Judicial Competition 
In a game setting, players are likely to end up in a confession-confession setting if they 
have conflicting interests and if there is not a uniform and clear guidance governing 
actions of players. In our context, a natural question is whether recognition and 
enforcement of annulled awards necessarily creates or increases the “disorder” at the
141 See Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Enforcement of Annulled Awards?’ op. cit. 20.
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international level? The question that follows is whether it would breach the harmony of 
legal orders among various signatory countries to the New York Convention.142
The modem development of international commercial arbitration has been made 
possible by the willingness of an increasing number of countries to permit matters 
traditionally reserved to the courts to be settled by private processes of dispute 
resolution. If international arbitration exists at all, this is only because states are willing 
it to be that way by sacrificing some judicial powers. Furthermore, it can continue to 
thrive and develop only if it retains the confidence of lawmakers and courts in 
jurisdictions where arbitration is conducted, the award is rendered or enforced. Such 
confidence has been secured in most countries because of the retention by the state of a 
minimum level of oversight and control over the arbitral process. The modem 
international arbitration “compact” that has emerged, as reflected in both the New York 
Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law, is founded on a system of dual control by 
the states, firstly by the original state of arbitration and secondly by the state where an 
award is enforced.143 The first type of judicial control occurs in the proceedings of 
setting aside arbitral awards while the second type of judicial control occurs in the 
proceedings of enforcing foreign awards. The distinction in these two types of judicial 
control is a distinction between control by the primary jurisdiction and control by the 
secondary jurisdiction.144
The first type of judicial control mainly arises but is also restricted by various 
grounds on which arbitral awards can be vacated as prescribed in national arbitration 
laws. A large number of national laws follow the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration, which actually has the same list of grounds for 
non-enforcement of awards as contained in the New York Convention. Some national 
arbitration laws contain grounds for vacating awards in addition to those in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. For instance, in the United States, according to dicta in two 
Supreme Court opinions, a number of courts of appeals have recognised a non-statutory 
ground for vacating arbitration awards if the awards are in “manifest disregard” of the 
law.145 There are also several national laws which contain fewer grounds for vacating
142 Ibid.
143 Article V(l)(e) o f the New York Convention also contemplates possible control by an authority o f the 
country “under the law of which the award was made”, a provision that has given rise to special 
difficulties and case-law beyond the scope of this discussion.
144 W. Michael Reisman, Systems o f  Control in International Adjudication and Arbitration (Duke 
University Press, Durham, NC 1992) 109-20.
145 E.g., Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R " Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998); George Watt & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 
248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001); see Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (dicta), overruled on other
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arbitral awards than the UNCITRAL Model Law.146 The degree of judicial control in 
the setting aside proceedings is reflected in the nature and number of statutory grounds 
for vacating arbitral awards. In most countries, including several major international 
arbitration centres, the grounds for vacating arbitral awards are mandatory and the 
parties are not entitled to contract around them.147 In the United States, however, some 
courts have opined that the grounds for vacating an award are a mandatory minimum 
basis rather than a mandatory maximum cap. Similarly, in England, “a party to 
arbitration proceedings may . . . appeal to the court on a question of law arising out of
14Ran award made in the proceedings” unless the parties agree otherwise. This means 
that the grounds for setting aside arbitral awards are a mandatory minimum basis and 
the parties to arbitration cannot contract for less judicial supervision than stipulated in 
the statutes but can contract for more judicial supervision.149 In other countries, the 
grounds for vacating international arbitration awards are default rules, especially for 
arbitrations involving foreign parties.150
The annulment stage of an award is very domestic compared to the regime 
governing recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Under the New York 
Convention, there is no restriction imposed on a state court to adopt any ground to set 
aside an award issued. The local law in the seat of arbitration may change from time to 
time subject to local conditions. In contrast, the second type of judicial control is less 
domestic, if not more international. A state court in which enforcement is sought 
decides on those defences that have been outlined in the New York Convention and 
may have been decided upon in an action for setting aside the award by the judge of the 
country of rendition. Nevertheless, it is not a proposition that the New York Convention
grounds, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp. Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); First Options o f  Chicago, 
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (dicta). See Gary B. Bom, International Commercial 
Arbitration: Commentary and Materials (2d edn Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001) 725, 727- 
28 (outlining in detail split among American courts over the grounds for vacating international arbitration 
awards made in the United States).
146 Swiss Private International Law Act, Art. 192(1) (December 18, 1987).
147 W. Laurence Craig et al., International Chamber o f  Commerce Arbitration (3rd edn Oceana 
Publications, Inc., Dobbs Ferry, New York 2000) § 28.04(c) at 503.
148 UK Arbitration Act (1996) § 69.
149 For cases holding that parties cannot contract out of judicial review of arbitral awards, see Iran 
Aircraft Indus, v. Avco Corp, 980 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992); M&C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., 87 
F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 1996).
150 Swiss Private International Law Act, Art. 192(1) (Dec. 18, 1987) states that “where none of the parties 
has its domicile, its habitual residence, or a business establishment in Switzerland, they may, by an 
express statement in the arbitration agreement or by a subsequent agreement in writing, exclude all setting 
aside proceedings, or they may limit such proceedings to one or several o f the grounds listed in Art. 190, 
para. 2”.
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tried to take away from the enforcement forum its judicial and legislative powers to 
regulate and decide non-recognition of a foreign judgment.151
The co-existence of judicial control by the state of rendition and state of 
enforcement in international commercial arbitration is recognised as a dual control 
mechanism, which is, to a significant degree, rooted in the “territorial” conception of 
arbitration. In other words, arbitration is conducted subject to the law of the place of 
arbitration, and the resulting award forms part of the legal order of that place and is
1 S?therefore legitimately subject to such recourse there as the legal order may provide. 
The theoretical foundation of the territorial theory is the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
The territorialism clings to the sovereignty notion that nothing of legal significance can 
appear anywhere if it is neither approved nor tolerated by the local sovereign.153 The 
UNCITRAL Model Law and other modem arbitration legislation recognise a traditional 
“territorial” view. “The UNCITRAL Model Law makes the place of arbitration the legal 
touchstone for international arbitration procedure and judicial recourse. ... One of the 
surprising effects of the legislative reform movement has been to reinforce the concept 
of the territorial application of arbitration law and the importance of the law of the seat 
of the arbitration”.154
An extreme theory opposite to territorialism is the “delocalisation” of 
international arbitration, which claims that there is no link whatsoever between the 
arbitral proceeding in the territory and the state’s legal regime, and, as a result, arbitral 
awards rendered in the country of rendition should be considered a-national awards.155 
Both Chromalloy and Hilmarton challenge the conventional “territorial” conception, 
and somehow adopt an anti-territorial or delocalised view though the reasoning may 
technically differ. The French court in Hilmarton stresses the international legal effect 
of an award from the very early beginning and states that: “... the award rendered in 
Switzerland was an international award that was not integrated into the legal order of 
that State, so that its existence remained established despite its annulment...”156 This 
was the basis for the Paris Court of Appeal’s decision to allow the enforcement of the
151 For a comparative overview o f grounds for refusal o f recognition, see Permanent Bureau of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, Note on the Recognition and Enforcement o f Decisions in the 
Perspective of a Double Convention with Special Regard to Foreign Judgments Awarding Punitive or 
Excessive Damages (Enforcement o f Judgments: Prel. Doc. No.4 (1996) pp.8-17.)
152 Ibid.
153 See Jan Paulsson, ‘Rediscovering the New York Convention: Further Reflections on Chromalloy’ op. 
cit. 20.
154 See W Laurence Craig, ‘Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice o f International 
Commercial Arbitration’ (1995) 30(1) Texas Int’l L J 36, 57.
155 Ibid. at 23.
156 Hilmarton c/OTV, Cass. Civ. Lre, (Hilmarton), Rev. Arb., 1994, 328.
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Chromalloy award in France. The decision of the US District Court in Chromalloy did 
not make similar comments.157 Instead, the Court assumed from the outset that, despite 
its annulment, there still remained in existence an award capable of enforcement. It 
seems that both French and US courts upheld the view that an annulled award is still of 
legal effect, either because of its continuous existence or its integration into the 
international regime from the outset. These two cases, inconsistent with the traditional 
“territorial” concept, may be justified by the delocalisation theory or the dual control 
regime, either of which triggers a parallel relaxation of the level of judicial review 
exerted by local courts in both countries of rendition and enforcement for 
“international” arbitral awards. The antithesis of the territorial view is that enforcement 
of awards annulled abroad is not impeded when the award in question has been annulled 
in the country of origin as a court can attribute that award to its existence or effect that 
is independent from the legal order of the home jurisdiction. The theory of 
delocalisation effectively suggests that, due to the detachment from the sovereignty, an 
arbitral award may become stateless and float in the international firmament, capable of 
being enforced wherever it may touch down.
The primacy of the delocalisation theory is the notion of party autonomy in 
determining two key aspects of arbitration. One is the movement toward the 
delocalisation of the arbitral proceeding, and the other is the trend toward delocalising 
the applicable law in arbitration. Both developments aim at freeing arbitration from the 
peculiarities of national laws. As to the delocalisation of arbitral procedure, the 
objective is to remove arbitration proceedings from the place of arbitration. The 
ultimate goal is to prevent the law of the place of arbitration from placing undue burden 
on the arbitration proceeding. However, the present move toward the harmonisation of 
national laws on arbitration would make delocalisation of arbitration proceeding 
relatively unnecessary. Therefore, the other development, delocalising applicable law, 
largely the substantive law, is of more significance. In international commercial 
arbitration, the governing law of arbitration is often the laws of the state where the 
arbitration is conducted, the lex loci arbitri. In practice, the place of arbitration is often 
chosen because of practical considerations such as a matter of convenience or a matter 
of connection.158 The delocalisation theory is to disconnect arbitration from the place of
157 There is nothing in its decision to suggest that the Court consciously sought to embrace the theory of 
the “stateless” award.
158 A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, ‘Conflict o f Law Issues in International Arbitration: Practice and Trends’ 
(1993) 9(4) Arb Int’l 371, 385.
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arbitration,159 and subject the arbitrating parties to non-national law, such as the lex 
mercatoria and global law.160 As an obvious example, if the parties to a state contract 
are to select international law as the governing law and the contract is unsupplemented 
by a particular national law, the dispute has nothing to do with any state law but 
international law, apart from its proclamations of pacta sunt servanda and similar 
generalities.
The motive behind the delocalisation theory is to make international arbitration 
independent from the rigorous national legal systems, which may impose excessive 
judicial interference on party autonomy and deprive parties to arbitration of the 
predictability, finality and confidentiality to which they attached so much importance in 
arbitration. The notion of delocalised arbitration allows the parties to arbitration to 
enjoy neutrality and convenience of the place of arbitration without resorting to the 
intricacies of local rules. This concept also suggests that the arbitral procedure and any 
resulting award shall be autonomous, being disconnected to any national legal system 
and deriving their legal force solely from the agreement of the parties. On the topic we 
discuss here, the concept of delocalised arbitration certainly supports the relaxation of 
judicial control exerted by the courts in both annulment and enforcement regimes. 
However, the concept of delocalised arbitration, a theory in favour of the complete 
detachment of the substance of the dispute from the ambit of national laws, will 
practically encounter difficulties.161 For instance, the Court of Appeal in England 
supported the view that the procedural law governing arbitration is that of the forum of 
the arbitration as this was the system of law with which the agreement to arbitration in 
the particular forum will have the closest connection.162 It has also been argued that a 
large number of provisions in the New York Convention such as Articles 11(1), 11(3), 
V(l)(a), V(l)(d), V(l)(e) and VI explicitly recognise the principle of lex loci arbitri. 
The counter argument, however, is that Article VII in the New York Convention allows 
lex loci arbitri to be bypassed as it establishes the right of the enforcement states to take 
a more pro-enforcement stance by enforcing a foreign award under its more arbitration 
friendly rules despite its annulment by the court of rendition where the annulment is not 
a ground under the domestic law for refusal of recognition of the award.
159 Hans Smit, ‘A-national Arbitration’ (1989) 63(3) Tul. L. Rev. 629, 632.
160 See Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
161 Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation, op. cit. 33.
162 Bank Mellat v. Helleniki Technicki SA [1983] 3 W.L.R. 783-89; Naviera Amazonica Peruana S.A. v. 
Compania Internacional de Seguros del Peru [1988] 1 Lloyds Rep 116.
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The dual control mechanism has some benefits. From an economic perspective, 
the key difference between arbitration and litigation is that governments ordinarily 
subsidise court systems, with the plaintiff paying only a small filing fee but the 
arbitration institutions charge administration fees to manage the arbitration proceedings. 
In any event, arbitration may be either more or less costly than litigation, but arbitrators 
and arbitration institutions, as discussed previously in a market setting, are competing 
under market pressures. The differing damage awards from the process may be different 
and is distributional in nature. 163 The differing expected damage awards have 
“deterrence benefits”164 and affect the parties’ contractual performance and behaviours. 
If the expected damage award in arbitration is closer to the optimal level than the 
expected damage judgment in litigation, all else being equal, arbitration will better deter 
wrongful conduct in arbitration than litigation.165 Along with its greater deterrence 
benefits than litigation, arbitration has inherent risks, one of which is the arbitration 
panel’s aberrational award. Unlike the court systems, an appeals process is uncommon 
in arbitration. The economic reason for this phenomenon is that arbitrators face market 
sanctions for poor decisions. Thus, the risk of an aberrational arbitration award should 
be theoretically less than the risk of an aberrational trial court decision.166 However, the 
market sanctions do not guarantee a zero aberrational award. The parties in arbitration, 
on the other hand, have little incentive to support or request the lawmaking function of 
appellate judges, the benefits of which are purely external to the parties. The lack of an 
internal appeals process requires an external regime to supervise the regularity and 
quality of arbitral awards. The court supervision of arbitral awards is a natural substitute 
in terms of risk management. The availability of judicial review and control by an 
enforcement court can reduce the risk of aberrational decisions by a court in the arbitral 
situs in two respects. First, enforcing courts can serve a constraint on or protection 
against an erroneous failure to vacate an award at the arbitral situs so that the prevailing 
party can still collect on the arbitral award. Second, if the award should have been 
vacated, enforcing courts can always refuse to enforce that award. As Park rightly
163 One party may require the other party to transfer payment before the disadvantaged party will agree to 
arbitrate.
164 Deterrence benefits can result either from the increasing level of deterrence if  the expected damages in 
court are too low (avoiding under-deterrence), or from the decreasing level o f deterrence if the expected 
damages in court are too high (avoiding over-deterrence).
165 See Keith N. Hylton, ‘Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis’ op. 
cit. 220.
166 Gordon Tullock, Trials on Trial: The Pure Theory o f  Legal Procedure (Columbia University Press, 
New York 1980) 123; Robert D. Cooter, ‘The Objectives of Private and Public Judges’ (1983) 41 Public 
Choice 107; Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, ‘Trial Courts: An Economic Perspective’ (1990) 
24 L & Society Rev 533, 545.
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pointed out, “judicial review of arbitral awards constitutes a form of risk management
1 t i ldesigned to safeguard against perverse arbitrators and shameless intermeddlers”.
The dual control mechanism, nonetheless, gives rise to tremendous uncertainties 
in practice. Depending upon which approach the court of the enforcement forum will 
take, either the territoriality or delocalised approach or the combination of both, various 
models can be arranged in dealing with the enforcement of an arbitral award that is set 
aside by the court in the country of rendition. The first model is a strict territoriality 
model in which the law of the enforcing state requires its courts to refuse enforcement 
of an arbitral award that has been set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. This 
model is adopted by Italy and the Netherlands. The second model is largely the same 
as the first model except that under the laws of the enforcing state, the grounds for 
refusal of enforcement of a foreign arbitral award are more limited than those of Article 
V and preclude the ground of the setting aside of the award under the lex loci arbitri. 
However, under this model, the award that has been set aside in the country of rendition 
may still be entitled to enforcement by the court in the enforcing jurisdiction according 
to the “most favoured right” provision (Article VII) of the New York Convention if the 
requirements of the law of the enforcement forum are satisfied. The third model 
recognises the territoriality rule by respecting the decision of a foreign court of 
competent jurisdiction setting aside the award subject to rights of impeachment in cases 
such as procedural unfairness or obtaining a judgment by fraud. This model grants a 
certain level of discretion to the courts in the enforcement forum. England,169
17 f i 171 177Mexico, Germany and Switzerland adopt this model. The fourth model is likely 
not to recognise an annulment order in the court of origin either as a ground in itself for 
refusing enforcement of the award or as any kind of presumption that such an order
167 William W. Park, ‘Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration’ (1999) 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 808.
168 Article 840(5) of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
The Court o f Appeal shall refuse recognition and enforcement of the foreign award if in the opposition 
proceedings the party against whom the award is invoked proves any o f the following circumstances:
(5) the award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or suspended by a 
competent authority o f the State in which, or under the law o f which, it was made.
Article 1076(l)(A)(e) of the Netherlands Private International Law Act provides as follows:
If  no treaty concerning recognition and enforcement is applicable, or if  applicable treaty allows a party to 
rely on the law of the country in which recognition and enforcement is sought, an arbitral award made in 
a foreign State may be recognised in the Netherlands and its enforcement may be sought in the 
Netherlands... unless:
(e) the arbitral award has been set aside by a competent authority o f the country in which the award is 
made.
169 Article 103(2) of the English Arbitration Act 1996.
170 Article 1462 of the Mexican Commercial Code.
171 Article 1061 of the German Code of Civil Procedure.
172 Article 194 of the Swiss Private International law Act 1987.
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establishes facts which would bring the case within a possible ground under the law of 
the enforcing state. The fifth model is based upon the delocalisation theory and has been 
adopted by French courts. In a series of cases, the Court of Cassation held that the 
setting aside or suspension of an award by a court in the country of origin did not 
deprive the party obtaining the award of his right to have the award enforced in France 
in the conditions permitted by French law.173 Under the French model, Article V of the 
New York Convention would rarely be applied and can be almost regarded as a dead 
letter. The sixth model is an extreme and unique model adopted by Belgium. According 
to the Belgian legislation, no court in Belgium could set aside an award unless at least 
one party to arbitration is Belgian. The model effectively endorses the delocalisation 
theory and reflects such theory in the annulment rather than enforcement stage. In brief, 
the possibility of various legislative or judicial models is likely to cast uncertainties over 
the enforcement practice and policies and spread scepticism and reluctance towards 
arbitration among international law- and policy-makers. Lack of certainty may also 
result in inconsistent judgments by foreign courts and multiple jeopardy, which have 
been demonstrated by Hilmarton and Chromalloy.
The dual control mechanism also causes the conflicts of interest and inherent 
inefficiencies. Conflicts of interest arise between the annulment of an award in the home 
jurisdiction and enforcement of an annulled award in a foreign jurisdiction because 
enforcement of an annulled award may be regarded by its home jurisdiction as a lack of 
respect to the court’s decision in setting aside the award. The French courts were 
criticised for its approach in dealing with Hilmarton where the Swiss Supreme Court’s 
decision to set aside the award was not duly respected. In Hilmarton, the French Court 
of Cassation did not recognise the regularity and legitimacy of the decision made by the 
Swiss Supreme Court but applied French law to the case. According to French law, the 
annulment of a foreign award in the jurisdiction where the award is issued is not a 
ground for rejecting an application to recognise and enforce the award in France. In this 
sense, the French courts’ approach was criticised as a unilateralist or imperialist one.174 
Nevertheless, from a legal perspective, for a court to apply its own law in its own 
territory would not be considered imperialist regardless of public international law. In 
Chromalloy, the interest of Egypt was undermined by the decision made by the US
173 Pabalt Tikeret Sirketi v. Norsolor, Cas. le. civ. 9 October 1984 (1985) Rev. de l’Arb. 431; Polish 
Ocean Line v. Jolasry, Cas. le civ. 10 March 1993 (1993) Rev. de l’Arb. 255; Hilmarton Ltd. v. Omnium 
de Traitement et de Valorisation (OTV) Cass, le civ., 23 March 1994 (1994) Rev. de l ’Arb. 327; Arab 
Republic o f  Egypt v. Chromalloy Air Services, CA Paris, 14 January 1997 (1997) Rev. de l’Arb. 395.
174 See Besson and Pittet, La recomnaissance a l’etranger d ’une sentence annulee dans son etat d’origine -  
reflexions a la de 1’affaire Hilmarton, Bulletin ASA, No.3 (1998) 498, 515.
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Court since its integrity of legal system, in particular, the arbitration system, was 
destroyed to a certain extent. In reality, conflicts of interest may cause more practical 
difficulty and inefficiency. It is likely that the dual control mechanism may be 
transformed into a multi-party control practice. It is possible under Article V(l)(e) that 
the courts in two or more countries, being the country where the award is rendered and 
the country under the law of which the award is rendered, may find that they both have 
jurisdiction to set aside an award and that the two decisions may be inconsistent175 
Further the country where the award is enforced may also find that it actually has 
jurisdiction to decide whether an annulled award shall be enforced or not. The judgment 
rejecting an appeal to set aside the award in the country where it is rendered leaves 
entire freedom to the court in the country where enforcement is sought to refuse
1 7Aenforcement of such awards. A bizarre consequence would be that after an action to 
set aside the award has been rejected in country A where the award was issued, 
enforcement of the award may be refused in country B but granted in country C.177 
Inefficiency is also reflected in an increasingly significant cost in the possibility of 
multiple enforcement actions faced by the parties. Enforcement of arbitral awards may 
take place in any jurisdiction that recognises an annulled award and where the losing 
party has assets. A party that fails in an attempt in one jurisdiction can bring successive 
actions to other jurisdictions until it ultimately realises its credit of the award. The 
exposure to a multiplicity of proceedings in a number of different countries undermines 
the economic efficiency in arbitration, induces profligacy and the wasteful use of 
resources.
A related question arising out of Chromalloy is how arbitration and litigation 
can co-exist in the trend of globalisation. Put differently, the question is how to balance 
the need of judicial review and private autonomy based on the principle of party 
autonomy. Notwithstanding the theory of “internationalism,” as opposed to 
“territorialism,” the Chromalloy decision, along with its Belgian and French 
predecessors, brings sovereign rules into doubt. The court’s tendentious pragmatism is 
not apt to preserve the sovereignty, and the enforcement of an annulled award 
constitutes a violation of the implicit allocation of sovereignty among national courts
175 See Fouchard, La portee internationale de l ’annulation de la sentence arbitrale dans son pays d ’origine, 
Revue de 1’arbitrage, No.3 (1997) 330, 332.
176 Fouchard, Ibid., at 345; Suggestions pour accroitre l’efficacite internationale des sentences arbitrales, 
Revue de I’arbitrage, No. 4 (1998) 653, 666; Poudret: Quelle solution pour en finir avec Paffaire 
Hilmarton? Revue de 1’arbitrage, No. 1 (1998) 7, 17.
177 See ‘Switzerland-Bezirksgericht [Court o f First Instance], Affoltem am Albis, 26 May 1994, (1998) 
XXIII Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, The 
Hague/London/Boston) 754-763.
134
under international law,178 even though such sovereignty is recognised by the New York 
Convention.
The New York Convention does not provide a solution to the chaos caused by 
Chromalloy and Hilmarton. Article VI of the New York Convention endeavours to 
reduce the discrepancy that arises between annulment in the country of origin and 
enforcement in another jurisdiction by providing that the enforcement court may 
adjourn the enforcement proceedings pending a decision of the annulment court. The 
proceedings in the country of rendition and in the country of enforcement are 
coordinative due to their closeness. In theory, the coordination can be achieved by 
giving priority to the court first seised. However, Article VI is not able to bring about 
international harmony to the chaos caused by the dual control mechanism between the 
country of origin and the country of enforcement since it, together with Article V(l)(e), 
provides the most important procedural weapon to respondents seeking to resist 
enforcement. The combined effect of Articles V(l)(e) and VI of the New York 
Convention is to enable the courts in the country of enforcement to refuse or postpone 
enforcement if the award “has not yet become binding on the parties” or if it has been 
“set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which it was made”. 
As previously discussed, both limbs give rise to practical and theoretical problems.
5.4 Tensions between Rendition and Enforcement Forums and Gaming Settings 
The New York Convention may be characterised by fundamental tensions between the 
courts of the enforcing forum versus those of the arbitral situs. Traditionally, arbitration 
is regarded as an important branch of customary international law, which is often 
understood as a general practice of states developed out of a sense of legal obligation. 
However, game theory principles suggest that customary norms are in fact the result of 
self-interested states acting in various strategic situations. States do not respect and 
comply with customary arbitration rules out of a sense of legal obligation. Rather, they 
act out of their rational self-interest in their interactions with other states. The felicific 
calculus is difficult because it is not certain how other states will react to alternative 
measures. Economic analysis makes an assumption that the state, like an individual
178 See Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Enforcement of Annulled Awards?’ op. cit. 15, quoting W. Michael 
Reisman, Systems o f  Control on International Adjudication and Arbitration (Duke University Press, 
Durham, NC 1992). An arbitral award would not be vested with a practically irrebuttable regularity at the 
moment o f its issuance.
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person, is a rational maximiser of its satisfaction.179 The discussion and analysis here 
are premised upon this conception.
In principle, regularities exist in behavioural models among states. In terms of 
influencing state behaviours, the implications for a game theory critique extend to both 
custom and treaties and appear to imply that neither source of law can be relied on to 
influence state behaviour when interests change. Even if this theoretic presumption is 
true, international law can continue to be used instrumentally to enhance international 
cooperation when desired. The feasibility of using customary norms or treaties to 
influence behaviours or not depends on the assessment of the level of functioning of and 
compliance with legal norms. In this sense, customary norms do not reflect a single 
unitary logic. Instead of a set of rules established by a general and consistent practice 
followed out of a sense of legal obligation, customary arbitration rules actually refer to 
behavioural regularities that emerge out of self-interested state interactions in various 
strategic settings. It appears that a new insight can be gained by identifying those 
situations in which behavioural regularities among states arise. There are four basic 
models that give rise to such regularities: coincidence of interest, coercion, cooperation, 
and coordination.
Coincidence of interest occurs “where states engage in behavioural regularities 
simply because each obtains private advantages from a particular action (which happens 
to be the same action taken by the other state) irrespective of the action of the other”.180 
Assuming that an arbitral award is issued by an arbitration panel which accepted bribes 
from both sides, the courts in the place of arbitration and the enforcement forum share 
the same interest in mitigating the negative effects generated by this award.181 Under 
certain conditions, it is simply more beneficial for the courts in both states to act 
without regard to the other state’s action. The payoff for ignoring the other’s judicial 
action is higher than extending its jurisdiction towards a judgment made by the other
179 For instance, if  a state will achieve more o f what it wants to achieve by taking step A rather than step 
B, homo economicus will, by definition, take step A; to do otherwise would, by definition, be acting 
irrationally. The felicific calculus is also problematic because of empirical difficulties in finding out what 
states do in fact want. What a state wants is, by definition, what a state is willing to pay for -  either in 
money, or by the development o f some other resource that a state has such as time and effort. For all that 
happens to a state can be reduced to things a state will pay to have or pay to be without, the solvent o f a 
hypothetical market.
180 Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, ‘A Theory of Customary International Law’ (1999) 66 U Chi L 
Rev 1113, 1122.
181 See the Paquete Habana decision 175 U.S. 677 (1900), in which each of two belligerent states that 
patrol the same body of water can choose between attacking or ignoring commercial fishing vessels o f the 
other state. Under certain conditions, it is simply more beneficial for each state to ignore the other state’s 
fishing boats than it is to attack them. The payoff for ignoring the other’s boats is higher than it is for 
attacking, and the fact that the two states refrain from attack is coincidental. “The outcome is no more 
surprising than the fact that states do not sink their own ships”.
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state, the side effect of which is to damage the relationship between two states. 
Moreover, the fact that two states refrain from “attack” is coincidental. The third model 
dealing with enforcement of an annulled award, discussed in Section 5.3.1 supra, 
adopted by England, Mexico, Germany and Switzerland, can be seen as a coincidence 
model.
Coercion takes place when “one state, or a coalition of states with convergent 
interests, forces other states to engage in actions that serve the interest of the first state
1 89or group of states”. For example, the European Union and the United States use 
coercion to codify their preferences in international law and “forum-shopping” among 
different governmental organisations to advance their interests by pushing international 
law to desired ends. The strategy employed first involves an agreement among a 
coalition of the willing, followed by enticing the resisting sovereign states to agree. The 
true basis of the legal prohibition is economic efficiency, rather than some other 
normative conception.184 In our context, the powerful state could threaten to destroy a 
weaker state’s judgment if it attacks or damages the stronger state’s commercial 
interests. The stronger state could do so if the costs of carrying out the threat are 
relatively low. The weaker state, realising that its payoff for attacking the stronger 
state’s commercial interests is very low, will not or will stop doing so. If the stronger 
state can make better use of its advantageous position, it will not necessarily attack the 
weaker state’s legal system.185 A different but possible scenario is retaliation. An 
arbitral situs might retaliate against an enforcement court that enforces an award vacated 
in the situs either by enforcing vacated awards originating from the enforcement 
jurisdiction or by refusing to enforce all awards from that jurisdiction.186 In a coercive 
model, some value is transferred from the weaker state to the stronger one without 
proper bargaining.187 Again, the regularity in the behavioural models cannot be simply
182 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, ‘A Theory o f Customary International Law’ op. cit.
183 Daniel W. Drezner, ‘On the Balance between International Law and Democratic Sovereignty’ (2001) 2 
Chi J Int’l L 321, 323, 329, 332.
184 So-called mala in se, such as murder, assault, rape and theft, are examples of coerced transactions. See 
Richard Posner, Economic Analysis o f  Law (4th edn Aspen Publisher Inc., New York 1993) 251-52.
185 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, ‘A Theory o f Customary International Law’ op. cit. at 1124.
186 See Eric A. Schwartz, ‘A Comment on Chromalloy: Hilmarton, a l’americaine’ (1997) 14(2) J Int’l 
Arb 125, 135 (“I fear the more likely consequence of decisions such as Chromalloy may be to undercut 
the efforts o f those who have been laboring for years to restore confidence in the international arbitration 
process in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East, where international arbitration has long been viewed 
with suspicion”). Also see Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Enforcement of Awards Set Aside in the Country of 
Origin: The French Experience’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed) Improving the Efficiency o f  Arbitration 
Agreement and Awards: 40 Years o f  Application o f  The New York Convention (Kluwer Law International, 
The Netherlands 1999) 521-23.
187 For instance, in a criminal law context, some value is transferred from the victim to the delinquent 
without proper bargaining. The law then penalises the thief, not because theft is some non-economic 
sense “wrong”, but in order to persuade the thief to use the market. The reason for punishment is that the
137
explained by a general rule. Rather, the explanation may be given by reference to states’ 
rational response to a given strategic situation. In this discussion, the obvious imbalance 
between two states may stop both sides from taking any direct actions towards the 
counter state. A stronger state, in terms of its commercial advantages and privileges in 
the international community, at a relatively lower price, may pressure a weaker state not 
to take any actions against it or otherwise discredit the weaker state’s judicial decision. 
There are practical difficulties in assessing damages in these circumstances since there 
is no available market in mutilation.
Cooperation takes place when states find themselves in a bilateral repeated
1 QO
prisoner’s dilemma. The logic of the prisoner’s dilemma, as previously illustrated in 
this chapter, is such that it would be mutually beneficial if two states in such a dilemma 
cooperate. If the game is played only once, the only “rational” thing to do is to defect. 
Over repeated interactions, though, states realise that it is more beneficial to cooperate 
so long as the other side does not defect. However, several conditions must be met for 
the purpose of cooperation. First, states must be aware of the benefits through 
cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Second, states must believe that they will 
continue to encounter each other in the foreseeable future. Third, both parties must care 
about the future, which means that they must both be willing to defer a present payoff
1RQfor future gains. In other words, states must believe that cooperation is better than 
other means in order to protect or realise their own interests. Finally, the payoffs for 
defection must not be too high relative to the payoffs for cooperation.190 Due to these 
conditions, the behavioural regularity among states through cooperation is less likely to 
arise than through coincidence of interest or coercion. Nevertheless, when such 
conditions exist, true cooperation among states does occur.191 The cooperative setting 
can also evolve from the coincidental setting where the common advantages become a 
common scenario. For instance, where the annulment court has not been impartial in 
handling the case,192 i.e., the relevant judgment was obtained by fraud, there has been a
cost to the delinquent needs to be greater than mere compensation in order to provide him with the 
necessary incentive to refrain.
188 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, ‘A Theory of Customary International Law’ op. cit. 1125-26.
189 This means that the future discount must be low.
190 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, ‘A Theory of Customary International Law’ op. cit. 1126.
191 Ibid. at 1127. For purposes o f this section, I will use “true” cooperation to refer to instances of 
behavioural regularities that are not merely the product of coincidence of interest or o f coercion. More 
positively, it is a decision that it is preferable to cooperate with or coordinate one’s strategy with 
another’s.
192 William W. Park discussed the possibility of biased or corrupt judiciaries in ‘National Law and 
Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1989) 
63(3) Tul L Rev 647, reprinted as ‘Judicial Controls in the Arbitral Process’ (1989) 5 Arb Int’l 230, 262 
(referring to “dishonestly annulled” awards).
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serious procedural irregularity,193 or there exists a previously made contrary judgment 
of the forum which is res judicata there,194 the annulment and enforcement regimes 
recognise similar defects in an award and it is in the common interests of both the 
enforcement and rendition forums to see non-enforcement of an annulled award.
Finally, coordination between states can arise when each state’s best move 
depends on the move of the other state. In this situation, state 1 prefers to take action X 
if state 2 takes action X, and state 1 prefers to take action Y if state 2 takes action Y. 
The problem, however, is that there must be one way or the other to know or 
communicate in advance what the other state will do so as to make coordination 
possible; otherwise, the states must choose by guessing as to what the other will do. In a 
legal context, access to an international treaty which adopts a reciprocal treatment may 
effectively inform the international community of its own position. Similarly, it can 
predict judicial actions or standings of other member states to the treaty on the same 
issue. The international treaty functions as a communicative tool. This again proves the 
need of a convention or a higher level of supervision mechanism in the field of 
international commercial arbitration.
Most behavioural regularities among states that purport to serve as a basis for 
customary norms can be explained by coincidence of interest or coercion. It is often 
claimed that the legal validity of a rule is a matter of that rule’s derivability from some 
basic conventional criterion of legal validity accepted in the particular legal system. 
Although most behavioural regularities among states can be understood as self- 
interested responses in one or more of the foregoing four types of gaming settings, it is 
still necessary to posit a universal customary norm that explains such behaviour in terms 
of the predictability and stability. Apparently, the collision of domestic and international 
standards in an unguided context threatens to create strife in judicial relations between 
nations. Cooperative universal behavioural regularities, however, are not illusory. 
Indeed, states have now moved beyond the stage of self-restraint and towards active 
international cooperation through various means such as legislation and international 
activism in promoting cross-border collaboration in specific fields. In our context, 
cooperation can be formed as a result of all state players’ recognition of a repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma or coordinative game. It has been proposed that the court, without
193 E.g. the defendant has not been duly summoned or was otherwise not given an adequate opportunity to 
present his case.
94 The Brussels Convention Article 27(3); the Hague Convention Article 5(3)(b). That case is sometimes 
considered to fall under the general ground of contrariety to public policy. See the Convention on the 
Reciprocal Recognition of Judicial Decisions (Athens 4 November 1961), Act 4305/1963, [1963] Official 
Gazette o f the Hellenic Republic, No.A78, Article 3(l)(a) (Federal Republic o f Germany-Greece).
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being bound to deny recognition of an award that has been set aside, may consider the 
award and the foreign judgment, together with the pertinent interests and policies, 
before deciding which decision should be given effect.195 This approach indeed 
acknowledges the superior position of the foreign court to review the arbitration. At the 
international level, cooperation in these circumstances is probably not common and, 
therefore, requires wider recognition of some basic norms or a systematic legal reform 
so as to build up an effective legal framework. This is partly due to the fact that 
universality implies a large number of actors. In the case of the n-person repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma, however, the game eventually raises the public good or tragedy of 
the common problems. In spite of cooperation among a large number of players, one 
will always find it advantageous to defect or ffee-ride. In the case of coordination, the 
sheer number of players makes such coordination very difficult. Given these problems, 
it appears that a form of cooperation among states can be more realistically 
accomplished through enacting treaties.196 After all, law is a matter of rule having been 
established in some recognised sources, such as a statute or a binding precedent. If 
rationalistic motivation is not to be hoped for, public measures should seek to balance 
conflicting aspirations by giving as much satisfaction to each actor in the game as 
possible. From an economical perspective, in settings in which the cost of allocating 
resources by voluntary transactions is prohibitively high making the market an 
infeasible method of allocating resources, the common law prices behaviour in such a 
way as to mimick the market. Alternatively, cooperation can be achieved if most states 
truly recognise party autonomy by treating the rule of enforceability or non­
enforceability of vacated arbitral awards as a default rule rather than a mandatory rule 
since party autonomy itself is a widely recognised arbitration norm and a “majoritarian” 
default rule, which most parties would likely acknowledge with full information and 
low bargaining costs. Besides, the decision by the enforcement court to or not to enforce 
a vacated award will be based on the parties’ agreement, rather than a mandatory rule of 
the enforcement jurisdiction. Therefore, there is less reason for the arbitral situs to take 
retaliative actions. This would reduce the likelihood of conflicts of interests among 
states or of the wrong choice of the default rule. A cooperative model will guarantee 
that the courts in different jurisdictions are more likely to grant the same courtesy in 
future situations by deferring to the court decisions in respect of the validity of awards
195 Stephen T. Ostrowski and Yuval Shany, ‘Chromalloy: United States Law and International Arbitration 
at the Crossroads’ (1998) 73 NYU L Rev 1692.
196 For instance, the New York Convention itself achieved uniformity which in turn creates a safer and 
more stable legal environment for arbitration to prosper and minimises forum shopping. See Hamid G. 
Gharavi, ‘Chromalloy. Another View’ (1997) 12 Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep 21, 21-22.
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in another jurisdiction, when the reviewing and enforcing roles are reversed. Therefore, 
international comity would potentially benefit a party seeking to enforce abroad an 
award affirmed or vacated in one jurisdiction, for example, by saving the extra trouble 
and expense of convincing another set of courts in the enforcement forum that the award 
should be recognised and enforced. In this way, observance of court review guards 
against the possibility of enforcing an unfair arbitral award and increases the university 
of award recognition and enforcement, which are necessary for the smooth functioning 
of an international system of dispute resolution by arbitration.
Annulment of an arbitral award is still relatively local, rather than international, 
in the sense that annulment of an award rendered in State A by State B does not 
influence any other jurisdictions’ decision to recognise and enforce this award. At the 
practical level, it is rare to see that the arbitral situs exports its conception of arbitration 
outside its border. Largely, this is because the grounds, for setting aside an award, 
unlike those for refusing recognition and enforcement of a foreign award, have not been 
standardised yet. In other words, those grounds are specific to the legal order of the 
country of rendition. The New York Convention does not regulate the grounds on which 
an arbitral award can be vacated and does not seek to harmonise the grounds of 
annulment of awards. However, the competition among jurisdictions for international 
arbitration business may influence the standards for vacating awards set out in national 
arbitration laws since serving as a situs for international arbitration proceedings can be
1 07lucrative. Consequently, jurisdictions compete to provide favorable arbitration
1 Oftsettings including providing favorable legal standards, norms and environment. 
International arbitration proceedings are so mobile that parties can choose a different 
arbitral situs in future agreements to arbitrate if a national arbitration law is seen as 
unfavorable,199 It is also in the interest of private parties and arbitration institutions to
197 See, e.g., UK Department o f Trade and Industry, Departmental Advisory Report 69 (1996) (“The fact 
is that this country has been very slow to modernize its arbitration law and this has done us no good in 
our endeavor to retain our pre-eminence in the field o f international arbitration, a service which brings 
this country very substantial amounts indeed”), quoted in W. Laurence Craig et al., International 
Chamber o f  Commerce Arbitration, op. cit. § 28.06 at 510 n.70.
198 Thomas E. Carbonneau, Cases and Materials on the Law and Practice o f  Arbitration (2nd edn Juris 
Publishing, New York 2000) 1143 (“Many jurisdictions have flung their regulatory authority to the winds 
in order to climb upon the ‘hospitable-jurisdiction-to-arbitration’ bandwagon and advertise their 
availability as venues to arbitration”); See Klaus Peter Berger, International Economic Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers, Deventer, Boston 1993) n. 62, 8-9.
199 W. Laurence Craig et al., International Chamber o f  Commerce Arbitration, op. cit. § 28.06 511 
(“Particularly at the margins o f venue selection, a reputation for a good or bad arbitration law will often 
cause a migration among otherwise plausible locations”); Filip De Ly, ‘The Place of Arbitration in the 
Conflict o f Laws of International Commercial Arbitration: An Exercise in Arbitration Planning’ (1991) 
12 Northwestern J Int’l L & Bus 48, 48-49; Jacques Werner, ‘International Commercial Arbitrators: From 
Merchant to Academic to Skilled Professional’ (1998) Disp Resol Mag 22.
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avoid locating arbitration in a jurisdiction with legal standards they find harsh and 
objectionable.200 Although some have decried inter-jurisdictional competition among 
arbitral sites as a “race to the bottom,”201 in other areas such competition has been 
beneficial in improving the quality of regulation. Technically speaking, the grounds 
listed in Article V(l)(a)-(d) of the New York Convention for refusing enforcement of an 
award, are essentially the same as those grounds on which the judges may set aside an 
award in the arbitral situs. This is so since more and more jurisdictions adopt 
UNCITRAL Model Law which is in turn modelled on the New York Convention. In 
terms of promoting arbitration and ameliorating the regulatory environment, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law provides for fairly uniform standards in this regard. Its 
continuous spread should eventually result in a diminishing number of local standards 
in the annulment practice. This would be the case even though various grounds for 
setting aside awards and different understandings of the scope and requirements of these 
grounds are in existence and can be chaotic. This task to harmonise the standards for 
setting aside an award should be at the core of the new regulatory or legislative regime 
which was yet established by the New York Convention.
To enforce an annulled award may cause the forum shopping which the 
international legal community has made great efforts to eliminate in the field of 
international litigation. The forum shopping will also attack the purpose of arbitration 
which tries to avoid most serious defects of the court system and international 
commercial litigation and to become a reliable substitute. The grant of international 
legal effect to an annulled award would indeed provide the home jurisdiction with a 
controlling discretion over disputes arbitrated within its territory. This excessive 
discretion amounts to giving the state courts the discretionary power to choose a 
possibly favourite result for the dispute, and, along with the tensions and conflicting 
interests between the retention and enforcement forums, further encouraging the local 
standard annulment, which is described by Paulsson as “annulments on the basis of ...
200 Stephen R. Bond and Christopher R. Seppala, ‘The New (1998) Rules of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce’ (1997) 12(5) Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep 33-38.
201 In the case of the Belgian arbitration law, competition has resulted in more oversight of arbitration at 
the arbitral situs. This will be discussed below. However, it should be pointed out that some parties may 
prefer a higher level o f court supervision in arbitration even though not every party prefers. In this sense, 
a higher level of judicial supervision may be regarded as a more favourable feature of that jurisdiction by 
some parties.
202 Roberta Romano, ‘State Competition for Corporate Charters’ in John Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast 
(eds), The New Federalism: Can the States be Trusted? (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California 
1997) 129 (“the best available evidence indicates that, for the most part, the race is towards the top but 
not the bottom in the production o f corporate laws”); and Richard L. Revesz, ‘Rehabilitating Interstate 
Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation’ 
(1992) 67 NYU L Rev 1210.
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other criteria than those which are internationally accepted”.203 It is therefore very likely 
that local courts may be inclined to protect the local party in a dispute by applying more 
biased local standards. This sort of local tendency is often described as local 
protectionism, which, as a matter of fact, is more popular in developing countries. The 
local protectionism is shown in the annulment standards, procedurally or substantively. 
A clear distinction has been made between local and international annulment standards, 
which comprise of four grounds contained in Article V(l)(a)-(d) of the New York 
Convention, the exclusive grounds for annulment in modem domestic laws as well as 
Article 36(2)(a) of the UNCITRAL Model Law.204 As a result, any international 
commercial dispute with parties from developing countries may largely rely on the 
court or judicial systems in those countries because relevant parties from these 
jurisdictions have confidence in their home jurisdictions for local protection. The 
potentially defeating party may search for a jurisdiction which adopts local annulment 
standards. The forum shopping in international litigation may occur again in 
international arbitration. To eliminate the forum shopping in international commercial 
arbitration also requires cooperation in the international community. Ideally, annulling 
decisions based on such grounds would be accorded deference by the courts in the 
enforcement forum, which conforms to the principle of international comity embodying 
such notions of mutual courtesy and respect. Annulment based upon any other local 
grounds needs to be denied extraterritorial effect.205 This scenario is close to the 
coincidental model because, in order to realise its self-interest to win international 
recognition of the locally vacated awards, the state will “allow the arbitral process to 
become truly international”, which “will create incentives for national courts to conform 
to internationally accepted standards”.206 In effect, this scenario becomes a competitive 
model, reputation costs of which certainly ensure optimal deference of the state 
mistakes or misconducts. The competitive behavioural model will possibly eliminate a 
“race to the bottom” if other jurisdictions are attracted to protect their own national’s 
commercial and legal interests and not to lower their annulment standards. In the
203 Jan Paulsson, ‘Rediscovering the New York Convention: Further Reflections on Chromalloy’ op. cit. 
20 .
204 Under this presumption, an arbitral award can be set aside if it violates fundamental legal principles, 
for example, the principle o f pacta sunt servanda, the protection against the misuse of a right, the 
principle o f good faith, or the protection against expropriation without remuneration. See Nathalie Voser, 
‘Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in International Commercial 
Arbitration* (1996) 7 Am Rev Int’l Arb 334.
205 Certainly, there may be some practical wisdom behind that construction, but it is entirely outside the 
language of the spirit of the New York Convention.
206 Jan Paulsson, ‘Rediscovering the New York Convention: Further Reflections on Chromalloy’ op. cit. 
31.
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judicial competition, the host country’s economic motivation to provide a desirable 
setting for future international commercial arbitrations, thereby promoting potential 
investors’ confidence in the country, makes its courts consider the appropriateness of 
adopting local annulment standards in the first phase of an arbitral award review. Since 
attracting international commercial arbitration requires a high level of fairness and 
impartiality, decent legal infrastructure, and sufficient attention to foreign parties’ 
legitimate concerns, the host state has to consider such factors when it reviews awards 
made within its territory. Expectation of fairness and impartiality by the international 
arbitration community requires courts in the home jurisdiction not to lower their 
annulment standards. Therefore, a “race to the top” is more likely to take place and the 
interstate interactions, in a model of perfect competition, would be welfare enhancing. 
For instance, the US courts are willing to recognise an award rendered in New York 
governing two foreign parties as a “foreign award” which then falls in the regime of 
New York Convention and is entitled to a more liberal and international enforcement 
standard. This effectively is a beneficial consequence of the “race to the top” whereby 
the US courts adopted a more lenient approach to arbitral awards even if those awards 
are rendered locally and therefore attract more arbitration. In our context, there is also a 
“race to the bottom,” a result of external competition for the supply of law. In order to 
make Belgium as an attractive forum for international arbitration, Belgium introduced a 
provision excluding the power of Belgian courts to entertain an application for 
annulment of an award unless at least one party to the arbitration is a Belgian as 
defined.208 This provision effectively removes the possibility of annulment by the 
Belgian courts, leaves the parties who wanted judicial assistance or had good grounds 
for annulment with nowhere to go, and gives the control over the arbitral awards de 
facto to the forum where the enforcement is sought. In effect, this provision makes 
Belgian a forum to be avoided by the international arbitration community.209 The 
International Court of Arbitration at the ICC did avoid Belgium as a place for
710arbitration, when it could determine the place of arbitration itself. The business 
community generally does not want to risk a forum for dispute resolution which
207 Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corporation, 710 F 2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1983). In this case, an award 
concerned a Swiss and Norwegian party and was made in New York. The court held that the award was a 
“foreign award”, which could then be enforced in the US under the New York Convention.
208 Judicial Code Article 1717(4).
209 Herman Verbist, ‘Reform of the Belgian Arbitration Law (The Law of 19 May 1998)’ (1998) 7 Int’l 
Bus L J 843; Luc Demeyere, ‘1998 Amendments to Belgian Arbitration Law: An Overview’ (1999) 15 
Arb Int’l 295, 308 (translation o f Judicial Code, Art. 1717.4) (“[Former Article 1717.4] was highly 
criticised and for some, including arbitration institutions, Belgium became a forum to be avoided” .).
210 Luc Demeyere, Ibid.
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removes any possibility of appeal from the outset. In response to the criticisms from the
011 010 o i 1international arbitration community, Belgium, along with Sweden and Tunisia, 
followed the lead of the Swiss Private International Law Act214 and changed its law by 
enabling the parties to exclude the request for annulment rather than a complete 
exclusion of it by operation of law.215 This is a real example to show the existence of 
judicial competition in reality and the need of a rational design in the competitive 
setting. This is also a strong example effectively indicating that the parties to arbitration 
do need judicial scrutiny in order to protect their interests.
A critique against the separatist proposition is that local law may subvert
1 f tinternational uniformity. For instance, the French position is that an award may be 
invalid in the rendition forum but still valid in France, which is close to a relativity 
theory in legal regime. By giving no weight to the judicial review on the award by the 
court in the arbitral situs and viewing the arbitral award as separate from the national 
judicial regime, France upholds party autonomy to resolve disputes This in turn 
supports the proposition that the benefits of arbitration, i.e., faster determination of 
issues and the ability to select a neutral forum, far outweigh any positive aspects of 
observing situs court review. Under this approach, enforcement of arbitral awards 
would dispel the parties’ unease because the thought and action of litigating in the 
courts of the opposing party’s home country would not be upheld in France. However, 
this relativity theory may hinder uniformity in the process of international commercial 
arbitration and award recognition217 and then further subvert any notion of international 
judicial co-operation and comity. Apparently, the French approach undermines 
international interaction necessary for the smooth functioning of the international 
market. The relativity theory of the French practice may lead to a “multi-localisation” as
211 William W. Park, ‘National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in 
International Arbitration’ (1989) 63 Tulane L Rev 647; Marcel Storme and Bernadette Demeulenaere, 
International Commercial Arbitration in Belgium: A Handbook (Kluwer Law & Taxation International, 
Antwerpen 1989) 22; Bernadette Demeulenaere, ‘The Place of Arbitration and the Applicable Procedure 
Law: The Case of Belgium’ in Marcel Storme and Filip De Ly (eds) The Place o f  Arbitration (Mys and 
Breesch, Ghent 1992) 67.
212 Arbitration Act 1999 s 51.
213 Tunisian Arbitration Act Article 78-6.
2.4 Private International Law Act Article 192(2).
2.5 It reads: “through an explicit declaration in their arbitration agreement or by a later agreement, parties 
may exclude all requests to nullify an arbitral award if none of the parties is a natural person of Belgian 
nationality or a natural person whose habitual residence is in Belgium or a legal person with its principal 
place of business or a branch in Belgium”.
16 See B. Leurent and N. Meyer-Fabre, La Reconnaissance en France des Sentences rendues a l’Etranger, 
l ’Exemple Franco Suisse, 13 Bull. A.S.A. (1995) 118; Hamid G. Gharavi, ‘Chromalloy: Another View’
(1997) 12(1) Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep 21.
217 See Erica Smith, ‘Vacated Arbitral Awards: Recognition and Enforcement Outside the Country of 
Origin’ (2002) 20 B U Int’l L J 355, 367.
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opposed to a complete detachment from national laws, or “delocalisation,” of 
international arbitral awards.218 The assumption of such criticism is that the courts of 
the state of origin have a legitimate claim to support annulment proceedings, and that 
the court will apply the same grounds for setting aside awards as under Article V(l)(a)- 
(d) of the New York Convention.219 However, it has been argued that the enforcement 
forum has a better claim to determine the validity of an international award than the
99Hrendition forum. The French theory is explicitly stated in the Chromalloy opinion by 
the Paris Court of Appeal: “[T]he award made in Egypt is an international award which, 
by definition, is not integrated in the legal order of that state so that its existence 
remains established despite it being annulled and its recognition in France is not in 
violation of international public policy”.221 The theory is consistent with common 
practice in France that the French legal order would not consider it an offence to its
999sovereignty for an enforcement forum to disregard an annulling French decision. The 
French theory and practice appear to reflect some features in a co-operative behavioural 
model. At least, the French courts have been aware of a repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
and deferred a present payoff for future gains. If other states move forward by following 
a coordinative behavioural model, that is, by adopting the French approach, according 
to the game theory, a higher level of co-operation may be formed without international 
written guidance or legislation.
It is the general principle of law that a party who is in pursuit of a particular 
course of conduct on which the other party reasonably relies upon cannot subsequently 
follow another course inconsistent with the position he previously took. This principle 
of estoppel is widely adopted in litigation. For instance, an English court will preclude a 
party from re-litigating the issue in England if a foreign judgment has already been
218 See P. Meyer, L’Insertion de la Sentence dans l’Ordre Juridique francaise”, in Y. Derains (ed) Droit et 
Pratique de 1’Arbitrage International en France (1984) 81, 82-84.
219 This proposition is believed to reflect principles o f international jurisdiction and sound policy that 
each State must provide for annulment jurisdiction for awards rendered in its territory, subject to proof 
that the parties have expressly provided that another State’s arbitration law will be the lex arbitri and that 
State will assume annulment jurisdiction. This is the crux of the problem with French law. Exorbitant 
grounds for awards are still current, though the propagation of the UNCITRAL Model Law and the 
modernisation of arbitration laws around the world will gradually bring about a greater degree of 
uniformity. If the grounds for annulment in the State o f origin tally with the grounds for refusal of 
enforcement, the same result would be achieved by both forums, see Gary B. Bom, International 
Commercial Arbitration in the United States: Commentary and Materials (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, Deventer and Boston 1994) 167-168.
220 See E. Gailard, ‘Enforcement of a Nullified Foreign Award’ (1997) New York L J 672-674.
221 ‘United States District Court, District of Columbia, 31 July 1996, Civil No. 94-2339 (JLG) 
Chromalloy Aeroservices Inc. (US) v. The Arab Republic o f Egypt’ (1997) XXII Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer, Boston) 1001.
222 See S. Besson and L. Pitter, La Reconnaissance a l’Etranger d’une Sentence Annullee dans son Etat 
d ’Origine -  Reflexions a la suite de 1’Affaire Hilmarton, (1998) 16 Bull. A.S.A. 498, 510.
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rendered against that party by a court of competent jurisdiction unless there are strong 
grounds to impeach the judgment. Practically speaking, it makes sense that the 
defendant in an enforcement proceeding shall be estopped from raising annulment as a 
defence if the party should have had an opportunity to raise a ground for such 
annulment in the arbitration proceeding.223 The justification for this proposition is that 
such party should have exhausted all means to protect its rights and interests in the 
arbitral situs, where the arbitral tribunal shall be given a full opportunity to review all 
aspects of the dispute and correct any defects, substantive or procedural, in the 
arbitration proceeding.224 This proposition is endorsed by arbitration rules and domestic 
arbitration laws,225 and suggests that the litigant’s failure to raise the matter in the 
arbitral proceeding is either due to its intention as its arbitration or litigation tactics to 
have a second chance or negligence, both of which may lead to estoppel. However, the 
estoppel doctrine may not be applicable to such defences that are raised for the first time 
in annulment proceedings. The underlying rationale of the estoppel doctrine is the 
preclusive effect of Article V(l)(a)-(d) defences admitted in enforcement 
proceedings.226
6 . “ S e c o n d  L o o k ” a t  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  C o n v e n t io n 227
6.1 Goals o f the New York Convention
The proper application of the New York Convention requires a careful consideration of 
its goals. The extreme view is that “a core objective of the New York Convention is to 
free the international arbitral process from the domination of the law of the place of 
arbitration”. However, the mainstream view is that two primary objectives of the New
223 See Gary H. Sampliner, ‘Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards after Annulment in their Country of 
Origin’ (1996) 11 Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep 162-63.
224 Cf. the purpose of the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies applicable in diplomatic protection 
proceedings; see the Ambatielos arbitration (1956) 23 I.L.R. 306, 12 R.I.A.A. 83 (Greece v UK ad hoc 
1956); Article 35(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (as amended by Protocol N o .ll of 
1994).
225 See LCIA Rules (1998) Article 32(1); Rules of the Arbitration Institute o f the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce (1988), Section 24. Cold of Civil Procedure Article 1076(2) (the Netherlands); Code 
Judiciaire Article 1704(4) (Belgium). Also see Hebei Import and Export Corporation v. Polytec 
Engineering Company Ltd, judgement of 9 February 1999 at www.info.gov.hk/jud (per Justice Litton PJ, 
discussing whether the concept of estoppel may properly apply to the Convention provisions).
226 ‘Supreme Court of Hong Kong, High Court, 5 January 1993, No. MP 1150, Qinhuangdao Tongda 
Enterprise Development Company, et al. v. Million Basic Company’ (1994) 19 Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law & Taxation Publisher, Deventer & Boston 1995) 675, 676.
227 “Second look” is a doctrine used by US courts to examine the public policy issue in enforcing arbitral 
awards. See Chapter 5 o f this dissertation. I borrow this term to stress the need to review the spirit and 
legislative background of the New York Convention when scrutinising relevant issues under it.
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York Convention are for greater enforceability of arbitral awards and greater 
uniformity and certainty of enforcement practice.229 The New York Convention 
enhances enforceability of arbitral awards by and large through the simplification of 
enforcement proceeding. 230 The goal of increasing uniformity of enforcement 
proceeding is realised though the enumeration of limited and exclusive grounds in 
Article V of the Convention, by which signatory states could refuse to enforce an 
award. This is explicitly stated in Article III that: “each contracting state shall 
recognise arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of 
procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid 
down in [these] articles”. Article VII further establishes a “more favourable right” 
regime leaving a loophole or opening the floodgates to the application of a diversity of 
national arbitration rules and solutions. The combined effect of Articles III, V(l) and 
VII effectively confirms that the New York Convention did not seek to establish a 
uniform regime and harmonise solutions to all problems in international commercial 
arbitration at the international level but leaves most of the problems such as the 
procedural flexibility to a specific territory. For this reason, the Convention did not 
impose or propose any common rules such as procedural rules in relation to the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. In addition, the New York Convention 
mainly focuses on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards other than 
all related or ancillary issues such as enforcement of an award set aside in its home 
jurisdiction. Obviously, the objective and approach adopted by the New York 
Convention are realistic.
For the time being, there have been no harmonised procedural rules for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign awards in the member states of the New York 
Convention. Given the non-harmonious approach, inconsistent decisions are inherent 
and permissible under the New York Convention and will continue to exist even if the 
rule that annulled awards may never be enforced is established. This is because Article
228 See Fali S. Nariman, ‘The Convention’s Contribution to the Globalisation of International Commercial 
Arbitration’ in Enforcing Arbitration Awards under the New York Convention: Experience and Prospects 
-  New York Convention Day (United Nations, New York 1998) available at 
http ://www/uncitr al.org/pdf7enough/texts/arbitration/MY-conv/NYCDay-e.pdf.
229 See Stephen T. Ostrowski and Yuhal Shany, ‘Chromalloy: United States Law and International 
Arbitration at the Crossroads’ op. cit. at 1656; Robert Briner, ‘New York Convention - Philosophy and 
Objectives of the Convention’ in Enforcing Arbitration Awards under the New York Convention: 
Experience and Prospects -  New York Convention Day, op. cit.
230 In particular by abolishing the cumbersome double exequatur procedure required by its predecessor, 
the 1927 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
231 See Hamid G. Gharavi, ’Chromalloy. Another View’ op. cit. 21-22 and Stephen T. Ostrowski and 
Yuval Shany, ‘Chromalloy: United States Law and International Arbitration at the Crossroads’ op. cit. 
1657.
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V(2) of the New York Convention leaves a large room for the courts in the jurisdictions 
where the enforcement of a foreign award is sought to decide whether an enforcement 
application can be rejected or not on the grounds of arbitrability and public policy 
according to the law of the enforcing state. The practice and legislation concerning the 
arbitrability of disputes and other issues have not been and will not be unified. 
Moreover, the public policy ground gives more flexibility and leeway to courts in 
various jurisdictions involved in international commercial arbitration. The New York 
Convention did not provide any guidance or place any restriction as to the exact content 
of and practical application to the notion of public policy. Therefore, signatory states 
indeed enjoy greater freedom to enforce or refuse to enforce a foreign award for any 
reason which may be only slightly connected with the ground of public policy. This is a 
source of disparity of treatment of awards at the international level. In the absence of a 
uniform scope of arbitrable matters and a common definition of, or approach to, dealing 
with public policy in all signatory states, it is very likely that an award granted in one 
jurisdiction may be found unacceptable in another due to different standards of 
arbitrability or public policy. It can also be anticipated that an award is not able to be 
enforced in one jurisdiction but enforced in the other. The New York Convention’s 
pragmatic ambition, goal and approach did not purport to establish a single and uniform 
regime for the enforcement of foreign awards in all respects in all signatory states.232
6.2 Limits for Discounting Annulment under the New York Convention 
The New York Convention is also an open-ended text. Articles V(l) and VII are two 
limbs of this text. Article V(l) provides for discretion without detailed guidance as to 
when and how such discretion should be exercised. Article VII makes domestic law 
prevail over the Convention if that law contains a more favourable regime for 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Accordingly, there would be two routes open to 
an award creditor seeking to have an annulled award enforced elsewhere. The award 
creditor must convince the enforcing court to either discount a particular annulling 
decision or discard annulment altogether without going to its merits. The former case 
falls under “may” in Article V(l) whilst the latter falls in the most-favourable-right 
regime of Article VII. In other words, Articles V(l) and VII outline two separate legal 
routes for the enforcement of annulled awards. The enforcing court can exercise its
232 See Jan Paulsson, ‘Enforcing arbitral awards notwithstanding a local standard annulment (LSA)’ 
(1998) 9(1) The ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin 14, 17.
233 See F.S. Nariman, ‘Some Thoughts on the Fortieth Anniversary of the New York Convention, 1958’
(1998) (5) Int’l Arb L Rev 163, 165.
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discretion under a more flexible “may” regime of Article V(l) by granting enforcement. 
The “may” regime allows the court in the enforcement forum not to exercise such 
discretion under its law on whether to grant or refuse enforcement. A more 
straightforward approach is to apply Article VII as long as a more favourable domestic 
law does not make annulment a ground for refusal of enforcement. Under Article VII, 
the award creditor would be entitled to enforcement of an annulled arbitral award under 
the domestic law of the enforcement forum. In substance, this is a right to have the 
annulling decision discounted or the award’s validity re-examined or even restored 
despite the separate existence of the judicial decision. The award creditor usually 
initiates the enforcement proceeding, rather than claiming for a declaration of non­
existence of the annulling decision, not to have the annulling decision recognised.234 In 
this sense, Articles VII and V(l) are applied altogether.
As to Article VII of the New York Convention, the conditions have several 
layers. First, there must be domestic laws applicable to foreign awards defined in 
Article I of the Convention. Second, these domestic laws must be more favourable than 
laws in other jurisdictions. The French jurisprudence, as illustrated in Hilmarton, does 
not take account of an annulling decision of the court in the country of rendition under 
Article VII because annulment under the domestic law is not a ground to refuse 
enforcement. In a recent case, the Cour de Cassation suggested that a proper analysis is 
to compare relevant French rules with the provisions under the New York 
Convention.235 This comparison leads to an understanding of Article VII as allowing 
“cherry-picking”. However, this selective approach to use domestic rules was criticised 
by some commentators, who upheld the view that domestic rules should apply either en 
bloc or not at all. This proposition is not easy to fit into reality. An award creditor 
cannot benefit from a more favourable provision in a foreign legal system but can still 
be caught by a less favourable law, even though a specific plea is necessary for the 
application of domestic law. Moreover, this proposition is also inconsistent with the 
nature of an international treaty which purports to step aside, as it were, in favour of
234 It is more appropriate to use the term of “denial of res judicata” instead. However, most national laws 
may treat the grant o f recognition and res judicata substantially same.
235 See Cass. Civ. Ire, 24 March 1998, Societe Excelsior Film TV, SRL v. Societe UGC-PH (1999) 126 
J.D.I 155, note Kahn (the case concerned the exception d ’ordre public of Articles 1502(5) NCPC and 
V(2)(b) of the Convention), Paris, 2 April 1998, Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Compagnie Francaise D’etudes et 
de Construction Technip v. Entreprise Nationale Des Engrais et des Produits Phytasanitaires’ [1998] 5 
Int’l A rb L R ev  N-80, 81.
236 See Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958: Towards a Uniform 
Judicial Interpretation, op. cit. 85-86.
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domestic law only where and to the extent that the latter contains more favourable 
provisions.
It is beyond doubt that arbitration is an indispensable means of dispute 
resolution in today’s global economy. It is the nature of a multilateral framework like 
the New York Convention to require the order and stability of the governing norms. 
Reliability and predictability are among the key features that make international 
commercial arbitration even more attractive. In order to preserve the effect and 
functioning of such institutions, lawmakers, courts, but first and foremost its main 
proponents, the arbitration community, should make great efforts to stabilise arbitration 
within the setting of international jurisdictional interdependencies. To continue the 
enforcement practice initiated by the Chromalloy Court would make arbitration 
increasingly unpredictable and undesirable. Enforcement of vacated awards may lead to 
the coexistence of inconsistent judgments towards the same award concerning the same 
dispute between the same parties and therefore may violate the well established 
uniformity of the international arbitral process.237 The outcome of Hilmarton is
9  I Qevidence of this chaotic consequence. Furthermore, under the present unsatisfactory 
situation, there may be two or more awards in respect of the same dispute. For instance, 
apart from the spectacle of the French courts paying no heed to the decisions of their 
Swiss neighbours, two distinct and inconsistent awards were in circulation and, indeed, 
even if the French Court of Cassation decided that the second award should not be 
recognised in France, it will presumably still be capable of enforcement in other 
jurisdictions.239 The situation created by Chromalloy and Hilmarton may be even worse 
than the “race to the bottom” or confess-confess scenario in a prisoner’s dilemma 
because the effect of annulment of an award in some legal systems may restore the 
ordinary competence of the courts so that a fresh proceeding may lead to a judgment 
which is required to be enforced elsewhere under bilateral or regional conventions such 
as the Brussels Convention 1968.240 This situation hardly contributes to the harmonious 
and uniform international treatment of arbitration awards and the lofty goals of those 
who crafted both the New York Convention and the Model Law. Ultimately, the parties
237 Hamid G Gharavi, ‘Chromalloy: Another View’ op. cit. at 23.
238 Jan Pualsson discounts the relevance of Hilmarton and then goes on to argue that “anyone who 
maintains that inconsistent results are intolerable anathema ... would, in order to be intellectually honest, 
have to accept that enforcement should never be granted until any possibility o f challenge to the award in 
its country of origin has been disposed o f ’. See Jan Paulsson, ‘Rediscovering the New York Convention: 
Further Reflections on Chromalloy’ op. cit. 28-9.
239 Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘ The New York Arbitration Convention o f 1958: Where is An Award Made? 
Case Comment House of Lords, 24 July 1991, Hiscox v. Outhwaite’ in Albert Jan van den Berg, The 
Place o f  Arbitration (Mys & Breesch, Gent 1992) 14-22.
240 See a brief discussion o f the Brussels Convention 1968 in Chapter 2.
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can no longer rely upon the judicial control of the state, where arbitration takes place, 
but have to fear that, despite an annulment, the vacated award will be caught and 
enforced somewhere in the world and the enforcement proceeding becomes an endless 
game.
7. U p g r a d in g  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  C o n v e n t io n  -  P r e l im in a r y  T h o u g h t s  
The provisions of the New York Convention and the understandings of them can be 
examined from various perspectives, e.g., the enforcement forum, the state of rendition 
or a truly international law point of view. As to the validity of an award, the law of the 
state of rendition shall have a primary control over the proceeding and the effectiveness 
of the award. There are two exceptions to this general rule. First, the annulling judgment 
fails to pass the test for res judicata in and under the law of the enforcement forum. 
Second, the enforcement forum has a law which does not treat annulment of an award as 
a circumstance precluding enforcement. These two exceptions can exist at the same 
time under the framework of Articles V(l) and VII of the New York Convention. 
Article V(l)(e) reflects a difficult cohabitation between provisions which have different 
underlying philosophies. Article V(l)(e) does not create or spell out the rule of 
allocating international competencies among multiple regimes.241 Instead, Article 
V(l)(e) indeed allocates international competencies between the home jurisdiction and 
enforcement forum. In an ideal judicial economy, the enforcement forum would either 
have complete freedom in evaluating an award within the boundaries set by the New 
York Convention, namely, the grounds contained in Article V(l)(a) to (d) and (2), or be 
absolutely bound by a decision of the forum of origin, subject to the grounds set out in 
Article V(2). This may indicate that the enforcement forum is a strong point of 
anchorage for foreign awards, and the rendition forum does not have a sole legitimate 
connection. Article VII of the New York Convention is a doctrinal development. The 
purpose of this article is to ensure that the New York Convention will not prevent the 
diversity of national practice and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award in a 
contracting state in the event where there is a distinct and more liberal regime for the 
enforcement of foreign awards in that country. In order to avail itself of Article VII, a 
party must therefore establish that the grounds for enforcement of a foreign award under 
domestic laws or an applicable treaty are more favourable than those set out in the New 
York Convention.
241 See W. Michael Reisman, Systems o f  Control in International Adjudication and Arbitration (Duke 
University Press, Durham, NC 1992) Ch. 4 111-114.
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As a matter of fact, the New York Convention abolished the requirement to have 
an award confirmed in the place of rendition, which was once the old rule adopted in the 
Geneva Convention.242 The New York Convention then established the notion that an 
award is valid and effective once it is rendered in the state of origin. It is widely agreed 
that it is neither desirable to restore the old rule under the Geneva Convention nor ideal 
to eliminate the mechanism of setting aside arbitral awards for any “good” grounds 243 
The New York Convention does not seem to support the proposition that an annulled 
award shall be effective in the enforcement forum. On the other hand, the New York 
Convention does not exclude such a possibility entirely. The travanx preparatoires 
shows that the issue was yet to be elaborated by the drafters of the New York 
Convention. However, this does not necessarily prove that the issue was outside the 
contemplation of the law as well. A neutral understanding of this issue would be that the 
New York Convention left the issue open to the enforcement forum,244 which is subject 
to a higher level but relatively abstract rule that a uniformed regime and a single texture 
should be created. The spirit of the New York Convention seems to require international 
arbitral awards truly be capable of enforcement notwithstanding the annulment by local 
courts in the jurisdiction where these awards are issued in the first place. To allow 
enforcement of an annulled award would protect the legitimate expectation and interests 
of the parties to arbitration and eventually enhance the creditability of arbitration as an 
effective means of international commercial arbitration. However, from a technical 
point of view, without a centralised ICSID-type body responsible for supervising all 
local systems of setting aside awards issued in contracting countries, a certain level of 
international legal effect over annulled awards is evidently not desirable.
Although we have been living in a truly “globalised world” in the 21st 
century,245 it appears that there is a force from time to time pushing the resolution of 
international commerce disputes to national courts. In the US, the “emphatic federal 
policy in favour of arbitral dispute resolution” which currently prevails as “policy 
[which] applies with special force in the field of international commerce”246 may be 
overturned. In the trend of globalisation, it appears that the original obstacles of
242 See Union Nationale des Cooperatives Agricoles de Cereales v Robert Catterall & Co. Ltd. [1959] 2
O.B. 44, 53-54 (CA).
2 3 It is good for the parties to have a setting aside procedure in place so that they may obtain relief from 
local judicial system and start a new arbitration when the award is defective.
244 See Richard A. Posner, ‘The Jurisprudence of Skepticism’ (1988) 86 Michigan Law Review 827, 881.
245 See generally Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: The Globalised World in the 21st Century 
(Penguin Books, Harmondsworth 2006).
246 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 US 614, 631 (1985).
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international merchants seem to diminish. Future lawmakers of the world shall envisage 
the New York Convention’s “full potential”.247
A brief analysis of the game theory in the context of the New York Convention 
seems to provide various options for the path of convergence. However, in reality Nash 
equilibrium is rarely achieved instantaneously. This is so because key conditions that 
state players are rational and know the payoff functions of all players and that they 
know their opponents are rational and know the payoff functions are almost impossible 
to satisfy. Therefore, we may have to rely upon a higher level regulatory co-ordination, 
which may not necessarily require identical standards. The uniform standards may 
often be either too strict to respond to the wide diversity of political and economic 
conditions that exist in various jurisdictions.249 By reference to the jurisprudence of 
natural law, law is treated as a body of commands laid down by a supreme legislative 
body in a legal system.250 Accordingly, we may have a superior framework to deal with 
annulled awards. To this end, it has been proposed that a supra-national court or a 
renvoi to an existing supranational court such as the International Court of Justice can 
be established and such supranational court will deprive jurisdiction from national
9^1courts so as to have exclusive jurisdiction over the control of arbitral awards. Once 
this superior framework has commenced its task, any individual enforcement action
9 S9must cease, and any individual attachments must be repaid to the collective pool, 
which would be shared by relevant states. This pool would be dealt with in a manner 
determined by a uniform decision-making process or an independent higher-level
247 See Jan Paulsson, ‘Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding a Local Standard Annulment’ (1998) 
9(1) ICC Int’l Ct Arb Bull 14.
248 The regulatory diversity has played a role in the ratcheting upwards of regulatory standards: in a long 
run it is welfare enhancing for some political jurisdictions to have stricter regulations than others.
249 Even within a particular country -  a point which has been repeatedly made by critics o f regulatory 
harmonisation. See Richard Revesz, ‘Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race to the 
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation’ (1992) 67 NYU L Rev 1210.
250 Bentham and Austin endeavoured to provide a firm foundation for the separation of expository and 
censorial jurisprudence by their general theories o f law. In their view, law is a body of commands laid 
down by the sovereign, a supreme law-making body in every single legal system. See J. Bentham, An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789).
251 Hamid G. Gharavi, The International Effectiveness o f  the Annulment o f  an Arbitral Award (Kluwer 
International Arbitration Law, The Hague 2002) 157-162.
252 More characteristic o f the economic analysis school is the importance it attaches to notional markets. 
Its adherents seek to draw implications for legal “wrongs” of all kinds from notional re-allocations within 
a total wealth-pie taken to be fixed at a particular moment of time. Granted sero transaction costs, every 
right would end up vested in the person who values it most -  value being determined by each party’s 
willingness to pay. Where transaction costs frustrate such re-allocations, the law should impose the 
“efficient” solution. See Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 L J Econ 1. Coase’s 
analysis purports to demonstrate that where real transactions are impracticable, stand in the way o f rights 
being accorded to those who would (if they could) pay most for them.
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regime.253 The supranational regime is able to guide and justify the conduct or even to 
order the use of coercive measures such as punishment. The normative nature of the 
supranational regime might be treated as predictions of what other states are likely to do, 
for example in the application of sanctions.
In the state strategic setting, it is now no longer irrational to co-operate.254 
Indeed, “cooperate” now dominates “enforce,” with the result that the bottom-right cell, 
in which both players choose “co-operate,” has become the dominant strategy 
equilibrium. In our context, as Paulsson has rightly observed, the establishment of 
criteria for enforcement that do not take account of annulment in the country of origin is 
n o t ... the current legislative trend, which is inspired by the UNCITRAL Model Law 255 
It is not necessary to subscribe to the view that the enhancement of efficiency should be 
the sole, or even the most important or ultimate, goal of the solution to the enforcement 
of annulled awards under the New York Convention. An appreciation of the costs of 
“rights” distress and the incentive effects of various legal responses is surely an 
important precondition in designing legal rules which will succeed in implementing any 
given policy. In fact, it has been proposed that the New York Convention needs to be 
rewritten. At the maximum, it remains at the level of legislative proposal. In any event, 
the New York Convention should be updated or upgraded to acknowledge the judicial 
review in the country that hosts arbitration. The New York Convention or its 
supplement in the form of a model law or guidelines, as an enabling framework, should 
outline international standards and standards for adopting the result of that review to 
ease the task of the recognition and enforcement forum257 but leave the detail of ever- 
changing practices to national arbitration laws and arbitration rules. As long as the 
annulment followed from one of those standards, recognition or enforcement should be
253 The normative implication of economic analysis o f law are, probably, most challenging when it is 
claimed that a real (not just notional) market should be introduced in respect o f some sensitive area of 
social interactions.
254 The game theory explains why states cooperate or do not, but it does not explain anything new about 
the scope o f the problem of international cooperation.
255 Jan Paulsson, ‘Enforcing Arbitral Awards notwithstanding a Local Standard Annulment’ (1998) 9(1) 
ICC Int’l Ct Arb Bull 14.
256 Hamid G. Gharavi, The International Effectiveness o f  the Annulment o f  an Arbitral Award, op. cit. 
(discussing the possibility o f “adoption of a new convention or an amendment or protocol to the New 
York Convention” to cover “jurisdiction over annulment and the extent of oversight o f arbitral awards 
during annulment proceedings” .) However, there is no point of harmonising annulment grounds through a 
new convention if the interpretation of these grounds rests entirely in the hands of State courts.
257 Ibid. at 169-193 (asserting that the interaction of international arbitration and national judicial systems 
can take one of two directions: “harmonisation, i.e., the synchronisation of national laws, [or] unification, 
i.e. [sic] the formation of an exclusively international legal regime through the establishment of a supra­
national court vested with exclusive jurisdiction over the control o f arbitral awards” .).
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allowed. The upgrading of the New York Convention would ultimately lead to a more 
harmonised mechanism or system of award review and enforcement.
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CHAPTER 4 LEX MERCA TORIA AND THE
NEW YORK CONVENTION
The significance of lex mercatoria lies in the issue of the applicable law or choice of 
law in international commercial arbitration, which is dealt with under the New York 
Convention. The exact meaning, scope and nature of lex mercatoria are contested both 
in scholarship and in practice. What is generally acceptable, however, is that lex 
mercatoria involves an array of principles not necessarily defined within any nation’s 
statutory law.1 Where international commercial arbitration involves lex mercatoria, 
arbitration panels or arbitrators have to look outside the national law ordinarily 
applicable to the dispute.
1. C o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n  o f  L e x  M e r c a t o r ia
Lex mercatoria lacks a universally accepted definition. It has been defined as “a set of 
principles and customary rules ... in a framework of international trade ... without 
reference to a particular national system of law”,2 “a single autonomous body of law
I
created by the international business community”, or “a uniform law developed by 
parallelism of action in various national systems in an area of optional law in which the 
state is disinterested”.4 These definitions are wide enough to include “the Hague and 
Vienna Conventions Establishing Uniform Laws for the International Sale of Goods” 
and “national legislation whose specific and exclusive object is international trade”.5 
Generally speaking, the term is defined as the “rules of law which are common to all or 
most of the States engaged in international trade or to those States that are connected 
with a dispute, and if not ascertainable, then the rules which would appear to be the 
most appropriate and equitable”. 6 Nevertheless, a group of less enthusiastic 
commentators may support the view that lex mercatoria is “a non-national or
1 A. Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003) 
104.
2 See Berthold Goldman, Lex Mercatoria (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, The Hague 1983).
3 Bernardo Cremades and Steven Plehn, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonisation of the Laws of 
International Commercial Transactions’ (1984) 2 Boston U Int’l L J 324.
4 Clive Schmitthoff, ‘Nature and Evolution of the Transnational Law of Commercial Transactions’ in 
Norbert Horn and Clive Schmitthoff, The Transnational Law o f  International Commercial Transactions 
(Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, The Hague 1982) 22.
5 Berthold Goldman, ‘The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law -  The Lex Mercatoria ’ in Julian 
D.M. Lew (ed), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration (Martinus Niihoff Publishers, The 
Hague 1988) 113.
6 Ole Lando, ‘The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1985) 34 Int’l & Comp L Q 
747-68.
157
transnational commercial law”7 which has sources both in national and international 
laws and in the vaguely defined region of general principles of law or “transnational
o
law”. It may be suggested that lex mercatoria is “a sort of shadowy, optional, aleatory, 
international commercial congeries of rules and principles”.9
These definitions somehow point out several key qualities of lex mercatoria, 
which are the detachment from any particular national system10 as well as the flexibility 
and adaptability to various international commercial activities.11 Accordingly, lex 
mercatoria can, at one time or another, include trade usages, a set of customary rules or 
general principles relating to international commercial transactions,12 uniform rules 
accepted in all countries,13 an autonomous system of law, an international body of law 
founded on commercial understandings and practices,14 certain equitable principles, as 
well as the entirety of transnational legal norms affecting international commercial 
operations.15 Therefore, lex mercatoria may be seen as a body of customary rules or 
principles, of a private law nature, arising out of or in connection with commercial 
activities or relationships of the transnational community, which is free from the 
assumptions inherent in any particular national regulatory regime.
It is worth mentioning that lex mercatoria is distinguishable from the concept of 
amiable composition or ex aequo et bono, which is frequently confused or used as 
synonyms. Amiable composition is a term used in continental legal systems to refer to 
the power to decide a dispute without reference to any fixed system of law. An 
arbitrator exercising such power is sometimes said to be deciding ex aequo et bono. 
Parties who authorise the arbitrator to act as an amiable compositeur may be deemed to 
have waived the right to challenge the award. Even the most impassioned proponents of 
lex mercatoria would agree that if a contract expressly stipulates a choice of governing
7 Julian D.M. Lew, ‘The Case for the Publication o f Arbitration Awards’ in Jan C. Schultse (ed), The Art 
o f  Arbitration (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, The Hague 1983) 223-232.
8 Horacio A. Grigera Naon, ‘The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’ in N. 
Horn and C. M. Schmittoff (eds), The Transnational Law o f  International Commercial Transactions: 
Studies in Transnational Economic Law (Kluwer, Deventer 1982) 89.
9 Keith Highet, ‘The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria' (1989) 63 Tulane L Rev 613, 618.
10 Berthold Goldmam, ‘The Applicable Law: General Principles of the Law -  The Lex M ercatoria’ op. 
cit. 116.
11 See Paul Freeman, 'Lex Mercatoria: A Legal Basis for the Resolution o f International Disputes’ in 
Martin Odams De Zylva and Reziya Harrison (eds), International Commercial Arbitration -  Developing 
Rules fo r  the New Millennium (Jordans, Bristol 2000) 123.
12 Clive Schmitthoff, ‘Nature and Evolution of the Transnational Law of Commercial Transactions’ op. 
cit. 19.
13 Clive Schmitthoff, Commercial Law in a Changing Economic Climate (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 1981)20.
14 Harold Berman and Colin Kaufman, ‘The Law of International Commercial Transactions {Lex 
Mercatoria)' (1978) 19(1) Harv Int’l L J 273.
15 William W. Park, ‘Arbitration of International Contract Disputes’ (1984) 39 Bus Law 1783.
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law and if the arbitrator is not an amiable compositeur, then the arbitrator cannot 
properly apply lex mercatoria in preference to the chosen law. The point to be made is 
that, at least in the eyes of the classical mercatorist,16 lex mercatoria is more akin to law, 
albeit imperfect and evolving, rather than some intangible and subjective notion. When 
lex mercatoria is expressly incorporated into an arbitration agreement, there is some 
room for arbitration panels or arbitrators to impose their own rules while contractual 
norms should prima facie be binding and enforceable according to the principle of pacta
17sunt servanda.
2 . E v o l u t i o n  o f  L e x M e r c a  t o r ia  : A  H i s t o r i c a l  P e r s p e c t i v e
“The criterion for determining the ambit of lex mercatoria . . . does not solely reside in
the object of its constituent elements, but also in its origin and its customary, and thus
1 8spontaneous nature”. A review of the evolution of lex mercatoria reveals a dialectical 
movement in the balance between merchant autonomy and state power in transnational 
capitalism.19
2.1 Medieval Law Merchant and Self-Regulation o f Commerce
The origin of lex mercatoria can be traced back to the Italian cities and market towns in
medieval times.20 As commerce expanded and trading communities grew, a system of
law drawing upon ancient Greek and Italian maritime customs, the Roman law of sales,
debt, and general civil obligations as well as the Roman jus gentium (law of nations) 
91emerged. Prior to the emergence of modem regulatory states, this system of law 
governing domestic commercial activities, international trade and commerce evolved 
within a self-regulating framework, free from government interference. Medieval 
merchants constitute a relatively independent class, separate from the feudal political
16 Berthold Goldman, ‘The Applicable Law: General Principles o f Law -  The Lex Mercatoria’ op. cit. 
124; Ole Lando, ‘The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1984) 34 Int’l & Comp L 
Q 747, 754. The difference between quality and rules of law was clearly stated in Sapphire International 
Petroleum v NIOC  (1984) 12 Int’l & Comp L Q 987.
17 In the Middle Ages, it was not the custom of the court of the lord king to protect private agreements. 
This illustrates the limited extent to which local legal systems regarded the regulation of commerce as 
their legitimate domain. See A. W. B. Simpson, A History o f  the Common Law o f  Contract (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 1975).
18 Berthold Goldman, Forum Internationale: Lex Mercatoria (Kluwer Law International: The Hague 
1984) 1,6.
19 Harold J. Berman and Colin Kaufman, ‘The Law o f International Commercial Transactions (Lex 
Mercatoria) ’ (1978) 19 Harv Int’l L J 221-78.
20 See Paul Freeman, 'Lex Mercatoria'. A Legal Basis for the Resolution of International Disputes’ in 
Martin Odams De Zylva and Reziya Harrison (eds), International Commercial Arbitration -  Developing 
Rules fo r  the New Millennium (Jordans, Bristol 2000)122.
21 A. Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority, op. cit. at 113.
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economy and municipal system of law, in special places such as fairs, markets and 
seaports. The members of domestic and transnational commercial community
99voluntarily and cooperatively created, adjudicated and enforced this system of law, the 
essence of which departed considerably from forms of property and ownership 
associated with the feudal system, and was aimed at avoiding feudal transaction 
restrictions.23 The social, legal and economic order, as well as the processes and 
institutions of law-creation and dispute resolution, is then an autonomous, informal, 
privatised and customary one, which is very much different from a state-centred order in 
the modem world.
Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries mercantile law evolved in 
England and Continental Europe.24 Although the development of mercantile law 
reflected the contrasting requirements of local traders and merchants, the foundations of 
the law merchant, the early generation of lex mercatoria, focussed primarily upon 
commercial matters and the ability to meet the demands of the business community, and 
remained unchallenged in both civil and common law systems. Generally, the law 
merchant regulated merchant conduct without the coercive assistance of state 
governments.25 The law merchant is largely self-enforcing in that a party failing to 
comply with a mercantile law or a merchant court’s decision risked damage to his
9 f%reputation and may be excluded from trading at the fairs.
Some imagination is necessary to understand how a merchant jurist functions 
and how its role differs from the role envisioned for judges under the present positivist 
conception of the judiciary. In medieval times, merchants were guided by “merchant” 
rules.27 The law merchant, together with church law, feudal law, manorial law and 
urban law, constitutes normative and institutional pluralism in the medieval authority 
structure, which makes local political and religious authorities unable to enforce
9Rmerchant law and hence mercantile disputes have to be channelled to merchant courts.
22 Bruce L. Benson, op. cit. 647.
23 A. Claire Cutler, ‘Historical Materialism, Globalisation, and Law: Competing Conceptions of Property’ 
in Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith (eds), Historical Materialism and Globalisation (Routledge, New York 
and London 2002) 230-56.
24 The evolution of lex mercatoria, in England at least, can be closely linked to the development of 
principles o f equity in the Chancery Division where, to some extent, lex mercatoria and law of equity 
have tended to clash. See, for example, the decision in Gibson v Carruthers (1841) 8 M&W 321 at 338.
25 Bruce L. Benson, op. cit. 649.
26 Bernardo Cremades and Steven Plehn, op. cit. 319.
27 Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty Vol.! Rules and Order (University o f Chicago, 
Chicago 1978) 19.
28 This is also consistent with the pluralism in political authority structure “in early modem Europe, at 
least at first, a government could be an Italian city, a feudal principality, the Hanseatic League, or a more 
familiar empire or kingdom”. See M. N. Pearson, ‘Merchants and States’ in James D. Tracy (ed), The 
Political Economy o f  Merchant Empires (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991) 41-116.
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Unlike royal, ecclesiastical or common law courts, merchant courts, which were not 
composed of professional judges but merchants themselves, achieved a high degree of 
independence. Like modem arbitrators, the merchant judges relied on their knowledge 
of and expertise in commercial custom and trade usages and on their familiarity with the 
evolving needs of commerce to resolve commercial disputes among merchants.29 
Merchant courts were able to apply commercial norms that merchants observe in
1A
practice, to uphold and enforce transactions otherwise unenforceable in other courts, 
and to support equity, in the medieval sense of fairness, as an overriding principle.31 At 
the procedural level, the merchant courts provided the most utilised institutional 
framework for settling commercial disputes. Like contemporary arbitration tribunals, 
merchant courts operated privately, speedily and informally.32 Jurists examined the truth 
themselves without regard to the formal legal rules of evidence and proof,33 and then 
tailored justice to specific facts by employing merchant custom. The fair courts and 
merchant jurists, with the assistance of guilds which provided facilities and discipline 
for members,34 also played an influential role in articulating merchant law and custom, 
building up an efficacious and private dispute settlement system, and established the 
foundations for the modem Continental courts of commerce.
Sovereign rulers did not object to an a-national regime governing the legal 
relationship among merchants as long as merchant activities can generate tax revenues 
and bring in foreign goods. The laissez-faire attitude facilitated the development of 
independent rules of conduct.35 No local ruler, legislator or jurist ever “made” the law 
merchant, which indeed was customary and self-regulatory in both law-creation and 
dispute resolution. The customary character of the law merchant reflects the more 
general autonomy of the merchant class from the feudal class system. The order of the 
law merchant occupied a space external to the local political economy and feudal mode 
of production. Therefore, the law merchant is a form of “unconscious” and self- 
enforcing law departing from “rational and systematic legislation” which is a product of
29 Bernardo M. Cremades and Steven L. Plehn, op. cit. 317, 319.
30 Frederick Pollock, ‘The Early History of the Law Merchant in England’ (1901) 67(3) L Q Rev 232-51.
31 Harold Berman and Colin Kaufman, ‘The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex 
Mercatoria)’ op. cit. 221-78.
32 See generally Leon E. Trakman, The Law Merchant: The Evolution o f  Commercial Law  (Littleton, co: 
Fred B. Rothman 1983).
33 Clive M. Schmitthoff (ed), The Sources o f  the Law o f  International Trade (Praeger, New York 1964).
34 Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry Weingast, ‘Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The 
Case of the Merchant Guild’ (1994) 102(4) J Political Econ 745-76.
35 Craig William Laurence Craig, William W. Park and Jan Paulsson, International Chamber o f  
Commerce Arbitration (Oceana Publications and ICC Publishing, New York 1990) para 35.01.
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“conscious human-lawmaking”. 36 The words “custom” and “statute” were used 
interchangeably, and most commercial statutes were merely compilations of existing 
custom37 rather than the “creation of legislature”.38 Merchants were free to develop their 
own legal institutions in light of their own commercial needs. The customs and laws 
governing maritime trade and commerce formed the foundation of the law merchant.39 
Amalfian Table, a collection of maritime laws produced by the Italian Republic of 
Amalfi, was adopted by all the Italian cities,40 and a collection of maritime judgements 
of the Court of Oleron on the French coast was widely adopted by the seaport towns of 
the Atlantic and North Sea and England.41 Various sea laws governing maritime 
transportation, insurance and instruments had their origin in and gained their currency 
and efficacy through commercial custom.42 These laws and customs spread to other 
commercial centres in Europe 43 A body of law regulating overland trade in the markets 
and fairs of England, Germany and northern France and in the city-state in Italy and 
southern France44 was also developed in inland towns. The fairs and city-states, allowed 
the evolution of a complete and ingenious system of the law merchant, separate from 
the authority of a sovereign. These platforms were important in facilitating the growth 
of commerce, providing security and safe conduct for merchants, and universalising the 
merchant custom. In many of the European city-states of the early Middle Ages, for 
example, the merchant gilds, which had traditionally arbitrated disputes among their 
members, gradually evolved into commercial courts with general jurisdiction over all 
commercial matters 45
Although lex mercatoria developed throughout Medieval Europe in numerous 
small states at varying rates, virtually all commentators have been struck by its near
36 Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds), Max Weber Economy and Society, Vols. I  and II  (University of 
California Press, Berkeley) 753-8.
37 Frederic R. Sanborn, Origins o f  the Early English Maritime and Commercial Law  (Century Co., 
London 1930) 183.
38 William Mitchell, An Essay on the Early History o f  the Law Merchant (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1904) 141, 155.
39 Merchants in ports drew upon the Sea Law of Rhodes transmitted to Western Europe by the Greeks and 
Romans. See A. Claire Cutler, ‘Private Authority in International Trade Relations: The Case of Maritime 
Transport’ in A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler and Tony Porter (eds), Private Authority and 
International Affairs (SUNY Press, Albany, New York 1999).
40 Frederic R. Sanborn, op. cit.
41 William Mitchell, op. cit.
42 See Alan Cafruny, Ruling the Waves: The Political Economy o f  International Shipping (University o f 
California Press, Berkeley 1987).
43 Shepard B. Clough and Charles W. Cole, Economic History o f  Europe (rev edn Heath & Co., Boston, 
MA and Washington D.C. 1946).
44 Frederic R. Sanborn, op. cit. 31.
45 See William C. Jones, ‘An Inquiry into the History of the Adjudication of Mercantile Disputes in Great 
Britain and the United States’ (1958) 25 U Chi L Rev 445, 450; Louise Hertwig Hayes, ‘Note, A Modem 
Lex Mercatoria’. Political Rhetoric or Substantive Progress?’ (1977) 3 Brooklyn J Int’l L 210, 212 n.13.
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universal uniformity. Most found that “despite some local variations, ... the law was 
common and uniform”,46 and that the usages of commercial cities tended to conform to 
the general usage of merchants throughout Europe. It is also observed that “each 
country ... had its own variety of Law Merchant, yet all were but varieties of the same 
species. Everywhere the leading principles and the most important rules were the same, 
or tended to become the same” 47 There are both economic and political reasons for this 
unplanned uniformity, which was not achieved through international treaties or 
conventions that did not yet exist.48 Rather, the law merchant gradually progressed 
towards and achieved considerable uniformity and universality through the expansion of 
commerce and trade as well as the mobility of capital and the transmissibility of 
property in the European trading world.49 The medieval law merchant contained 
principles facilitating exchange through informal and flexible standards was easy to be 
adopted and implemented in the commercial circle. In substance, the medieval law 
merchant system “does not derive its normative claims from treaties amongst sovereign 
states” 50 but is a de-territorialised and predominantly private legal order. The law 
merchant granted more autonomy and discretion to merchants who in turn strengthened 
the independence of their social status as a separate class. Although a great deal of 
conscious borrowing of law occurred, it was never done with the intent to create a 
uniform law, but arose from the merchants’ desire to emulate the successful commercial 
practices of their more prosperous neighbours.
Although local or municipal authorities regulated trade and production with the 
aim to ensure adequate production and a fair and reasonable price level, municipal 
governments were relatively accommodating to the merchants due to their reliance upon 
commerce for tax revenue and, were therefore anxious to promote business and trade in 
markets and fairs within their borders. Thus, despite the rather primitive state of 
economic knowledge, governors were prudent enough to discern that merchants were
46 Frederic R. Sanborn, op. cit. 126.
47 William Mitchell, op. cit. 9.
48 Foreign merchants were granted immunities from municipal laws, for example, in England. See 
William S. Holdsworth, ‘The Development of the Law Merchant and Its Courts’ in John Henry Wigmore, 
Ernst Freund, William Ephraim Mikell (a panel o f Association of American Law Schools eds), Select 
Essays in Anglo-American Legal History Vol. /  (Little, Brown, and Company, Boston 1909) 289-331.
49 See Henri Pirenne, Economic and Social History o f  Medieval Europe (Kegan Paul, London 1937); R. 
Lopez, The Commercial Revolution o f  the Middle Age (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1971) 
950-1350; and Stephard B. Clough, The Economic Development o f  Western Civilisation (McGraw-Hill 
Book Co. Inc., New York 1959).
50 See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science, and Politics in the 
Paradigmatic Transition (Routledge, London and New York 1995) 289.
163
best left to regulate their own affairs.51 Governments best contributed to the growth of 
commerce and trade, at this time, by merely keeping the peace at fairs and market towns 
and by protecting the trade routes. Merchant courts seldom required the assistance of 
state governments to enforce their judgments because a variety of private remedies were 
available that were usually sufficient.52 In summary, during the medieval phase, 
merchants were able to privately generate and enforce legal norms in response to 
commercial developments and the needs and expectations of merchants, and such 
merchant-made norms constitute the main body of lex mercatoria, which is an 
autonomous legal order separate from the nation-state system.
2.2 Nationalisation o f Law Merchant and Decline o f Lex Mercatoria 
Starting in the sixteenth century, the rise of the sovereign state substantially changed the 
medieval landscape. The state-building process changed the balance between public and 
private spheres, and shifted in favour of the former. The states became the major players 
in the commercial development and mercantilism, and economic state-building involved 
the use of national policies and practices in order to secure economic unity through a 
national economy. As states grew more powerful and merchants disappeared as a 
separate class, the state authority replaced the overlapping authority structure of the 
medieval period and sought dominant control over commercial activities, economic 
process and actors over which the church, town and guild authorities had hitherto 
weakened controls.53 Thus, merchants gradually lost the autonomous status and the law 
merchant became a tempting target for nationalisation.54 Along with the rise of 
capitalism, the process of legal nationalisation was carried out in every country but in 
different manners and degrees due to local conditions and traditions.55 In England, 
nationalisation occurred on two fronts: the consolidation of substantive merchant law 
into the common law applicable to all persons56 and the absorption of the specialised
51 The principal threat to trade from government at this time was not over-regulation per se, but rather 
over-taxation. Greedy rulers often inadvertently taxed lucrative fairs out of existence.
52 Bernardo M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, op. cit. 319.
53 Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism (Macmillan, New York 1955).
54 Thomas E. Carbonneau & Marc S. Firestone, ‘Transnational Law-Making. Assessing the Impact of the 
Vienna Convention and the Viability o f Arbitral Adjudication’ (1986) 1 Emery J Int’l Disp Resol 61.
55 Clive M. Schmitthoff, ‘International Business Law: A New Law Merchant’ in Clive M. Schmitthoff, 
Current Law and Social Problems 2 (University of W. Ontario 1961) 129-53.
56 William S. Holdsworth, ‘The Development o f the Law Merchant and Its Courts’ in John Henry 
Wigmore, Ernst Freund, William Ephraim Mikell (a panel o f Association of American Law Schools eds), 
Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History Vol. I  (Little, Brown, and Company, Boston 1909) 289- 
331. In Pillans v. van Mierop 3 Burr. 1663, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (KB 1765) Lord Mansfield held that the 
rules o f the law merchant were questions of law to be decided by the courts and not matters of customs to 
be proved by the parties.
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courts into the common law courts.57 As a result, the commercial law was based 
fundamentally on the customs of merchants but retained a cosmopolitan flavour.58 In the 
United States, nationalisation occurred in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries through 
the adoption of English commercial law and the unification of state commercial law and 
practices. Unification of state laws in the form of the Uniform Commercial Code in the 
twentieth century had an impact on international transactions by rendering American 
commercial norms more consistent with international usage.59 France took a different 
course and the French Revolutionary values delinked special personal status from the 
special status of commercial transactions. 60 The Napoleonic commercial code 
established the pattern of the separate and distinct treatment of commercial matters, a 
practice subsequently adopted by many other civil law countries.61 In Germany, 
codification and unification of law aimed at securing political unification constituted the
fOmain feature of legal nationalisation. The German Commercial Code was borrowed by 
Austria and Japan and the latter codes appeared to bear a greater likeness to the 
medieval law merchant. Regardless of these differentials, legal nationalisation was 
reflected in two respects: commercial relations were subject to increasing state-based 
rules and law merchant was gradually juridified, formalised and incorporated into the 
territorial-based national regulatory and court systems, rendering it subject to the 
vagaries of each nation’s peculiar legal order.63 As the political counterpart of 
mercantilism and as part of the political process, the codification or nationalisation of 
law merchant or lex mercatoria in Europe resulted in a nationalised, rationalised, 
systematic and positivist64 form of legal regulation adapted to the needs of major trading 
nations according to principles of territorial sovereignty and legal positivism.65 The 
state regulations contained and formed part of the measures adopted and implemented
57 Denis Tallon, ‘Civil Law and Commercial Law’ in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law: 
Specific Contracts, Vol. Ill, Ch. 2 (Martinus Nijihoff 1993) 103-4 available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/biblio/graffi.html.
58 Philip W. Thayer, ‘Comparative Law and the Law Merchant’ (1936) 6(2) Brooklyn L Rev 139-54.
59 John Honnold, ‘The Influence of the Law of International Trade on the Development and Character of 
English and American Commercial Law’ in Clive M. Schmitthoff (ed), The Sources o f  the Law o f  
International Trade (Praeger, New York 1964) 70-87.
60 Denis Tallon, op. cit. 103-14.
61 Ernst von Caemmerer, ‘The Influence of the Law of International Trade on the Development and 
Character o f Commercial Law in the Civil Law Countries’ in Clive M. Schmitthoff (ed) The Sources o f  
the Law o f  International Trade (Praeger, New York 1964) 88-100.
62 Clive M. Schmitthoff, ‘International Business Law: A New Law Merchant’ op. cit. 2: 136.
63 Bernardo M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, op. cit. 320.
64 The codification engendered an attitude o f legal positivism being aggravated by nationalist sentiments. 
Rene David and J. E. C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the
Comparative Study o f  Law  (Stevens & Sons, London 1978) 62.
65 Leon Trakman, ‘The Evolution of the Law Merchant: Our Commercial Heritage’ (1980) 12 J Marit L 
& Com 153.
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by state authorities to gain control over economic activities in the era of state building, 
mercantilism and capitalism.
The localising tendency of national regulation and the incorporation of lex 
mercatoria into the municipal law continued throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries,66 and by the twentieth century jurists began to assert that municipal law was 
the only law which could govern transnational transactions.67 The autonomous and self- 
supportive law merchant order was so much less compatible with economic expansion 
and state dominance that merchant autonomy in law-creation and dispute resolution 
declined. As merchant courts became incapable of dealing with transnational disputes 
due to the geographic expansion of commercial relations and inadequacy of self- 
enforcement systems, merchants were forced to yield disputes to non-merchant judges 
of state courts, which became dominant in the legal sphere and had far-reaching 
jurisdiction in commercial disputes.68 The self-imposed sanctions became difficult to 
enforce as markets proliferated in number. During this period, the expansion of trade 
through colonisation and the functioning of private and autonomous law merchant were 
contingent upon national intervention.69 Perhaps even worse, from the merchant’s 
perspective, the previously uniform law of international commerce disintegrated as lex 
mercatoria became embedded in the “myopic prism of national adjudicatory 
sovereignty”.70 The role of commercial customs declined as it gave way to national 
legislation and case law which were regarded by both states and merchants as definitive 
sources of law.71 The movement from a delocalised system of customary mercantile 
law to a localised and positive state regulatory regime, though elements of commercial 
custom persisted, was a crucial development in the growth of capitalism,72 and in the 
erosion of lex mercatoria as an independent legal order governing legal relationships 
among merchants. At the international level, state laws incorporated international 
mercantile custom retaining significant universality, and states replaced individuals,
66 By the beginning of the 19th century, municipal jurists had convinced themselves that they were not to 
take the law from merchant custom, but that merchants were to take their law from the courts and 
legislatures - thus completely halting the dynamic evolution of the law merchant. See Clive M. 
Schmitthoff, ‘International Business Law: A New Law Merchant’ op. cit. at 136.
67 Christopher W.O. Stoecker, ‘The Lex Mercatoria'. To What Extent Does it Exist?’ (1990) 7 J Int’l Arb 
101, 103.
68 Thomas E. Carbonneau & Marc. S. Firestone, ‘Transnational Law-Making. Assessing the Impact o f the 
Vienna Convention and the Viability o f Arbitral Adjudication’ (1986) 1 Emery J Int’l Disp Resol 62.
69 Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the M aking o f  History (Columbia 
University Press, New York 1987).
70 Thomas E. Carbonneau and Marc. S. Firestone, op. cit. 62.
71 Rene David, ‘Sources of Law’ in International Encyclopaedia o f  Comparative Law, Vol. II, Ch. 3 
(1972) 3-404 available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/biblio/graffi.html.
72 Piers Beime, ‘Ideology and Rationality in Max Weber’s Sociology o f Law’ in Piers Beime and Richard 
Quinney (eds), Marxism and Law  (John Wiley & Sons, New York 1982) 44-62.
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private associations, corporations and became the main subjects in international law. 
These phenomena reflect the acceptance of national sovereignty and political autonomy, 
the expansion of public regulatory authority in enforcing commercial agreements and 
reinforcement of national particularism during this period.
Nationalisation brought about not only the fragmentation but also the 
sterilisation of lex mercatoria. The argument was that municipal courts were easily 
confused by commercial innovation while new business practices spread quickly among 
merchants.73 Therefore, judges were reluctant to admit evidence of innovation once 
custom had been codified by legislators or officially recognised by the courts,74 and 
merchants required certainty in business.75 However, the conclusion seems to be that 
nationalisation did not eradicate the law merchant. Although the law merchant persisted 
and influenced the development of rules governing financial transactions, insurance and 
shipping beyond the medieval period, it is important to recognise disjunctives and 
discontinuities. In substance, during this period, the law merchant became more
7 f tlocalised and less universal due to the rising state power. Merchant autonomy in 
commercial law was transformed into modem contract law, which replaces the medieval 
notion of equity in contracting and stresses the freedom of contract. The contractual 
freedom, together with the new political economy, facilitated commercial exchange and 
substantially increased efficiency,77 because the courts could play a more facilitative 
role by enforcing contracts with minimum judicial intervention into business activities 
and substantive contractual terms. Contrary to the medieval phase, merchant autonomy 
operated with the sanction and support of state authorities as territorially individuated 
states became stronger in economic, political and ideological senses.
Positivism is the ideology that legitimised the nationalisation of lex mercatoria. 
It is a jurisprudence that regards law “as a deliberate construction based on empirical 
knowledge of the effects it would have on the achievement of desirable human 
purposes”.78 This line of thinking reflects the impact of capitalism on moral theology, 
which became more consistent with the capitalist business techniques and mercantilist
73 John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 
1990)418.
74 Goodwin v. Robarts, 10 L.R.-Ex. 337, 357 (1875); see also Robert W, Aske, The Law Relating to 
Custom and the Usages o f Trade 23 (1909); Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, ‘The Law of 
International Transactions (Lex Mercatoria)’ (1978) 19 Harv Int’l L J 221, 227.
75 Harold J. Berman and Colin Kaufman, ‘The Law of International Transactions (Lex Mercatoria)’ op. 
cit. 226.
76 Bruce Benson, op. cit. 644-61.
77 Patrick Atiyah, The Rise and Fall o f  Freedom o f  Contract (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1979).
78 Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty Vol. 1 Rules and Order (University o f Chicago, 
Chicago 1978) 19.
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doctrine, “a new degree of freedom from religious constraints on individual enterprise 
and individual aspirations for economic betterment”.79 The juridification of commerce 
is shaped by a juridical ideology that departed from the medieval tradition of 
substantive justice, which was based upon the belief that the justification of contractual
OA
obligation is derived from the inherent justice or fairness of exchange. Thus, the 
juridical ideology helps to distinguish the judicial function of the judiciary from 
economics, politics and morality. The ideology of market economy as well as modem 
contract law proclaims that all men are equal. Such ideology fundamentally transformed 
the philosophical foundation of mles and legal systems.
Today “international business occurs within a myriad of independent national 
legal systems”.81 Each nation filters the once uniform law merchant through its own 
unique historical, cultural and political experiences. Needless to say, the regulatory 
variation arising from the national legal order both distorts and dismpts international 
commerce. As it has been rightly pointed out, “... the way in which international 
commerce is regulated today ... relates to the nationalisation of law that took place in 
the 19th century, it is as unsatisfactory as it could be”.84 Similarly, the jurisprudence of 
positivism today is so embedded in many judicial systems that many judges are 
reluctant to recognise other sources of law because the application of lex mercatoria by 
a national court . . . would be likely to render part of a State’s sovereignty into the 
invisible hands of a constantly changing community of merchants. The jurisprudence of 
positivism may not support a theory postulating the development of a legal regime 
outside of the national legal order.85 A law merchant developed in such a fashion could 
at times go against the interest of a State or its government.
3 . T h e  N a t u r e  o f  L e x M e r c a  t o r ia  in  t h e  L e g a l  R e a l m
79 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f  Capitalism (Allen and Unwin, London 1978), and 
Jacob Viner, Religious Thought and Economic Society (Duke University Press, Durham, NC 1978).
80 Morton Horwitz, ‘The Historical Foundations of Modem Contract Law’ (1974) 87(5) Harv L Rev 917-
56.
81 Bernardo M. Cremades and Steven L. Plehn, op. cit. 317.
82 Ibid.
83 Gerald Malynes, Consuetudo, Vel, Lex Mercatoria: or, the Ancient Law-Merchant (1685) 3.
84 A note of the transactions o f the 2nd UNIDROIT Congress o f Private Law, Rome, September 1976 
published in UNIDROIT, New Directions in International Trade Law, Vol. I  (Oceana Publications, New 
York 1977) 5.
85 Bernardo M. Cremades and Steven L. Plehn, op. cit. 317.
86 Christopher W.O. Stoecker, ‘The Lex Mercatoria: To What Extent Does it Exist?’ (1990) 7 J Int’l Arb 
108.
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Lex mercatoria is often regarded as the private customary law of international
87commerce, an autonomous legal order “independent of any one national legal 
system”.88 Arguably, lex mercatoria functions as conduits by which the law is enriched 
to allow more space for concepts not encompassed by one particular legal order. In this 
sense, lex mercatoria can be regarded as “a quasi-legal recognition of rules of common 
sense, equity and reasonableness”, 89 which may provide the increased flexibility 
necessary in developing legal relationships.90 Alternatively, lex mercatoria can be seen 
as a tool “to clarify, to fill gaps, and to reduce the impact of peculiarities of individual 
countries’ laws, often not designed for international transactions at all”.91
3.1 Relationship between Lex Mercatoria and National Laws 
There are two aspects to the relationship between lex mercatoria and national law. The 
first aspect is the interaction between national laws and lex mercatoria. The reality, as 
the second aspect, is that both are closely related. The difference between the state laws 
and lex mercatoria is not one of degree but of kind. The practice of lex mercatoria 
proceeds on different line from any other kind of law. For instance, lex mercatoria can 
include or refer to those principles of municipal systems common to each other and 
common to international law.93 Likely, lex mercatoria can annex to its own sphere some 
of the particular aspects of commercial activities which at present lie between the 
“domestic” and non-domestic jurisdictions. A related question is the weight of national 
laws and lex mercatoria the arbitrator shall place in deciding substantive issues of the 
dispute. The question in itself can be complicated in the absence of a choice of law or 
where the parties have chosen a variety of “general principle of law” instead of a
87 Thomas E. Carbonneau and Marc. S. Firestone, ‘Transnational Law-Making: Assessing the Impact of 
the Vienna Convention and the Viability of Arbitral Adjudication’ (1986) 1 Emory J Int’l Disp Resol 51,
57.
88 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, ‘Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator’s View’ in Thomas E. Carbonneau (ed), Lex 
Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion o f  the New Law Merchant (rev edn Kluwer Law International, 
Yonkers, New York: Juris; Cambridge, MA 1998) 49.
89 Keith Highet, op. cit. 628.
90 Ibid.
91 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, ‘Lex Mercatoria: an Arbitrator’s View’ op. cit. 56.
92 International law may be close to lex mercatoria than state laws. The majority of the rules of 
international law are generally observed by all nations without actual compulsion, for it is generally in the 
interest o f all nations concerned to honour their obligations under international law. Lex mercatoria may 
not impose such obligations upon states. Nevertheless, states may have great economic interests to respect 
lex mercatoria. A nation will likewise be reluctant to disregard lex mercatoria since the benefits that it 
expects from the recognition to lex mercatoria given by other states would be complementary to those 
anticipated by the latter. It may stand to lose more than it would gain by not respecting lex mercatoria. 
This is particularly so in the long run since a nation that has the reputation of disregarding its commercial 
obligations will find it hard to conclude commercial treaties beneficial to itself.
93 David W. Rivkin, ‘Enforceability of Arbitral Awards based on Lex Mercatoria’ (1993) 9(1) Arb Int’l 
68 .
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specific national law. The second aspect concerns the reaction of national courts to an a- 
national award. The real concern is whether the court of the place where arbitration 
takes place or where the enforcement is sought will agree to enforce an award that is 
based upon lex mercatoria.94
There are two further perspectives relevant to these two aspects on the 
fundamental issue of which is more important between national laws and lex mercatoria 
in a commercial context. A traditional view may hold that national laws are the 
authority in determining and evaluating lex mercatoria. In contrast, it has been asserted 
that lex mercatoria takes precedence over national laws,95 and avoid the effect of 
relatively unsophisticated national laws unsuited to international transactions.96 In both 
theory and practice, lex mercatoria is performing a useful and indeed a necessary 
function in the international society, inter alia, international business community in 
enabling business entities to carry on their day-to-day intercourse along orderly and 
predictable lines. Most norms of lex mercatoria serve such complementary interests. 
Following this classical mercatorist view, the arbitrator should avoid all references to 
national laws and thus a conflict between the two would not arise. This view appears in 
a few arbitral awards. For example, in the Pyramids’ case, the tribunal proceeded by 
interpreting Egyptian law as conforming with the general principle exemplified in 
Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention and then applying it in that sense.97
QO
Two lines of argument in favour of each side can be found in the Rakoil case.
In the dispute between Deutsche-Schactbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft Mbh (DST), a 
consortium of oil companies, and the Government of R’As al-Khaimah, via a 
government-owned oil company (Rakoil), an agreement included an ICC arbitration 
clause providing for arbitration in Geneva. The dispute related to a 1973 concession 
agreement and two oil exploration agreements and the alleged inducement by 
misrepresentation. The contract contained no choice of law clause but the arbitration 
tribunal held instead that the proper law was “internationally accepted principles of law
94 See Chapter 3 o f this dissertation.
95 See Ole Lando, ‘The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1985) 34 Int’l & Comp 
L Q 759 (“It is now established by ... the Convention [of 18 March 1965 on the Settlement o f Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, which instituted the International Centre for the 
Settlement o f Investment Disputes (ICSID)] that, in the case of a conflict between the law of a 
Contracting State and “the rules of international law, the latter rules may be given preference to the 
former” .)
96 David W. Rivkin, op. cit. 67.
97 SPP (Middle East) v The Arab Republic o f  Egypt 9 YBCA 111.
98 See D ST v R ’As al-Khaimah National Oil Co [1987] 3 WLR 1023; the Court o f Appeal in the Rakoil 
case was called upon to interpret the scope of Art 13(3) of the ICC Rules; and ‘United Kingdom, Court of 
Appeal, 24 March 1987, Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohr-gesellschaft mbH (FR Germ) v. Ras A1 
Khaimah National Oil Co. et al.’ (1988) XIII Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law & Taxation 
Publishers, Deventer & Boston) 523, 530.
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governing contractual relations”. The arbitrators derived such power from Article 13(3) 
of the ICC Rules which empowers them to apply the law designated by appropriate 
conflicts of law rules if the parties have not chosen the proper law. The arbitration 
tribunal focused on the “common” practice of arbitrators adjudicating oil exploration 
disputes to select general principles, and concluded that the practice “must have been 
known to the parties” and thus represents their “implicit will”.99 Eventually, the alleged 
misrepresentation had not been established and there were no other grounds for holding 
that the agreement was invalid. Both the High Court in London and arbitral tribunal 
appeared to support that the national law does not necessarily rank ahead of lex 
mercatoria as long as the parties, through the Arbitration Rules or arbitration clause, 
grant the tribunal to apply lex mercatoria to the dispute.100 The Court of Appeal 
dismissed RakoiTs appeal, which sought to resist enforcement of the award in England 
on the basis that a reference in the award to international principles was contrary to 
English public policy. Rakoil argued that public policy prevented enforcement where 
the party’s rights and obligations were based on “unspecified, possibly ill-defined, 
internationally accepted of law”.101 In sharp contrast to the traditional English hostility 
to anything akin to lex mercatoria or a-national standard, the court rejected this 
argument and pointed out that “parties can validly provide for some other system of law 
to be applied to an arbitration tribunal. ... The parties could validly agree that their legal 
relationships should be decided by the arbitral tribunal ... perhaps on the basis of 
principles of international law”.102 This judicial view is consistent with Lord Denning’s 
opinion expressed in the case of Eagle Star v. Yuval that both the contract and the 
arbitration clause requiring an “equitable rather than a strictly legal interpretation” are 
valid.103
In Rakoil, Donaldson MR proposed a three-pronged test to determine the 
validity and enforceability of an award based upon a-national law: (a) the state shall not
99 ‘United Kingdom, Court of Appeal, 24 March 1987, Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohr-gesellschaft 
mbH (FR Germ) v. Ras A1 Khaimah National Oil Co. et al.’ (1988) XIII Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers, Deventer & Boston) 523, 530
100 See XIII YBCA at 532 and Martin J, Hunter, ‘Lex Mercatoria -  Deutsche Schachtbau-und 
Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v. R’As Al Khaimah National Oil Co.’ (1987 Part 3) Lloyd’s Maritime and 
Commercial L Q 277, 279.
101 DST (FR Germany) v. (1) R ’as A l Khaimah National Oil Co. (UAE); (2) Shell International Co., Ltd. 
(UK) [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 246-258 [1987] 2 All E.R. 769-784; ‘United Kingdom, Court of Appeal, 24 
March 1987, Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohr-gesellschaft mbH (FR Germ) v. Ras Al Khaimah 
National Oil Co. et al.’ (1988) XIII Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law & Taxation 
Publishers, Deventer & Boston) 523, 530.
102 ‘United Kingdom, Court o f Appeal, 24 March 1987, Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohr-gesellschaft 
mbH (FR Germ) v. Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Co. et al.’ (1988) XIII Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers, Deventer & Boston) 532.
103 [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 357.
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interfere with the dispute if the parties intend to create legally enforceable rights and 
obligations; (b) whether the resulting agreement is sufficiently certain to constitute a 
legally enforceable contract; (c) whether it would be contrary to public policy to enforce 
the award, using the coercive powers of the state.104 This test actually gives die court a 
broad nod and a wink to the proponents of the lex mercatoria. Without an express 
choice of law, the arbitrator has mandate to decide that he will apply “internationally 
accepted principles of law” in appropriate circumstances.105 The three-pronged test then 
demonstrates the court’s willingness and flexibility to recognise lex mercatoria, at least 
in co-existence with national law. Lord Mustill down-plays the importance of the Rakoil 
case as regards lex mercatoria and stressed that the judgment did not address the 
question whether, under English law, a contract is effective if it does not contain any 
explicit choice of the “general principles”. The established proposition may be that a 
contract cannot exist in vacuo and nor can it be stateless if the parties wish to seek 
enforcement by a court.106 Although this line of argument is probably against the tide of 
academic opinion, it raises a critical question: how can lex mercatoria, as a law, operate 
without the support of a legal system? In a positivist sense, the functioning of lex 
mercatoria may rely upon the recognition of nation-states. Nevertheless, the servicing 
function of lex mercatoria strongly explains why the rules in lex mercatoria are 
generally self-enforced, which will be discussed below.
3.2 Lex Mercatoria: Effective Tool to Fill Gaps in Commercial Contracts?
The power of arbitrators to review and fill gaps in commercial contracts is the most
1 m  __ i n scontroversial arbitral doctrine. The discussion started in the last century but did not 
bring out a satisfactory solution due to a seemingly clear cut dogma: the procedural 
character of arbitration may be incompatible with the substantive nature of contractual 
gap-filling.
The drawback of complex long-term “relational” contracts lies in the fact that 
contracts are vulnerable to the change of technological, political or economic 
circumstances or the omission of detailed contractual terms. Arbitrators are theoretically
104 ‘United Kingdom, Court o f Appeal, 24 March 1987, Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohr-gesellschaft 
mbH (FR Germ) v. Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Co. et al.’ (1988) XIII Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers, Deventer & Boston) 534.
105 Martin Hunter, ‘Lex Mercatoria -  Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v. R’As Al 
Khaimah National Oil Co.’ (1987 Part 3) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial L Q 277 279.
106 Michael J. Mustill, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria: The First 25 Years’ (1988) 4 Arb Int’l 86; and Keith 
Highet, ‘The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria’ (1989) 63 Tulane L Rev 614-5.
107 See William Laurence Craig, William W. Park and Jan Paulsson, International Chamber o f  Commerce 
Arbitration (Oceana Publications and ICC Publishing, New York 1990) 143.
108 Clive M. Schmitthoff, ‘Hardship and Intervener Clauses’ (1980) J Bus L 82.
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entitled to deal with any issue arising from such a contract. Nevertheless, this power is 
subject to two opposing principles of contract law: the principle of pacta sunt servanda, 
which stands for the sacrosanct character of the parties’ initial agreements, and the 
notion of clausula rebus sic stantibus, which reflects a necessary flexibility in 
interpreting the contract so that the initial economic equilibrium can be maintained. It 
appears that the degree of the arbitrator’s discretion to modify or fill gaps in contracts is 
dependent on how the dilemma between die need for commercial flexibility and the 
ideal of sanctity of contracts is resolved.
The role of arbitrators in practice is somehow quite narrow and is confined to 
make a simple judgement on the non-performance or violation of contractual duties.109 
Such a traditional role of the arbitrator is reflected in the UNCITRAL Model Law and 
other domestic arbitration laws110 but is incompatible with the reality that arbitrators 
may be compelled to play a more constructive role in evaluating economic issues and 
modifying the contract. In practice, the line between gap-filling and contractual 
interpretation is not easy to draw and is a matter of degree. Under German civil law, if a 
contractual stipulation for a specific issue has been omitted from the contract, arbitrators 
may apply the principle of the “supplementary construction” (erganzende 
Vertragsauslegung) of contractual terms derived from Section 157 of the German Civil 
Code so that gaps in the contract can be closed, if and to the extent that this is in line 
with the hypothetical will of the parties.111 This part of the arbitrator’s decision-making 
still falls under the arbitrator’s general task to apply the lex causae. A tribunal acting 
under English law may avoid the unenforceability of “to be agreed” clauses by applying 
the principle of construction and assuming an implied term in the contract where the
119parties have commenced performing the contract. Similarly, under US law, an 
arbitral tribunal may supply an omitted contract term by “implication” based upon the 
expectations of the parties or the principles of justice and fairness.113 The Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) defers to the authority of lex mercatoria for gap-filling 
purposes and “the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant ... shall 
supplement its provisions”.114 Thus, private parties’ commercial or legal objectives can
109 See the statement made by the German delegation in drafting Model Law in UN Doc. A/CN.9/263, 
para 15: the activity of the arbitral tribunal is concentrated on the interpretation and application of 
contractual agreements and legal provisions.
110 See Article 7(1) o f the UNCITRAL Model Law.
111 See Fritz Nicklisch, ‘Agreement to Arbitrate to Fill Contractual Gaps’ (1988) 5(3) J Int’l Arb 35, 38.
112 Hillas & Co. v. Arcos Ltd  [1932] All ER 494; Foley v. Classique Coaches [1934] 2 KB 1.
113 See Edward Allan Farnsworth, Contracts (3rd edn Aspen Law & Business 1999) § 7.16.
114U.C.C. 1-103 (1992). In fact, the authors o f the UCC proclaimed it to be a modem lex mercatoria. 
Friedrich K. Juenger, ‘The Lex Mercatoria and the Conflict of Laws’ in Thomas E. Carbonneau (ed), Lex
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be satisfied without resorting to the legal system. In essence, lex mercatoria is regarded 
as an addition other than an alternative to state law.115
The admissibility of contract adaptation or supplementation by arbitrators 
ultimately boils down to a clash of two basic ideas: the adjudication of pre-existing 
rights is a matter of procedural law; and the contractual intervention to create rights is a 
matter of substantive contract law. The distinction relates to the filling of “initial” and 
“supervening” gaps.116 Initial gaps are those deliberately left open by the parties in 
negotiating the contract. Therefore, the arbitrator has not been granted any discretion to 
fill such gap. In contrast, supervening gaps occur after the conclusion of the contract. 
Since such gaps are not foreseen by the parties in the drafting stage, arbitrators may be 
entitled to fill such gaps if conditions of substantive and procedural laws are satisfied. 
Such a distinction triggers various concerns in procedural and substantive aspects of law. 
From a procedural perspective, initial gaps are left by the parties at the outset with an 
intention to settle any future ambiguities by themselves when the contract is performed. 
No dispute is actually left for arbitration. For instance, in the case of “indefinite 
agreements” in English and American contract law, courts may refuse to enforce a mere 
“agreement to agree” or a “contract to negotiate” since terms are too vague to shape any
117legal remedies according to the parties’ intent. Certainly, if the parties fail to reach an 
agreement in filling the gap, it may suffice to establish the competence of a tribunal for 
arbitration.118 The risk remains in some common law jurisdictions such as England and 
America where such agreements to agree are not enforceable by international arbitral 
tribunals. In order to avoid such problems, the parties may clearly convey to arbitrators 
the power to fill in gaps under the principle of lex mercatoria.
In the drafting of the UNCITRAL Model Law, besides the distinction between 
contract modification and gap filling, the distinction between authorisation and non-
Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion o f  the New Law Merchant (rev edn Kluwer Law International, 
Yonkers, New York: Juris; Cambridge, MA 1998) (citing U.C.C. 1-105, cmt. 3 (1992).
1,5 Edward Allan Farnsworth, Contracts, op. cit.
116 See Pieter Sanders, Quo Vadis Arbitration? Sixty Years o f  Arbitration Practice, A Comparative Study 
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1999) 141; Wolfgang Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiation o f  
International Investment Agreements: A Study with Particular Reference to Means o f  Conflict Avoidance 
under Natural Resources Investment Agreements (2nd edn Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, The 
Hague 1995) 254.
117 May and Butcher v R. [1934] 2 KB 17; Walford v Miles [ 1992] 2 AC 128; MeKendrick, Force Majeure 
and Frustration of Contract (2nd ed 1995) 110. Lahaina-Maui Corp. v Tau Tet Hew, 362 F 2d. 419; 
Transamericana Equipment Leasing Corporation v Union Bank, 426 F 2d. 273, 275; Joseph Martin Ju., 
Delicatessen v Schumacher, 52 NY 2d. 105; Magna Development Co. v Reed, 228 Cal. App. 2d. 230, 236; 
White Point Company v Paul B Herrington et al., 268 Cal. App. 2d. 458, 468.
118 See Sec 82(1) of the UK Arbitration Act 1996 which reads: “ in this part... dispute includes any 
difference...”
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authorisation was put forward,119 and was adopted in some well-known arbitration cases 
such as AMINOIL.120 With authorisation,121 the principle of pacta sunt servanda is in 
favour of the arbitrator’s competence to reshape the contract.122 The party autonomy in 
international commercial arbitration builds up a strong theoretical ground for arbitrators 
to exercise the discretion to adapt or fill gaps in contracts.123 Without express or implied 
authorisation, arbitrators and arbitral tribunals must look for legal authority to interfere 
with the contract. Such authority may be found in the applicable law but the principle of 
sanctity of contacts makes this difficult.124
3.3 Lex Mercatoria and Principles o f  Good Faith and Fairness
Law includes enforceable rules of conduct or transaction that the community recognises 
as binding and that convey signals to business decision-makers about the community 
goals, norms and values. The principles of good faith and fair dealing are important 
components of lex mercatoria125 and have become the benchmarks for the “social 
control” of business behaviours and agreements. As a supplement to legal rules, such 
principles, together with other norms or values in lex mercatoria, reach toward general 
notions of “rights” that may be in tension with the dictates of the state, and appeals to 
commands of morality or ethics beyond those expressed in statutes and court decisions. 
The emphasis on such principles signals the transition to a new form of contractual
119 See Alan Redfem and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration (3rd 
edn Sweet & Maxwell: London 1999) No.8-17 in fin e ; also see the proposals to include in the Model Law 
a provision dealing with the arbitrator’s authority to adapt contacts and fill gaps and requiring an “express 
authorisation” by the parties, UN Doc A/CN.9AVG.II/WP.41, para 11; A/CN.9AVG.il/WP.44, para 32.
120 See Kuwait v The American Independent Oil Company, ILM 1982, 976, 1015: “there can be no doubt 
that ... a tribunal cannot substitute itself for the parties in order to make good a missing segment o f their 
contractual relations -  or to modify a contract -  unless that right is conferred upon it by law, or by the 
express consent o f the parties”.
121 For instance, the parties may authorise the tribunal to decide on “all disputes arising out of the contract 
including a change of the contract itse lf’. See ICC (Partial) Award No.7544 in (1999) Clunet 1062, 1063 
with Note Hascher, ibid, at 1064, 1065.
122 Ugo Draetta, Ralph B. Lake and Ved P. Nanda, Breach and Adaptation o f  International Contracts: An 
Introduction to Lex Mercatoria (Lexis Law Publication, 1992) 202.
123 It should be inherent in the principle o f party autonomy that the parties may entrust a third party to 
decide on how a contract should be adapted or supplemented. See the UNCITRAL Working Group in UN 
Doc. A/CN.9/233 para 16.
124 The German delegation emphasised that a stricter approach should be taken where the parties have not 
authorised the arbitrators because “if  the parties do not want an arbitration of this kind, it should not be 
imposed on them”. See UN Doc. A/CN.9/263 para 15.
125 David W. Rivkin, ‘Enforceability o f Arbitral Awards based on Lex Mercatoria’ (1993) 9(1) Arb Int’l 
68 .
126 See E. Allan Farnsworth, ‘Duties o f Good Faith and Fair Dealing under the UNIDROIT Principles, 
Relevant International Conventions, and National Laws’ (1994) 3(1/2) Tulane J Int’l & Comp L 45-64; 
Arthur Hartkamp, ‘The Concept o f Good Faith in the UNIDROIT Principles for International 
Commercial Contracts’ (1994) 3(1/2) Tulane J Int’l & Comp L 65-72; and Michael Joachim Bonell, 
‘Policing the International Commercial Contract Against Unfairness under the UNIDROIT Principles’
(1994) 3(1/2) Tulane J Int’l & Comp L 73-92.
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morality in international business and the emergence of a more flexible and pragmatic 
approach from the sanctity of contractual rules. This approach is in consonance with 
commercial common sense and reflects the fact that various extra-contractual devices 
such as cooperation and flexibility involving the “entangling strings of friendship,
197reputation, interdependence, morality and altruistic desires”, and the intrinsic 
willingness of the parties to adjust terms can help operate to reduce the rigid use and 
inefficiency of contract law. Arbitration certainly matches and facilitates such an 
approach as well as the application of principles of good faith and fair dealing.
The Norsolor case seems to suggest that arbitrators’ sense of fairness is not only 
a rule but also the primary rule of decision.128 Legal rules are not necessarily to provide 
the predictability that business people need in planning business strategies, evaluating 
commercial risks and making commercial choices. Although dispute resolution 
according to non-legal criteria is unlikely to be far more successful than state-centred 
legal rules in bringing community standards to bear on the allocation of values and 
resources that affect third parties, in meeting the needs of cross-border business and 
protecting public interests, lex mercatoria and ad hoc justice are needed in the long run 
in the international business community.
To the extent that commercial law lags behind norms, principles and standards 
shared by the business community, arbitration according to principles of good faith and 
fair dealing rather than legal rules may occasionally promote and satisfy the parties’ 
commercial needs and expectations. Lex mercatoria adds a new dimension to the 
arbitrator’s dilemma in navigating among the legal mandates. Many arbitrators are 
inclined to include the application of this a-national customary business law on the basis 
of “general principles of law” or “equitable considerations”, in rendering arbitral awards 
without relying on a particular national legal system. For instance, in continental 
European countries arbitration in equity or ex aequo et bono, where arbitrators act as
190amiable compositeur, is an institution in itself. Arbitrators may find their way to a 
contractual interpretation under Article 13(5) of the ICC Arbitration Rules, which 
commands arbitration in all cases to “take account of ... relevant usages”, or a
127 K.M. Sharma, ‘From “Sanctity” to “Fairness”: An Uneasy Transition in the Law of Contracts’ (1999) 
18 N.Y.L. Sch. J. of Int’l and Com Law 95, 120 (citing Ian MacNeil, ‘Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
and Presentation’ (1974) 60 Va L Rev 589, 595).
128 9 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (1984) 109. See also Mechema v. Troisem [1980] Revue de 
l’arbitrage 560.
129 Jacques Covo, ‘Commodities, Arbitrations and Equitable Considerations’ (1993) 9(1) Arb Int’l 61.
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“commercial custom” which is of binding force under the United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (the “Vienna Convention”).130
3.4 Lex Mercatoria and Legal Process
In terms of the predictability, authoritativeness and accessibility that a “proto-typical 
system of legal rules” carries,131 lex mercatoria arguably does not have the same “force” 
of law even though both the Hague Convention and the Vienna Convention are said to 
be the product of lex mercatoria.132
3.4.1 Uniformity and Predictability of the Proceedings
Lex mercatoria can be argued as particularly suitable for arbitration proceeding in three 
ways. First, arbitrators often follow a common understanding of what is “fair” in the 
business world.133 “Most arbitrators have common ethics and common notions of how 
business should be conducted”.134 Second, lex mercatoria is regarded as a necessary 
supplement to the strict rules of law,135 and a “useful tool for arbitrators ... when faced 
with dissatisfying answers from their initial inquiries”, supplying an addition rather than 
an alternative to the applicable law .136 Third, the changing and unforeseeable 
circumstances that arise in international business community need a more permissive 
and flexible legal or quasi-legal regime,137 and lex mercatoria can play this role well.
However, the paradox is that while the application of lex mercatoria is meant to 
be a method of getting closer to the participating parties’ expectation of fairness, a 
choice of lex mercatoria may result in arbitrary and capricious decisions, in particular as 
perceived by the losing party. The possible incapability of lex mercatoria to achieve 
fairness may be largely due to the uncertainty surrounding the content of lex mercatoria 
itself, and that prevents practitioners from being able to predict the outcome of
130 Edward Allan Farnsworth, ‘Unification and Harmonisation of Private Law’ (1996) 27 Can Bus L J 48; 
and Edward Allan Farnsworth, ‘Unification of Sales Law at the Regional and International Level: Why 
They Behave Like Americans’ in Jacob Ziegel and William Foster (eds), Aspects o f  Comparative 
Commercial Law: Sales, Consumer Credit, and Secured Transactions (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana 1969) 110.
131 Keith Highet, ‘The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria’ (1989) 63 Tulane L Rev 613, 624.
132 See the Hague Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 
834 U.N.T.S. 107 (1972) and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, concluded at Vienna, Apr. 1, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.97/18 (1990), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 671 
(1980).
133 Ole Lando, ‘The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1985) 34 Int’l & Comp L 
Q 747.
134 Ibid. 753.
135 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, ‘Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator’s View’ op. cit. 51, 57.
136 Ibid. 51.
137 W. Laurence Craig, William W. Park & Jan Paulsson, International Chamber o f  Commerce 
Arbitration, op. cit. 138, 310 n .l, 312-13; and Rene David, Arbitration in International Trade (Kluwer 
Law & Taxation, Deventer 1985) 336.
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arbitration. Practically speaking, arbitrators are likely to apply lex mercatoria “either in 
accordance with their own comparative law interpretation of general principles and 
trade customs or refer to their favourite school of thought and ... published arbitral 
awards”.138 If parties, courts or legislatures give arbitration panels or arbitrators the 
freedom “to pursue more perfect justice by ignoring otherwise applicable law that the 
arbitrator finds inconvenient in the case at hand”, 139 arbitrators act as de facto 
“legislators”, defining and applying their own concept of fairness and thus implicating a 
personal creative process into arbitration, the result may be abstract or ad hoc justice.
The ad hoc justice of lex mercatoria somehow affects the degree of 
predictability and may result in a loss of confidence in “the system”. Indeed, the 
deficiency of the consensus on the scope or nature of lex mercatoria will add 
uncertainty to transactions.140 One function of adjudication is the delineation of 
acceptable goals, values and norms for commercial activities. However, lex mercatoria 
may not provide sufficient guidance to the community as regards commercial behaviour 
and may discourage consistent application over time.
As previously discussed, lex mercatoria may function as a conduit by which law 
is enriched and expanded to allow greater room for concepts and standards not 
encompassed by domestic laws. The next question is then whether arbitration is the 
proper forum for the development and elaboration of lex mercatoria due to the lack of 
precedential value created by arbitral awards. As precedent is the foundation upon 
which the growth of law depends particularly in common law countries,141 the relative 
imprecision of lex mercatoria is necessarily unable to provide sufficient support for 
such growth. Arbitral tribunals and arbitrators are more concerned with finding a 
solution appropriate for the dispute per se than with the evolution of the law.142
3.4.2 Judicial Review of the Court
138 Wolfgang Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiation o f  International Investment Agreements: A Study with 
Particular Reference to Means o f  Conflict Avoidance under Natural Resources Investment Agreements
(1995) 172, 176.
139 William W. Park, ‘Control Mechanisms in the Development of a Modem Lex Mercatoria’ in Thomas 
E. Carbonneau (ed), Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion o f  the New Law Merchant (Kluwer 
Law International, Yonkers, New York: Juris; Cambridge, Mass. 1990) 110, 113.
140 Wolfgang Peter, op. cit. 178. Pierre Lalive disagrees and states that “the difficulties of determination 
or application of the general principles [of lex mercatoria] are greatly exaggerated”, but he is in the 
minority in holding this position.
141 Rene David, Arbitration in International Trade, op. cit. 106 (arguing that “arbitration [in general] will 
in all probability gradually assume the same features as the justice administered by the courts”.)
142 Thomas E. Carbonneau (ed), Resolving Transnational Disputes Through International Arbitration 
(University of Virginia Press, 1984) 88 (arguing that because arbitrators do not risk being overruled for 
errors in their legal reasoning, they “can be expected to give reasoned awards more frequently, thereby 
contributing to the development of a modem “law merchant, or lex mercatoria”.).
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The business community’s desire to free international arbitration from de novo review 
by the court is understandable and must be satisfied to some extent. The parties to 
international arbitration and the states involved generally exclude the jurisdiction of 
national courts to review the merits of arbitral awards. As a result, an arbitrator has the 
ability to invoke the power of lex mercatoria without risking judicial review. Under lex 
mercatoria, arbitration is vastly uncontrolled and the parties to arbitration cannot expect 
community but individual justice. However, a total freedom from judicial control may 
not be realistic and may lead to unfairness.143 Without judicial review in place, the 
losing party in arbitration where the arbitrator has exceeded the granted authority, either 
by incorrectly applying lex mercatoria or applying lex mercatoria without the 
permission of the parties, may have no recourse in the country where the award is 
rendered or where the enforcement is sought. Moreover, the losing party will have no 
access to any enforcement forum since there will be no award to enforce and the party 
will be forced to resort to litigation or a second arbitration. The viability of transnational 
arbitration requires that the national legal system ensure the integrity of arbitration. The 
trend of “justice without law” may injure the arbitrating parties as well as the legitimate 
public interest that law is designed to protect.
4 . L e x M e r c a  t o r ia  a n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o m m e r c i a l  A r b i t r a t i o n
The reluctance of business community to use national courts raises a key question of 
whether national courts can be expected to recognise lex mercatoria. Merchants in 
many countries are convinced that municipal judges do not understand the complexities 
of international business. Both national courts and laws are designed by national 
governments for domestic purposes and, therefore, are rarely suitable to international 
commerce. This has been the merchants’ perennial complaint since nationalisation 
began in the seventeenth century.144
4.1 Inherent Feature o f Arbitration and Lex Mercatoria
Arbitration itself is a business-friendly customary tool developed by the merchants over 
last several centuries. Compared to litigation in a national court, arbitration meets the
143 Total freedom may also cause the interests national courts have in “ensuring the integrity of 
proceedings conducted within their national borders” to be ignored, and may result in the devaluation o f 
these awards abroad in terms of enforceability. William W. Park, ‘Arbitration o f International Contract 
Disputes’ (1984) 39 Bus Law 1795.
144 Daniel R. Coquillette, ‘Ideology and Incorporation II: Sir Thomas Ridley, Charles Molloy, and the 
Literary Battle for the Law Merchant, 1607-1676’ (1981) 61 Boston U L Rev 351-371 (quoting 4 William 
Searle Holdsworth, A History o f  English Law  (3rd ed. 1945) 154 n.l).
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needs of business better than national courts. Arbitration is preferable to litigation 
because arbitration is informal, faster, less costly, equitable, a way to avoid unfavorable 
publicity, relatively conciliatory, and requires less time. Most importantly, arbitration is 
seen as providing the best chance to preserve the parties’ goodwill and therefore save 
their underlying business relationship.145 In arbitration the businessmen can choose 
arbitrators who possess specific expertise in trade or industry and who are better able to 
deal with technical questions than municipal judges whose expertise is limited to 
municipal law.146 Because arbitrators are more familiar with practices and technical 
aspects of international commerce, they are better equipped than municipal judges to 
determine and apply customary usages that meet the parties’ expectations. Further, the 
business community is eager to assess the risks they face if a contract is breached, or if 
collection of debts proves difficult, or if the dispute arises. Arbitration under lex 
mercatoria likely makes the risk assessment much easier.147 Resort to lex mercatoria 
through arbitration “eliminates the risks inherent in political resolutions of 
controversies” whether through the mandatory application of some national “public 
policy” or in the local bias often found in national courts.148 The degree of uncertainty is 
then reduced through carefully drafted arbitration provisions.'49
Arbitration is a reflection of the inherent jurisdictional power of the international 
merchant community. The business community possibly provides nothing substantial in 
contracts, leaving arbitrators free to select a governing law according to their views of 
justice and appropriateness. Arbitrators are then given power to act as amiables 
compositeurs and to dispense with the law or to apply lex mercatoria. Merchants also 
need to re-establish their own adjudicatory institutions to articulate and apply private 
law based on transnational commercial customs.150 Such desire to “keep transnational 
commercial disputes out of the national courts, and thereby beyond the reach of local 
laws . . . has become nearly universal”.151 International commercial arbitration is the 
preferred method for realising this desire, and its customary nature not only matches but 
also supports lex mercatoria in arbitration. Merchants are reluctant to have their
145 James E. Meason & Alison G. Smith, ‘Non-Lawyers in International Commercial Arbitration: 
Gathering Splinters on the Bench’ (1991) 12 Northwesten J Int’l L & Bus 27-28.
146 Bernardo M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, op. cit. 331.
147 Nicholas Katzenbach, ‘Business Executives and Lawyers in International Trade’ in International 
Chamber of Commerce (ed), International Arbitration, 60 Years o f  ICC Arbitration: A Look at the Future 
(ICC Publishing, Paris 1984) 67, 69.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 Berthold Goldman, Forum Internationale: Lex Mercatoria, op. cit. 8.
151 See Friedrich K. Juenger, ‘The Lex Mercatoria and the Conflict o f Laws’ in Thomas E. Carbonneau 
(ed), Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion o f  the New Law Merchant (Kluwer Law International, 
Yonkers, New York: Juris; Cambridge, MA 1990).
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contracts governed by a particular national law and sometimes authorise arbitrators to 
resolve disputes ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeurs. In the former case, 
arbitrators may depart from a law and decide the case according to equity and good 
sense. In the later case, arbitrators will use their goodwill to engineer an amicable 
settlement. Since arbitration does not derive its authority from the coercive power of 
national governments,152 but from an agreement between two private parties, merchants 
may contract outside of municipal law or a-national private law embodied in lex 
mercatoria and applied in arbitration. 153 Through constant use by the business 
community and a large number of international arbitral institutes such as the ICC Court 
of Arbitration,154 lex mercatoria may grow rapidly due to its strong link with 
international arbitration.155 Both the ICC Rules156 and the UNCITRAL Model Law157 
require that the arbitrator consider the provisions of the contract as well as relevant trade 
usages when rendering an arbitral award and permit at least a reference to lex 
mercatoria}5*
Arbitration is recognised to be one of a few functionally acceptable dispute 
resolution processes available to parties from different jurisdictions who want to depart 
from a national legal system, which may be unfairly biased or conciliatory. The concern 
with the distortion of the arbitral process by national laws may justify the modem trend 
toward “a-national” arbitration. However, the a-national and autonomous legal order of 
lex mercatoria attracts its most resonant criticism.159 It has been argued that “the 
fostering of a lex mercatoria has nothing to do with the harmonisation of trade law. The 
aim of the latter is to minimise the differences between the law of individual nations, so
152 See Carlo Croff, ‘The Applicable Law in an International Commercial Arbitration: Is It Still a Conflict 
of Laws Problem?’ (1982) 16 Int’l Lawyer 613.
153 Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., ‘An Introduction to ICC Arbitration’ (1980) 14 J Int’l L & Econ 382.
154 The ICC is a private institution, founded and financed exclusively by the enterprises that are its 
members and by the users of the services it offers. Its organisation and rules have been designed 
specifically to meet the needs of international arbitration. Arthur Tompkins, ‘A Practical Guide to 
International Commercial Arbitration’ (1991) 47 Newzeland L J 274, 276.
155 See Carlo Croff, ‘The Applicable Law in an International Commercial Arbitration: Is It Still a Conflict 
o f Laws Problem?’ (1982) 16 Int’l Lawyer 634-35.
156 Article 13(5) of the ICC Rules. Note that under the current ICC Rules, the ability to provide for
amiable composition no longer depends on whether the procedural law o f the seat of arbitration would 
permit such use. The 1975 version of the Rules, unchanged in the 1988 version, made this change from 
the 1955 version, which placed an additional condition on the power to act as amiable compositeur 
besides requiring that the parties agree to the use of such power: such use “ [must] not in any way interfere 
with the legal enforcement o f the award”.
157 Article 33(3) o f the UNCITRAL Model Law. Isaak Ismail Dore, Arbitration and Conciliation Under 
the UNCITRAL Rules: A Textual Analysis (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 1986) 65, 209.
158 See ICC Rules Art 13(3); Model Law Art 28(2) and the same wording used in Art 23 o f the
UNCITRAL Rules; see also D ST  v. R 'As al-Khaimah National Oil Co [1987] 3 WLR 1023, CA; see also 
later elaboration in this chapter.
159 Frederick A. Mann, ‘England Rejects “Delocalised” Contracts and Arbitration’ (1984) 33 ICLQ 193; 
Michael Mustill, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria The First 25 years’ (1988) 4 Arb Int’l 86; Frederick A. Mann, 
‘Private Arbitration and Public Policy’ (1985) 4 Civil Justice Quarterly 257, 264.
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as to provide a stable and uniform basis for commerce. To the mercatorist, the laws of 
individual States are irrelevant, save as a quarry from which to draw the raw materials 
for generalised rules”.160 In essence, “a-national” arbitration may be realised through 
non-application of any municipal law, but the application of general principles of 
international business and equity. The exercise of self restraint by governments is 
inspired less by any solicitude for merchant self-regulation than by the practical 
difficulties encountered by governments in attempting to reach agreement on a uniform 
transnational law of trade.161
4.2 Necessity o f A rbitrators ’ Discretion
Arbitrators often regard themselves as morally and legally bound to apply the law 
chosen by the parties, expressly or tacitly. Arbitrators also regard themselves as bound 
by the applicable law contained in arbitration rules such as the ICC Rules or the 
UNCITRAL Rules, to which the parties have subjected their arbitration. Where there is 
no choice of law by the parties, the arbitrators’ task is exceptionally difficult and they 
may simply make awards as they think fair and just. This can be justified by that both 
parties choose justice according to their own standards or the domestic rules of conflicts 
of law, and the parties choose arbitrators to make a decision. It is not surprising to see 
that a different approach, which enjoys a strong support of some commentators, is to 
eschew national laws altogether, and apply what is often described as lex mercatoria. 
Whether this is a viable approach, and whether it should be adopted if the parties in 
their contract or arbitration agreement have not sanctioned it, is a matter of practice and 
controversy.162
4.3 Recognition o f Lex Mercatoria in Major Jurisdictions
No national courts directly applied lex mercatoria in cases as lex mercatoria is not a 
national law. The enforceability of arbitral awards rendered on the basis of lex 
mercatoria depends entirely upon the national system where enforcement is sought and 
is now almost uniformly accepted.163 Historically, the most revealing difference among 
England, France and the United States in terms of arbitration policy is the view towards 
the purpose of the arbitral process: is arbitration viewed as a strict substitute for 
adjudication or as a method of reaching settlement between the parties? The judicial
160 Michael Mustill, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria The First 25 years’ (1988) 4 Arb Int’l 86, 88.
161 Mark A. Buchanan, ‘Public Policy and International Commercial Arbitration’ (1988) 26 Am Bus L J 
511-12.
162 Francis A. Mann, ‘Lex Facit Arbitrum ' (1986) 2 Arb Int’l 244; Michael Mustill (1984) 37 CLP 150.
163 David W. Rivkin, ‘Enforceability o f Arbitral Awards based on Lex Mercatoria’ (1993) 9 Arb Int’I 74.
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attitude towards the role of arbitration partly reflects the level of recognition of lex 
mercatoria in the legal system.
4.3.1 England and other Common Law Jurisdictions
English courts have traditionally been unreceptive to the application of lex mercatoria 
in arbitration. Commercial disputes were once solved only according to common law 
and law merchant was simply regarded as commercial customs and practices that were 
questions of law to be decided by courts164 in each case “to the satisfaction of twelve 
reasonable and ignorant jurors”.165 It was the position of English law prior to 1979 that 
arbitrators must apply English law,166 and the courts consistently rejected the validity of 
clauses calling for a non-state legal standard on the ground that “arbitrators in general 
are bound to apply a fixed and recognisable system of law”.167 The clear proposition
1 iTO
was that lex mercatoria is not a law at all. It was argued that an arbitrator who 
intentionally applies rules other than English law exceeds his jurisdiction and that his 
award should be set aside or remitted for misconduct by arbitrators as manifest 
disregard of choice of law by the parties,169 under the court’s powers to supervise 
arbitration. This proposition rests on two grounds: (i) the long-standing belief in 
extensive judicial supervision of and interference in arbitral matters; and (ii) the 
suspicion of the legitimacy, credibility and predictability of awards based on non-legal 
criteria. The judicial attitude since the passage of 1979 Arbitration Act has inclined 
towards non-intervention,170 and pointed the way towards favouring, if not encouraging 
enforceability of an award on the basis of a chosen extra-legal criterion.171 In the case of 
non-domestic arbitration without a substantial connection with England, the courts
164 Pillans v. Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (KB 1765); Orion Compania Espanola de Seguros 
v. Belfort Maatschappij von Algemene Verzekgringeen, [1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 251 (Q.B. Com. Ct.)
165 Theodore Frank Thomas Plucknett, Concise History o f  the Common Law (5th edn Lawbook Exchange 
Ltd 2001) 660 and C.H.S. Fifoot, English Law and Its Background (G. Bell and Sons, London 1932) 105.
166 Lawrence Collins, et al. (eds), Dicey & Morris on The Conflict o f  Laws (12th edn Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 1993) 543 (stating that an English arbitrator cannot apply any substantive law other than that o f a 
fixed and recognisable system. In the 19th century the most important parts of the commercial law 
contained in common law cases were embodied in various statutes such as Bills o f Exchange Act 1882 
and Sales of Goods Act 1893.)
167 Maritime Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Assecuranz-Union Von 1865, [1935] 52 Ll.L.R . 16.; Orion v. Belfort, 
[1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 251 (Q.B. Com. Ct.); and Czarnikow v. Roth, Schmidt & Co. [1922] 2 K,B. 478 
and (1922) Ll.L.R. 195.
168 See Michael J. Mustill and Steward C. Boyd, Law and Practice o f  Commercial Arbitration in England 
(2nd edn Butterworths, London 1989) 80-82.
169 Ibid, 497-9.
170 Pioneer Shipping v BTP Tioxide Ltd.: The Nema [1982] A.C. 724 (H.L.)
171 Julian D.M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration (Oceana, Dobbs Ferry, 
New York 1978) 123.
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1 79generally would not interfere with the arbitrator’s failure to apply English law, or 
foreign law.173 Nevertheless, the English court may take an incongruous approach in 
cases with the English connection whereby the resort to lex mercatoria may not be well 
recognised. Public policy may preclude the validity of an arbitration agreement that 
allows the arbitral tribunal to determine the merits of the dispute by recourse to 
considerations that are purely equitable, or standards that are recognised and followed 
within the industry itself.174 The policy distinction may be made between the cases 
precluding English and foreign laws respectively.
The judiciary in England used to view lex mercatoria and amiable composition 
with great skepticism. An equity clause may be a good substitute. However, it has been 
said that such a clause would imply that there was no contract at all “because the parties 
did not intend the contract to have legal effect”.175 Indeed, in England, equity is a 
“system of rules and remedies which form part of the law and do not in any way lie 
outside it”. 176 The judicial attitude towards lex mercatoria has changed over time. In the 
Court of Appeal’s Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. v Yuval Insurance Co. Ltd, an 
arbitration clause provided that the arbitrators “should not be bound by the strict rules of 
law b u t... settle any difference referred to them according to an equitable rather than a 
strictly legal interpretation of the provisions of this contract”.177 The Court of Appeal 
however rejected the established view that an equity clause makes the contract no 
contract.178 Rather, the Court held that the clause was valid, having the effect of “not 
ousting the jurisdiction of the courts” 179 but ousting “technicalities and strict 
constructions”, 180 and enabling arbitrators “to view the matter more leniently and 
having regard more generally to commercial considerations than would be done if the 
matter were heard in Court”.181
172 Michael J. Mustill and Steward C. Boyd, Law and Practice o f  Commercial Arbitration in England, op. 
cit. 603-4.
173 E.g., in the case of Deutsche Schachtbau und Tielfbohrgesellschaft mbh v. the R ’as A l Khaimah 
National Oil Company, the English Court o f Appeal has seen that there is no policy reason for refusing to 
enforce in England an award determined in Switzerland in accordance with Article 13(3) o f the ICC 
Rules, i.e., whereby the tribunal applied “internationally accepted principles o f law governing contractual 
relations” . [1987] 2 AER 769.
174 Home and Overseas Insurance Co Ltd. v. Mentor Insurance Co (UK) Ltd  (in liq) [1989] 3 All ER 74.
175 Orion Compania Espanola de Seguros v. Belfort Maatschappij Voor Algemene Verzekgringeen [1962] 
2 Lloyd’s List. L. Rep. 257.
176 Michael Kerr, ‘“Equity” Arbitration in England’ (1991) 2 Am Rev Int’l Arb n 295.
177 [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 357.
178 Orion Compania Espanola de Seguros v. Belfort Maatschappij Voor Algemene Verzekgringeen [1962] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep 257.
179 [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 357.
180 Lord Denning, M.R. [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 362.
181 Carlo Croff, ‘The Applicable Law in an International Commercial Arbitration: Is It Still a Conflict of 
Laws Problem?’ (1982) 16 Int’l Lawyer 363.
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In Rakoil case,182 the Court of Appeal in England was concerned with the 
enforcement of an arbitral award made in Switzerland concerning a contact with an ICC 
arbitration clause, which provides that in the absence of the choice of law by the parties, 
the arbitrator shall apply the law designated by the rule of conflict. The arbitrators held 
the proper law of the contract to be the “internationally accepted principles of law 
governing the contractual relations”. The respondents contended that it would be 
contrary to English public policy to enforce an award in which rights and obligations 
are determined otherwise than on the basis of the particular national law. The effect of 
the judgment of John Donaldson MR was however to recognise “a clause which 
purports to provide that the rights of the parties shall be governed by some system of 
‘law’ which is not that of England or any other state or is a serious modification of such 
a law”, so long as the parties intended to create legally enforceable rights and duties and 
the agreement is not too uncertain. The court held that there was no national public 
policy objection to the enforcement in England of an arbitral award according to lex 
mercatoria. English arbitration law apparently is finally moving in the direction of
to i
countries such as France and the United States in accepting equity-type clauses. The 
greater freedom, and emphasis placed upon the broadest possible understanding of the 
scope of “party autonomy” can be found in the English Arbitration Act 1996, which 
now clearly permits arbitrating parties to choose lex mercatoria as their governing law 
or to invest their tribunal with the power to act as amiable compsitors.m
English law is widely used as the governing law in international arbitration. Its 
common law tradition is found in a large number of jurisdictions including Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Hong Kong. However, common law systems do 
not guarantee a common approach because the common law system has increasingly 
begun to diverge from one another. For instance, the law on equitable compensation is
1 Off
tending in different directions in Canada, Australia and England. Australia may be 
more liberal to the application of lex mercatoria. The New South Wales Commercial 
Arbitration Act explicitly allows “determination to be made according to law or as 
amiable compositeur or ex aequo at bono;” and “if the parties to an arbitration 
agreement so agree in writing, the arbitrator or umpire may determine any question that 
arises for determination in the course of proceedings under the agreement by reference
182 [1987] 2 All ER 769 (C.A.); [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 246 (Eng. C.A.).
183 Michael Kerr, op. cit. 396.
184 Section 46 of the English Arbitration Act 1996.
185 Martin Odams De Zylva and Reziya Harrison (eds), International Commercial Arbitration - 
Developing Rules fo r  the New Millennium  (Jordans, Bristol 2000) xxxii.
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to considerations of general justice and fairness”.186 More importantly, English law is a 
national legal system and is unlikely to be distilled by different national cultures. The 
purpose of English judges’ developing, for example, contract law principles, was to 
make the principles of law similar to those of the other nations that England traded 
with.187 Much of English law remains precedent-based but, as the number of precedents 
has increased enormously with the natural progression of the years, the principles have 
become obscured.188 Then the question of whether English law in its current state is 
really apt for international arbitration, whether it provides sufficient easily graspable 
international commercial principles, becomes a real one.
4.3.2 France and other European Continental Countries
In continental Europe, the appearance of national legislation in the age of mercantilism
1RQled to the decline of the custom-based merchant law and its universality. France had a 
reputation of being a jurisdiction in which international arbitration was relatively free 
from judicial interference.190 With the enactment of the Decree of 12 May 1981,191 the 
French acknowledgment of, and even deference to, the ability to decide arbitration by
109reference to lex mercatoria or as amiable composition became clear. The Decree 
permits “almost unlimited freedom” in the choice of law to be applied in international 
commercial arbitration by providing that “the arbitrator shall decide the dispute in 
conformity with the rules of law chosen by the parties; in the absence of a party choice, 
he shall decide according to the rules that he deems appropriate”.193 In this respect, the 
French Code “appears to go farther than any other document on international 
commercial arbitration” by allowing the use of lex mercatoria when expressly chosen 
by the parties.194 The Decree of 1981 also set out very limited grounds for judicial
186 Sections 22 of the New South Wales Commercial Arbitration Act.
187 Best J in Cox v. Troy (1822) 5 B & Aid. 474; 106 ER 1264: ‘This is a question of the law merchant, 
and it is desirable, that that law should be the same in this as in every other commercial country’.
188 Steyn LJ in the Court o f Appeal in England complained of the inadequacy o f the practice on the part of 
counsel o f simply reading large numbers of cases to the court rather than elucidating for the court the 
‘argument’ that lay behind the cases. White v. Jones [1995] 2 AC 207, CA at 235.
189 E. V. Caemmerer, ‘The Influence of the Law of International Trade on the Development and Character 
o f the Commercial Law in the Civil Law Countries’ in Clive M. Schmitthoff (ed), The Sources o f  
International trade London (1964) 90.
190 Gerald Pointon & David Brown, ‘France: Resolving Disputes’ (Supp. Sept. 1991) Euromoney 13.
191 Decree of May 12, 1981, 1 J.O. 1492, translated in 2 0 1.L.M. 878, 917 (1981).
192 Under Articles 12 and 58 of the Nouveau code de procedure civile, even a judge can be given the 
power to decide as an amiable compositeur.
193 Ibid.
194 Other provisions in the French Code allow for amiable composition as long as the parties choose it. 
See French Code Art. 1474 (“The arbitrator decides the dispute according to the rules of law, unless in the 
Terms of Reference, the parties give the arbitrator permission to act as amiable compositeur”.); Art. 1483 
(“The judge may act as amiable compositeur if  the arbitrator was given such permission”.); Art. 1497
186
intervention by setting aside arbitral awards. In domestic arbitrations expressly 
established under the powers of amiable composition, Article 42 of the Decree provides 
that, except in certain specific instances, the arbitral award is not subject to appeal 
unless the parties agree otherwise.195
Several cases such as the Norsolor case demonstrate the judicial acceptance of 
lex mercatoria. In 1982, an arbitral tribunal established under ICC Rules rendered an 
award based upon lex mercatoria, where the parties, a French company, Norsolor, and 
its Turkish agent, Pabalk, had not chosen any specific national law and nor had they 
granted the power to arbitrate under amiable composition}96 Without a clearly specified 
national law, the arbitrators considered that, given the international character of the
107contract, it was appropriate to avoid any national law, but to apply lex mercatoria. 
The arbitrators also stated that principles on which lex is based are good faith and fair 
dealing, which exist in the formation and performance of contracts and implies trade 
usage and a moral rule of behaviour. The proceeding for enforcement was commenced 
in France brought by Pabalk whilst Norsolor, the loser, simultaneously brought 
proceedings in Vienna (where arbitration took place) for annulment of the award. One 
complaint made was that the arbitral award had been decided on equitable grounds in 
excess of the arbitrators’ jurisdictional mandate. However, the Paris Tribunal de Grande 
Instance in the enforcement proceeding held that the award did not offend any 
“mandatory norms” of the forum in applying lex mercatoria. The court also found that 
arbitrators, in selecting lex mercatoria, had acted within the scope of their mandate 
under Article 13 of the ICC Rules and therefore did not wrongly act as amiable 
compositeurs without party authority. The French Cour de Cassation also upheld
1QRenforcement upon failing to find a violation of public policy. The enforcement 
proceeding succeeded.
Norsolor challenged the award in Austria where the award had been rendered, 
arguing that the arbitral tribunal had based its decision on lex mercatoria whereas “there
(“The arbitrator may act as amiable compositeur if  the Terms o f Reference give the arbitrator such 
permission”.)
95 Those instances are: absence or invalidity of an arbitration agreement; excess of jurisdictional 
authority; lack of due process; improperly appointed tribunal; non-compliance with form requirements; or 
violation o f domestic public policy. Steven J. Stein & Daniel R. Wotman, ‘International Commercial 
Arbitration in the 1980s: A Comparison o f the Major Arbitral Systems and Rules’ (1983) 38 Bus Law 
1685.
196 Pabalk Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Turkey) v. Norsolor S.A. (France), award 26 October 1979, reprinted 
in (1984) IX Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 109.
197 Judgment of Oct. 9, 1984 (Pabalk Ticaret v. Norsolor), Cass., Pourvoi N# 83-11.355 (Fr.), reprinted in 
Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Introductory Note: France: Court o f Cassation Decision in Pabalk Ticaret v. 
Norsolor (Enforcement of Arbitral Awards; Lex Mercatoria) (October 9, 1984)’ (1985) 24(1-3) 
International Legal Materials 360-64.
198 Ibid.
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exists no lex mercatoria equivalent to a legal system, and one may refer to general 
principles of commerce and of good faith only if the specific rules of the law..., which 
take precedence over general rules ...”.199 The Commercial Court of Vienna dismissed 
this claim and declared that “... the principles of good faith and loyalty, applied by the 
arbitral tribunal in conformity with lex mercatoria, .  . . constitutes a general principle of 
law”.200 On appeal, the Viennese Court of Appeal criticised the tribunal’s reference to 
lex mercatoria as violating ICC Rule 13(3). Lex mercatoria, as the Court asserted, was 
of global uncertainty and had no connection to any national legal order.201 The Austrian 
Supreme Court found the tribunal’s application of lex mercatoria justified and reversed 
the Court of Appeal. The Court confirmed that the application of equity by the arbitral 
tribunal without special authorisation from the parties does not involve a transgression 
of its competence.202 In the Court’s viewpoint, the arbitrators had applied private law 
principles which did not violate mandatory provisions of either French or Turkish law 
and the award was thus enforceable 203 The claim for setting aside the award failed.
At the very least, the courts in both France and Austria recognised the status of 
lex mercatoria as valid and enforceable body of law and were satisfied that arbitrators 
had validly rendered the award in accordance with general principles of law in 
international trade. While the French court accepted lex mercatoria as a genuine system 
of law, the Austrian Supreme Court did not share the same view even though it did 
uphold the validity of the award. In effect, the Austrian litigation was not an 
endorsement of lex mercatoria so much as the recognition of a court’s limited power 
where a tribunal’s reasoning was under attack.204 By contrast, the French Cour de 
Cassation did lend support to the mercatorists but only to the extent that the court did
90Snot repudiate the notion of lex mercatoria.
199 Societe Norsolor v. Societe Pabalk Ticaret Ltd. Sirketi, 108 J.D.I. 836, 839 (Trib. Gr. Inst. 1981) (Fr.).
200 1 983 Revue de L’Arbitrage Rev. Arb. 513, 515-16 (Handelsgericht HG Wien 1981) (Aus.).
201 1984 Rev Arb 513 discussed in Berthold Goldman, ‘The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law -  
The Lex M ercatoria’ in Julian D.M. Lew (ed), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration 
(Longman 1988) 124.
202 Norsolor v. Pabalk Ticaret Ltd. Sirketi, (1983) Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 362 (Cour d’Appel 
Paris 1981); Norsolor v. Pabalk Ticaret Ltd., (1984) Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 154 (Oberster 
Gerichtshof OGH 1982) (Aus.) 160. “It should be stressed that the basic issues before the Court were 
whether a decision based on bona fides considerations (Grundsatz von Treu und Glauben) and equity 
(Billigkeit)” exceeded the arbitrators’ powers under Austrian law. Id. at 163 note W. Melis. “Although it 
would have been desirable for the Supreme Court to have taken a stand on the legal qualification of the 
lex mercatoria, this was not necessary under the circumstances”.
203 1 983 Recht der Intemationalen Wirtschaft 29, 868 (Supreme Court o f Austria, decision of 18 
November 1982); excerpts printed in (1984) IX Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 159; Ole Lando, ‘The 
Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1985) 34 Int’l & Comp L Q 757.
204 Michael Mustill, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria The First 25 years’ (1988) 4 Arb Int’l 106.
205 Ibid. 107.
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The French courts again upheld the validity of the arbitrator’s choice of a- 
national law in Fougerolle case. The dispute related to an agency agreement between 
Fougerolle, as an intermediary assigned to negotiate a contract, and Banque, which 
however terminated the agency.206 The arbitrators in the ICC arbitration, in the absence 
of a clear mandate to act as amiables compositeurs, rendered an award on the basis of 
“general principles of obligations generally applicable in international trade”. The 
respondent first contested the award before the Court of First Instance claiming that the 
tribunal had wrongly decided as amiables compsiteurs, and the award had exceeded the 
scope of submission and was thus invalid. This claim was rejected. Rather, the court 
found the arbitrators had implicitly referred to usages of international trade “evidently in 
force” and had thus based the award on a rule of law, acting within the scope of 
submission.207 Eventually, both the Court of Appeal and the Cour de Cassation upheld 
the award. The Cour de Cassation even expressly stated that the general principles of 
international commerce form a part of law, and that the arbitrators had duly fulfilled
90Stheir duties under the Terms of Reference to define the applicable law, and lex 
mercatoria was a valid source of law in international trade.
A case decided in 1989 by the Paris Cour d’Appel also upheld the application of 
lex mercatoria, where the parties could not agree which national law was applicable but 
did not expressly authorise the use of lex mercatoria. The parties had, however, agreed 
to arbitration under ICC Rules which do permit the use of lex mercatoria. The Cour 
d’Appel held that the arbitrator, who had applied “general principles of the conflicts of 
laws” and lex mercatoria, had properly fulfilled the terms of reference.209
The French law encompasses a doctrine that every contract is subject to a 
national law although an international contract can be subject to commercial usages. 
Some French scholars define lex mercatoria as a term containing a collection of 
practices and usages which are a spontaneous non-law system relevant to the object of
910the law. The judicial definition refers lex mercatoria to “the body of international 
commercial rules consecrated by practice and approved by national courts”.211 In 
practice, the arbitrator must comply with “fundamental notions of procedural fairness”,
206 Fougerolle (France) v. Banque de Proche Orient (Lebanon) 1982 Rev. Arb. 183; 1982 J. Droit Int’l. 
(Clunet) 931 (Cour de Cassation, 9 December 1981).
207 1 09 J. Droit Int’l (Clunet) 231 (1982) (decision of June 12, 1980).
208 [1982] Rev. Arb. 1983; 109 J. Droit Int’l (Clunet) 931 (1982) (decision of December 9, 1981).
209 Gerald Pointon and David Brown, ‘France: Resolving Disputes’ (Supp. Sept. 1991) 13 Euromoney 70.
210 Kahn (198) Journal du Droit International 836. Also Philippe Kahn ‘La Lex Mercatoria: point de vue 
francais apres quarante ans de controverses’ (1992) 37 McGill L J 413-427.
2,1 Jean-Pierre Ancel, ‘French Judicial Attitudes Toward International Arbitration’ (1993) 9(2) Arbitration 
International 128.
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must not violate public policy in the terms of the award, and must give reasons for the 
award, the court “will use its power” to lay down modifications ... “in a very sparing 
fashion”.212 In theory, the French courts can accord great deference to the arbitral 
tribunal.
The judicial practice in France seems to spread to other European jurisdictions. 
For instance, as far as the Austrian courts are concerned, a more specific endorsement of 
lex mercatoria was given by the Commercial Court, which, although referred to in a 
derogatory by the Vienna Court of Appeal, was not specifically condemned by the 
Austrian Supreme Court. There has also been a significant decision approving the
m i
concept of the lex mercatoria in Italy. The Supreme Court of Italy has expressly 
recognised law merchant: “the law in which such arbitration operates is transnational 
being independent of the laws of the individual states. Since “mercantile” law comes 
into existence through adhesion of merchants to the values of their milieu, merchants 
comply with those values, because of necessity, [and] that merchants [do not] belong to 
a state. . . lex mercatoria exists”. Accordingly “mercantile” law comes into existence 
when binding values are recognised and complied with, and merchants coordinate their 
conduct on the ground of common rules.214 It appears that the European courts have 
been moving cautiously towards approving certain rules beyond the purely national 
commercial laws. To a certain extent, lex mercatoria is distinct from any national 
system of law but is emerging.
4.3.3 The United States
Lex mercatoria is not explicitly recognised in American statutes or case law, nor in the 
arbitration rules of American Arbitration Association (AAA). Nevertheless, it is used in 
practice perhaps even more frequently by US arbitrators than French arbitrators. This 
is partly because US arbitrators “do not think of themselves as doing anything special in 
so acting”.216 In the US, equity is an integral part of “the law”. Thus, every arbitrator 
ought to make equitable considerations part of the body of law on which decisions are 
based, even without express authorisation by the parties in arbitration.
212 W. Laurence Craig, William W. Park and Jan Paulsson, International Chamber o f  Commerce 
Arbitration, op. cit. 314.
213 Dennis Thompson, ‘Court Decision: Soc. Pabalk Ticaret Ltd Sirketi v. Soc. anon. Norsolor’ (1985) 2(2) 
J Int’l Arb 67-76.
214 Thomas E. Carbonneau and Marc. S. Firestone, ‘Transnational Law-Making: Assessing the Impact of 
the Vienna Convention and the Viability of Arbitral Adjudication’ op. cit. 56-57 (quoting Damiano v. 
Topfer, 105 Foro It. I 2285, 2288) (Cass. 1982) (Italy)).
215 W. Laurence Craig, William W. Park and Jan Paulsson, International Chamber o f  Commerce 
Arbitration 310 n .l, 137.
216 Ibid.
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Although lex mercatoria is essentially foreign to American law, it appears that 
an American court would not likely challenge an agreement to which such a system is 
applied.217 As a matter of fact, in the United States, a powerful and consistent pro­
enforcement bias in both public policy and case law have made state and federal courts 
reluctant to overturn arbitral awards on legal grounds.218 In Scherck v. Alberto-Culver 
Co., the US Supreme Court stated that the purpose of adhering to the New York 
Convention was to encourage recognition and enforcement of arbitral agreements in
1 Q
international contracts and to unify standards of enforcement. In this vein, arbitration 
clauses are liberally construed in favour of enforcement. The leading case in this regard 
is Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., in which the Supreme 
Court concluded that “the international arbitral tribunal owes no prior allegiance to the
0 0  f\ 0 0 1 _legal norms of particular states”. This effectively gives a green light to lex 
mercatoria.
In addition, the defences to enforcement permitted under Article V of the New 
York Convention are narrowly interpreted to be exclusive. According to US law, the 
only grounds to challenge an international arbitral award are the fundamental fairness of 
the proceedings, the arbitrability of the subject matter, and the scope and validity of the 
arbitration agreement.222 Typically, a party may not be allowed to challenge an 
arbitrator’s findings of law or fact; “the interpretation of the law by the arbitrators ... are 
not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation”.223 Thus, 
the US law apparently shelters from judicial review of arbitral awards rendered under 
lex mercatoria, a non-national standard. Indeed, the court in International Standard 
Electric Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial Y Commercial stated 
that the 1958 New York Convention would not allow a court to refuse enforcement of 
the arbitral award due to “manifest disregard of the law”224 even if an arbitrator were to 
act as amiable compositeur without authority. The Court held the view that the 
objective of the New York Convention would be frustrated if judges are permitted to 
make a de novo inquiry into whether the law supposedly applied by the arbitrators was
2,7 Ole Lando, ‘The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1985) 34 Int’l & Comp L 
Q 759.
218 See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 US 427,436-37 (1953).
2,9 417 US 506, 520(1974).
220 4 73 U.S. 614 (1985).
221 Restatement (Third) o f the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, §488 (1987).
222 Gerald Pointon and David Brown, France: Resolving Disputes, (Supp. Sept. 1991) 13 Euromoney.
223 San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A., v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796 (1961), cited 
in Ole Lando, ‘The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1985) 34 Int’l & Comp L Q 
759.
224 See 745 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) and 3 U.S.T. 2517, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. (1968) 1042.
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properly applied.225 In the case of Ministry o f Defence o f the Islamic Republic v. Gould, 
Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court’s 
jurisdiction to enforce, pursuant to the New York Convention, an award for Iran against
996an American corporation, rendered by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. Gould sought an 
interlocutory review by asserting that Article V(l)(e) of the New York Convention 
imply that the Convention applies only to awards rendered under a “national arbitration 
law”. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument on the ground, among others, that the 
discrepancy between Article V(l)(d), which seemed to give primacy to the parties’ 
choice of arbitral law, and Article V(l)(e), which seemed to require the award be made 
under a national arbitration law, led to the conclusion that the only possible intended
997interpretation was for the Convention to apply to national and non-national awards. 
The US case law and pro-enforcement bias appear to secure the likelihood that the 
freedom to apply lex mercatoria, even if not expressly acknowledged as such, is de 
facto recognizable in the US.
5 . R e v iv a l  o f  L e x  M e r c a t o r i a  a n d  I n t e r n a t io n a l  C o m m e r c ia l
A r b it r a t io n
5 .1 Lex Mercatoria and Globalisation: An Evolutionary Perspective
Lex mercatoria must be placed in the historical context of evolving global capitalism.
99RGlobalisation implies the self-deconstruction of the hierarchy of legal norms. The 
evolution of lex mercatoria in the twentieth century is a revival of “medieval 
internationalism”229 and the emergence of “global capital’s own law”230 liberalising the 
state and world order and economy. Alongside the separation of the state and economy 
and the distinctions between politics and economics and the public and private spheres, 
commercial relations re-appear to be privatised, juridified and pluralised through an
225 International Standard, 745 F. Supp. at 182.
226 See Gould Mkting, Inc. v. Ministry o f  Defence o f  the Islamic Republic o f  Iran , 6 Iran-USCTR 272 
(award No. 136-49/50-2 22 June 1984).
227 8 87 F.2d at 1365, referring in support to the Dutch Supreme Court’s decision in SEEE v. Yugoslavia, 
HR (Hoge Raad de Nederlanden) NJ 74, 361 (1974) (holding that no examination of the relationship 
between the award and a national law is warranted until a party pleads and undertakes to prove the 
existence of an Article V impediment to enforcement). Robert P. Lewis, ‘What Goes Around Comes 
Around: Can Iran Enforce Awards of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in the United States?’ (1988) 26 
Colum J Transnational L 515.
228 Gunther Teubner, ‘Breaking Frames -  Economic Globalisation and the Emergence of Lex Mercatoria’ 
(2002) 5(2) European Journal of Social Theory 199-217.
229 Clive M. Schmitthoff, ‘International Business Law: A New Law Merchant’ in Clive M. Schmitthoff, 
Current Law and Social Problems 2 (University of W. Ontario 1961) op. cit. 139-40.
230 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Towards a New Common Sense: Law, Science, and Politics in the 
Paradigmatic Transition (Routledge, London and New York 1995) 288.
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9 “X 1intensification process associated with transnationalised social forces, which in turn
919results in a “transnationalisation of the legal field”.
As discussed in Chapter 2, according to Darwinian theory, speciation occurs 
spontaneously through natural selection in the natural world, which consists of, first, 
mutations and rearrangements of the germ-line that are responsive to external forces of 
change; and second, sorting by the environment of the most adaptive organisms. In the 
legal sense, the environment, or more precisely, social force, is a decisive element in 
determining the survival of individual organisms which are transformed through the 
meme over the time. More specifically, in our topic, the most sensible explanation for 
the rise or decline of lex mercatoria during various historical periods is the 
socioeconomic development and change as the primary driving environmental force.
In terms of the environment, there are crucial distinctions between the 
contemporary and the medieval orders. Conditions are profoundly different in the sense 
that the sheer volume of overseas transactions is different. Of significant importance is 
the difference in the political economies of the two periods. In the medieval trading 
world, merchants engaged in foreign trade and business were autonomous in the 
absence of political authorities that did not desire to or were incapable of disciplining 
their activities. Local political authorities exercised limited control by mainly granting 
trade charters, maintaining safe-conduct of merchants and securing the peace of the 
markets and fairs. The commercial law governing business exchange emerged from the 
customs generated by the merchant community and dispute settlement was a private 
engagement amongst merchants.
In the modem age, the capitalist model of production, market and economic 
exchange has transformed substantially and capital is not constrained by national 
borders,233 both of which contribute to the re-patterning and re-transformation of state- 
society relations like the restructuring process of nation-states right after the medieval 
period. As a result, the current commercial environment is comprised of both private 
and public spheres, which is a unique feature of the modem mercantilism.234 There are 
two limbs. First, the contemporary process of reconfiguration is historically 
unprecedented in the sense that it gradually involves a massive “shake-out” of societies,
231 Robert Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the M aking o f  History (Columbia 
University Press, New York 1987) 357-9.
232 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, op. cit. 276.
233 Stephen Gill and David Law, The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and Policy (John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1988).
234 Philip Cemy, The Changing Architecture o f  Politics: Structure, Agency and the Future o f  the State 
(Sage Publications, London 1990) 23.
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economics and institutions of governance and obscures a clear distinction between 
international and domestic, external and internal affairs. Political authorities make great 
efforts to reconfigure the relationships between politics and economics and between the 
public and private spheres so that the state regulatory authority and sovereign power 
may be partly delegated to or assumed by private groups or institutions or 
intergovernmental institutions. Meanwhile, merchant autonomy operates with a strong 
support of state authorities, and they now have both administrative and legal 
infrastructures to exercise concrete but limited control over business activities, and have 
often adopted, enacted and enforced private commercial regulations. Second, the 
reconstituting and delegation of state power, functions and authority enhances the 
diversity and pluralism of market actors and mercatocracy. National regulatory 
authorities are weakening as decisions or actions over capital resources and commercial 
activities are made increasingly by private commercial actors over the time. 
Furthermore, the state is emerging as a “commodifying agent” in the private sphere and 
is functioning as the market players in an alliance with corporate actors in the broader 
mercatocracy. The alliance of public and private actors favours merchant custom as a 
source of legal norms and private arbitration over adjudication in national courts. The 
diagram below shows how the private-public dimension changes during various periods.
235 Susan Strange, ‘The Defective State’ (1995) 124(2) Daedalus 55-74.
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Diagram 4-1: Public-Private Spheres in Various Periods
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Second, the global mercatocracy, as a transnationalised social force, appears 
with an elite association of public and private organisations engaged in the unification 
and globalisation of transnational merchant law. This elite association is the “organic 
intellectuals” of the transnational capitalist or managerial class,236 which shares the 
same concern to maintain the system that enables the class to remain dominant.237 The 
global capitalist system and global economy transcend nation-states to the extent that 
private rather than national interests prevail across borders. The mercatocracy plays a 
critical role in furthering such major focal goals in globalisation as the formation of a
236 Robert Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the M aking o f  H istory  (Columbia 
University Press, N ew  York 1987) 359.
237 Ibid, 359-60.
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borderless global economy, the denationalisation of substantive and procedural aspects
9 “^ Rof business activities and the eradication of economic nationalism. In this sense, the 
modem mercatocracy is part of the global effort and neoliberal commitment to
9 *10consolidate capitalism and to the further expansion of capital. The transnational 
capitalist class, the contemporary counter part to the nascent merchant class, is the main 
driver of a series of globalising practices in the global economy and is the leading force 
in the emergence of a global capitalist system,240 and, through its material links to 
transnational capital, its monopoly of expert knowledge and its controlling influence in 
the institutional framework of the new lex mercatoria, in exercising near hegemonial 
influence in a material, ideological and institutional way. The influence is an instance of 
“disciplinary neoliberalism” or “new constitutionalism”, which advances a blurring of 
the distinction between public and private spheres. The neoliberalism confers privileged 
rights of citizenship and representation on corporate capital and imposes disciplines on 
public institutions for interference with property rights,241 which constitutes the juridical 
and ideological underpinnings of the contemporary world social, economic and legal 
order. The business class therefore becomes relatively autonomous, operating locally 
and transnationally in a separate regime parallel to the state system.
The third trend of modem capitalism is the emergence of the global civil society 
while the civil society matures and exceeds the territorial confines of the state 
worldwide.242 The civil society is a “civilising process”243 through which independent 
groups of citizens concern about substantive empowerment of citizens, disseminate 
values of mle of law and counter-control abuses of power by the state.244 When this 
civilising process or social movement operates across national boundaries, the civil 
society has a global dimension. The global civil society is a natural consequence of the 
spread of neoliberal ideas and democratisation, the collapse of previously closed 
societies, the dramatic developments in information technologies and the intensifying 
process of global interconnectedness, which is a political, economic and social
238 David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: 
Politics, Economics, and Culture (Polity Press, Cambridge 1999).
239 Stephen Gill, ‘Theorising the Interregnum: The Double Movement and Global Politics in the 1990s’ in 
Bjom Hettne (ed), International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder (Femwood 
Publishing, Halifax 1995) and David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to 
Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford University Press 1995).
240 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from  Prison Notebooks (Lawrence and Wishart, London 1971) 103-4.
241 Stephen Gill, ‘Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism’ (1995) 24(3) 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 399-423.
242 Andrew Arato and Jean L. Cohen, Civil Society and Political Theory (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 
1995); John Keane, Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions (Polity Press, Cambridge 1998).
243 Norbert Elias, The Civilising Process: State Formation and Civilisation (Blackwell, Oxford 1982).
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transnational process. The rising of the global civil society, in substance, reflects the 
demand for a radical extension of personal autonomy and a more advanced level of self­
organisation in increasingly complex and uncertain post-modern societies as well as the 
growth of a variety of actors such as state government authorities, international 
governmental organisations, non-governmental institutions, corporations and 
individuals. As a result, the global civil society becomes a self-ordering regime,245 
which constrains the autonomy and narrows the freedom of the state. Although nation­
states remain the focus of politics, some of the key political and economic decisions are 
now no longer made at the level of the nation-states but taken in international fora, an 
autonomous space with citizens’ groups and market players. The key feature of global 
civil society, the new merchantalism or neoliberalism is that the mercatocracy unites 
private and public authorities, both of which are committed to expanding capitalism, 
disembedding international commerce from national and social controls and then 
reembedding it into the private sphere. The contemporary concept of global civil society 
has ideological, societal and geographical significance. Ideologically, the modem 
capitalist time restored the belief in the self-sufficiency and autonomy of lex mercatoria, 
which are the philosophical and juridical underpinnings of the modem merchant order. 
In a societal sense, the civil society has replaced the state-centred thinking with more 
individual-based empowerment and autonomy. Geographically, the intensifying 
interconnectedness has made the nation-state less important in restructuring social 
relations. Put differently, it is no longer possible to sustain a civil society within the 
territorial confines of the state.246 The institutional foundation of the global civil society 
is global civic networks including new transnational social movements and non­
governmental organisations.
Fourth, although sovereignty is of great ideological and legal significance, it is 
substantially transformed even though the nation-state retains its power in the modem 
era and its role as a primary actor in the world order.247 In the nationalisation period, the 
concept of sovereignty has two distinct dimensions. Internally, sovereignty is “a final 
and absolute authority in the political community”,248 which allows a state government 
to exercise the supreme command over a given society. In an international dimension,
245 Philip Allott, ‘Chapter 16: International Order II: Legal Order’ in Philip Allot, Eunomia, New Order 
fo r  a New World (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004)
246 David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: 
Politics, Economics, and Culture (Polity Press, Cambridge 1999).
247 Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalisation in Question: The International Economy and the 
Possibilities o f  Governance (Polity Press, Cambridge 1996).
248 F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (2nd edn Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1986) 1.
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sovereignty is “the supreme legal authority of the nation to ... enforce the law within a 
certain territory”, 249 which is a key quality reflected in the fact that a state is 
independent in all matters of internal politics from the authority of any other nation 
under international law.250 The scale of economic exchange generates a demand for an 
international regime, a set of formal and informal rules that facilitate cooperation among 
states251 and guarantee the ex ante creditability of commitments. Interactions among 
states are changing the identity and interests of a state in that states are now 
“internalising sovereignty norms” to “rely more upon the institutional fabric of 
international society”. Accordingly, sovereignty today neither remains intact under 
existing forms of complex interdependence nor is it wholly eroded. Instead, sovereignty 
becomes “less a territorially defined barrier” but “a bargaining resource for a politics 
characterised by complex transnational networks”, 253 or “an order of liberal 
international sovereignty, which seeks to limit the nature and scope of state power”.254 
Consequently, given a broader framework of governance in which states are 
increasingly but one site for the exercise of authority, a vacuum is created in the 
international order. This vacuum is likely to be filled by “a multi-centric system of 
diverse types of other collectives”257 and the merchant class is a critical component of
7*0
collectives or cosmopolitanism.
In modem capitalism, it is conceivable that a new mercatocracy emerged in that 
the functions of sovereign states might have eroded and been replaced by a modem and 
secular equivalent of the kind of universal political regime that existed in Western 
Christendom in the Middle Ages.259 The idea of returning to the mediaeval period, more 
precisely, refers to the development of a modem and secular counterpart of the 
mediaeval model which embodies a central characteristic: a system of overlapping
249 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (4th edn Knopf, New York 1967) 305.
250 F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, op. cit.
251 Stephen D. Krasner (ed) International Regimes (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York 1982); 
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International Society’ in Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorensen (eds), Whose World Order? Uneven 
Globalisation and the End o f  the Cold War (Westview Press Inc. 1995).
254 David Held, Law o f  States, Law o f  Peoples, Legal Theory (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2002) 1 -  44.
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256 Susan Strange, The Retreat o f  the State: The Diffusion o f  Power in the World Economy (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1996).
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authority and multiple loyalty.260 It may be envisaged that states would come to share 
the authority with citizens and other authorities to the extent that the state sovereignty 
and supremacy over the territory and people becomes less important and a non-state- 
centred status would prevail over the globe. In substance, the return to the mediaeval 
period is not a repetition of old time but an appearance of a neo-mediaeval form of 
universal political order in the new century. The return to a neo-medieval mercatocracy 
also represents a superior path to the world order since it theoretically avoids a 
structural overlapping of authorities and loyalties in a sovereign state-based universal 
society, and the overt concentration of power in a world government. The neo- 
mercatorist world structure is likely to provide a firm basis for the realisation of 
elementary goals of social and economic life in the trend of globalisation. In any event, 
even a return to the mediaeval time does not guarantee a pure repetition of previous 
historical experiences because any future form of society will have certain features that 
are unique to the future society and does not resemble an old systemic form. The table 
below outlines major social, economic and legal features during different periods, and 
demonstrates some features in the current world which resemble those in the medieval 
period and support a revival of lex mercatoria or appearance of new mercatoriasm.
Table 4-2: Major Social, Economic and Legal Features in Various Periods
' v \ P e r i o d s
I n d i c a t o r ^ ^
Medieval Period 16th -  19th C enturies 20th -  21st Centuries
Com m erce / 
Economy
• Expansion of 
commerce
• Growth of trading 
community
• Rise of capitalism
• Expansion of national 
economy
• National capital 
accumulation
•  Expansion of cross­
boarder transactions
•  Market-dominated
•  Modem capitalism
•  Privatisation
M erchant
Class
• Merchant class
• Separate from the 
feudal political 
economy
• Self-regulatory 
autonomy
• Lost independence
• Subject to state 
intervention
• Target for 
nationalisation
•  Appearance of global 
mercatocracy
• Rise of global 
capitalist class
•  Dominance of 
multinational 
corporations
State-hood • City-states •  Nation-states
•  State-building
• Political unification
• Colonisation
•  Modem states
Public/Private
Dimension
• Merchantalism
• Dominance of 
private sphere
• Nationalisation
• State intervention
• Dominance of public 
sphere
•  Globalisation
• Re-patterning of state- 
society relations
•  Mix of public/private 
spheres
260 Ibid.
199
^ \ P e r i o d s  
Indicator 'sv ^
M edieval Period 16th -  19th C enturies 20th -  21st Centuries
Key “A ctor” •  Merchant class •  Nation-states • Pluralism of “actors”
• Proliferation of 
public/private 
agencies
A uthority •  Merchant autonomy • Territorial sovereignty • Pluralisation of 
authority including 
sovereignty
• Sharing o f sovereignty 
by other “actors”
•  Rising of Business 
autonomy
• State is experiencing a 
loss of control
Social O rder • Autonomous
• Informal
• Privatised
• Customary
• State-centred
• Formal
•  Publicalised
• Mandatory
•  Rational and 
systematic
•  Mixture of 
autonomous and 
nationalised natures
Legalisation 
of Business
•  Juridification
• Unification
• Nationalisation
• Rationalisation
•  Codification
•  Fragmentation of lex 
mercatoria
• Pluralisation
• Harmonisation
Law
M erchant
•  Uniformity achieved 
through the 
universality o f 
merchant customs
• Unifying influence 
of norms and 
procedures
•  Merchant courts
•  Nationalisation of 
regulation of business
•  Dominance of national 
courts and 
domestic/municipal 
laws
• Incorporation of 
customs into domestic 
laws
• Proliferation of legal 
sources
• Modem lex 
mercatoria
• Private regulation
• “soft” law
Sources of
In ternational
Law
• Trade usages and 
merchant customs
• Classic international 
law
• “hard” law
• International 
conventions
• Regional conventions
• “soft” law such as 
model law
Legal System •  Law as autopoietic 
system261
• Law as discipline • “Law as game”263
T rend •  Law merchant is a 
central and 
spontaneous 
mechanism
•  Self-forcing /
•  Being localizaed and 
territorialised
• Statutory and binding
• Being delocalised and 
deterritorialised
• Increasing soft, 
voluntary, informal 
and discretionary
261 Niklas Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp (1993) cited in Gunther Teubner, 
‘Breaking Frames: Economic Globalisation and the Emergence of Lex M ercatoria' (2002) 5(2) European 
Journal o f Social Theory 203.
262 Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir: la naissance de la prison (Gallimard Paris 1975), Ibid.
263 This is a term created by Gunther Teubner to summarise the key feature of various legal philosophies. 
Ibid 203. This term is used here to describe the complexity o f current status of law.
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^ v ^ P e r io d s
I n d i c a t o r ' ' ^
M edieval Period 16th -  19th C enturies 20th -  21st Centuries
voluntary 
• Autonomous
regulations of legal 
relations 
•  Apolitical
Ideological
Foundation
•  Mercatorism • Positivism • Disciplinary 
neoliberalism
• Global capitalism
Along with the foregoing social forces, there is also a unification or harmonisation 
movement seeking to recreate the medieval tradition of jus commune which disappeared 
in the nationalisation period. The modem unification movement is an integral aspect of 
the juridification of commerce although contemporary juridification, as a variation to 
the meme, differs from an earlier version which occurred through the processes of state- 
building and national capital accumulation, and is intensified through delocalising and 
transnationalising legal disciplines that both reflect and facilitate the expansion of 
capitalism and related commercial practices. The modem unification movement is 
engaged more in harmonising, unifying and, more fundamentally, globalising merchant 
law as a result of the proliferation of national differences in the period of nationalisation, 
the decline of state sovereignty and competition derived from universal imperatives of 
deregulation, privatisation and the restrictions of public intervention in economic
264processes.
5.2 Unification o f Commercial Law and Rise o f “Soft Lawn
The modem unification process is to facilitate exchange and transnational mobility of
9 AScapital by reducing national and territorial legal barriers to exchange through 
delocalised laws, procedures and dispute settlement mechanisms. In essence, legal 
unification, again, is a global restructuring or re-patterning process. 266 The 
transnationalised business blurs the boundary between public and private domains by 
narrowing the jurisdiction and powers of the public sphere and broadening those of the 
private sphere, and that has important implications for understanding the relationship 
between lex mercatoria and world order. As a result, the modem unification movement 
becomes a cooperative strategy for managing conflicting nationally-based commercial 
laws and is a changing process shifting the structural power from nationally to
264 Robert Cox, ‘Critical Political Economy’ in Bjom Hettne (ed), International Political Economy: 
Understanding Global Disorder (Femwood Publishing, Halifax 1995) 31-45.
265 William Robinson, ‘Beyond the Nation-State Paradigms: Globalisation, Sociology, and the Challenge 
of Transnational Studies’ (1998) 13(4) Sociological Forum 561-94.
266 Roland Robertson, Globalisation: Social Theory and Global Culture (Sage, London and Thousand 
Oasks, CA 1992) 53.
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transnationally-based interests.267 This structural shift is evident in increased pluralism 
in the subjects of law, with private business associations and transnational corporations 
as de facto legal “subjects” and with a host of other identities aspiring to status as 
“subjects” of law. This structural shift is also manifested in the growing pluralism of 
sources of law, evident in the growing preference for non-binding “soft law” over 
binding “hard law”, and a renewed emphasis on merchant custom as a source of law. 
Given the devolution of the public authority in creating and enforcing commercial 
norms, merchant autonomy in the private sphere promotes merchant norms to be 
operative substantive rules. Parallel to the revival of substantive but “soft” law which 
only provides normative guidance, private arbitration offers a private infrastructure for 
enforcement of commercial norms so as to avoid excessive interference from national 
courts. The practical aspects of such structural shift form the essential components of 
neoliberal restructuring of the state and society, which are consistent with globalised 
tendencies.
As a critical part of the unification movement, many of the values embodied in 
the medieval law merchant re-gain their significance in transnational businesses. These 
values include substantive norms upholding party autonomy in creating contractual 
relationships, the self-disciplining and self-regulating abilities and capacities of 
merchants,268 and procedural norms in support of private dispute settlement, speed and 
informality. The renewed values include variations of medieval values and have adopted 
the primacy of liberal capitalist values. Regardless of the current environmental 
differential to the medieval age, the code of meme remains unchanged and the 
fundamental value and operative principle of new lex mercatoria is merchant autonomy. 
According to the “new political economy” and utilitarianism, freedom to transact is an 
indispensable component in the evolution of international business.269 On the basis of 
the merchant autonomy, commercial conventions or merchant customs delineate and 
codify permissive and facultative commercial practices of merchants’ business habits. 
The functioning of the merchant autonomy still relies upon the self-regulating ability of 
merchants to manage their own affairs, and, more importantly, a delegation by the state
770to private parties to maximise the freedom of contracting.
267 Philip Cemy, ‘Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalisation’ (1997) 
32(2) Government and Operation 251-74 and Stephen Gill, ‘New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and 
the Global Political Economy’ (1998) 10(1) Pacifica Rev 23-38.
268 Bruce Benson, op. cit. 644-61.
269 Leon E. Trakman, The Law Merchant: The Evolution o f  Commercial Law (Fred B. Rothman, Littleton, 
Colorado 1983) 97.
270 Bemado M. Cremades and Steven L. Plehn, op. cit. 328.
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The merchant community has redeveloped its own laws and adjudicatory 
institutions. Recognising that the expansion of international commerce and trade and 
growing economic interdependence demand the privatisation of commercial regulations 
and rules, merchants and lawyers are working together to re-establish an autonomous 
transnational regime of private customary law.271 Their efforts have enabled lex 
mercatoria to undergo a tremendous revival in the past several decades. For instance, 
the nineteenth century codification of sales law in England did not spell out the 
principles of fair dealing for sales contracts, but translated the effect of the fair dealing 
principle into standard implied terms for the sale of goods. Fair dealing terms of a more 
global nature are now experiencing a revival.272 Another example is the principle of 
“good faith”, signifying the ancient origin of fair dealing principle, which however is
77 ^still regarded as “foreign” by the majority of English lawyers. Continental lawyers 
are already looking into various ways in which English and European systems may be 
harmonised.274 This old principle has never been abolished and even today remains 
underpinned by the force of a number of primary legislatures 275 The US UCC provides 
for good faith in commercial contracts, but stipulates that: “good faith in the case of 
merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards 
of fair dealing in the trade”.276
Lex mercatoria does not only refer to a general practice but also local or regional 
customs, which can be found in the practice of global, regional or even local business 
communities or groupings. Most rules of lex mercatoria are only conventional or 
contractual in their origins but may have passed into the general corpus of international 
commercial law or customary law. These rules are now accepted as such by the opinio 
juris so as to have become binding even for those which may have never accepted
777them. Local customs may supplement or derogate from general customary rules, 
which can be described as a constant and uniform usage accepted as rules. A customary 
system of law, regardless of a rarity of new universal customary law, can never be 
adequate to satisfy the needs of any modem but a primitive society. However, in order
271 Thomas E. Carbonneau and Marc. S. Firestone, ‘Transnational Law-Making: Assessing the Impact of 
the Vienna Convention and the Viability of Arbitral Adjudication’ op. cit. 62.
272 European Council Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 1993 OJ L 95/25.
273 It is still be fair to say that many English lawyers remain sceptical about the existence of an English 
law of good faith. Reziya Harrison, Good Faith in Sales (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1997); and Roger 
Brownsword, et al. (eds), Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context (Ashgate, Dartmouth 1999).
274 C.E.C. Jansen, Towards a European Building Contract Law (Kluwer, Deventer 1998).
275 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the US UCC.
276 UCC Article 2-103(l)(b).
277 Hersch Lauterpacht defined opinio necessitates juris  as all uniform conduct o f state governments. See 
Hersh Lauterpacht, The Development o f  International Law by the International Court (Frederick A. 
Prager, New York 1958) 380.
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to deal with frequent clashes, lex mercatoria, an advanced level of customary system of 
law, should be recognised to reflect the modem needs of globalisation. Lex mercatoria 
will never play a really effective part in a “global” world until it has a source of “law”. 
A very critical trend in the modem world is the increasing reliance upon “soft law” 
which is not directly enforceable in domestic courts or international tribunals. In 
contrast with “hard law” such as conventions and customary international law which are 
usually enacted by international organisations and have binding legal effect, “soft law” 
is composed of non-binding, informal and discretionary standards. “Soft law” is not 
“weak law”279 as it binds market players on a voluntary basis. Recent examples include 
the Equator Principles, which were put together by leading banks to determine and 
manage environmental and social risks in project financing. In the first year of its 
launching, twenty seven banks had signed up representing over seventy five percent of 
global project financing funds.280 In addition, soft law usually helps establish a legal
7R1foundation for treaties.
As previously discussed, the contemporary world has seen a multiplicity of 
“actors” in global socioeconomic development, which is also reflected in the resurgence 
of lex mercatoria, that is, the diversity of agencies, intergovernmental or non­
governmental, private or public, global or regional, involved in the harmonisation of 
commercial laws and principles. The main intergovernmental organisations are the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO)282 and the United Nations Conference on International Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). The main non-governmental agencies are the International Chamber of
278 Hugh M. Kindred, J. G. Castel, W. Graham, A. De Mestral, L. Reif, I. Vlasic, and S. Williams, 
International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada (5th edn Emond Montgomery Publishers 
Ltd., Toronto 1993) 78.
279 Roy Goode, ‘Rule, Practice, and Pragmatism in Transnational Commercial Law’ (2005) 54 Int’l & 
Comp L Q 547, 549.
280 Jane Monahan, ‘Principles in Question’ (2005) The Banker 60.
281 Thomas Walde, International Standards in Transnational Investment & Commercial Disputes: The 
Role of International Standards, Soft Law, Guidelines, Voluntary and Self-regulation in International 
Arbitration, Negotiation and Other Forms of Dispute Management -  Preliminary Study, Transnational 
Dispute Management, October 2004, available at www.transnational-dispute-management.com and 
Stephane Brabant, Designing Petroleum Contracts and Emerging Principles of International Law, 
Transnational Dispute Management, December 2004, available at www.transnational-dispute- 
management.com
282 IMO, a specialised agency set up in 1948 and enter into effect in 1958, has engaged in a number of 
projects unifying private maritime law.
83 UNCTAD was created as an organ of the General Assembly in 1964 and has engaged in unifying 
regulations of bills of lading, marine insurance, charter-parties, shipowners’ liabilities, and flags of 
convenience.
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Commerce (ICC),284 the International Law Association (ILA) and the Comite Maritime 
International (CMI).285 According to the classic international legal personality doctrine, 
individuals, corporations or private institutions lack formal legal personality as subjects 
of the law. However, in reality, they do actively and constructively participate in 
formulating commercial rules by undertaking a harmonisation initiative as de facto 
subjects of the law. Their participation now becomes even more and more influential 
along with the deepening of juridified, pluralised and privatised commercial relations. 
Numerous efforts by international, regional and transnational organisations to produce 
guidelines, codes, recommendations and other “soft law” norms would be a major 
contribution to the development of modem lex mercatoria.
Without the requisite international legal personality to create “hard law”, 
international private organisations such as the ICC, the ILA, the CMI may have to 
develop “soft law”, an autonomous system from the international law regime and, 
though legally non-binding, acquire binding force and influential effect through the 
voluntary adoption by the private parties in cross-border transactions and the supportive 
enforcement by the state. The ICC, for instance, has formulated a number of codes that 
are universally recognised by the merchant community, by arbitral institutions, and even 
by many national courts. Among these are Incoterms, Uniform Customs and Practice 
for Documentary Credits,287 Uniform Rules for a Combined Transport Document, and 
the International Code of Standards of Advertising Practice.288 The ICC has also issued 
ground rules for an electronic version of its uniform customs and practices for 
documentary credits (UCP) entitled Uniform Rules of Conduct for Interchange of Trade 
Data by Teletransmission (UNCID),289 with the aim to “lay down minimum standards 
of professional care and behaviour for commercial parties engaged in trade deals 
involving electronic data interchange EDI”.290 The efforts undertaken by the ICC to 
unify trade and business terms resulted in influential rules such as the Incoterms 
governing transportation costs and liabilities in carriage of goods by sea. Although 
Incoterms is not mandatory in nature, reliance upon Incoterms has become so common
284 ICC was founded as a private French association of national chambers o f commerce and engaged in a 
number of projects aimed at unifying international commercial law.
285 CMI was created in 1897 for the purpose of unifying private maritime law.
286 A. Claire Cutler, ‘Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions o f International Law and 
Organisation: A Crisis o f Legitimacy’ (2001) 27(2) Rev Int’l Stud 133-50.
287 Michael Rowe, ‘The Contribution of the ICC to the Development o f International Trade Law’ in 
Norbert Horn and Clive Schmitthoff (eds), The Transnational Law o f  International Commercial 
Transactions (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer 1982) 51-60.
288 Carlo Croff, ‘The Applicable Law in an International Commercial Arbitration: Is It Still a Conflict of 
Laws Problem?’ op. cit. 636.
289 Paul Murphy, ‘Automation up to a Point’ (1988) The Banker 89.
290 Ibid.
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that it has acquired the status of customary international law.291 In contrast to the work 
of the ICC and Incoterms, unification efforts for bills of lading, bills of exchange, 
promissory notes and letters of credit, being first initiated by private associations, are 
subsequently taken over by intergovernmental associations and codified in the form of 
binding international conventions.
UNIDROIT’s Principles of International Commercial Contracts (the
9Q9“Principles”) is a good example to show why “soft law” is becoming more “popular” 
in practice. The Principles were formulated on the basis of idea that private law can be 
unified by other than legislative means, with the aim to “establish a balanced set of rules 
designed for use throughout the world irrespective of the legal traditions and the
90^
economic and political conditions of the countries in which they are to be applied”. 
Accordingly, in view of the manifold national legal orders, the Principles referred to the 
UCC, the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts, and the 1980 Vienna Sales 
Convention, Incoterms, the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, 
and included those principles that were common to the existing national legal systems 
and seemed best adapted to the particular needs of international commercial contracts. 
However, the key question was whether the Principles would be functional to meet the 
needs of international community. One point of view is that rules which spring out of no 
country’s background lack an essential foundation.294 Moreover, it has been argued that 
the work of UNIDROIT is aimed at, or at least more suited to, developing legal 
systems; 295 thereby seeking to provide a platform of legal principles for such 
jurisdictions.296 Nevertheless, it is worth noting the legislative methodology adopted in 
the drafting of Principles, which is deliberately not packaged as a treaty or model law. 
Instead, the Principles are elaborated to include basic contract rules such as freedom of
9Q 9  9QQ 9 0 0  ^  A ncontract, openness to usage, favour contractus, good faith and fair dealing,
291 Jan Ramberg, ‘Incoterms 1980’ in Norbert Horn and Clive Schmitthoff (eds), The Transnational Law 
o f  International Commercial Transactions (Kluwer, Deventer 1982) 146.
292 At its 83rd session (2004) the Governing Council of UNIDROIT adopted the new edition of the 
UNIDROIT Principles o f International Commercial Contracts. See 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm (last visit on July 18, 2007).
293 UNIDROIT Principles o f International Commercial Contracts, “Introduction” (Rome 1994) viii.
294 This problem has been addressed by the draftsmen of the proposed European Civil Code. See A.S. 
Hartkamp, Christian von Bar, Martijn W. Hesselink, Ewoud Hondius, Carla Joustra, Edgar Du Perron 
(eds), Towards a European Civil Code (Ars Aequi Libri, Nijmegen 1994).
295 See the 1989 Report o f the Mustill Committee as to the incorporation of the Model Law on the English 
legislative panorama.
29 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales o f Goods 1980. This may be 
because the Convention is designed to obviate the need to refer to national law, which is, anathema to 
national pride.
297 Article 1.1 of UNIDROIT Principles.
298 Article 1.8 o f UNIDROIT Principles.
299 Articles 2.11, 2.14, 2.22, 6.2.1-6.2.3 of UNIDROIT Principles.
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that are flexible enough to accommodate changing circumstances brought about by the 
technological and economic developments but without a binding force so that the 
acceptance of the Principles would be exclusively dependent on the persuasive power 
and the authority of UNIDROIT.301 Also, the legislative techniques adopted in drafting 
the Principles are also consistent with the overall methodology. For instance, the 
Principles deliberately avoid using a terminology that is peculiar to any given national 
legal system. The search for legal ideas and principles common to various national 
and international legal systems has been thoroughly undertaken by means of 
comparative analysis.303 The openness to usages and customs, as a tool responsive to 
new commercial practices developed by the merchant community, is considered in 
determining the rights and duties of the parties in each contract.304 These static features 
make the Principles a distinct modem and systematic legal order closely linked to lex 
mercatoria,305
As part of this burgeoning “soft law” trend, even the UNCITRAL has been 
pushing for the progress of harmonising international sale of goods, payments and 
commercial arbitration,306 by focusing more on its efforts through “soft law” and 
promoting the adoption of uniform rules, standard contract terms, general standards, 
trade terms and other measures. UNCITRAL has become the leading international body 
for harmonising private commercial law 307 and has an impressive record of 
achievements such model laws and advisory documents dealing with various 
international commercial sectors as the Model Law on Procurement of Goods, 
Constmction, and Services (1993), Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
(1985), Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996). Thus, it is important not to 
overlook a great success of international agencies such as UNCITRAL in establishing 
internationally acceptable rules to regulate various aspects of commercial relations.
300 Article 1.7 of UNIDROIT Principles.
301 UNIDROIT Principles o f International Commercial Contracts, “Introduction” (Rome 1994) ix.
302 Comment 2 to Article 1.6 of UNIDROIT Principles.
303 K. P. Berger, Die UNIDROIT-Prinzipien fur International Handelsvertrage in 94 ZvglRWiss (1995) 
226.
304 Article 1.8 of UNIDROIT Principles.
305 Lex mercatoria is clearly identified in the Preamble of the Principles.
306 The policy of UNCITRAL centred on the belief “that international trade co-operation among States is 
an important factor in the promotion of friendly relations and, consequently in the maintenance of peace 
and security” .
307 Harmonisation of international trade law was previously the stated objective o f the UNIDROIT, which 
was set up in 1926 as an auxiliary organ of the League of Nations, which, following the League’s demise, 
was re-established in 1940 by way o f a multilateral agreement entitled ‘the UNIDROIT Statute’. Apart 
from producing the highly respected UNIDROIT terms of international sales, this organisation seems 
largely to have been overtaken by the more efficient and radical UNCITRAL.
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Gradually, “soft law”, through customary usage or transformation into the public 
domain, can be evolved into customary international law.308 The growing trend in the 
use of soft law and voluntary or non-binding arrangements signals the increasing 
salience of the private ordering of commercial relations that grants maximum scope to 
merchant autonomy and flexibility. The private regulation of commerce is natural, 
neutral and consensual and can produce greater efficiencies by reducing transaction 
costs and achieving greater economies and thus represent a new ordering of 
international commerce. Regardless of various national legislative variations and 
judicial interpretations of these international uniform and model laws, the development 
of customary business rules and the harmonising and compromising efforts in the “soft 
law” process are part of the formation of new lex mercatoria.
5.3 Infrastructure o f Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration
Lex mercatoria that is preferred by the business community now has a well-shaped legal 
infrastructure in place. For instance, the inter-governmental trade associations respond 
to the requirements of international commerce and are able to harmonise the cross- 
border trading environment by distilling the operative common principles and, with the 
comfort of a huge bureaucracy, they can enforce such self-disciplinary commercial rules 
and norms. These bodies are concerned, and well placed to deal, with the requirements 
of corporate and other commercial actors in the market place.
Probably, of equally importance is the need for a “safety-net” regime under 
which users could enjoy certain basic protections. It is claimed that lex mercatoria has a 
weakness in enforcement because there is no police force that makes a system of 
traditional rules strong and respected. Many informal mechanisms also contribute to the 
unchallenged enforcement of business agreements, including business norms such as 
good faith, commercial honesty and the paramount anxiety to protect business 
reputation.309 The imperative character of lex mercatoria may be felt and obedience to it 
has become a matter of habit within a highly civilised community and has been spread 
to most developing countries along with the development of globalisation. There are a 
variety of private sanctions and disciplinary rules established by many professional 
organisations, arbitral institutions, chambers of commerce, stock exchanges and
308 Michael C. Rowe, ‘The Contribution of the ICC to the Development o f International Trade Law’ in 
Norbert Horn and Clive M. Schmitthoff (eds), The Transnational Law o f  International Commercial 
Transactions (Kluwer, Deventer 1982) 51-60.
309 Ibid, 348-49.
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commodity exchanges.310 As in medieval times, one potent sanction is the exclusion 
from the industry’s professional association or exchanges which often is tantamount to a 
complete commercial boycott.311 The power of trade associations, exchanges and 
arbitral institutions to deny recalcitrant parties benefits, membership, or access, and to 
blacklist them, gives them the ability to inflict substantial economic harm. The 
institution of international reputational sanctions would make lex mercatoria effective. 
In addition, national law has developed a machinery of borrowing and adoption.
Arbitration also plays a constructive role in shaping such an infrastructure for 
the development of lex mercatoria. For instance, international commercial arbitration 
succeeds in abolishing the distinctions between the traditional practices and 
philosophies of the common law and civil law systems by providing a fusion of their 
best aspects.312 Arbitration in different locations may well follow a similar course, that 
is, a pro-arbitration bias or a favour arbitrandum stand. In essence, arbitration derives 
its binding authority from a contractual arrangement between the parties, not from 
national law. Due to its nature of being an autonomous, independent and a-national 
institution,313 arbitration is an important component and supportive infrastructure in 
both revival of lex mercatoria and modem unification movement although it has lost its 
early simplicity and become more complex, legalistic and institutionalised. A simple 
international commercial arbitration case may require reference to as many as three 
different national systems or rules of law. First, there is the law which regulates the 
arbitration proceeding. Second, there is the law or a set of mles which the tribunal has 
to apply to substantive matters in the dispute. Finally, there is the law that governs 
enforcement of the award made by the arbitral tribunal. Each arbitration is a “national” 
one in the sense that it must be bound by the national law of one country in order to 
manifest its legal effect.314 Meanwhile, each arbitration is an “a-national” one in that 
the trend in modem arbitration is moving towards the delocalisation or denationalisation 
of conflict of laws mles because the mechanical relation between arbitration and a 
national law does not necessarily arise.
310 Pierre Lalive, ‘Enforcing Awards’ in International Chamber of Commerce (ed), International 
Arbitration. 60 Years o f  ICC Arbitration: A Look at the Future (ICC Publishing, Paris 1984) 348.
3,1 Ibid.
312 The traditional distinction exists between the so-called adversarial and inquisitorial systems in 
common and civil law systems respectively.
313 Roy Goode, ‘The Role of the Lex Loci Arbitri in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2001) 17(1) 
Arb Int’l 19; Jan Paulsson, ‘Delocalisation o f International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why it 
Matters’ (1983) 32 Int’l & Comp L Q 53.
314 Frederick A Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, (1986) 2 Arb Int’l 244.
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It may be of little use to enforce an obligation to arbitrate by reference to law or 
the rule of law in one specific country if arbitration is conducted in an autonomous 
regime. Theoretically, an international arbitration agreement is better given an effect 
world-wide other than merely in the place where the agreement is made. In Darwinian 
terms, the meme of the international effect of arbitration was first recognised in the 
Geneva Protocol of 1923, one of the first multilateral conventions on arbitration.315 The 
Protocol provides that the courts of the contracting state, on being seized of a dispute to 
which an arbitration agreement covered by the Protocol applies, “shall refer the parties 
on the application of either of them to the decision of the arbitrators”.316 The New York 
Convention is silent as to lex mercatoria. Neither Article I, outlining the scope of its 
application, nor Article V, enumerating defences to the enforcement of an arbitral award, 
refers to reliance upon a non-national law per se. Although New York Convention does 
not clearly warrant the concept of a stateless award or arbitration, or, as claimed by 
some scholars, its legislative history may not have intended it to cover an “a-national” 
award,317 it appears agreeable to bypass some territoriality-based arbitration procedural 
rules such as lex loci arbitri, which indirectly support substantive a-national 
arbitration.318 For instance, in Rakoil case, as discussed above, the Court of Appeal in 
England regarded the award based on a non-national law or extra-legal criteria as valid 
under the New York Convention.319 In addition, Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention 
binding the UK, the US and other signatory countries allows a tribunal to incorporate 
non-national law in its awards.
Arbitrators may decline to apply the strict letter of a national law to the merits of 
the dispute. Instead, arbitrators may be tempted to resolve the dispute according to a 
semi-regime which consists of three components. First, arbitrators may have their own 
notion of justice and fairness, which appears in the international law of contract or 
general principles of law. Second, there are well-established arbitration norms such as 
forum non conveniens, lex fori and lex loci arbitri in arbitration practice. Third,
315 League of Nations Treaty Series (1924) Vol XXVII p 158 No 678.
316 Geneva Protocol o f 1923, Art 4. The New York Convention extends similar recognition to the
international force and effect o f arbitration agreements in Art II (3).
317 Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial
Interpretation, op. cit. 29-43.
3.8 Ibid, 33 (stating that “the detachment of the substance from the ambit o f national laws will generally 
not encounter difficulties” and “the ‘de-nationalisation’ o f the substance in international arbitration is, in 
fact, increasingly gaining acceptance”.). Also Albert Jan van den Berg, When is an Arbitral Award 
Nondomestic Under the New York Convention of 1958? (1985) 6 Pace L Rev 25.
3.9 XIII YB Com. Arb. 534.
320 A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, ‘Conflict of Law Issues in International Arbitration: Practice and Trends’ 
(1993) 9(4) Arb Int’l 375.
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arbitrators may interject into the awards elements of commercial or trade usages to 
supplement a national legal system the parties provide for to govern the dispute. 
Seduced away from the rules of the otherwise applicable law, the arbitrator may take on 
unauthorised powers of lex mercatoria or amiable composition. It has been sometimes 
argued that international commercial arbitration should be freed from the constraints of 
national law and regarded as denationalised or delocalised.322 Liberating international 
arbitration from constraints of national legal systems entails several implications, one of 
which relates to the choice of law. The controversy surrounding a-national arbitration 
and lex mercatoria seems unnecessary and could be resolved by more astute use of 
conflicts of law principles which may help supplement the ambiguity of lex mercatoria 
by designating an appropriate governing national law. However, the variety of choice of 
law clauses found in international contracts makes it difficult to generalise the limits of 
arbitral autonomy. The viability of transnational arbitration and adoption of lex 
mercatoria require the national legal systems that make arbitration binding to also 
ensure its integrity. Otherwise, the trend toward transnational norms and “justice 
without law” may injure the parties as well as the legitimate public interest that law is 
designed to protect. This argument justifies a certain level of judicial control or review 
of the arbitrators’ use of lex mercatoria.
A number of enforcement devices for arbitral awards are expressly premised on 
reputation considerations. A possible sanction involves the publication of the arbitral 
award or the fact of a party’s non-compliance with it.323 A particularly effective device 
is the prohibition from recourse to institutional arbitration in the future. A more 
refined version of the prohibition involves the ability of a defendant to refuse arbitration 
initiated by a party who has previously refused to comply with an award. For 
example, the world’s largest insurance companies resort almost exclusively to 
arbitration in settling disputes arising under reinsurance contracts. Arbitration clauses 
usually provide that insurance experts act as the arbitrators. Enforcement of these 
awards by national courts is rarely necessary because failure to comply with the terms
321 Roy Goode, ‘The Role of the Lex Loci Arbitri in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2001) 17(1) 
Arb Int’l 19.
322 An early mention o f this revolutionary theory appears in Fouchard: L’Arbitrage Commercial 
International (1965) 30-1.
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of an award will result in an economically damaging loss of reputation. The modem 
doctrine of lex mercatoria attaches the international currency to the award and 
represents a delocalised trend in arbitral practice which matches the social environment 
in the 21st century compared to the medieval and nationalisation periods.
5.4 Commercial Justification o f Lex Mercatoria in the Commercial World
It must be recognised that “the law tends to respond to social realities”.327 The twentieth 
century has seen increasing internationalisation of commerce, trade and investment. 
However, the complexity of modem cross-border business and finance “has led to an 
awareness that general mles in an international instrument are no longer sufficient and 
need to be supplemented by mles which in varying degrees are problem-oriented and 
fact-specific”.328 A growing body of international business principles and techniques, 
together with their similarity and wide acceptance, led to the rediscovery of lex
. 329 mercatoria.
The speed, complexity, diversity and sophistication of modem business 
activities and non-traditional markets also challenge the legitimacy, efficiency, 
suitability and adequacy of existing national commercial law and push commercial law 
to keep up with the needs of the commercial community.330 National laws have been 
adapting to the needs and demands of international business community but always lag 
behind and are divorced from reality,331 and yet demonstrate hostility towards 
mercantile customs. However, the application of diverse but inadequate and less 
updated national laws including over complicated conflicts of law mles inherently 
impedes the mobility and growth of global commerce, which calls for a regime of mles 
founded on a mutual understanding among merchants, and perhaps a revival of lex 
mercatoria,333 On the other hand, the international character of the commercial law
326 Bernardo M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, op. cit. 325-26.
327 Friedrich K. Juenger,’ The Lex Mercatoria and the Conflict of Laws’ in Thomas E. Carbonneau (ed), 
Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion o f  the New Law Merchant (Kluwer and Juris Publishing, 
Dobbs Ferry, New York 1990) 219.
328 Roy Goode, ‘Rule, Practice, and Pragmatism in Transnational Commercial Law’ (2005) 54 Int’l & 
Comp L Q  539, 541.
329 Clive M. Schmitthoff, Commercial Law in a Changing Economic Climate (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 1981) 19.
330 Andre Tunc, ‘English and Continental Commercial Law’ (1961) J. Bus. L. 237; Ole Lando, ‘The Lex 
Mercatoria and International Commercial Arbitration’ (1985) 34 Int’l & Comp L Q 754.
331 Harold J. Berman and Colin Kaufman, ‘The Law of International Commercial Transactions’ (1978) 19 
Harv Int’l L J 224.
332 Aleksandar Goldstajn, ‘The New Law Merchant Reconsidered’ in F. Fabricius (ed), Law and 
International Trade (Athenaum Verlag, Frankfurt 1973) 171.
333 Ibid, Goldstajn 182; Christoph W.O. Stoecker, ‘The Lex Mercatoria: To What Extent Does it Exist?’ 
(1990) 7 J Int’l Arb 106.
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started to move away from the restrictions of national law to a universal and 
international concept of international business law. A strong argument for the 
application of lex mercatoria in international transactions and arbitrations is the need of 
the international business community for a system which allows a departure from 
national rules. This need arises because (1) national laws are generally meant for 
domestic “consumption” rather than for the application in international context; (2) 
national legal systems are largely, if not necessarily, one-sided, which may result in 
inequitable judicial intervention or even outright injustice; (3) a national system of law 
may be inadequate to respond the changing circumstances of modem international 
business and to accommodate the multilateral aspects of contemporary commerce. The 
regime of lex mercatoria will be essential to viable commercial practice across national 
boundaries, 334 better accommodate the multilateral aspects of contemporary 
commerce,335 and have a wider application and recognition in both nation-states and 
commercial community. This notion has been reflected in the Incoterms, EU treaties 
and UN conventions, and, more importantly, has led to the public recognition and 
support of an autonomous commercial law regime, independent from national legal 
systems.336
Business decision-makers contemplating a cross-boarder sale, loan or 
acquisition want to predict how potential commercial disputes will be adjudicated. By 
opting for binding arbitration, international business people are indicating their desire of 
a more simplified and straightforward procedure than that in a national court. However, 
the business community is not opting for abandonment of legal rules. The lack of 
reasonable certainty, familiarity and predictability regarding the applicable norms of 
legal regimes will not enhance cross-border commerce, finance or investment. Without 
a set of rules for arbitration, the business community may lose confidence in the 
arbitration process. No party to the arbitration agreement would like to see the dispute 
resolved according to an adjudicator’s intuitive sense of fairness. Rather, the business 
community will likely prefer a greater level of stability and predictability, in both 
substantive and procedural perspectives, offered by a choice of national legal rules or a 
fixed legal regime governing the merits of any dispute.337 On the other hand, the
334 Leon Trakmann, ‘The Evolution of the Law Merchant’ (1980/81) 12 J Marit L and Com 173-4.
335 Michael Medwig, ‘The New Law-Merchant: Legal Rhetoric and Commercial Reality’ (1993) 24 L & 
Policy in Int’l Bus 615.
336 EU legalisation and growth of harmonised private law with enforcement by the ECJ may undermine 
the argument here, which will be discussed below.
337 English law is frequently chosen to govern international insurance and maritime agreements. See 
Dicey & Morris on the Conflicts o f  Laws, op. cit. 549-51.
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business community is inclined to abandon the diverse and rigorous rules of law in 
favour of the more fluid principles of fairness and equity. The involvement of various 
legal systems suggest that these systems may have different, if not contradictory, legal 
rules, values and principles that hamper the flow of international commerce and 
investment. To have disputes involving the parties from multiple jurisdictions resolved 
by reference to a national system of law allows for the possibility of inequitable 
intervention or impasse due to claims of sovereign immunity or even outright injustice 
should the national law deliberately be changed or interpreted so as to favour one 
party.338 In order to maintain a certain level of uniformity and flexibility in the 
governing law, arbitrators who are not empowered to decide as amiables compositeurs 
sometimes may hold the view that the more fluid but uniform principles of fairness and 
good faith, based on a common origin and a faithful reflection of mercantile customs, 
may be in the best interest of the business community. The selected law may 
incorporate nebulous terms such as “fair play” or “good faith”. Lex mercatoria contains 
commonly accepted legal and commercial norms which are supposed to get around the 
conflicts of law question as there is only one possible law to apply.339 As such, lex 
mercatoria reflects the commercial need to promote business based upon party 
autonomy and freedom of contract and recognises the capacity of merchants to regulate 
their own affairs through their customs, usages and practices, 340 even though 
businessmen used to certain national practices actually prefer protection under national 
rules. Another justification for permitting resort to lex mercatoria is party autonomy and 
expectations; that is, the parties to international contracts are generally relational rather 
than adversarial, thus expecting autonomy and fairness rather than a strict legal 
interpretation of their rights and duties. Why shouldn’t courts give effect to the parties’ 
choice to empower the arbitral tribunal to disregard the law and resolve the dispute 
according to its own sense of fairness and good conscience? Party autonomy is certainly 
not an evil to be avoided.
There has been sufficient jurisprudence to establish that lex mercatoria 
obviously exists despite the fact that some writers vehemently reject it or claim that lex 
mercatoria is not a law at all.341 Therefore, we perhaps should not be overly concerned
338 See Keith Highet, ‘The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria’ op. cit. 613; David W. Rivkin, ‘Enforceability 
of Arbitral Awards Based on Lex M ercatoria' (1993) 9 Arb Int’l 67.
339 Ole Lando, ‘The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1985) Int’l & Comp L Q 
754.
340 Leon E. Trakman, The Law Merchant: The Evolution o f  Commercial Law, op. cit. 8.
341 Frederick A. Mann, ‘Private Arbitration and Public Policy’ (1985) 4 Civil Justice Quarterly 264; 
Michael Mustill, ‘Contemporary Problems in International Commercial Arbitration: A Response’ (1989) 
Int’l Bus L 163.
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with theoretical questions of how lex mercatoria exists and whether it is a law seeking 
to oust national jurisdictions so long as a system of norms or principles exists,342 which 
is recognised and valued by the business community. Factors as accessability or general 
applicability; authoritativeness and consistency; predictability and fairness343 can be 
used to determine if a convincing system of legal rules may be regarded to be in place. 
Does lex mercatoria provide the business community with a set of rules which is 
sufficiently accessible and certain to permit the efficient conduct of transactions? Has 
lex mercatoria been developed to the stage that lex mercatoria can be inserted into an 
agreement in a manner which would do his client a positive service? An unwritten law, 
understood amongst merchants, does exist and does something to fill the contractual 
vacuum that arbitrators stumble on from time to time.344 In this sense, the general 
principles of the law merchants offer at least as much predictability as the occasionally 
unexpected law of a given country, particularly if it is a law not selected by the 
parties.345 Andreas Lowenfeld takes a much more pragmatic approach to the subject of 
the application of lex mercatoria. In terms of an evolving body of principles, the 
principia mercatoria rather than lex mercatoria, there is something of benefit available 
to arbitrators and businessmen alike. Lowenfeld offers a number of illustrations of cases 
where lex mercatoria provides a just solution to a problem where national systems of 
law fall short of the task. It is argued that arbitrators offer resort to principles of the 
usages of a particular trade {lex mercatoria) without drawing attention to the fact that 
they are doing so.346 Lex mercatoria also matches a flourishing global commercial 
culture.347 There are signs that jurists are becoming increasingly sensitive as to how 
local legal norms and principles continue to thrive in the transnational commercial 
setting. Assuming that global private law is possible and global law and business are 
situated as cultural artefacts, they likely evince some of the same connectedness to the 
society in which they evolve. Some attention has been turned to the transnational law
342 Keith Highet offers a ‘principia mercatoria’ in lieu of lex mercatoria in Keith Highet, ‘The Enigma of 
the Lex M ercatoria ' (1989) 63 Tulane L R 616, 627.
343 Keith Highet, The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria, op. cit. 614-5.
344 Andreas Lowenfeld, ‘A Lex Mercatoria'. An Arbitrator’s View’ (1990) 6 Arb Int’l 150.
345 Ibid, 133.
346 Ibid, 142-3.
347 The discussion of a culture-oriented way of thinking about the law can be generally seen in Roger 
Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society -  Legal Ideas in the Mirror o f  Social Theory (Ashgate, Aldershot 
2006).
348 Hugh Collins, ‘European Private Law and the Cultural Identity of States’ (1995) 3 European Rev Pr L 
354.
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in the European Union,349 and, more occasionally, in respect of Europe’s evolving 
shared jus commune.35°
5.5 Positivist Rhetoric and Jurisprudential Justification o f  Lex Mercatoria in a 
Globalised Period
Many scholars have responded to lex mercatoria with fear and loathing. Some have 
expressed their doubt as to the existence of lex mercatoria351 due to the fact that lex 
mercatoria has not been enacted and lacks authority as a substantial legal order or 
system.352 Others have argued that “such rules are not at present part of the international 
legal system”353 and that “a source of lex mercatoria is of doubtful validity”.354 Lex 
mercatoria was once described as an “elusive and often frightening subject”355 and “a 
myth . . .  an enigma”.356 These writings indicate that positivist jurisprudence does not 
recognise the “validity” of lex mercatoria as a legal order. However, there may arguably 
be objections to viewing lex mercatoria through the lens of legal positivism. For 
instance, many positivists maintain that a contract governed by law merchant and 
arbitrated by a private tribunal is a stateless contract and therefore a nullity. 
Positivists hold that the force of the obligation in a contract comes from “the force of 
the legal system that creates the obligation”.358 Accordingly, the state is the only legal 
system sufficiently potent to “create” a contractual obligation.359 The positivist 
criticism of lex mercatoria flows from the belief that lex mercatoria has “no connexion 
with any definable society” and does not “amount in positivist terms to a legal system at 
all”. In substance, the positivists adopt a formalistic approach that ignores the fact
349 See Cianco, Elargissement et problemes de traduction, in Semaine de Bruges, Une communaute a 
douze? L’impact du nouvel elargissement sur les communautes europeennes 113 (1978).
350 Walter Van Gerven et at. (eds), Cases, Materials, Text on National, Supranational and International 
Tort Law. Scope o f  Protection (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1999) xviii.
351 Michael J. Mustill and Stewart C. Boyd, The Law and Practice o f  Commercial Arbitration in England, 
op. cit. 611.
352 Frederick A. Mann, ‘England Rejects “Delocalised” Contracts and Arbitration’ (1984) 33 Int’l Comp. 
L. Q. 196; Frederick A. Mann, ‘Private Arbitration and Public Policy’ (1985) 4 Civil Justice Quarterly 
264.
353 See Hans Smit, ‘A-National Arbitration’ (1989) 63 Tulane L Rev 633.
354 Christopher W.O. Stoecker, ‘The Lex Mercatoria: To What Extent Does it Exist?’ (1990) 7 J Int’l Arb 
124-27.
355 Keith Highet, ‘The Enigma o f the Lex Mercatoria’ op. cit. 613.
356 Ibid.
357 This argument is based on the positivist premise that “freedom of contract is a delegation by the state 
to individuals o f the power to enter into binding contracts”. Bernardo M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, op. 
cit. 328.
358 Keith Highet, ‘The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria’ op. cit. 614.
359 Georges R. Delaume, ‘Comparative Analysis as a Basis of Law in State Contracts: The Myth of the 
Lex Mercatoria’ (1989) 63 Tulane L Rev 582.
360 David Suratgar, ‘Considerations Affecting Choice of Law Clauses in Contracts Between Government 
and Foreign Nationals’ (1962) 2 Indian J Int’l L 311.
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that international business is often conducted in such a manner beyond national laws. 
Under positivist theory, the international merchant community and arbitral institutions 
do not constitute a “legal system”, nor do agreements created with reference to this 
system constitute “contracts”. However, the arbitrating parties, who are part of the 
business community, deserve a certain level of flexibility to have their dispute arbitrated 
according to the merchant mles they choose to comply with. Therefore, the national and 
largely positivist character of legal ideology is ill suited to international commerce. The 
positivist theory cannot account for what was, and is against the trend that the strict 
legalistic view that only state mles have a binding effect should be rejected. 
Contemporary lawyers should be aware that state mles are not indispensable 
components of efficient commerce. For centuries during the middle ages lawyers were 
excluded from many commercial courts because their slavish adherence to tedious 
formalities made dispute resolution costly, slow, uncertain and unfair.361
There are also jurisprudential grounds for recognising lex mercatoria. The 
criticisms of lex mercatoria and of a denationalised arbitration are similar to those made 
of public international law. It was argued that, in light of recognition afforded to the 
customary international public law, “there is no fundamental theoretical opposition to 
the existence of lex mercatoria”, except the lack of a “formal” system for the 
enforcement of arbitral awards provided in the merchant society. In this respect, 
however, lex mercatoria is even more effective than the public international law 
regime. First, the New York Convention provides for compulsory enforcement of 
awards through the network of national courts. There is nothing in Article V of the New 
York Convention requiring the denial of recognition of an award based on lex 
mercatoria. Second, lex mercartoria is also enforced through private action within the 
merchant community. Third, institutional arbitration rules, the major source of 
arbitration laws, provide arbitrators with freedom to apply lex mercatoria. For example, 
Article 13(3) of the ICC Rules allows the arbitrator to apply the proper law by the rule 
of conflict which he deems appropriate in the absence of the parties’ choice of 
applicable law. Article 28 paragraph 4 of the Model Law also allows the arbitral 
tribunal to decide “in accordance with the terms of the contract and take into account 
the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction”. Both the “proper law” under ICC 
Rules and “usages” under the Model Law may refer to lex mercatoria.
Some positivists argue that, because it allegedly contains no delineated set of
361 Frederic R. Sanborn, Origins o f  the Early English Maritime and Commercial Law  (Century Co., 
London 1930) 196.
362 Ibid.
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general principles, arbitration “results become unpredictable, and parties to agreements 
have little ground on which to base their expectations”.363 It is even argued that: “the 
relative clarity of the legal process ... is simply far less for lex mercatoria than for the 
established national legal systems . . . ”.364 Other arguments include that the application 
of lex mercatoria “provides a court with a diminished level of guidance” that creates 
uncertainty.365 These assertions, indeed, are only a variation of the dubious argument 
that lex mercatoria consists of “rules of uncertain existence and content”.366 A similar 
objection arises from the purported “lack of binding precedent”, the lack of an
*^7
obligation to follow what precedents there are for guidance, and the “lack of 
consistent, specific sources”. The underlying logic of these arguments seems to 
suggest that the inherent defects of lex mercatoria will yield a system that is “unlikely 
to produce a uniform interpretation of custom and practice”.369 Nevertheless, it appears 
from the published awards that the content of lex mercatoria is neither vague nor 
uncertain. Practically speaking, merchants are more familiar with the uniform practices 
of their own trade than with the vagaries of various municipal regulations or the niceties 
of conflicts doctrine. Likewise, the development of a common law of international 
business should enhance predictability rather than diminish it. It is clearly not true 
that the state is the exclusive source of law as the classic positivism has concluded. The 
most compelling argument in favour of lex mercatora may lie in its practical evolution: 
the continued growth of international business simply demands a reconstituted, if not 
new, lex mercatoria capable of accommodating the multinational aspects of 
contemporary international commerce. New economists claim that commerce is an 
evolving process of interaction and reciprocity which is simultaneously facilitated by
363 ‘Notes: General Principles of Law in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1988) 101(8) Harv L Rev 
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111. Park described the law merchant as “a catch all phrase of uncertain content”. It is also suggested that 
“the lex mercatoria is too uncertain a set o f mles to be regarded as a law that binding for everyone”, 
Christopher W.O. Stoecker, ‘The Lex Mercatoria: To What Extent Does it Exist?’ (1990) 7 J Int’l Arb 
125, or that “the lack of clear definition renders these mles inadequate for the choice of law”, Craig M. 
Gertz, ‘Comment, The Selection of Choice of Law Provisions in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Case for Contractual Depecage’ (1991) 12 Northwestern J Int’l L & Bus 176.
365 ‘Notes: General Principles o f Law in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1988) 101(8) Harv L Rev 
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366 See Hans Smit, ‘A-National Arbitration’ (1989) 63 Tulane L Rev 633.
367 Cremades & Plehn, op.cit. at 336. (153).
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370 Nicholas Katzenbach, ‘Business Executives and Lawyers in International Trade’ in International 
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and leads to an evolving system of commercial law.371 Carl Menger proposed that the 
origin, formulation and the ultimate process of all social institutions including law is 
essentially the same as the “spontaneous order” and markets guided by Adam Smith’s 
invisible hand coordinate interactions, and so is customary law. Accordingly, these 
institutions develop because, through a process of trial and error, the actions they are 
intended to coordinate are performed more effectively and efficiently under one 
institutional arrangement or process than under another. Thus, in a Darwinian sense, the 
more effective institutions and practices replace the less effective ones. Merchants have 
a long history of legal autonomy, and any argument against the viability of a 
transnational and self-regulating system of commercial law is belied by the history of 
lex mercatoria. In the case of the customary commercial law, traditions and practices 
evolve to produce the observed spontaneous order. Lex mercatoria, in the form of 
customary commercial law, continues to be made by the international merchant 
community despite government efforts to monopolise such law.373
Lex mercatoria is far more conducive to economic growth than national law. 
International merchants want to do business, hope to make a profit and expect their 
contracting partners to perform the contract with the willingness to do so on their own 
part. Considering that new technologies and political realities are continuously altering 
the dynamics of international business, the merchant community cannot wait for state 
governments or courts to initiate legal changes in favour of international merchants. 
Only lex mercatoria can immediately adapt to the changing circumstances and practices 
of transnational commerce. National legislation takes much longer; and by the time the 
agreement is reached on international treaties, the law embodied within them is already 
obsolete due to the divergence of interests of contracting states. Furthermore, merchants 
have better incentives to develop practices that facilitate rather than obstruct 
transnational business, and are better equipped than state governments to articulate and 
to enforce these customary rules.374 The ultimate justification for lex mercatoria is its 
conforming to and effectuating what merchants understand or expect to be the 
consequences of contractual undertakings or business arrangements. From the economic 
point of view, the avoidance of conflict is far more important than the resolution of it.
371 Bruce L. Benson, op. cit. 648.
372 Thomas E. Carbonneau and Marc. S. Firestone, ‘Transnational Law-Making. Assessing the Impact of
the Vienna Convention and the Viability of Arbitral Adjudication’ op. cit. 79.
373 Bruce L. Benson, op. cit. 644.
374 We cannot ignore the fact that lex mercatoria may also be imposed on hindsight and therefore may not
give businesses the ex ante clarity they desire. Nevertheless, compared to coded law, lex mercatoria is 
theoretically more responsive to the need of business community.
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While both international arbitration and lex mercatoria aim to facilitate private 
transactions by reducing conflicts, the advocates of positive national law institutionalise 
conflicts within the national state through the attempts to localise international 
commerce in national legal systems. As such, national law runs counter to the object 
and purpose of the international commercial relationship. The opponents of lex 
mercatoria are concerned less with the promotion of international business than with 
the protection of their own prominent position in the regime of regulatory states. This 
form of legal protectionism has become increasingly obstructive to economic growth.
It has been rightly observed that “the way in which international trade rules nowadays, 
in relation with the nationalisation of law in the 19th century, is unsatisfactory”.376 The 
proponents of national systems of commercial laws are afraid of their shrinking 
jurisdictions and are reluctant to lose any more business to a-national systems. While
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the rationalities of negotiated orders such as lex mercatoria are recognised, their 
existence and real function “are actually effaced.”378 Neither the future development of 
private international law nor the continued growth of international business should be 
held hostage to the narrow pecuniary and ideological interests of domestic theorists and 
bureaucrats: “the strongly legalistic view that rules can only have a binding force if 
enacted by state authorities has to be rejected”.379
6. N e w  L e x  M e r c a t o r ia  a n d  N e o - N e w  Y o r k  C o n v e n t i o n  
The role of arbitration in cementing international commerce is undisputed. What is 
more open to question is whether arbitration, in addition to its procedural contribution, 
can and should yield a uniform law of international commerce. If so, the existence and 
continued development of lex mercatoria are real and undeniable, and should be 
encouraged and supported.
International transactions, by their very nature, usually involve parties from one 
or more countries and who will have differing perceptions of principles of law. They 
will probably also have differing interpretations of their rights and duties as understood
375 Michel Gaudet, ‘The International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration’ (1986) 4 Int’l Tax & 
Bus L 216.
376 Rene David in Rapport General at UNIDROIT in 1977.
377 “They involve a different orientation to the normative repertoire from those of state law; decision­
making is through agreement, reached through cyclical processes o f information exchange and learning, 
rather than the imposed order o f a third party; different forms o f trust are necessarily involved.” Simon 
Roberts, ‘After Government? On Representing Law without the State’ (2005) 68(1) Modem Law Review 
1.
378 Ibid. at 23.
379 Christopher W.O. Stoecker, ‘The Lex Mercatoria: To What Extent Does it Exist?’ (199) 7 J Int’l Arb 
119.
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by the legal system of the party with whom they are doing business, or of the place 
where a contract is to be performed or, even, of the place where they have chosen to 
resolve their disputes. Parties who decide to enter a cross-border transaction are faced 
with a significantly increased level of complexity compared with entities that trade 
exclusively within their domestic familiar jurisdiction. It is for this reason that the 
interaction of different legal rules can tend towards a disruption of international 
transactions. Globalisation requires commonly accepted practice to cut across differing 
juridical and commercial traditions, drawing from each of those elements that are 
considered to be most universally practical. In business, certainty is highly valued, the 
support of which needs rules. Rules are derived from principles, and practice, as well as 
legal reasoning, has a hand in shaping principles. Commercial practice in a global 
economy will increasingly tend to reflect conditions, concerns and expectations that are 
common, that is, transnational, rather than purely local. This process of harmonisation is, 
to a great degree, a product of sustained effort by proponents of a principled system of 
international commercial arbitration.
Over the years, the business community, driven by the desire to make honest 
profits in marketplaces, has developed a relatively sophisticated system comprised of 
laws, trade practices, custom and usages, to manage and balance the risks of the 
marketplace with the opportunities of business. Freedom of international business calls 
for transnational principles and customary rules, spontaneously and progressively 
produced by the societas mercatorum. Many customary practices and mercantile 
principles have been well- willed, adopted and codified, almost in an organic fashion, in
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many national legislation. While most international arbitrators are conscientious in 
respecting the bounds of their missions, some have been known and bold to try their 
skills in finding ways to bypass the established rules of the party-chosen law. To 
circumvent the prescribed limits of their authority, they have discerned “emerging 
trends” that lead in a contrary direction, or implemented new commercial principles and 
lex mercatoria. Legislators and policymakers alike can appreciate the international 
arbitrators’ desire for freedom from constraints of substantive and procedural national 
legal constrains. Today, commercial practices and rules are expanding and have 
obtained international currency. This may not support the view that lex mercatoria can
380 For an interesting politico-legal account as to developments see Alan Rodger, ‘The Codification of 
Commercial Law in Victorian Britain’ (1992) 108 L Q Rev 570.
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claim to constitute a complete but separate legal order. However, it at least can claim a 
right to exist.381
Lex mercatoria is spoken of under a number of names, including international, 
transnational, or supranational commercial law; international customs or usages; general 
principles of international commercial law; and merchant law.382 Regardless of the label, 
the same phenomenon - a set of rules encompassing commercial practices of the 
international merchant community - is being described. Lex mercatoria is a 
manifestation of the commercial community’s growing disenchantment with national 
legal systems. Over the last century, merchants have slowly begun to extricate their 
commercial disputes from the tangled regulatory web of the national legal order. In 
order to escape the labyrinth of conflicting national laws, international merchants 
submit their disputes to a-national arbitral bodies, and increasingly, arbitrators are 
resolving disputes by applying an a-national body of private customary law -  lex 
mercatoria.
A new lex mercatoria is rapidly developing in the world of international 
commerce. There exists an autonomous commercial legal regime that has grown 
independently of the national systems of law. It is the desire of the business community 
to have an efficient and self-enforcing system of law that has led to the emergence of a 
new lex mercatoria, the universality of which can promote cross-border transactions. 
The evaluation of lex mercatoria is central to the elaboration of a trans-border rule of 
law and to efforts to harmonise world adjudicatory practices.384 The New York 
Convention’s popularity in different legal, political and economic systems reflects its 
flexibility compatible to lex mercatoria. The provisions in the New York Convention 
continue to be widely acceptable although the Convention has been in existence for 
around sixty years. Furthermore, the popularity is also demonstrated by the fact that the 
chapter on recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in the UNCITRAL Model 
Law was closely modelled on the main provisions of the New York Convention, and 
that the solutions of the New York Convention have been incorporated into multilateral 
and many bilateral international treaties. The development of lex mercatoria, however, 
requires the members of the New York Convention to demonstrate their further
381 Dennis Thompson, ‘Court Decision: Soc. Pabalk TicaretLtd Sirketi v. Soc. anon. Nor so lor' (1985) 2(2) 
J Int’l Arb 67-76.
382 Carlo Croff, op. cit. 623.
383 Mark A. Buchanan, ‘Public Policy and International Commercial Arbitration’ (1988) 26 Am Bus L J 
511.
384 There are projects aimed at making lex mercatoria principles more readily identifiable, notably the 
Transnational Law Database set up by the University of Cologne’s Centre for Transnational Law, through 
what has been termed as “creeping codification”. See www.tldb.uni-koeln.de
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willingness, through the judiciaries, to recognise and embrace more self-governing rules 
of the international commercial community. This kind of willingness needs a new level 
of flexibility in implementing the New York Convention, eventually a neo-New York 
Convention.
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CHAPTER 5 PUBLIC POLICY AND THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
Public policy, along with the closely related issue of the role and function of the state 
courts in commercial arbitration, is the most controversial issue in the New York 
Convention and is the key topic of this chapter.
A discussion of public policy can be far-reaching but the focus of this chapter is 
from a more macro perspective. This chapter starts with the basic concept of public 
policy and focuses on two constitutive aspects of public policy within the framework of 
the New York Convention. The issue of arbitrability appears in the early stage of 
arbitration proceedings where courts will exert judicial discretion to conduct substantive 
or procedural review over the dispute which is arbitrable or not by reference to public 
policy. At the end of an arbitration proceeding, courts have the last resort not to 
recognise and enforce arbitral awards on the ground that arbitral awards are in violation 
of public policy.
A review of judicial approaches to public policy law follows in Part 2. Currently, 
the major judicial approaches dealing with public policy in international commercial 
arbitration are, respectively, to draw a distinction between substantive and procedural 
laws and to distinguish national and international disputes. Attention needs to be given 
to the fact that most courts may only describe what the public policy is but rarely 
explain the underlying rationale, which is classified as the distinction between 
prescriptive and normative public policy. Normative public policy is analysed in Part 3 
in detail. In addition to the core concept of normative public policy, the discussion will 
focus on the options available to achieve the normative public policy according to game 
theory. Public policy is a major concern to most states in international commercial 
arbitration. However, the development of international commercial arbitration needs 
more recognition of party autonomy and less judicial intervention from the states. 
Therefore, the role and function of states in the era of globalisation will be studied so 
that the significance of public policy and party autonomy can be understood in a larger 
picture.
Part 4 tries to explore the possibility of framing the normative public policy 
theory in the “real world”. The basic idea is to assess the possibility of forming the 
normative public policy based on game theory. For instance, the critical issue can be 
whether the normative public policy regime can be built up through a “federalism” 
model and global legislation. In Part 5, jurisprudential analysis will be applied in 
discussing the possibility of building up a world legal framework so that public policy
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will not be manipulated by states to constrain but facilitate international commercial 
arbitration. Market economic theory and democratic process have become defining 
elements of contemporary international law. Is the normative public policy compatible 
with these fundamental theories? This part of the discussion is more focussed on the 
problems in globalisation such as the transplant to developing countries.
Part 6 would discuss how to make use of the current international legal system 
to solve the divergence of local practice and to strengthen the convergence of 
harmonised practice. The chapter will conclude in Part 7 with a conclusive summary.
1. C o n c e p t  a n d  P r a c t ic e  o f  P u b l ic  P o l ic y
Public policy is not a determinate but malleable legal concept which has been judicially 
compared to “a very unruly horse and when once you get astride it you never know 
where it will carry you”.1
1.1 A rbitrability and Public Policy
According to Article V(2)(a) of the New York Convention, enforcement of an arbitral 
award may be refused “if the competent authority in the country where recognition and 
enforcement is sought finds that the subject matter of the difference is not capable of 
settlement by arbitration under the laws of that country”. The concept of arbitrability 
reflects the level of judicial control the court exerts over arbitration. When one party 
submits the dispute to arbitration, the other party is entitled to stay the proceeding. The 
courts will consider whether national public policy denies the parties’ right to 
arbitration or should reserve for the exclusive jurisdiction of its national courts. The 
current position in the international regime is that no uniform standard is set nor does 
exist among all states on the scope of arbitrable matters.3
Apart from those explicitly excluded from arbitrable matters by statutes, courts 
will judicially determine a number of matters as non-arbitrable according to public 
policy. Some obvious examples are disputes relating to family law4 or criminal law or
1 Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 228 at 252.
2 Stephen M. Schwebel and Susan G. Lahne, ‘Public Policy and Arbitral Procedure’ in Pieter Sanders (ed), 
Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration (Kluwer 1978) 205, 208; and 
generally Julian D.M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration (Oceana, Dobbs 
Ferry, New York 1978).
3 G. Gaja, International Commercial Arbitration: New York Convention (3 Vols., Oceana, Dobbs Ferry, 
New York 1990) IB  2.
4 In the US, marital status and capacity are within the exclusive jurisdiction o f the courts o f law. Thomas
E. Carbonneau, ‘A Consideration of Alternatives to Divorce Litigation’ (1986) U 111 L Rev 1119, 1159. 
However, arbitration in most areas o f family law has been gradually acceptable to US courts. Stephen W.
225
disputes in which a compromise cannot be reached through arbitration. As a result, 
matrimonial disputes and cases involving parent-child relationships are non-arbitrable.5 
Also, these non-arbitrable disputes include public law concerns such as those arising 
under the Constitution or mandatory laws. For example, in England, an award 
concerning the illegality or criminality of a transaction cannot be enforced. Therefore, 
these matters are exclusively reserved for state courts due to the public law nature and 
protection of public interests.6 Similarly, a dispute concerning a contract tainted by 
bribery, fraud and corruption are not suitable for arbitration as well because the dispute 
is no longer a contractual one in nature and “the general principles denying arbitrators
n
the power to entertain disputes of this nature”. In Argentinian Bribery, Judge 
Lagergren held that contracts tainted by bribery, fraud or corruption could not be
Q
enforced by arbitral tribunals or judges (ex turpi causa action non oritur). Lagergren 
referred to “the general principles denying arbitrators the power to entertain disputes of 
this nature” and declined jurisdiction after it was established that “the agreement 
between the parties contemplated the bribing of Argentine officials”. In his view, 
“parties who ally themselves in an enterprise of [such] nature must realise that they have 
forfeited any right to ask for assistance of the machinery of justice (national Courts or 
arbitral tribunals) in settling their disputes”. It was found later that this may not be the 
best approach to deal with such cases.9 Assuming that any initial illegality did not 
directly impeach the arbitration clause, the arbitrator should assume jurisdiction 
according to the principles of severability and kompetenz-kompetenz even if the 
contract itself is null and void. The arbitrator should rule that the contract is null and 
void because it is tainted by fraud, corruption or bribery. Such approach has been 
expressed very eloquently by the US Supreme Court10 and the Court of Appeal in 
England.11
Schlissel, ‘A Proposal for Final and Binding Arbitration of Initial Custody Determination’ (1992) 26 Fam 
L Q 76-77.
5 Florian F. Haase, ‘Arbitration Awards in German International Business Relations’ (2005) I.C.C.L.R. 
143.
6 Jason C.T. Chuah, Law o f  International Trade (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1998) 416.
7 See Argentinian Bribery case, ICC Award No. 1110; J. Gillis Wetter, ‘Issues of Corruption before 
International Arbitral Tribunal: The Authentic Text and True Meaning of Judge Gunnar Lagergren’s 1963 
Award in ICC Case No. 1110’ (1994) 10(3) Arb Int’l 277.
8 Ibid. The case concerned a contract between a British company and an Argentine intermediary who was 
engaged to obtain a public works contract in Argentina. In return, the intermediary was to receive a 
commission of 10% of the contract value. The British company then refused to pay the promised 
commission, and the dispute was referred to Judge Lagergren as a sole arbitrator.
9 ICC Award No. 5622; ‘Switzerland Cour de Justice [Court of Appeal], Geneva, 17 November 1989, 
Tribunal Federal [Supreme Court], 17 April 1990, OTV v. Hilmarton’ (1994) XIX Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer & Boston) 214-222.
10 “ ... if  the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself - an issue which goes to the
‘making’ of the agreement to arbitrate -  the federal Court may proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory
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Most commercial and civil matters do not pose the problem of arbitrability. 
Nevertheless, there are some subject matters which are not entirely clear whether they 
can be resolved by arbitration, or which aspects of the dispute are arbitrable. National 
laws may exclude them from the arbitrable category of disputes due to the expansion of 
public policy concern. In Australia, for example, disputes concerning insurance 
contracts12 and carriage of goods by sea13 are of limited arbitrability according to 
express legislative provisions. Trade practices disputes have also been a murky area. 
The Australian courts were previously more cautious in dealing with such disputes even 
though the courts of the US and New Zealand have held that trade practice disputes are 
fully arbitrable.14 More recently, however, Australian courts held that an arbitration 
clause was broad enough to encompass trade practices disputes.15 Likewise, bankruptcy 
and labour disputes are not arbitrable in some jurisdictions. These matters are of 
overwhelming public interest and are often heavily influenced by political policy 
considerations. Accordingly, labour arbitration is separate from commercial arbitration 
and often falls into the category of administrative law.
Non-arbitrable matters, from one time to another, included disputes concerning
1A 17 1 ftpatent and trademark filings, competition law, securities claims, foreign illegality
language does not permit the federal Court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract 
generally” . Prima Paint Co. v Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Corp., 388 US 395 (1967).
“In English law the principle o f separability of an arbitration clause contained in a written contract 
could give jurisdiction to an arbitrator under that clause to determine a dispute over the initial validity or 
invalidity o f the written contract provided that the arbitration clause itself was not directly impeached. 
Furthermore, an issue as to the initial illegality of the contract was also capable of being referred to 
arbitration, provided that any initial illegality did not directly impeach the arbitration clause. In every case 
the logical question was not whether the issue o f illegality went to the validity of the contract, but whether 
it went to the validity of the arbitration clause”. Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd  v. Kansa General 
International Assurance Co Ltd and ors [1993] 3 All ER 897 (English Court o f Appeal).
12 Section 43 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), although parties are free to agree after a dispute 
has arisen to refer that dispute to arbitration, (s 43(2)).
13 Section 2C of the International Arbitration Act saving the continued operation o f s 9 of the Sea 
Carriage of Goods Act 1924 (Cth) and the operation of ss 11 and 16 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
1991 (Cth).
14 For the US, see Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth 473 US 614 (1984); and for New 
Zealand, see AG v. Mobil Oil New Zealand [1989] 2 NZLR 649.
15 The New South Wales Court of Appeal, IBM  Australia Ltd  v National Distribution Services Ltd, (1991) 
NSWLR 466. A similar finding was made in OH Tours Ltd  v. Ship Design and Management (Aust) Pty 
Ltd. (1991)33 FCR227.
16 The granting of a trademark or patent is a monopolistic right and a prerogative of the State. Disputes 
regarding the granting of such rights between the State and the applicant, which is a vertical relationship 
and administrative law in nature, are not capable of settlement by arbitration. The ICC’s Final Report on 
IP Disputes and Arbitration states that: “the existence, extent, meaning and application of such rights 
could legally only be definitively investigated, reviewed, ... revoked or confirmed by the authority which 
issued or granted the right [...] This had the effect that rights and entitlements to intellectual property, and 
the legal issues which flowed from those rights, could not usefully be referred to or considered by an 
arbitration tribunal”. The ICC International Court o f Arbitration Bulletin Vol.9/No.l -  May 1998, at 38. 
The disputes concerning patent infringement, validity of a copyright, and trademark claims are arbitrable. 
Joseph T. McLaughlin, ‘Arbitrability: Current Trends in the United States’ (1996) 12(2) Arb Int’l 135. 
These disputes involve a horizontal relationship between the parties to the commercial transaction.
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and punitive damages. These matters are of great importance to the public interest and 
even to “the democratic capitalism of the regime”. 19 For example, in respect of
competition-related matters, as Adam Smith pointed out, the proper functioning of the
00market is an important matter of public interest. Competition and antitrust laws protect 
the market from distorting practices such as cartels21 and, as a result, protect the 
essential fabrics of a market economy. Currently, cases involving antitrust disputes are 
still not arbitrable in domestic US disputes on the ground of public policy. Restrictions 
on the right to waive recourse to courts in favour of private arbitration are naturally 
imposed if courts perceive the private dispute as implicating a public policy issue so 
sensitive that it should be reserved for decision by public authorities, i.e., state courts. 
The underlying rationale of this proposition rests in part on the “mistrust of
arbitration”.22 Historically, it was claimed that “public law issues are too complicated
01for arbitrators” to apply the proper law, legal skills and theories to such issues. For 
example, in the opinion of the court in the case of Wilko v. Swan, arbitration of a claim 
under the Securities Act “requires subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of 
an alleged violator of the Act” and the arbitrator will make this determination under the 
strain of no “judicial instruction of law” 24 Besides, the court held that arbitration lacked 
the judicial system’s ability to provide investors with the level of protection necessitated
17 In the US, the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits contracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint of 
trade in interstate commerce, and creates both civil rights for damages against antitrust violators and 
criminal sanctions for violations Any person, who monopolise or attempts to monopolise, or combines 
with others to monopolise trade or commerce, shall be guilty o f a felony and punishable by fine 
(including treble damages) or imprisonment. Civil actions may be filed by the Federal government or a 
private party.
8 The arbitrability o f securities disputes was extended in 1987 to the domestic case of Shearson v. 
McMahon, 482 US 220; 107 S.Ct. 2332 (1987). A survey in 1995 showed that over 10 million of the 
contracts contained arbitration clauses. See Constantine N. Katsoris, ‘Foreword to New York Stock 
Exchange, Inc. Symposium on Arbitration in the Securities Industry’ (1995) 63(5) Fordham L Rev 1495, 
1525. Customers seem to insist that the brokerage firms honour arbitration clauses. The reason for this 
can be seen in the investor friendly Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton decision, 115 S Ct 1212, 
U.S. Supreme Court, March 6, 1995. See William E. Huth, ‘Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 
Inc. 115 S Ct 1212, U.S. Supreme Court, March 6, 1995’ (1995) 89(3) Am J Int’l L 601-603.
19 See Sigvard Jarvin, ‘Arbitrability o f Anti-trust Disputes: The Mitsubishi v. Soler Case’ (1985) 2(3) J 
Int’l Arb 69; American Safety Equipment Corp. v Maguire (J.P.) & Co.; 391 F.2d 821 (2d) cir. (1968). 
One of the four reasons the Court o f Appeal listed in support o f non-arbitrability of antitrust cases was 
“the fundamental importance to American democratic capitalism of the regime o f the antitrust laws and 
the pivotal role played by private parties -  by means of the private action for treble damages -  in aiding 
enforcement of the antitrust laws”.
20 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f  the Wealth o f  Nations (Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1869).
21 Article 81 o f EC Treaty.
22 482 US at 233.
23 William Park, ‘National Law and Commercial Justice -  Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in 
International Arbitration’ (1989) 63 Tulane L Rev 648, 700.
24 346 US 435-436(1953).
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by the Securities Act.25 There is a risk that the entire community loses out as a result of 
the arbitrator’s failure to interpret and apply the law appropriately when arbitrators must 
interpret a statute that implicates the public policy.
There are other policy considerations for non-arbitrability such as non­
recognition of a foreign law which is penal only,26 which may result in a punitive award,
77involvement of arbitrators chosen from a foreign business community, and the public 
law nature of competition law to promote trade other than private rights and to impose 
criminal penalties other than merely monetary damages.28 Disputes arising out of or in 
connection with illegal contracts are not arbitrable because foreign revenue and penal
70laws are generally not enforceable in one country at the suit of a foreign government. 
As Lord Denning said, “these Courts do not sit to collect taxes for another country or to 
inflict punishments for it”.30 Therefore, these disputes are legitimately in the sole 
jurisdiction of national courts and arbitration on these disputes may not be judicially 
allowed.
The current judicial trend, however, is a pro-arbitration bias. Courts have more 
confidence in arbitration procedures31 and recognise the capacity of arbitral tribunals to 
deal with factual and legal complexities of statutory claims32 and to provide sufficient 
protection to investors.33 Accordingly, courts have been more inclined to bring new 
subject matters such as antitrust and competition issues into the arbitrable domain.34 
This liberalisation approach in turn becomes a strong national public policy and the 
importance of some policy concerns decreases. In Germany, for example, the
25 Ibid. The Court o f Appeal in the case of American Safety Equipment Corp. v Maguire (J.P.) & Co.; 391
F.2d 821 (2d) cir. (1968) was of the opinion that “antitrust issues, prone to complication, require 
sophisticated legal and economic analysis, and are thus ill-adapted to the strengths of the arbitral process,
i.e., expedition, minimal requirements of written rationale, simplicity, resort to basic concepts of common 
sense and simple equity” .
26 Laminoirs, etc. v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
27 American Safety Equipment Corp. v Maguire (J.P.) & Co.; 391 F.2d 821 (2d) cir. (1968). The Court of 
Appeal claimed that “decisions as to antitrust regulation of business are too important to be dealt with by 
arbitrators chosen from the business community -  particularly those from a foreign community that has 
had no experience with or exposure to US law and values”.
28 As far as the UK and EU are concerned, the determination of anti-competitive practices is primarily a 
matter for the jurisdiction of the administrating body such as the EU Commission.
29 However, a party to a civil action may plead the foreign illegality o f a contract even if  the illegality is 
in respect o f a law o f a penal or revenue nature. D.M. Day & Bemardette Griffin, The Law o f  
International Trade (Butterworths, London 1993) 178.
30 In Regazzoni v K C S e th ia  (1944) Ltd. [1956] 2 QB 490 at 515.
31 482 US at 233-34.
32 Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler, 473 US 614 (1985).
33 Shearson/American Express v. McMahon.
34 Antoine Kirry, ‘Arbitrability: Current Trends in Europe’ (1996) 12(4) Arb Int’l 373; John Beechey, 
‘Arbitrability of Anti-trust/Competition Law Issues -  Common Law’ (1996) 12(2) Arb Int’l 188.
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liberalising reform allows arbitration of revocation or declaring patents void.35 In some 
jurisdictions such as Belgium, legislation has been changed to allow arbitral tribunals to 
order payment of a penal sum.36 As a practical matter, the jurisprudence of arbitrability 
of securities claims has “established that most disputes in the securities industry will be 
resolved not in the courts but through arbitration”.37 In principle, non-arbitrable disputes 
are outside the purview of the New York Convention. This paradigm rule is catered by 
national laws such as section 103(3) of the English Arbitration Act which provides that 
enforcement of an award may be refused if the award is in respect of a matter which is 
not capable of settlement by arbitration.
1.2 Public Polity in Article V(2)(b) o f the New York Convention 
The fundamental importance of public policy in the arbitration regime relates to the 
enforcement of arbitral awards. Judges may review an arbitral award at the enforcement 
stage. Blackmun J made this clear in Mitsubishi’.
“Having permitted the arbitration to go forward, the national Courts of the 
United States will have the opportunity at the award enforcement stage to ensure 
that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the ... laws has been addressed. 
The [New York] Convention reserves each signatory country the right to refuse 
enforcement of an award where the ‘recognition and enforcement of the award 
would be contrary to the public policy of that country’. Article V(2)(b). While 
the efficacy of the arbitral process requires that substantive review at the award- 
enforcement stage remains minimal,... ”.38
Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention allows the court in which 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is sought to refuse enforcement on the 
defendant’s motion or sua sponte, if “enforcement of the award would be contrary to the 
public policy of [the forum] country”. While the term “public policy” is used in the 
English text of Article V, the term “ordre public” appears in the French text and is 
adopted in such civil law countries as Germany and France. It is well recognised that 
“no single English expression is equivalent to ordre public” as it is much broader than
35 Daniel Paul Simms, ‘Arbitrability o f Intellectual Property Disputes in Germany’ (1999) 15(2) Arb Int’l 
195.
36 Traditionally the Belgian doctrine has held that an arbitral tribunal could not order payment of a penal 
sum which was changed by the new Article 1709bis JC. See M. Storme and B. Demeulenaere, 
International Commercial Arbitration in Belgium (Kluwer, Antwerpen 1989) 73.
37 Lewis D. Lowenfels and Alan R. Bromberg, ‘Securities Industry Arbitration: An Examination and 
Analysis’ (1989) 53 Albany L Rev 755, 757.
38 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 US 614; 105 S.Ct. 3346; 87 L.Ed.2d 444 
(1985).
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“public policy”.39 Although Article V(2)(b) is the only provision in the New York 
Convention explicitly mentioning the term “public policy”, other provisions may be of 
relevance in interpreting or applying that term. Article V(l)(b), for example, allows a 
court to refuse enforcement of an award if the award violates basic standards of due 
process.40 The legislative history of this provision provides no definite guidance as to 
its construction. Its precursors in the Geneva Convention and the New York 
Convention’s ad hoc committee draft extended the public policy exception to awards 
contrary to “principles of the law” and awards in violation of “fundamental principles of 
law”, respectively. The uncertainty still exists in most jurisdictions and is likely to be 
interpreted by the judiciary widely enough to cover many other ways in which an award 
can offend public policy.
Many of the judicial decisions refusing enforcement of arbitral awards are made 
on the grounds of such public policy concerns as due process, fraud or the breach of 
natural justice. The US court in Parsons v. Whittemore held that Article V(2)(b) of the 
New York Convention “essentially sanctions the application of the forum state’s 
standards of due process” 41 The English court must also be satisfied that the rules of 
natural justice have been complied with in the arbitration proceeding and the making of 
the award 42 This requirement has several aspects. Where the party against whom the 
enforcement of award is sought is not given sufficient notice to present his case, the 
enforcement of award must be refused. Where a party is under some legal incapacity 
and is not properly represented, this too would constitute a breach of procedural justice 
and there can be no enforcement of that award.43 Errors of law do not per se conflict 
with public policy. However, awards in deliberate and manifest disregard of the law 
may not be enforced.44 The courts of England, France and the United States have all 
attempted in recent years to facilitate the conduct of international arbitration by 
loosening the public policy restraint on arbitration. England has incorporated a public 
policy favouring the autonomy of contracting parties to choose arbitration as a dispute
39 Kurt H. Nadelmann and Arthur T. von Mehren, ‘Equivalences in Treaties in the Conflicts Field’ (1966- 
1967) 15 Am J Comp L 195, 200.
40 Article V(l)(b) is intended to be raised by the party defending against enforcement (“at the request of 
the party against whom it is invoked”) while Article V(2)(b) is to be raised by the court itself (“may be 
refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought”).
41 Parsons v. Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe generate de I ’industrie dupapier (RAKTA), 508 F. 
2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1974).
42 Jason C.T. Chuah, Law o f  International Trade (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1998) 413.
43 Section 37(2)(b) of the English Arbitration Act (1950).
44 Sidarma Societa Italiana etc v Holt Marine, 515 F Supp 1362 (1981).
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resolution means which “prevails over the public policy favouring judicial review of 
arbitration awards”.45
Public policy is also implemented in the setting-aside stage of an arbitral 
award.46 Grounds for setting aside an award are normally based on public policy 
principles of the country of rendition rather than the country of enforcement. As the 
purpose of the setting-aside proceeding is to ensure that a minimum standard of fairness 
is provided to parties in arbitration, the power of the court may be seen as an overall 
compliance check of the award with the fundamental principles of the State. In contrast, 
Article V(2)(b) is a permissive mandate which means that the court has a certain 
discretion to overrule the defence and to grant the enforcement of the award if the court 
views the violation of the public policy of the award is not of such a nature and extent 
so as to prevent enforcement of the award.
2 . J u d ic ia l  A p p r o a c h e s  t o  P u b l ic  P o l ic y
The issue of judicial approaches to public policy, to some extent, is the same as the 
issue of the relationship between national courts and arbitrators as well as between 
national laws and applicable law in arbitration. There are basically two aspects. From 
the perspective of the court, national courts used to view any agreement between the 
parties to arbitrate as an effort to oust the courts’ supervisory powers which is contrary 
to the public policy and therefore is null and void.47 A measure of control is necessary 
to be exercised by the court over arbitrations such as the conduct of arbitration, the 
making of awards, the application of laws, etc. From the perspective of arbitration, the 
similarity in the arbitral territory and the consensual nature of the process bred by 
national legal traditions makes for a process that functions within defined parameters 
under the umbrella of the national judicial system. Arbitrators are bound to consider the 
provisions in the agreement between the parties as well as the applicable law and to 
observe the prevailing legal norms of fairness and justice in the proceeding within the 
confines of the state. It is certain that minimum standards of natural justice or due 
process shall be observed and adhered to in the arbitration proceeding. Unlike domestic 
arbitration, the entire situation becomes more complicated once a dispute transcends 
sovereignty boundaries. Although the imperatives guiding international arbitration vary 
from those directing arbitrators and judges operating within the framework of national
45 Steven J. Stein and Daniel R. Wotman, ‘International Commercial Arbitration in the 1980s: A 
Comparison of the Major Arbitral Systems and Rules’ (1983) 38 Bus Law 1685.
46 See Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
47 Czarnikow v. Roth, Schmidt & Co. [1922] 2 K.B. 478, C.A.
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legislation and judicial system, national laws play a role in sustaining and supporting 
the international system of dispute resolution through arbitration. Logically, the national 
law is supplementary to all stages of the arbitration proceeding including the 
enforcement of the arbitral award.
2.1 Distinction between Substantive and Procedural Laws
The distinction between the substance and procedure is a principal element of 
international commercial arbitration. This segregation of the law applicable to the 
substantive side of the dispute from the law applicable to the arbitration procedure 
indicates that the arbitral process may be independent from the system of law that 
regulates rights and obligations of the parties. The segregation also implicitly 
acknowledges that the choice and application of two sets of applicable laws may be 
subject to different considerations. Therefore, the public policy relating to the 
substantive and procedural sides of the dispute shall not be the same. The explanatory 
memorandum that accompanied the Australian International Arbitration Act Bill in 
1988 adopted this distinction by requiring compliance with the “procedural justice as 
well as substantive principles of law and justice”.
As far as the law governing the arbitration proceeding is concerned, there is 
much to be said for setting an international standard by which international arbitration 
should be superintended, as opposed to leaving each State to enact and enforce its own 
local standards, which may run contrary to the aspirations of foreign arbitrating parties. 
The current trend is moving towards the harmonisation of international arbitral practices 
through the uniform adoption of internationally accepted standards for the conduct of 
the arbitration proceeding, one of which is enforcement of arbitral awards. Significantly, 
both the New York Convention and the Model Law, which are the two major pieces of 
global legislation on international commercial arbitration, demand that the arbitration 
process conform to international minimum standards such as the restriction imposed on 
the substantive review of arbitral awards by the court while it respects the doctrine of 
party autonomy. The prevailing view is that the disregard or ignorance of imperative 
procedural requirements in the domestic law of the arbitral situs constitutes a breach of 
public policy.48 These requirements are usually in the form of “international due 
process” or “procedural irregularities” which often includes equal treatment of the 
parties, proper notices in respect of the conduct of the proceeding and appointment of
48 Julian D.M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration (Oceania Publications, New 
York 1978) 536.
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arbitrators, fair and equal opportunity to present the case and evidence, or ex parte of 
relevant evidence, etc.49 In the same vein, a statute of limitations defence may not be an 
arbitrable matter as well due to its mandatory nature.50 Legislative efforts have been 
made in some jurisdiction such as England to draw up an exhaustive list of what 
constitutes serious irregularity affecting the proceeding.51 Nonetheless, no agreement 
has been reached as to the scope or overage of “procedural irregularities” among all 
jurisdictions.
As to the substance or merits of the dispute, the doctrine of party autonomy 
prevails in “virtually all international conventions dealing with arbitration and contract 
law”. However, the true situation is more complicated than this stand-alone principle. 
The controversy surrounding party autonomy in choosing the substantive law, for 
example, can be that the parties will resort to lex mercatoria.53 Equally controversial is 
the parties’ decision to allow the arbitrator to act as an amiable compositeur, freeing 
him from the designated responsibility to apply systemised principles of law.54 These 
controversial areas may necessitate the states to exert judicial or legislative discretion 
and impose public policy restraints on arbitrators who are then bound to observe some 
mandatory rules. In most jurisdictions, judicial review over the merits of arbitral awards 
is usually allowed, in the context of both domestic and international arbitrations.
Mandatory rules of national law are frequently applied by international 
arbitration tribunals regardless of the choice made by the parties. This seems inevitable 
because the parties’ choice of law in no way precludes a tribunal from determining the 
applicable law which may have connections with a jurisdiction. Every arbitrator has to 
consider the importance of preserving commercial arbitration as an independent 
instrument for the settlement of international disputes. On the other hand, like courts 
which arbitrators or tribunals replace, arbitral tribunals or arbitrators must consider the
49 Totem Marine Tug & Barge Inc. v. North American Towing Inc. 607 F.2d 649 (5th Circ. 1979).
50 Smith Barney et al. v. Luckie, 85 NY 2d 198 (1995).
51 These are (a) failure of the tribunal to comply with its general duty contained in s. 33; (b) the tribunal
exceeding its powers; (c) failure by the tribunal to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the
procedure agreed by the parties; (d) failure by the tribunal to deal with all the issues that were put to it; (e) 
any arbitral or other institution or person vested by the parties with powers exceeding its powers; (f) 
uncertainty or ambiguity as to the effect o f the award; (g) the award being obtained by fraud or the award 
or the manner in which it was procured being contrary to public policy; (h) failure to comply with the 
requirements as to the form of the award; (i) admitted irregularity in the conduct o f proceedings. Section 
68(2) o f the English Arbitration Act 1996.
52 Okezie Chukwumerije, Choice o f  Law in International Commercial Arbitration (Quorum Books, 
Westport, Connecticut and London 1994) 130-31.
53 See Chapter 5 of this dissertation.
54 Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit. at 117.
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public policy of a country that is closely connected with and relevant to the dispute.55 
The reputation of arbitration may suffer and the judicial support of the state courts may 
deteriorate if arbitration itself is used as means to evade public policies of those 
countries which have a stake in the subject-matter of the dispute. Therefore, a natural 
question is how and to what extent arbitral tribunals or arbitrators should apply 
mandatory rules of a state. In determining the particular national public policy system to 
be implemented in the arbitral process, as proposed, “the requisite test should be the 
connection of the jurisdiction (whose policy is at issue) to the dispute and the nature of 
the policy involved”56 regardless of the fact that the national law of that jurisdiction is 
not the governing law chosen by the parties to the dispute.
This “close connection” test may not be workable in a more liberal arbitration 
regime. The restrictive and intervening effect of a country’s public policy and 
mandatory rules is neither consistent nor compatible with the spirit of party autonomy 
and may further nullify the parties’ agreement or an arbitral award, in whole or in part. 
Such a test usually invalidates self-contained arbitration rules on the basis of party 
autonomy and underpins the legitimacy of the arbitration regime. It seems implausible 
that arbitral tribunals or arbitrators should depart from the decision which they would 
otherwise make in order to further the interests and public policy of all countries which 
are connected to a cross-border and multi-party dispute. In other words, due to the lack 
of a functional definition, the “close connection” test does not appear to be workable in 
particular when a dispute has close connections with various jurisdictions. Technically, 
multi-nationals sometimes seek escape from an onerous public policy restraint by 
choosing to have their contracts governed by the law of a country with more liberal 
norms. If there is a risk that such a choice of law clause might be declared invalid as 
against the public policy, one way of avoiding the potential invalidity would be to 
submit future disputes to arbitral tribunals or arbitrators who do not share the judicial 
respect for the mandatory public norms in question. These strategic devices may prove 
to be of great utility in practice.
The next question is whether mandatory rules should take priority over the 
doctrine of party autonomy as well as the arbitral tribunal or arbitrator’s way to promote 
fairness and justice in arbitration. The application of public policy may be dependent
55 Ole Lando, ‘The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration’ [1985] 34 Int’l & Comp L Q 
764-8.
56 Okezie Chukwumerije, op. cit. 203.
235
upon the express agreement by the parties in the arbitration clause,57 the mandatory 
requirement in national laws and regulations, or arbitrators’ own consciences or 
personal standards of morality and propriety. An individual party’s preference to apply 
mandatory rules to arbitration may be rare. Nevertheless, the moral and justice 
considerations do exist in reality. The standard of morality would oblige arbitral 
tribunals or arbitrators to take into account the public policy in arbitrating such disputes
CO
as contracts obtained by, or involving, corruption or other wrong-doings. 
Internationally recognised defences also include duress, mistake, fraud,59 waiver or a 
breach of fundamental policies of the forum state.60 The notion of justice may also 
oblige arbitral tribunals or arbitrators to consider the public policy in cases, for example, 
where, after the making of the contract, specific performance was prohibited by the law 
of the country where that performance would result in criminal penalty.61 A better view 
is that arbitral tribunals or arbitrators should only apply public policy and mandatory 
rules which are designed to protect public interests rather than the interest of a particular 
party to the dispute. The application of public policy and mandatory rules by arbitrators 
or arbitration tribunals is indeed supplementary to the mandatory rules and public policy 
to be applied by courts at the set-aside and enforcement stages. Courts can still set aside 
or refuse to enforce an arbitral award that operates in tandem with a choice-of-law 
clause as a “prospective waiver” of sensitive public policy.62
2.2 Distinction between National and International Disputes
The applicability of public policy in many jurisdictions such as France, the US and 
Argentina traditionally requires a distinction between national and international public 
polices. National public policy focuses on interests and values cherished by the national 
community at large. Accordingly, the application of national public policy contemplates
57 A.J.E. Jaffey, ‘Essential Validity of Contracts in the English Conflict of Laws’ (1974) 23 Int’l & Comp 
L Q 1, 3-8 (arguing that an express choice of a governing law should not in itself lead to the application 
of that law’s invalidating rules).
58 Ole Lando, ‘The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1985) 34 Int’l & Comp L Q 
765; Julian D.M. Lew, ‘Determination of Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction and Public Policy Limitations’ in 
Julian D.M. Lew (ed), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1987) 82-5.
59 Renshaw  v. Queen Anne Mansions Co. [1897] 1 QB 662.
60 Tennessee Imports Inc. v. Pier Paulo Filippi and Prix Italia SRL, 5 Mealey’s International Arbitration 
Report (1990) E7; Rhone Mediterranee Compagnia v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50 (3rd Cir. 1983).
61 In English law this is the rule in Ralli Brothers v. Compania Naviera Soyay Aznar [1920] 2 K.B. 287 
that the arbitrators might not apply it in respect of an illegality existing at the time of the contract, on the 
ground that the party concerned should have anticipated this predicament.
62 W. Michael Reisman, W. Laurence Craig, William Park, Jan Paulsson, International Commercial 
Arbitration, Cases, Materials and Notes on The Resolution o f  International Business Disputes (The 
Foundation Press Inc., New York 1997) 381-2.
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the absolute exclusion of foreign law and legal principles contradictory with the 
national public policy, which is the case in Argentina.63 In contrast, courts, for example, 
in England, used to be given more considerable leeway to intervene in and exercise 
various supervisory powers over international arbitrations and awards.64 As part of the 
judicial effort, the current trend has been moving in the direction of limiting judicial 
involvement in the cross-border arbitration process. Hence, international arbitration is 
generally treated more liberally with greater respect for the doctrine of party autonomy 
and far less judicial intrusion in the arbitration process than in domestic arbitration.
As some leading cases have indicated, there is growing judicial predilection to 
expand the ambit of arbitratiblity in transnational disputes. This trend originated in the 
US which used to hold a hostile attitude towards arbitration but now, more often than 
not, permits business people to arbitrate some matters that were previously considered 
non-arbitrable. In the well-known case of Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler- 
Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.,65 the US Supreme Court stated in a 5:3 decision that antitrust 
claims are arbitrable in an international context since: “[t]he Bremen and Scherk [cases] 
establish a strong presumption in favour of enforcement of freely negotiated contractual 
choice of forum provisions. ... Thus we must weigh the concerns ... against a strong 
belief in the efficacy of arbitral procedures for the resolution of international 
commercial disputes and an equal commitment to the enforcement of freely negotiated 
choice of forum clauses. ... Accordingly, we ‘require this representative of the 
American business community to honour its bargain’... by holding this agreement to 
arbitrate ‘enforceable]’...”66 In response to the argument that anti-trust claims were 
inappropriate for arbitration owing to the “pervasive public interest” in enforcing anti­
trust law, the US Supreme Court stated that “concerns of international comity, respect 
for the capacities of foreign transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the 
international system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we 
enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be 
forthcoming in a domestic context”.67 The US Supreme Court powerfully advocates the 
need for international comity in an increasingly interdependent world. Such respect is
63 Article 14(2) of Argentine Civil Code.
64 J. Kodwo Bentil, ‘Making England a More Attractive Venue for International Commercial Arbitration 
by Less Judicial Oversight’ (1988) 5(1) J Int’l Arb 50.
65 See Sigvard Jarvin, ‘Arbitrability of Anti-trust Disputes: The Mitsubishi v Soler Case’ (1985) 2(3) J 
Int’l Arb 69.
66 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 US 614; 105 S.Ct. 3346; 87 L.Ed. 2d 
444 (1985).
67 473 US 614 at 629.
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especially important, in this Court’s view, when parties mutually agree to be bound by 
freely negotiated contracts”.68
Wilko v. Swan clearly established that securities transactions are not arbitrable.69 
However, the 1974 decision of Fritz Scherk v Alberto-Culver foreshadowed this case- 
based principle. The US Supreme Court recognised the validity of an ICC arbitration 
clause in a contract by which an American company acquired shares of a German 
citizen’s business. The Court held that federal securities claims in the international 
context are arbitrable. It reached this decision even though the claim concerned 
fraudulent representation of the status of the trademark rights, which is a violation of
70section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. As a practical 
matter, Wilko's holding with respect to the arbitrability of federal securities claims is a 
dead letter after the judgments of McMahon71 and Rodriguez de Quijas,72 and 
arbitration since then has been “no longer an alternative to litigation ... but widespread 
practice” in securities disputes.
The trend of expanding the domain of arbitrable matters also spreads to other 
jurisdictions such as Belgium.74 The judicial trend, on the other hand, is reflected in 
limiting the use of public policy in commercial arbitration. For instance, in England, the 
practice has been changed to minimise the judicial interference in international 
commercial arbitration. The English High Court was precluded from allowing a party to 
an international arbitration to appeal to it on a question of law arising from an award if 
the parties to the reference in question have entered into a written agreement which 
excludes the right of appeal.75 This is consistent with the English courts’ effort to let the
7public policy give way to the need for greater finality in arbitral awards.
What drives this change then? The reasons in Mitsubishi allowing a case that 
essentially involved antitrust matters to be settled by arbitration rested mainly on the
68 ‘United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, 17 March 1987, No. 86-2014-Y Societe 
Nationale Algerienne Pour La Recherche, La Production, La Transport, La Transformation et La 
Commercialization De Hydrocar’bures (Sonatrach) (Algeria) v. Distrigas Corp. (US)’ (1995) XX 
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/Boston) 795-804.
69 Wilko v. Swan 346 US 427 (1953).
70 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver A l l  US 506 (1974).
71 Shearson/American Express v. McMahon 482 US 220 (1987).
72 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express 490 US A l l  (1989). The court made it clear that 
Wilko was wrongly decided.
73 Robert S. Clemente, ‘Trends in Securities Industry Arbitration’ (Sep/Oct 1996) New York State Bar J 
20 .
74 Luc Demeyere, ‘1998 Amendments to Belgian Arbitration Law: An Overview’ (1999) 15(3) Arb Int’l 
303.
75 Section 3(1) of the English Arbitration Act 1979.
76 [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 423; Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v. Salen Rederierna A.B. [1985] 1 A.C. 
191, [1984] 3 W.L.R. 592, [1984] 3 All E.R. 229.
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international nature and dimension of the dispute. In the US, the courts make a 
distinction between international and domestic agreements or transactions and are of the 
opinion that “the [New York] Convention does not contemplate the expression of local 
public policy as a barrier to the arbitrability of claims”.77 For example, in Scherk, the 
court recognised the nature of the agreement as “the significant and crucial difference 
between Wilko and Scherk?* because the agreement in Scherk “was a truly international 
agreement” which implicated “considerations and policies significantly different from 
those found controlling in Wilko”.78 Similarly, the international nature of the transaction 
in Mitsubishi was also a determinative factor.
This distinction between international and domestic transactions and the 
recognition of the international nature of the transaction indicates the courts’ increasing 
concern over the cry of non-arbitrability which impairs the effectiveness and efficiency 
of arbitration in providing a neutral forum for adjudication of international business 
disputes. In a legitimate sense, for instance, if American courts fail to uphold an 
arbitration agreement on the basis that the dispute touches on non-arbitrable subject 
matters under US law, courts in other countries may be tempted to do the same when 
their nationals are conducting business with Americans. In such case, all parties 
concerned will suffer as they may have no alternative but go before non-neutral courts 
to argue or defend their cases in foreign languages under unfamiliar procedures 
according to foreign laws.
The judges in Scherk appreciated that US businesses are not able to do business 
in the world market exclusively on US terms, governed by US laws, and resolved in US
70Courts. This line of reasoning also appeared in other cases. The US Supreme Court 
held in The Bremen v. Zapata that: “The expansion of American business and industry 
will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial 
concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our Courts” and re­
emphasised the judicial position that “[the US businesses] cannot have trade and 
commerce in world markets ... exclusively on [US] our terms, governed by our laws 
and resolved in [US] Courts”.80
The judges in Mitsubishi Motors explicitly listed such distinctive considerations 
in cross-border transactions as the principle of international comity, a basic level of 
respect for international arbitrators, and sensitivity to the needs of international trade as
11 Develop. Bank o f  Philippines v. Chemtex Fibres Inc., 617 F. Supp. 55, 57 n. 12 (S.D.N.Y 1985).
78 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 US 506 (1974) 515.
79 Ibid.
80 Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co.; 407 US 1; 92 S.Ct. 1907; 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972).
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decisive factors. This distinction is also drawn by courts in New Zealand because 
“international trade and commercial relationships are of critical importance” even to a
O 1
small country. The English courts tended to discourage the exercise of judicial control 
in international commercial arbitration so as to impress upon the international business 
community the attractiveness of England as a venue for settling disputes by
89international arbitration in contemporary times.
These concerns or policy considerations drive the courts to distinguish between 
domestic and cross-border disputes and to adopt different approaches dealing with the 
arbitrability and public policy issues in two scenarios. The cornerstone of the 
consideration is to facilitate and favour international trade over an expansive application 
of domestic laws such as the securities law.83 As a result, some matters that are not 
arbitrable in a domestic context may be arbitrated when the controverted event covered 
by the arbitration clause has an international aspect. Gradually, the distinction of 
international public policy and national public policy has been adopted in national 
legislation and court decisions.84 The distinction between international and domestic
Of
disputes is also adopted in judicial review under the Model Law. Such a double 
standard might be justified by the objectives of fostering international commercial and 
economic intercourse, reciprocity, harmony, unification of international economic 
transactions as well as the particular need for neutrality in trans-border commercial 
dispute resolution and overly better result in a game theory.
It has been claimed that there is a category of “transnational public policy” 
including globally accepted norms of conduct with respect to international 
transactions.86 The concept is said to constitute private international law that represents
8' Attorney-General o f  New Zealand v. Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd. [1989] 2 NZLR 668.
82 Lord Hacking, ‘Where We Are Now: Trends and Developments Since the Arbitration Act 1979’ (1985) 
2 J Int’l Arb 7, 14.
83 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 US 506 (1974).
84 Decision o f 11 May 1983 No. 3 Ob 30/83, 38 Osterr. Juristen-Zeitung, pp. 519-21, Evidenzblatt No. 
142 (1983) 113 Clunet, p. 395 (1986), 56 Entscheidungen des osterr. Obersten Gerichtshofes in Zivil-ind 
Justizverwaltungssachen (SZ) No. 77 (1983). To the same effect Austrian Supreme Court, 23 February 
1983, No. 3 Ob 185/82 38 Osterr. Juristen-Zeitung 327, Evidenzblatt No. 84 (1983); 24 Zeitschfrift fiir 
Rechtsvergleichung 206 (1983).
85 Article 34(1) of the Model Law provides: “recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made 
only by an application for setting aside in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) o f this article”. 
Paragraph (2) sets out the grounds for setting aside an award, which are, in material respects, exactly the 
same as the grounds upon which an application for enforcement o f the award may be refused under 
Article 36. The only differences is that Article 36 is intended to apply to any international arbitral award 
irrespective of the country in which it was made, whereas Article 34 applies only to awards made within 
the country in which the application for setting aside is made. Consequently, the Model Law does not 
permit an arbitral award to be set aside on the ground of error committed within jurisdiction whether such 
error relates to a question of fact or o f law.
86 See M. Buchanan, ‘Public Policy and International Commercial Arbitration’ (1985) 26 Am Bus L J 
514-15.
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the “international consensus as to universal standards or accepted norms of conduct that 
must always apply and provide limitations to public as well as private international 
relationships and transactions”. There has been some judicial support for such a 
proposition. The Supreme Court of France has interpreted certain restrictive domestic 
policies as inapplicable to international commercial arbitration.88 In the US case of 
Parsons and Whitmore Overseas Co. v. Societe General de L ’Industrie du Papier, 
public policy was interpreted as “those mandatory norms that comprise a State’s most
QQ
basic notions of morality and justice”. The Court of Appeals, the Second Circuit, held 
that the concept of public policy employed in Article V(2)(b) of the New York 
Convention is narrower than the notion of national policy. Accordingly, the court 
rejected an objection to the enforcement of an arbitral award in favour of an Egyptian 
defendant on the ground that it violated the current US foreign policy towards Egypt. 
The narrower scope of public policy in international commercial arbitration was 
elaborated in a number of cases. The District Court of Massachusetts summarised the 
position in the case of Sonatrach that “the line of decisions which conclusively tip the 
judicial scale in favour of arbitration [is] rather a line of United States Supreme Court 
opinions which enthusiastically endorse an international approach towards commercial 
disputes involving foreign entities”. These decisions, Bremen, enforcing the forum 
selection clause in an international commercial contract, and Scherk, enforcing the 
international arbitration clause in conflict with federal securities law, and Mitsubishi, 
holding the international arbitration clause enforceable when in conflict with federal 
antitrust laws, eschew the parochial tendencies of domestic tribunals in retaining 
jurisdiction over international commercial disputes. The Austrian Supreme Court also 
invented the equivalent concepts of “supranational public policy” and “a common 
European ordre public” in the case of VAG.90
A technical question naturally arises from this approach: what can be considered 
to be national or international public policy. The scope of national public policy 
theoretically includes all mandatory rules of domestic law91 or economic policy of
87 Ibid. 514.
88 Steven J. Stein and Daniel R. Wotman, ‘International Commercial Arbitration in the 1980s: A 
Comparison o f the Major Arbitral Systems and Rules’ (1983) 38 Bus Law 1685 n . l l ;  Thomas E. 
Carbonneau, ‘The Elaboration of a French Court Doctrine on International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Study In Liberal Civilian Judicial Creativity’ (1980) 55 Tulane L Rev 1.
89 5 08 F 2d 969, 974 (2d Cir 1974).
90 The Austrian Supreme Court held that the New York Convention simply refers to the public policy of 
the country where enforcement of the award is sought.
91 J. H. v. Brum , Zur Nachprufbarkeit von Schiedsspruchen, 22 Neue Jur. Wochenschift (1969) 826.
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09sufficient importance. However, it is unlikely that every mandatory rule forms part of 
public policy.93 The term of “national public policy” is at risk of being interpreted 
widely. It has been held by an Indian court that a dispute arising from an international 
agreement for the transfer of technology is not arbitrable under Indian law “because 
such agreement implicates national economic policies”.94 In the Anglo-American legal 
context, “public policy” probably comprises all the elements of due process of law.95 
This is same as the requirement of complying with certain procedural formalities in civil 
law jurisdictions such as Germany.96 The bottom line is that the term should not be used 
as “a parochial device protective of national political interests”.97
The scope of international public policy is difficult to be defined because 
“international” itself is a vague concept in international arbitration. A rather vague 
definition is supplied in Article 1492 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, which 
provides that “arbitration is international if it implicates international commercial 
interests”. French case law has broadly construed this statutory definition by holding 
that the international character of arbitration is determined by the international feature 
of the economic transaction in question such as a cross-border flow of goods, persons 
and services rather than the nationality of the parties or the governing law.98 A more 
precise definition appears in Article 176(1) of the Swiss Federal Code of Civil 
Procedure Law, which provides that: “the provisions of this chapter shall apply to all 
arbitrations if the seat of the arbitral tribunal is in Switzerland and if, at the time of the 
conclusion of the arbitration agreement, at least one of the parties had neither its 
domicile nor its habitual residence in Switzerland”.
Article 1(3) of the Model Law provides a more detailed definition of 
“international arbitration” in which the parties to an arbitration agreement can be from 
different states, or the parties have expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the 
arbitration agreement relating to more than one country. All these definitions are of 
great practical value but have an inherent problem in certain situations. The New York 
Convention itself simply applies to any award made in another contracting state and
92 Christopher B. Kuner, ‘The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards in 
the United States and West Germany Under the New York Convention’ (1990) 7(4) J Int’l Arb 71, 88.
93 Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, ‘Public Policy and Arbitrability’ ICCA Congress Series No. 3, Comparative 
Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration (Kluwer 1987) 183.
94 M. Somarajah, ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law: A Third World Viewpoint’ (1989) 6(4) J Int’l Arb 7.
95 Kurt H. Nadelmann and Arthur T. von Mehren, ‘Equivalences in Treaties in the Conflicts Field’ (1966- 
1967) 15 Am J Comp L 195, 200.
96 Christopher B. Kuner, op. cit.
97 Parsons v. Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe generate de I'industrie du papier (RAKTA), 508 F. 
2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
98 Jean-Pierre Ancel, ‘French Judicial Attitudes Toward International Arbitration’ (1993) 9(2) Arb Int’l 
121 .
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does not require that an award relate to an international arbitration. In theory, 
“international public policy” is taken to be narrower than “national public policy”.99 It 
has been suggested that “international public policy” requires the application of 
particular rules designed to be used in cases involving international commerce100 as the 
term “international” at least rules out any resort to either domestic or foreign municipal 
law. In this case, “national policy” in the diplomatic or foreign policy sense would not 
be taken into account.101 In any event, a clear line between domestic and international 
public policy has not been drawn in theory and practice.
“The goal of the New York Convention ... was to encourage the recognition and 
enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to 
unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards 
are enforced in the signatory countries”.102 However, the New York Convention fails to 
provide for the content of public policy. Courts in some countries such as Germany 
regarded “public policy” in Article V(2) of the New York Convention merely as having 
a declaratory effect.103 It is noted that the New York Convention’s failure to include 
similar language in its earlier draft signifies a narrowing of the non-enforcement 
defense.104 The counter argument is that this omission may be regarded as an indication 
of the intention to widen the non-enforcement defense.105 More constructive inferences 
can be drawn from the history of the New York Convention as a whole. The general 
pro-enforcement which is the New York Convention’s supersession of the Geneva 
Convention points toward a narrow reading of the public policy defense. An expansive 
construction of this defense would vitiate the New York Convention’s basic effort to 
remove pre-existing obstacles to enforcement of arbitral awards.106 A circumscribed 
public policy doctrine contemplated by the New York Convention’s framers indicated 
that a country, in acceding to the Convention, meant to subscribe to this super-national
99 Komblum, “Ordre public transnational”, “ordre public international” und “ordre public interne” im 
Recht der privaten Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, in Beitrage zum intemationalen Verfahrensrecht und zur 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (Festschrift ftir Heinrich Nagel) 140, 155 (1987).
100 Pierre Lalive, ‘Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration’ in 
Pieter Sanders (ed), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration (Kluwer 1978) 
275.
101 Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. Inc. v. International Navigation Ltd. 737 F. 2d. 150 (2d. Cir 1984) at 
152.
102 417 US 506 (1974) at n. 15.
103 Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldem, ‘Austrian Public Policy and the Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards’ 
Arb Int’l 328.
104 See Paolo Contini, ‘International Commercial Arbitration The United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards’ (1959) 8 Am J Comp L 283, 304.
105 See Leonard V. Quigley, ‘Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards’ (1961) 70(7) Yale L J 1049, 1070-71.
106 See Straus, Arbitration of Dispute between Multinational Corporations, in New Strategies for Peaceful 
Resolution o f International Business Disputes 114-5 (1971).
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effort.107 Therefore, enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on the basis 
of public policy only where enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic 
notions of morality and justice.108 The public policy provision in the New York 
Convention surely “was not meant to enshrine the vagaries of international politics 
under the rubric of public policy”.109 In equating “national” policy with state “public” 
policy or national political interests may seriously undermine the New York 
Convention’s objective, utility and efficacy. Similarly, a State’s foreign policy shall not 
be regarded as part of the public policy recognised under the New York Convention. To 
this end, the distinction between domestic and international disputes suggests that an 
international arbitrator has to ensure that domestic public policies have a legitimate 
claim for application in the international arena but national courts are more willing and 
ready to look only to the domestic public policy.110 International or transnational public 
policy in theory is a product of many legal sources including natural law, jus cogens, 
and the norm of justice and equality universally applied in most nations today.111 
Therefore, the material content of “international public policy” seems to include general 
principles of law to be found in the domestic law of all countries such as rules on good 
faith, rules against corruption and bribery.112
2.3 Distinction between Prescriptive and Normative Public Policy 
The traditional judicial approach dealing with public policy purports to reflect what the 
courts actually are doing rather than presenting a normative theory of how they should 
deal with it. To that end, the legislation may simply describe the key components or 
main factors in public policy rules. For instance, section 19 of the Australian 
International Arbitration Act defines two scenarios as the violation of “public policy”, 
that is, the making of the award being induced or affected by fraud or corruption, and a 
breach of the rules of natural justice having occurred in connection with the making of
107 Cf. Scherk v Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2449, 41 L.Ed.2d 270(1974).
108 Cf. 1 Restatement Second of the Conflict o f Laws § 117, comment c, at 340 (1971); Loucks v Standard 
Oil Co., 2 2 4 N.Y. 99, 111, 120N.E. 198(1918).
109 Parsons v. Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe generale de Vindustrie du papier (RAKTA), 508 F. 
2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
1,0 Okezie Chukwumerije, Choice o f  Law in International Commercial Arbitration (Quorum Books, 
Westport, Connecticut and London 1994) 44.
111 Julian D.M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial 
Arbitration Awards (Oceana, Dobbs Ferry, New York 1978) 535.
112 Berthold Goldman, Les conflits des lois dans 1’arbitrage international de droit prive, 109 Recueil des 
Cours, (1963 II) 432.
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the award. Similarly, the arbitration act in Zimbabwe also adopted this two-pronged 
definition of public policy,113 which is the standard proposed by the Model Law.
The prescriptive public policy is potentially helpful in predicting future results 
from past cases based upon prescriptive rules. The resulting clarity has advantages over 
seemingly disparate court holdings, including facilitating ex ante public policy and 
satisfying the public expectation of judicial efficiency. However, the defects of a 
prescriptive approach are also obvious. First, the prescriptive approach says nothing 
about the merits of any rule and only has value in comparison to a regime in which 
courts say one thing and do another. The judges are likely to be over mechanical by 
using “escape devices” to reach more intuitively satisfying results114 or advocate their 
own proposals on prescriptive grounds.115 Second, the prescriptive approach forces the 
courts to take the issue into account regardless of the formal method the judges are 
supposed to use. The criticism of formalistic theorists on this issue is that courts actually 
are using criteria to make public policy decisions without considering the underlying 
rationale of legal criteria. The two aspects of “public policy” listed in the Australian 
arbitration act, for example, fail to provide the court with guidance in interpreting 
“natural justice”, which ultimately makes the application of this two-prong standard 
very hard and unpredictable. Third, the prescriptive rules may not guarantee efficient 
judicial results because judges may serve their own, interest groups’ or legislators’ 
interests rather than those of the society as a whole. Judges are likely to favour 
particular interest groups such as local lawyers who prefer to attract litigation116 and 
may have influence on judicial selection, or a particular group of companies such as 
energy companies in a highly energy dependent economy. “Such countries may not 
lightly accept the notion in the Model Law that [exploitation agreements and 
concessions] could be removed from the public law sphere by a mere commercial
117contract” since these agreements and concessions “are subject to the doctrine of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, a doctrine which, whatever its validity in
113 An award is in conflict with the public policy of Zimbabwe if (a) the making of the award was induced 
or effected by fraud or corruption; or (b) a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection 
with the making of the award. Articles 34(5) and 36(3).
1,4 See Brainerd Currie, ‘Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method’ (1958) 25 U 
Chi L Rev 227 99-107 (criticising the opportunistic use of escape devices).
115 See Robert A. Leflar, ‘Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law’ (1966) 41 NYU L Rev 
267, 324-252.
116 See Michael E. Solimine, ‘An Economic and Empirical Analysis o f Choice of Law’ (1989) 24 Ga L 
Rev 49, 73 (noting that judges may favor the bar through decisions that will generate litigation as the bar 
may fund judicial election campaigns).
117 M. Somarajah, ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law: A Third World Viewpoint’ (1989) 6(4) J Int’l Arb 7.
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1 1 Q
international law may be, is constitutionally enshrined in many countries”. Judges 
may also favour forum law, partly to serve the legislators that determine judges’ pay 
and perquisites, and partly because this simplifies the judges’ judicial task. Following 
this line of analysis, the dominant prescriptive approach is naturally pro-resident and 
pro-forum biased.119
There has, indeed, been a kind of “race to the bottom” in formulating and 
implementing public policy rules. Although judges usually start with a rule-based 
approach that might have deterred them from indulging their own preferences or 
interests by making departures over obvious and dramatic, the courts have often tended 
to develop a more open-ended approach that facilitates a more discretion-orientated 
judicial decision-making process. This approach may be attributable to a prisoner’s 
dilemma type of game among the states, that is, individual states and their courts gain 
judicial advantages by abandoning a socially or globally optimal approach or standard. 
Courts in the larger states could adopt a wider range of constraints in the public policy 
framework in order to protect or serve their self-interests. The more attractive markets 
of larger states, in terms of the availability of rich resources, market transactions and 
commercial opportunities in these states, make it harder for business entities to avoid 
contracts that create a basis for exerting jurisdiction. The smaller states could not easily 
compete for arbitration or litigation business by giving potential arbitrating parties a 
“safe harbour” from a tough public policy regime. Therefore, courts in the smaller states 
would have little incentive to sacrifice their own self-interests by forgoing more flexible 
public policy rules. In short, it would not pay for most national state courts to retain a 
more self-restrictive approach to public policy. Certainly a dynamic might appear 
through the jurisdictional competition that overcomes these barriers to efficiency. That 
is particularly true now that innovations in business, communications and transportation, 
such as Internet (or the cyberspace), give business firms more flexibility about where to 
do business and chances to move to a more business-friendly regime. For the time being, 
there is a legitimate reason to cast doubt on the efficiency of at least some rules 
developed by state courts.
Compared to the prescriptive approach, the normative approach takes a different 
course by recognising the normative role that the public policy plays in legislation,
118 Ibid.
119 Stuart Thiel, ‘Choice of Law and the Home Court Advantage: Evidence’ (2000) 2 Am L & Econ Rev 
291; and George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection o f Disputes for Litigation, (1984) 13 J 
Legal Study 17 (claiming that litigated disputes are biased toward those that are on the margin).
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adjudication and compliance.120 The emphasis on the normative value of public policy 
reflects the normative jurisprudence which is concerned with the moral underpinnings 
of law and morality of commercial lawmaking.121 This jurisprudence has traditionally 
concentrated on the legislative legitimacy and justice in the field of public law such as 
criminal law and human rights law. Nevertheless, it should be also compatible with 
commercial law for several reasons. First, like public law, the prospective and 
facilitative role of commercial law demarcates commercial rights of business 
participants and provides guidance for the conduct of commercial actors. Second, the 
virtues such as clarity and certainty are also moral imperatives for the commercial law 
so that it can carry out its prospective (i.e., regulatory) and retrospective (i.e., 
adjudicative) functions adequately and the commercial players are able to ascertain 
without doubt when, where, how and with whom they will be doing business. Third, the 
“rule of law” requires the commitment made by the legislature and judiciary, in both 
public and commercial laws, to certain procedural and substantive accounts which have 
the same moral notions. These moral notions include the generality of rules,
199ascertainability to the public, non-retroactivity, consistency and coherency. As
19^regulation is viewed as a “free good”, there is a strong social bias against any laws 
intervening in the ordinary conduct of business and narrowing or diminishing existing 
rights of business actors. Therefore, the overall moral objective requires legislation to 
have some key features. First, the law should be drafted in ascertainable and specific 
terms, the application of which can be reliably predicated. Second, the law should adopt 
concepts and principles which are consistent. Third, the law should not impose 
intolerable or unreasonable costs or burdens. For example, the law should contain fixed 
rules rather than flexible standards so that people can focus on the literal or plain
120 Ronald Dworkin defined the normative theory of law in detail. In his opinion, the normative party of 
the law is about a theory of legislation, o f adjudication, and of compliance from the standpoints of a 
lawmaker, a judge, and an ordinary citizen respectively. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 
(Duckworth, London 2005) Introduction vii-viii.
121 In the opinion o f Dworkin, “the normative theory will be embedded in a more general political and 
moral philosophy which may in turn depend upon philosophical and theories about human nature or the 
objectivity of morality” . Ibid.
122 Lon Fuller, The Morality o f  Law (Yale University Press: New Heaven 1969) (listing such 8 principles 
as (i) rules must apply standards on a general, not an ad hoc or ad hominem, basis; (ii) rules must be 
publicly ascertainable; (iii) legislation must not be retroactive; (iv) rules must be expressed in terms 
comprehensible to citizens or their advisers; (v) the legal system must be internally consistent and 
coherent; (vi) rules must not be impossibly onerous nor standards unachievable; (vii) laws laid down must 
not be changed too frequently; and (viii) congruence between the rules as they are declared and the rules 
as they are administered is a matter of administrative, not legislative, fairness. State law’s loss o f moral 
authority and its declining ability to generate and sustain commitment have been long seen as a great 
problem of our time. See Simon Roberts, ‘Domesticating the Sociology of Law’ (2008) 71(1) Modem 
Law Review 132.
123 See generally Charles Goodhart, Philipp Hartmann, David T. Llewellyn and Liliana Rojas-Suarez and 
Weisbrod, Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now? (Routledge, London 1998).
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meaning of the text other than purposive or contextual methods. According to the 
“internal morality of law”, Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention is not ideal. 
The term “public policy” is an ambiguous and abstract definition that lacks specificity, 
certainty and clarity such that its application cannot accurately be predicted as most 
marginal cases have indicated.124 As a result, there is a large room for the improvement 
of public policy rules so as to avoid “cumulative infringement of legal morality”.125
At the technical level, the normative approach does not try to define the term or 
identify boundaries or parameters of public policy. Instead, the normative approach is 
principles-based. The concept of principles-based regulation is not new and, in the 
context of commercial laws, was first originated by Sir David Walker, the then 
Chairman of the UK Securities and Investments Board in the late 1980s. The 
importance and popularity of such a concept was waning in the mid-1990s when more 
prescription and greater certainty became the fashion in legislation. The concept has 
experienced a revival in the European Union when Charlie McCreevy, the European 
Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, re-adopted the approach to “well-
19Aregulate” rather than “over-regulating” the market. In the same vein, the UK 
Financial Services Authority in December 2005 published a “Better Regulation Action 
Plan” which moved to a more principles-based approach for regulation.127 The 
principles-centred arbitration legislation is not rare as well. For instance, the English 
Arbitration Act 1996 started with an express statement of several key principles in 
commercial arbitration, which is viewed as a commendable innovation. The 
principles-based normative approach does not mean that the approach would not 
consider some key legislative norms. Rather, the principles-based regulation needs to 
take account of legal rationality. As far as the public policy is concerned, the underlying
124 There are no paradigmatic cases to be crystal clear on the term “public policy” .
125 Charles Goodhart, Philipp Hartmann, David T. Llewellyn and Liliana Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod, 
Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now?, op. cit. 92.
126 Charlie McCreevy, German-Irish Chamber of Industry and Commerce, Ireland: Making the Most of 
the Internal Market, 9 December 2005; and Europe’s Capital Markets in a Global Marketplace, 4th Annual 
Financial Services Conference, Brussels, 31 January 2006, cited in Deborah A. Sabalot, ‘The World 
Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas in Regulation’ (2006) 21(4) Butterworths Journal of International 
Banking and Financial Law 147-164.
127 The Financial Services Authority is already a principles-based regulator. It set out 11 high-level 
Principles for Businesses which are supposed to be complied with by financial services firms. FSA 
Handbook PRIN 2.
128 These principles are found in Section 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996 which provides:
The provisions of this Part are founded on the following principles, and shall be construed accordingly:
(a) the object o f arbitration is to obtain the fair solution of disputes by an impartial tribunal without 
unnecessary delay or expense;
(b) the parties should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as 
are necessary in the public interest;
(c) in matters governed by this Part, the court should not intervene except as provided by this Part.
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judicial rationality was clearly pointed out in Egerton v. Brownlow where the court 
described public policy as “that principle of law which holds that no subject can 
lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public 
good”.129
The principles-based regulation also needs to utilise some major economic 
factors such as efficiency and wealth-maximisation to guarantee the functioning of 
public policy rules. For example, it is argued that one of the failings of the rules-based 
approach is that prescriptive rules are often introduced too late to rectify market 
misconduct that has occurred. The high level principles, instead, will reduce market 
misconducts because they establish the nature and limits of the market players’ duty to 
obey the law in different forms of state and are easier for compliance than the minutiae 
of prescriptive rules. In the same vein, the morality of commercial law-making regards 
proportionality as a critical measuring tool or safeguard test.
The philosophical idea of maximising the “good” such as utility, happiness, 
pleasure or other human positives, requires individual rights or interests be subsumed 
and aggregated in a general calculation about what is best for the general population or 
overall majority. In light of “proportionality”, the decision-makers shall assess whether 
the rule or decision limiting the right was necessary, for example, meeting a pressing 
social need. As far as the public policy is concerned, the assessment should be made on 
whether the judicial interference is really proportionate to the legitimate aim being 
pursued, judicially or administratively. The assessment would then rule out such judicial 
interference with commercial rights that is disproportionate to the policy objectives in 
question.
Under the normative approach, prescriptive standards or rules would be replaced 
by high level principles focusing on how best to act in a general situation, rather than 
simply following a mechanistic process such as a tick-box approach to prescriptive rules. 
The key principles incorporated in the normative public policy may include (i) a narrow 
construction of public policy in light of the overriding purpose of the New York 
Convention; (ii) an avoidance of applying vague, abstract or all-encompassing terms 
such as “principles of the law”, and (iii) a increased application of a favour arbitrandum 
stance. As a general rule, the normative approach is moving towards “attenuated” rather 
than “strict” public policy norms and is fundamentally centred on the notion of 
individual choice. Like a choice-of-law system that allocates political power among the
129 (1853) 4 HLCI.
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states, the normative approach to public policy also tended to achieve the similar 
objective among the state courts, arbitration institutions and arbitrating parties.
The prescriptive public policy in substance is a form of “interest analysis”, 
which focuses on the states’ political objectives and values reflected in the legislation. 
Quite differently, the emphasis on the state interests and powers is misguided to the 
normative public policy because political leaders cannot be expected to maximise social 
welfare. As the Commissioner McCreevy observed, “politicians are not there to dictate
1 mto market participants what they should do or not do”. The political decision-making 
is infected by agency costs that inevitably follow the delegation of power. Normative 
public policy can help to alleviate political agency costs by letting the governed avoid 
inefficient mandatory rules by individual action131 as the economic players make their 
own business choices based upon the sound economic reasoning.132
Is normative public policy likely to produce an efficient result? Traditionally, it 
had been up to the courts to articulate the philosophy underlying arbitration laws. A 
clear theory can serve as a focal point that augments the effect of jurisdictional 
competition in moving the law toward efficiency and efficacy without sacrificing clarity 
and predictability. This is illustrated by contrast with a system that lacks a clear theory, 
i.e., a kind of grand description accommodating all of the various judicial approaches to 
public policy,133 or a baseline presumption that courts can ignore if a multi-factored 
analysis indicates that another state’s law most appropriately applies.134 This system 
ends up sanctioning whatever the courts want to do, thereby contributing to the judicial 
agency costs, and further frustrates parties who seek to determine the law applicable to 
conduct before they engage in it. The principle-based normative approach articulates a 
new vision of arbitration by balancing party autonomy with other judicial considerations. 
In addition, such approach provides a useful legislative standard by which judicial 
decisions on arbitrable matters and public policy can be more critically evaluated. The
130 Charlie McCreevy, Speech at EP Hearing on Cross-border Consolidation, 31 January 2006 cited in 
Deborah A. Sabalot, ‘The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas in Regulation’ (2006) 21(4)
Butterworths Journal o f International Banking and Financial Law 147-164..
131 This argument has been made in the securities law context. See Roberta Romano, ‘Empowering 
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation’ (1998) 107 Yale L J 2359, 2395-99, 2415-18 
(arguing that more favorable securities laws can result under the choice-of-law clause approach if state 
regulatory competition replaces federal securities regulation).
132 Charlie McCreevy, Speech at EP Hearing on Cross-border Consolidation, 31 January 2006, cited in
Deborah A. Sabalot, ‘The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas in Regulation’ (2006) 21(4)
Butterworths Journal o f International Banking and Financial Law 147-164..
133 See William A. Reppy, Jr., ‘Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?’ (1983) 34 
Mercer L Rev 645, 655-66.
134 Jason E. Pepe, ‘Comment, Kansas’s Conflict of Laws Rules for Insurance Contract Cases: It’s Time to 
Change Policies’ (1998) 46 U Kan L Rev 819, 828-29 (noting that some jurisdictions essentially ignore 
the presumptive rule in favor o f the most significant relationship test).
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normative rule is likely to result in a reduction in detailed and complex rules and 
standards, which may have made them not only a barrier to entry but also a barrier to 
compliance. Technically, the normative approach applies public policy on a case-by- 
case, issue-by-issue and ad hoc basis in view of the specific subject-matter and dispute 
at stake.
3 . N o r m a t iv e  P u b l ic  P o l ic y  in  t h e  G a m in g  C o n t e x t  
The notion of public policy is a changing concept in line with a state’s level of 
development, economic, legal, religious or political persuasions. Therefore, no matter 
what approach a state court will take, “the content of the [public policy] rules should 
vary from country to country and from era to era”.135 The prescriptive public policy 
theoiy may be less able to reflect such a changing character of public policy and has 
revealed the defects and drawbacks in current legislation and case law that merely 
explain the inferiority of modem public law and call for a higher level of regulation of 
public policy. Besides, the diversity and divergence of national public policy may make 
the determination of an independent internationally acceptable minimum both 
imperative and difficult.136 This Part explores what is normative public policy, whether 
the normative public policy method is feasible in practice and which institution, if any, 
should take the lead in assisting the production of the normative public policy. Section
3.1 defines the normative public policy on the basis of efficiency and explains problems 
of inefficient laws and causes of such problems. Sections 3.2 to 3.4 introduce various 
theories as viable approaches to deal with inefficient public policy. Section 3.2 
discusses the exit by which the private parties can avoid the hostile jurisdiction by 
escaping to another jurisdiction. Competition and cooperation are analysed in sections
3.3 and 3.4 respectively as alternative long-term methods of overcoming impediments 
to insufficient public policy.
3.1 Normative Public Policy -  Efficiency-centred Approach to Public Policy 
Compared to prescriptive public policy, normative public policy is not made up of an 
exhaustive list of items that are deemed to be critical to public interests nor a complete 
description of basic components or features of public policy which have been scattered
135 C B IN Z Ltd. V. Badger Chiyoda [1989] 2 NZLR 669 at 674.
136 Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, ‘Public Policy and Arbitrability’ in Pieter Sanders (ed), Comparative 
Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration (Kluwer 1978) 176, 178-181.
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in a large number of cases and legislation.137 Instead, the major standard underlying 
normative public policy should be efficiency or efficacy, which is a key economic factor 
in determining the value, justifying a norm or system and measuring aggregate welfare 
from minimum to maximum. The public policy rule is closely linked to the choice-of- 
law or contractual choice principle. To apply this comparison at the judicial level, the 
public policy ground should be construed or applied extremely narrowly. The narrow 
construction of public policy is also reflected in a broader scope of arbitrable matters, 
which in turn indicates the judicial recognition of arbitration as an important and 
growing tool in procuring the speedy, efficient and fair resolution of disputes. The 
perverse effects of inefficient public policy rules can be mitigated to the extent that
11Rparties may avoid the application of these laws by escaping from the hostile 
jurisdiction or altering the contract. On the other hand, the parties’ ability to choose and 
evade laws reduces the benefits generated by efficient public policy.
The problem of inefficient public policy is best described by using simple 
algebra. It can be assumed that, if parties cannot avoid the dispute or settle their dispute 
on their own, i.e., through mediation or friendly consultation, and then have to apply a 
law, the law generates aggregate benefits B while imposing social costs C. If those 
burdened by the law have some ability to opt out of its application, the costs are reduced 
by the amount C[e], Also, the law’s benefits might be reduced by an amount B[e] 
through parties’ ability to avoid application of the law. The rule of thumb is that a law is 
efficient if B - B[e] > C - C[e]. As the law may be subject to the parties’ free choice, 
exit is an important element in calculating the efficiency of law. Exit may not only 
mitigate the effect of an enacted law but also deter the enactment of a law. Increasing 
the availability of exit increases both B[e] and C[e]. A law allowing an exit is efficient 
if CfeJ > B[e], which suggests that exit reduces the law’s overall costs by more than it
11Qreduces the law’s benefits. Exit is also important in the discussion of public policy.
137 These basic features or components include global justice and equality, uniform moral values, 
international institutional and economic order, international democracy, civil and political human rights, 
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being, etc. See Thomas W. Pogge, ‘Priorities 
o f Global Justice’ in Thomas Winfried Menko Pogge (ed), Global Justice (Blackwell Publishing, Boston 
2001). Since these elements are largely morality-based, they are not a better target for the legal study 
compared to the efficiency, which can be “economically” measured. However, these moral values can 
become a universal minimum of the efficiency-centred public policy.
138 See Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein, ‘Contract and Jurisdictional Competition’ in F.H. 
Buckley (ed), The Fall and Rise o f  Freedom o f  Contract (Duke University Press, Durham, NC 1999) 325 
(arguing that validating choice-of-law clauses will lead parties to opt out o f inefficient laws, promoting 
jurisdictional competition between states to pass efficient laws).
139 The overall efficiency of law can be analysed in light o f the public choice implications of the law. By 
reducing the effect of laws, exit can decrease both the support of interest group proponents and the 
opposition o f those who would be burdened by laws. See Erin A. O ’Hara, ‘Opting Out o f Regulation: A 
Public Choice Analysis o f Contractual Choice o f Law’ (2000) 53 Vand L Rev 1551.
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The efficiency of public policy depends upon the extent to which the rules increase 
social wealth by enabling exit from inefficient laws or, conversely, reduce social wealth 
by blocking access to efficient laws. As the effect of law on those benefiting from the 
law and those suffering costs from the law will vary from one person or transaction to 
another, there is no reason to believe that law, i.e., a public policy rule, will affect B[e] 
and C[e] equally.140 The normative public policy rules, nevertheless, are in support of 
an exit since the non-prescriptive rules allow more flexibility in choice-of-law by the 
parties. The normative public policy may be used to enhance C[e] while simultaneously 
preserving B as the reduction of exit costs may increase both B[e] and C[e] and higher 
exit costs can increase social welfare for the law with high B and low C. Therefore, in 
theory, normative public policy is able to strengthen efficient laws while mitigating 
inefficient ones. Such rules should help ensure the application of laws that produce 
efficiencies but not those that produce inefficiencies. In other words, a law that is 
supported by or compatible with normative public policy is efficient if B  - B[e] > C - 
C[eJ. A full scale discussion will touch upon the basic problem of inefficient laws, the 
exit as a potential solution, the potential for choice of law to facilitate an exit from 
inefficient laws.
Certainly, it is still necessary to define “efficiency” first. There are many 
theoretical and practical ways to define efficiency or to determine a priori, the relevant 
costs and benefits of a particular law. In the context of arbitration, the notion of 
efficiency may also contain the element of efficacy, which is often considered by 
legislature, courts, arbitrators and commentators.141 In a jurisprudential sense, the term 
of “efficiency” is an ethical criterion in social decision-making, i.e., the extent to which 
courts enhance the democratically enacted law. If so, the parties should not be able to 
escape even the law, the primary effect of which is to transfer social wealth. 
Economically, the term efficiency denotes that allocation of resources in which value is 
maximised.142 Accordingly, an inefficient law may be characterised as one that 
primarily redistributes wealth while imposing deadweight transfer costs. However, the 
society as well as the judicial and legislative bodies may regard the redistribution itself 
as an aspect of B rather than of C. In practice, the efficiency of a law can also depend 
upon the extent to which it suits individual parties or transactions that are subject to the
140 This tension between B[e] and C[e] cannot be easy to resolve without empirical data on the efficiency 
of law.
141 E.g., “Arbitration needs the support of national law if  it works effectively”. Alan Redfem, 
‘International Commercial Arbitration: Jurisdiction Denied: The Pyramid Collapses’ [1986] J Bus L 15.
142 Richard A. Posner, Economics Analysis o f  Law  (5th edn Aspen Publishers, Inc., New York 1998) 13.
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law.143 In other words, if a law is ill-suited for some parties or transactions, C rises with 
the number of these parties and transactions and with the magnitude of the costs 
imposed upon these parties or transactions.
The efficiency of public policy rests on the extent to which it suits the society or 
community as a whole. The analysis here focuses on two limbs of efficiency. First, it is 
important to spot potential inefficiencies in statutory law, including judicial and 
administrative interpretation and application of statutes. The costs and benefits of a 
statute depend on the baseline of case law,144 customary rules, judicial interpretation or 
other legal rules. Efficiency of legal rules is likely to occur in an evolutionary 
mechanism in which inefficient rules are more likely to be challenged and ruled out 
through litigation and arbitration 145 due to temporary balances in rent-seeking 
pressures.146 Second, it is also important to assess exit costs which critically impact the 
formation of efficiency-centred public policy. Given the focus of this dissertation, the 
approach adopted here is to analyse which institution is able to formulate efficient 
public policy. In commercial arbitration, the main institutions involved are two state 
bodies, that is, legislatures and courts, and one non-public body, i.e., arbitration 
institutions and arbitrators, all of which bear the natural duty to promote and protect 
efficiency of the legal system. The discussion will also indicate why inefficient public 
policy exists and how to deal with such inefficiency.
3.1.1 Legislatures
As the political agent, legislatures and legislators are responsible for enacting laws, 
either efficient or inefficient. Agency costs always exist whenever the power, whether 
administrative or judicial, is delegated to agents such as political representatives and 
government agencies. However, it is difficult to closely monitor the exertion of the 
delegated power by the legislators or legislature. It is claimed that statutes, made by the 
legislative or administrative agencies,147 are not efficient as legislators are rent creators
143 This refers to default rules as well as to mandatory rules because of the potential costs o f drafting 
around default rules. See R.H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 J L & Econ 1, 15-19 
(discussing the significance o f transaction costs for legal rules). Public policy rules arguably make an 
entire body o f state law a “default” rule and may be a less costly alternative than drafting around each rule 
individually because of less transaction costs.
144 For arguments that common law is efficient, see George L. Priest, ‘The Common Law Process and the 
Selection o f Efficient Rules’ (1977) 6 J Legal Stud 65-66 (arguing that efficient outcomes of common law 
are largely immune to individual biases of judges). For arguments to the contrary, William M. Landes and 
Richard A. Posner, ‘Adjudication as a Private Good’ (1979) 8 J Legal Stud 280-84.
145 Paul H, Rubin, ‘Why is the Common Law Efficient?’ (1977) 6 J Legal Stud 51-52.
146 Martin J. Bailey and Paul H. Rubin, ‘A Positive Theory o f Legal Change’ (1994) 14 Int’l Rev L & 
Econ 467, 468-69.
147 J.W. Harris, Legal Philosophies (2nd edn Butterworths, London 1997) 49.
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or seekers for interest groups148 and extract rents from interest groups in return for 
forbearing from regulating.149 For the purpose of rent-seeking, legislators may increase 
their campaign contributions, lobbying efforts and other perks by brokering wealth 
transfers that end up favouring some interest groups at the expense of others.150 
Logically, most statutes are the products of the pressures brought by the competing 
interest groups.151 The winning interest groups are those who can organise most 
effectively and least expensively to raise and spend funds, or to mobilise political 
resources, i.e., votes.152 The resulting legislation may fail to serve the interests of even a 
majority of voters but only a particular group of people. In our context, for example, it 
is common to see large corporations require their employees to sign labour contracts 
which have a standard arbitration clause arbitrating all disputes involving discrimination, 
harassment or termination. A lobby of trial lawyers in the US has also led many states to 
enact legislation to “protect” consumers or employees from arbitration.153 More 
importantly, from the perspective of social welfare, the proponent interest group’s gains 
from the law may not outweigh losses to the rest of society. In an extreme case, the 
State of Alabama, for example, regards enforcement of arbitration clauses agreed prior 
to the origin of the dispute, i.e., an arbitration clause in standard form contract, as being 
against public policy.154
Even legislatures and legislators motivated to enhance social welfare are not 
necessarily perfect agents in reality. First, legislatures or legislators lack perfect 
knowledge and foresight about the effects of laws. Second, legislatures or legislators 
with perfect knowledge and foresight may still be unable to craft efficient regulation 
because of the lack of legislative skills. Third, given incentives and self-interests of 
legislators and interest groups, a piece of well-crafted legislation may not be efficient 
because the law may impose net costs on some people even if it has net benefits as 
applied to others. For example, it may be understandable for the legislature, perhaps 
after the lobbying efforts of interest groups such as state-owned giants, to pass the law 
or adopt the public policy in protecting the state-owned sector and state-owned assets
148 See Robert D. Tollison, ‘Public Choice and Legislation’ (1988) 74 Va L Rev 339, 361-62.
149 See Fred S. McChesney, ‘Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation’ 
(1987) 16 J Legal Stud 101, 102-05.
150 See Robert E. McCormick and Robert D. Tollison, Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy 
(Martinus Nijhoff 1981) (applying interest group theory to legislatures).
151 J.W. Harris, op. cit. 49.
152 See Mancur Olson, The Logic o f  Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory o f  Groups (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge MA 1971) 53-57 (arguing that these features have made small groups 
historically effective).
153 David J. Branson, ‘Arbitrability and Pre-emption: More Litigation in the United States’ (1996) 12(2) 
Arb Int’l 163.
154 Ibid.
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from being the subject of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Nevertheless, such 
protection offered by the legislation may harm other economic sectors and eventually 
harm the neutrality of the arbitration regime, the entire legal system and the interest of 
the whole society. Fourth, the efficiency of law is also closely linked with the market. 
The incidence of burdens and benefits depends upon elasticities of supply and demand 
in particular markets.155 As it has been rightly pointed out, “virtually any individual 
piece of legislation will generate both a plausible private-interest and a plausible public- 
interest explanation”.156 For example, the forum-biased public law can expand litigation 
opportunities. Should public policy grant discretionary power to the courts supervising 
arbitrators and tribunals’ malpractice or misconduct for the purpose of protecting the 
society and interest parties in the case? Is it a justifiable public policy to ensure that 
only foreign arbitral awards will have the privilege to be the subject of procedural 
review only, thus limiting party autonomy of domestic parties which are subject to 
substantive review in local arbitration or vice versa? The difficulty of determining 
whether any particular law or public policy is efficient suggests the necessity of 
preserving a role for individuals and firms to decide for themselves the laws that apply 
to them.
3.1.2 Courts
Courts play a critical role in effecting and implementing black letter rules and making 
rules functional. Courts also play a critical role in making law efficient157 because 
judges “legislate new legal rights and apply them retrospectively to the case at hand”,158 
and the significance of judges’ residual function is increasingly more important while 
the court is being re-conceptualised explicitly as a supervised negotiated order.159 As a 
result of judicial intervention, courts have placed themselves in a pivotal position to 
influence the pace, pattern and direction of legal evolution and integration on matters of 
economic and social regulation. In theory, courts are at least able to use judicial 
interpretations or precedents to mitigate inefficiencies created by legislation. However, 
courts may not be expected to take a constructive role in checking legislative efficiency
155 See Erin O’Hara and Larry E. Ribstein, ‘Interest Groups, Contracts and Interest Analysis’ (1997) 48 
Mercer L Rev 765, 766-67 & n 7.
156 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law  
(Yale University Press, New Heaven 1997) 37.
157 See Robert Cooter and Lewis Komhauser, ‘Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of 
Judges?’ (1980) 9 J Legal Stud 139, 140-41 (arguing that unguided evolution o f law does not by itself 
maximise economic efficiency).
158 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, London 2005) 81.
159 See Simon Robert, ‘What is a Court?’ (unpublished paper on file with the author).
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or inefficiency and bargains because courts are also rent-seeking and the judicial 
lawmaking process involves agency costs.160 It would be highly unlikely that every 
doctrine and decision adjudicated by the court is efficient given the nature of judges’ 
incentives. State court judges have some incentives to respond to legislators’ interests 
and concerns to the extent that the latter controls judges’ salary161 and tenure.162 In this 
case, judges might actually increase the durability and value of legislature and guarantee 
the stability of interest group deals by enforcing the legislation within the state.163 In 
addition, judges may also have incentives to serve the interest group,164 which 
substantially affects their ability to maximise the wealth of society.
Judges may experience difficulties in acting in the public interest as an 
independent body due to the difficulties in isolating themselves from the pressures of 
legislature or interest groups. Judges may be particularly responsive to the interests of 
domestic lawyers, who are motivated to compete for and protect their own interests as 
well as economic and social interests of local interest groups.165 For example, lawyers 
are claimed to have competing interests to push for limited liability company statutory 
provisions in a jurisdiction.166 The interdependence and correlation between judges and 
lawyers would also require judges to respond to or act in respect of the domestic 
lawyers’ agenda. In some countries, judges may be nominated and recommended by bar 
associations. Most judges may seek to return to practice or work in the legal profession 
after they leave the bench. Judges are naturally attuned to the lawyer’s interests or 
thinking because of their legal training and professional association. Lawyers’ concerns
160 See Bruce Hay, ‘Conflicts o f Law and State Competition in the Product Liability System’ (1992) 80 
Georgetown L J 617 (arguing that the courts have competing incentives to entice plaintiffs or favor local 
litigants).
161 See Gary M. Anderson, William F. Shughart II, and Robert D. Tollison, ‘On the Incentives of Judges 
to Enforce Legislative Wealth Transfers’ (1989) 32 J L & Econ 215, 217, 220-26 (arguing with empirical 
evidence that legislative control of judicial salaries is used as a reward for upholding legislative output).
162 See Edward Hartnett, ‘Why Is the Supreme Court o f the United States Protecting State Judges from 
Popular Democracy?’ (1997) 75 Tex L Rev 907, 975 (Only three states in the US grant de facto  life 
tenure.).
163 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, ‘The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group 
Perspective’ (1975) 18 J L & Econ 875, 877-88.
164 Richard S. Murphy and Erin A. O ’Hara, ‘Mistake of Federal Criminal Law: A Study of Coalitions and 
Costly Information’ (1997) 5 S Ct Econ Rev 217, 274-76 (giving an example o f how court rulings on 
mistake of law can strengthen an interest group bargain made with the legislature).
165 See Erin A. O ’Hara and William R. Dougan, ‘Redistribution Through Discriminatory Taxes: A 
Contractarian Explanation o f the Role of the Courts’ (1998) 6 Geo Mason U L Rev 869, 914-16 (arguing 
that the Delaware bar has an incentive to lobby for seemingly innocuous statutory changes for the purpose 
of extracting rents from the initial wave of clarifying litigation).
166 Larry E. Ribstein, ‘Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and Evidence from LLCs’ (1995) 
73 Wash U L Q  369,412-30.
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such as the increased litigation costs are often reflected in judgments and would 
influence the court’s attitudes towards legal changes.168 Lawyers are often politically 
motivated to protect local interests. For instance, lawyers actively attract litigation to the 
state as business whether or not the litigation produces efficient incentives. To this end, 
lawyers may participate in drafting uniform laws and creating complex and vague 
provisions in order to serve their institutional interests.169 Given the close relationship 
with the local bar, judges may have personal biases such as self-interests or favourite
1 70social status that skew their decisions. It was argued that “Delaware lawyers, m 
essence, are the Delaware legislature, at least insofar as corporate law is concerned”.171 
Although appellate courts and reputational considerations may discipline judges at the 
lower level,172 such constraints are imperfect and of limited practical value simply 
because court decisions are effectively insulated from reversal on appeal in arbitration
17^cases as “a judge’s managerial decisions are interlocutory in nature”. In any event, 
arbitral awards are subject to a lenient “abuse of discretion” in the judicial review 
process. Since very few precedents have been created in the area of public policy, 
lower-level judges are tempted to do justice in individual cases without taking into 
account the effect on future cases.174
Given both information and agency costs, there is little reason to assume that 
judges’ decisions on the scope and contents of public policy would be significantly 
more efficient than those made by legislators or, in particular, by the parties themselves. 
Practically speaking, even well motivated judges lack the investigative and 
policymaking apparatus necessary to evaluate reliably the relative efficiency of public 
policy in the arbitration case. Judges may be faithful agents of the legislature and
167 Larry E. Ribstein, ‘The Mandatory Nature of the ALI Code’ (1993) 61 Geo Wash L Rev 984, 1023 
(claiming that lawyers’ support for changes to the corporate governance code due to the differential 
impact of increased litigation costs).
168 Jonathan R. Macey, ‘Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules o f Procedure’ (1994) 23 J 
Legal Stud 627, 628 (stating that the bar is unlikely to support procedural changes that serve to minimise 
the cost of litigation).
169 See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, ‘Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware 
Corporate Law’ (1987) 65 Tex L Rev 469, 505 (discussing that the Delaware bar “has some interest in 
reducing the clarity o f Delaware law to enhance the amount of litigation”).
170 See Richard A. Epstein, ‘The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice 
Theory’ (1990) Brig Young U L Rev 827, 831-38.
171 Larry E. Ribstein, ‘Delaware, Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of Law’ (1994) 19 Del J Corp L 999, 
1007-12.
172 See Erin O ’Hara, ‘Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: Toward a Game Theoretic Analysis of 
Stare Decisis’ (1993) 24 Seton Hall L Rev 746, 767-68.
173 See Jonathan T. Molot, ‘How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil Procedure’ 
(1998) 84 Va L Rev 955, 1004.
174 See Stewart E. Sterk, ‘The Marginal Relevance o f Choice of Law Theory’ (1994) 142 U Pa L Rev 949, 
993-96 (citing the comments o f Charles D. Breitel, former Chief Judge of the New York Court o f Appeals 
that judges first approached cases by asking themselves which party deserved to win and, move on the 
question: what harm to the jurisprudence will result if  I do justice in the individual case).
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government in effectuating legislators’ interest group deals and may have self-interested 
reasons for implementing forum-based and restrictive public policy. The legislature is 
certainly in a position to monitor the enforcement of public policy and to amend 
legislation when judicial decisions go awry.175 Nevertheless, it has been recognised that 
courts normally view the forum’s law as “better”.176 It is likely, courts would lean on 
local public policy, efficient or inefficient. In reducing the effect of inefficient public 
policy while preserving its ability to monitor arbitration efficiently, courts could either 
try to determine which public policy is more efficient and apply it, or apply rules that 
allow affected parties make the decision themselves. This latter alternative seems 
consistent with the doctrine of party autonomy in commercial arbitration. Therefore, in 
order to make public policy more efficient, it is important to decrease the chances and 
occasions where courts may intervene in the business community by resorting to public 
policy and increase arbitrating parties’ opportunity to choose among competing legal
177regimes.
3.1.3 Arbitration Institutions, Arbitral Tribunals and Arbitrators
Arbitration institutions are theoretically regarded as sub-agents of courts given the 
court’s view of delegating judicial power to arbitrators. As a sub-agent, arbitration 
institutions certainly involve more agency costs than courts. Confidential, private and 
self-managed arbitration is thought to present significant dangers to the public interests. 
Arbitral awards and the publicity surrounding these awards do not generate uniform 
standards to shape public policy.178 Confidential decisions may hinder the creation of 
precedent and the development of the law because “arbitration is based on an avoidance 
of the outcome of litigation” which is different from litigation based on a prediction of 
the outcome of litigation.179 Without sufficient and easy access to arbitral awards, the 
arbitrating parties may find it difficult or impossible to evaluate a pattern of practice and 
predict the application of public policy. As a result, the parties to arbitration are not 
certain to what extent arbitration institutions, arbitral tribunals and arbitrators should
175 See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, ‘Privatising Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on 
Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworker’s Trilogy to Gilmer’ (1993) 44 Hastings L J 
1187, 1237-38.
176 See Robert A. Leflar, ‘Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law’ (1966) 41 NYU L Rev 
267, 298-99.
177 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis o f  Law (Aspen Law & Business 1998) 570 (claiming that a 
judge will naturally ask which of the competing activities is more valuable in an economic sense).
178 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, ‘Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow 
Dog Contracts o f the 1990s’ (1996) 73 Denv U L Rev 1043.
179 See Christine Godsil Cooper, ‘Where Are We Going with Gilmer? - Some Ruminations on the 
Arbitration of Discrimination Claims’ (1992) 11 St. Louis U Pub L Rev 203, 214-15.
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apply mandatory rules such as public policy rules, of countries with which the parties or 
the contracts may be connected. It has been suggested180 that arbitrators in international 
commercial arbitration are under certain duty to apply the public policy and mandatory 
rules of countries closely connected with the contract or dispute even though they may 
not have to regard themselves as bound to apply any country’s mandatory rules. As 
Lando has pointed out:
“[Although the arbitrator derives his authority from the will of the parties, he 
cannot have regard to their interests only. Like the courts of law which he 
replaces, he must consider any strong principle of public policy of a country 
closely connected with the contract ...Furthermore, every arbitrator has to 
consider the importance of preserving commercial arbitration as an instrument 
for the settling of international disputes ... If ... arbitration is used as means to 
evade the relevant policies of those countries which have an interest in the
1 0 1
subject-matter of the dispute, the reputation of arbitration will suffer”.
In reality, arbitration institutions, arbitration tribunals and arbitrators are not a 
state authority. They have neither a forum nor lex fori. In international commercial 
arbitration, from the perspective of arbitration institutions, tribunals and arbitrators, all 
state laws are on an equal footing and none of them has a privileged status. Therefore, 
they do not have the duty, even a moral one, to apply foreign policy laws and will not 
act as the guardian of state public policy since neither domestic nor foreign public 
policy but only policy laws foreign to the lex contractus are binding on them. They are 
merely constrained by the possibility of judicial review by the courts to reflect or 
comply with public policy according to the standards imposed by the courts. As a matter 
of fact, numerous arbitrators remain strongly opposed to the application of foreign 
policy rules.182 In this sense, arbitration institutions, tribunals and arbitrators are not in a 
predominant position in making efficient positivist public policy at least in the current 
arbitration regime. However, they may be the best candidate to make efficient public 
policy in favour of international commercial arbitration given their basic instinct to 
promote arbitration.
3.2 Exit as a Potential Solution to Inefficient Public Policy
If interest groups and other agency costs are likely to prevent legislative or judicial
bodies from generating efficient public policy, then the question is how to deal with
180 Ole Lando, ‘The Lex Mercatoria In International Commercial Arbitration’ [1985] 34 Int’l & Comp L 
Q 764-8.
181 Ibid.
182 ICC award no. 1512 of 1970, Jarvin and Derains, [1974-1985] ICC Arbitral Awards 554.
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inefficient public policy so as to improve efficiency of public policy. There are two 
ways to eliminate inefficient public policy. First, in theory, the local political, judicial or 
legislative process can involve, if not facilitate, public participation and monitoring of 
their representatives in producing efficient public policy or improving efficiency of 
public policy. This voice option, however, has limited practical effect. Individuals or 
firms must use scarce resources, including time, energy, money and human resources, to 
obtain and analyse information and then to form and express their views, which are not 
necessarily to be heard or adopted by the legislative body. Individual voters may have 
little or inadequate incentives to use private resources or to suffer personal burdens in 
order to generate laws that have public benefits. In the global era, foreign individuals 
and companies may have even less incentives to change inefficient public policy in a 
specific foreign locality because no locality is indispensable. The mobility of 
individuals and firms allows exit to function as a second means. Exit is not an option 
that substitutes for the voice option in the political, judicial or legislative process.
1 0 1
Rather, it effectively complements the voice option by sorting people by preferences. 
As no political organisation or sovereignty state has infinite jurisdiction, the governed 
can escape from a “harsh” legal regime they do not like by gravitating toward more 
appealing legal systems. It has been vividly argued that the governed can effectively 
vote with their feet.184 For example, consumer-voters can choose their preferred level of 
public goods such as taxes and expenditures by moving to another place.185 Similarly, 
individuals and companies are inclined to take the exit route when the costs of exit are 
less than the costs they would incur or burden by remaining in the jurisdiction. The 
forum-shopping is a typical and strong example of the exit route. In this sense, exit is a 
disciplinary mechanism which would discipline, directly or indirectly, lawmakers or 
judicial bodies, to opt out of inefficient laws and promote “better” laws and public 
policy.
In the long run, both voice and exit obligate politicians, lawmakers and judges to 
consider the public interest and efficiency of public policy so as to avoid losing clientele 
in the community. While politicians, lawmakers and judges are motivated to compete186
183 See Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations, and 
States (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 1970).
184 See Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
185 Charles M. Tiebout, ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’ (1956) 64 J Pol Econ 416, 418-21, 423-24.
186 Some commentators are skeptical about such motivation to compete. Douglas J. Cumming and Jeffrey 
G. Macintosh, ‘The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law: A 
Second Look’ (2000) 20 Int’l Rev L & Econ 141.
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for clientele if business players are mobile,187 they are also subject to other economic 
factors, especially in a cross-border context. Legislators may not be able to gain benefits 
from the competition because other jurisdictions easily can free ride on their efforts by 
copying successful legislation. Public policy rules are domicile-centred and may impose 
potentially higher exit costs on individuals and firms who will move to avoid dealing 
with over restrictive jurisdictions.188 The costs of exit would be lowered if the exit can 
be realised through the choice of governing law of another jurisdiction. The problem of 
inefficient public policy may disappear once the cost of exit falls to zero. In 
international commercial arbitration, enforcement must take place in a specific 
jurisdiction and the choice-of-applicable-law by the arbitrating parties does not 
guarantee the zero cost of exit. Although the exit route can eliminate inefficient laws, it 
has side effects and can reduce the benefits of efficient regulation. The businesses’ 
leaving the regulating states may make unilateral state regulatory efforts less effective 
and meaningful.
Efficiency of the public policy is a critical dimension to the debate over the 
nature of regulation and private ordering.189 The key is whether contracting parties 
should be allowed to waive statutory protections, regardless of efficiency, through the 
choice of law mechanism or forum shopping. Among other things, legislators, courts 
and interested private parties internalise at least some of the influences of the laws in the 
home jurisdiction since the laws politically affect the parties located in that state, 
thereby giving legislators or courts an incentive not to regulate or deregulate 
inefficiently merely for the purpose of attracting out-of-state transactions or parties. 
Contractual choice may be a reasonable compromise between oppressive laws and 
complete circumvention from regulations. The arbitrating parties, however, may not 
make the right choice on some occasions because of information asymmetries, 
bargaining imbalance, third-party pressures, or judgment biases, which may not justify 
judicially or legislatively imposed restrictions on the contractual choice or other exit 
routes. The public policy inquiries thwart certainty, objectiveness and predictability, 
which will not be achieved by interest-group-pressure-influenced and non-public- 
choice-focused legislation or ad hoc, case-by-case public policy cases and public 
interest inquiries made by the state courts. In this sense, public policy must be designed
187 For articles discussing the importance of mobility to jurisdictional competition, see Frank H. 
Easterbrook, ‘Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism’ (1983) 26 J L & Econ 23, 34-35.
188 A restrictive law may be efficient to the extent that it protects against erroneous choices such as those 
attributable to cognitive biases and asymmetric information.
189 Bruce H. Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein, ‘Contract and Jurisdictional Competition’ in F.H. Buckley, 
(ed), The Fall and Rise o f  Freedom o f  Contract (Duke University Press, Durham, NC 1999).
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with a view of improving and strengthening efficiency of arbitration. To maximise 
efficiency, public policy should, in general, facilitate the individual choice and well 
recognise and respect the doctrine of party autonomy. This involves greater enforcement 
of the contractual choice clauses.
3.3 Jurisdictional Competition as an Alternative to Form Efficient Public Policy 
Public policy has side-effects such as nurturing local protectionism and excessive 
judicial interference. This will ultimately damage a state’s long term benefits of having 
a neutral and internationally recognizable arbitration regime. There may be another way 
out of this conundrum. Similar to market competition, jurisdictional competition may 
create effective pressures on states to adopt necessary reforms190 for better or more 
efficient public policy and more restrictive state intervention.191 This would give the 
state a competitive advantage that attracts capital and labour and then enhances social
1 Q?welfare. The judicial competition can be traced to the historical developments of 
markets and business,193 which were rooted in the liberal concept of individuals as 
being self-interested, and the assumption that the behaviour is best mediated by the 
market. Ultimately, law has both “demand” and “supply” sides. Parties to disputes are 
likely to find it worthwhile to pay legal expenses and filing fees associated with 
switching jurisdictions,194 if they find that there is a jurisdiction in which compliance 
costs are lower. Incentives to customise the arbitration law regime to the needs of 
businesses do exist. On the supply side, states are motivated to amend or even reform 
their laws to make laws more user-friendly.195 The developing jurisdictions reserve a 
higher level of judicial review by imposing more public policy constraints over arbitral
190 See Wolfgang Kerber and Viktor Vanberg, ‘Competition among Institutions: Evolution within 
Constraints’ in Luder Gerken (ed), Competition among Institutions (MacMillan, London 1995) 35, 42-48 
(stating that jurisdictions that “introduce new superior institutions or abolish old ones” would outlive their 
usefulness).
191 See Luder Gerken, ‘Institutional Competition: An Orientative Framework’ in Luder Gerken (ed), 
Competition among Institutions (MacMillan, London 1995) 1-31 (claiming that legislatures o f different 
states compete with one another, leading to a more limited government intervention).
192 Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger, ‘Competition among Jurisdictions: The Idea of FOCJ’ in 
Luder Gerken (ed), Competition among Institutions (MacMillan, London 1995) 209 (advocating a 
framework that would encourage competition among all levels o f government in the EU, thus enhancing 
social welfare). Arthur Laffer and Stephen Moore, ‘The (Tax) War between the States’ The Wall Street 
Journal, 11 December 2007 at 19 (claiming that noncompetitive states may be plagued by falling housing 
values, a shrinking tax base, business outmigration, capital flight and high unemployment rates, and less 
money for schools, roads and aging infrastructure).
193 See B. Buchell, S. Deakin, J. Michie and J. Rubery (eds), Systems o f  Production: Markets, 
Organisations and Performance (Routledge, London 2002).
194 Brian Cheffms, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operations (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
1997) 431.
195 In the US, the Delaware company law is dominant in company codes and the judiciary and legislature 
in Delaware give strong confidence to the managers and owners o f the companies. See generally Roberta 
Romano, The Genius o f  American Corporate Law (AEI Press, Washington DC Press 1993).
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proceedings and awards. Even though there is a lack of reciprocity, developed 
jurisdictions do not seem to move downward by imposing more restrictions or exerting 
more control over arbitral awards. Instead, more and more jurisdictions are moving 
upwards by building a more flexible and arbitration-friendly regime, showing more 
respect to the party’s autonomy and implementing public policy in fewer circumstances.
Judicial competition can achieve efficiency in several ways. First, states may be 
pressured to adopt facilitative rather than intervening public policy rules in arbitration. 
Individuals and firms can avoid one state’s law by disconnecting all contacts with that 
state. Modem communication technology substantially lowers exit costs. In particular, 
the Internet increases the viability of exit.196 For example, firms using blocking software 
to target sales can swiftly avoid states that impose onerous taxes or regulation. In this 
sense, firms now are less vulnerable to changes in the law in their home states. The state 
has to retain those who otherwise would physically flee by allowing them to contract 
out of the application of rigid public policy197 or adopt better public policy. Interested 
parties may accede to a more favourable jurisdiction with choice-favouring or user- 
friendly public policy.198 Parties usually prefer to choose the national law of an 
economically sophisticated state, often the location of a significant financial, business or 
arbitration center. Although the firms’ costs to avoid jurisdictional connections with a 
large state are higher, the increasing international business and jurisdictional 
competition is able to influence and constrain larger states as well.
Second, the interest parties’ pressure to leave the stringent and intervening 
jurisdictions may accumulate a competitive atmosphere. Private parties will gravitate 
toward better commercial law, therefore motivating interest groups to urge their states 
to join the competition in order to preserve business.199 Some jurisdictions have 
ambitions to make arbitration in the local jurisdiction an appealing proposition. The pro- 
arbitration mles will bring economic benefits to the jurisdiction together with an 
expansion of employing other professionals in related areas of services. The overall 
result is important to determine the direction of improvement in response to the local 
economic needs. The US experience suggests that, over time, the regulatory competition
196 Internet may ultimately uncouple applicable law from its territorial roots and lead to a system that is 
based on individual interests rather than political power.
197 See Larry E. Ribstein, ‘Choosing Law by Contract’ (1993) 18 J Corporation L 247; Bruce H. 
Kobayashi and Larry E. Ribstein, ‘Contract and Jurisdictional Competition’ in F.H. Buckley (ed), The 
Fall and Rise o f  Freedom o f  Contract (Duke University Press, Durham, NC 1999) 331-32.
198 Erin A. O ’Hara, ‘Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis o f Contractual Choice of Law’ 
(2000) 53 V andL R ev 1551.
199 Larry E. Ribstein, ‘Delaware, Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of Law’ (1994) 19 Del J Corp L 999, 
1016-18.
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in commercial law leads to a fairly high level of convergence among states, the 
empirical value of which is to confirm the possibility of regulatory convergence 
surrounding a single and efficient system or model in a competitive setting.
Third, rather than simply avoiding contacts within the regulating jurisdiction, 
disadvantaged parties may choose to stay and fight against the rigid public policy in a 
jurisdiction. The larger the public policy levy imposed on the disadvantaged party, the 
more likely it will be willing to incur the costs of opposing such policy. The interested 
parties will determine their support or opposition based on the costs and benefits of the 
statutes net of the effect of exit respectively. Interested parties such as foreign investors 
and lawyers can coordinate in the arbitration proceeding as well as in legislative action 
thereby fostering the gradual evolution of more narrowly defined public policy rules 
compatible with those in other jurisdictions. Both litigators and commercial lawyers 
specialising in dispute resolution may want their states to respect the doctrine of party 
autonomy by enforcing contractual choice of law. Corporations may contractually 
designate the forum in order to arbitrate in a jurisdiction where courts are most likely to 
enforce their contracts. Courts, in turn, may be more willing to enforce choice-of-forum 
rather than choice-of-law clauses because the former does not force courts to deal with 
the potentially contentious issues such as the application of foreign law that conflicts 
with the public policy and local values. Legislature may also gain by making local 
adjudication, legislation and legal values attractive to contracting parties. Through 
opposing rigid public policy, disadvantaged parties may gain more from substantially 
softening public policy rules than from exit.
The fundamental question here is whether jurisdictional competition, a theory 
contemplating the process towards efficiency, is able to improve public policy, which is 
“interventionist” rather than “facilitative” in nature. Competitive forces do not operate 
spontaneously, instantaneously and perfectly, and are not likely to result in a 
convergence as the state response to the preference over the content of public policy and 
the level of legal intervention and protection may vary significantly. In addition, the 
transboundary externalities may alter the effect of competition. Despite the competitive 
dynamics, the efficiency-enhancing forces discussed in this section co-exits with the 
evolutionary theory discussed in Chapter 2, according to which evolution should occur 
without any assumptions of altruism by state legislatures or courts. This evolutionary 
theory also does not depend upon the states’ conscious willingness to forgo short-term 
gain for long-run efficiency. Rather, jurisdictional competition can be seen as an 
application of Darwinian theory that competitive pressures can produce efficient results
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over time with the public actors’ view of consciously generating such results by 
diminishing their intervening role and causing efficient ones to thrive.200 In summary, 
even if legislators or courts lack knowledge, motivation and foresight to formulate or 
supply efficient public policy, legal evolutionary theory suggests that efficient public 
policy may ultimately emerge through competition.201 Market players who have an 
incentive to minimise their transaction and information costs and possess capability to 
choose a more user-friendly legal regime or more efficient and restricted public policy 
may cause that public policy to evolve towards efficiency, if only because inefficient 
regimes end up governing fewer and fewer market players and transactions.
3.4 Cooperation among States to Formulate Efficient Public Policy
States are players in a repeat-play game and have long-run incentives to cooperate over
909choice of applicable law. The same applies to public policy which is a residual 
product of the choice of law. In the context of cross-border arbitration, the formulation 
and implementation of public policy may be viewed as a prisoner’s dilemma game in 
which each state has a strong incentive to cooperate because (i) defection is likely to 
happen because state courts cannot easily monitor, let alone discipline, the 
uncooperative courts of other states; 203 and (ii) the joint losses from defection 
substantially exceed the benefits unilaterally enjoyed by a defecting state. In theory, in 
order to make cooperation feasible, (i) the long term and joint gains from cooperation 
must exceed the short term benefits from defecting via the application of forum law; and 
(ii) the present discounted value of each state’s long-run gains from cooperation must 
exceed that of its short-run gains from defecting or “unjustified distributive effects”.204 
The state law may end up evolving toward an efficient equilibrium through cooperation 
rather than competition if these conditions can be satisfied.
Judicial cooperation may create an atmosphere of reciprocity that motivates 
states to apply uniform laws or local laws containing widely accepted normative 
standards, and to defer to other states’ interests, which in turn protects its own
200 Martin J. Bailey and Paul H. Rubin, ‘A Positive Theory o f Legal Change’ (1994) 14 Int’l Rev L & 
Econ 467-77 (positing model o f legal change in which legal rules reflect temporary balances in rent- 
seeking pressures).
201 See Armen A. Alchian, ‘Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory’ (1950) 58 J Pol Econ 211, 213 
(claiming that an “economic natural selection” of the market may be more fruitful than that o f individual 
motivation).
202 See Larry Kramer, ‘Rethinking Choice of Law’ (1990) 90 Colum L Rev 342-44 (applying prisoner’s 
dilemma to model choice-of-law situation between states).
203 See Stewart E. Sterk, ‘The Marginal Relevance of Choice o f Law Theory’ (1994) 142 U Pa L Rev 949, 
1008-10 (claiming enforcement and information problems undercut the emergence of stable reciprocity).
204 See John Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1999) 43.
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interests. Judicial cooperation ultimately fosters comity, which further provides a 
legal regime where enforcement is uniform and predictable and facilitates multiple 
jurisdiction activities. Likely, judicial cooperation also facilitates diminishing forum 
shopping and promotes efficient behaviours and public policy in arbitration. In the 
context of arbitration, there is a strong chance that judicial cooperation among states and 
arbitration institutions on public policy would enhance efficiency or party autonomy. 
This is so because states are partially, if not entirely, isolated from the arbitration regime 
and a uniform position on public policy taken by the states would help avoid the 
prisoner’s dilemma. Therefore, cooperation may dominate defection in the prisoner’s 
dilemma. This line of thinking, however, may overlook the practical difficulty in 
achieving reciprocity. Governance at the international level is a constantly evolving 
discourse involving multiple actors whose influence and roles vary across time and 
policy realms. A legitimate and effective model of global governance such as judicial 
cooperation needs a delicate balance between international cooperation and national
207sovereignty.
Judicial cooperation differs significantly from judicial competition in that it 
requires either coordination or interstate monitoring. Cooperation among state courts 
requires them to monitor and discipline defections, which is difficult to implement via 
the classic tit-for-tat enforcement strategies.208 Monitoring other state courts’ public 
policy decisions is costly, ineffective and inefficient.209 Retaliation is also not an 
effective monitoring tool for three reasons. First, an interstate dispute will not arise 
often so as to enable a disadvantaged state to retaliate against the defector.210 Second, 
states possess different levels of retaliatory power. Larger plaintiff-favouring states 
would have more opportunities to defect than smaller states. Third, the reputation cost 
may restrict retaliation. Therefore, the remaining feasible cooperative mechanics is 
multilateral or bilateral treaties which can facilitate states’ monitoring or disciplining 
each other. The treaty-model is a more transparent, inclusive, participatory and
205 Larry Kramer, ‘Rethinking Choice o f Law’ op. cit. 314 (“From a selfish and parochial point o f view, it 
may still be in State A ’s interests to apply other states’ laws in some true conflicts in State A courts, 
thereby inviting reciprocal action that advances State A policies in cases brought elsewhere”.).
206 Ibid, 313 (arguing that states share “multistate policies” that may point toward the application of 
another state’s law or policies like comity toward other states).
207 Daniel W. Drezner, ‘On the Balance between International Law and Democratic Sovereignty’ (2001) 2 
Chi J Int’l L 321, 323.
208 See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution o f  Cooperation (Basic Books, New York 1984).
209 See Larry Kramer, ‘Rethinking Choice of Law’ op. cit. 343 & n228 (noting that monitoring and 
punishing defections will be among the most likely impediments to cooperation).
Stewart E. Sterk, ‘The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory’ op. cit. 1008-11 (claiming that 
the discounting of potential gains from cooperation is likely to be very high, and that defection will not 
always be obvious to each court).
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legitimacy-enhancing decision-making process among state and non-state actors, and 
can decrease accountability and uncertainty concerns.211 The often used technique is the 
introduction of a uniform approach or uniform standards to narrow the scope of public 
policy, which would not only reduce the uncertainty but also increase aggregate 
certainty and welfare. A certain degree of equivalence in state arbitration laws is 
necessary to disincentivise the “movement” of disputes from one state to another. There 
is evidence that states generally adopt uniform rules and practices where uniformity is 
functional and efficient.212 Prominent examples include the adoption of uniform 
grounds on which an award can be rejected to be enforced in the New York Convention 
and the Model Law. However, efficient uniformity failed in formulating public policy in 
arbitration.213 Even if uniformity emerges in certain areas, the result may not be optimal. 
This is a potential problem not only with uniform laws but also with other mechanics 
for achieving uniformity. It has been argued that state cooperation can be fostered by 
soft law such as the Model Law.214 However, soft law may not be a panacea in that it 
reflects the agenda of various interest groups and the very purpose of having the soft
i c
law may be compromised.
4 . C o n s t r u c t io n  o f  N o r m a t iv e  P u b l ic  P o l i c y  in  I n t e r n a t io n a l  
A r b it r a t io n
The evolutionary game theory indicates that judicial cooperation can be structured to 
diverse distributional effects216 and that states ultimately will evolve to adopt efficiency- 
maximising public policy. As a gaming theoretic approach, the evolutionary game 
theory may lead to another equilibrium depending on the operative assumptions 
concerning, among others, risks as well as payoffs from cooperation and defection. 
Constraints on policy-makers’ time, resources and information limit their ability to 
develop new public policy theories, methodologies or norms. The “federalism” court
211 Robert Howse, ‘Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation and the Problem of Democracy’ in George A. 
Bermann et al. (eds), Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000) 469, 
471.
212 See Larry E. Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi, ‘An Economic Analysis o f Uniform State Laws’ (1996) 
25 J Legal Stud 131.
213 Other failing efforts to adopt uniformity rules include the service of judicial documents and taking 
evidence abroad. The Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil 
and Commercial Matter, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361 and the Convention on the Taking o f Evidence 
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, July 27, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555.
214 See Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
215 See Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, ‘The Political Economy o f Private Legislatures’ (1994) 143 U 
Pa L Rev 595, 596-97.
2,6 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, New York 1996) 265-7.
217 See Randal C. Picker, ‘Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption 
o f Norms’ (1997) 64 U Chi L Rev 1225.
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model is likely to provide national courts with a mechanism to look to foreign courts’ 
judgments, which is one way to achieve convergence and efficiency of public policy. 
Lawmakers may rely upon external guidance to formulating the public policy. 
International treaties and model laws are major guiding tools for legislators.
4.1 Impediments to Adoption o f a “Federalism ” Court
State courts are unlikely to turn from politics to efficiency in formulating public policy. 
First, judges are likely to adhere closely to the local case law, statutes, and jury 
instructions they are familiar with rather than foreign law or international law. Second, 
in response to local protectionism such as pressures from local bars and domestic 
business giants including state-owned enterprises and special interest groups, judges 
may apply forum law, which increases the demand for forum lawyers’ expertise and 
systematic support from the domestic community. States often act through their 
governmental bodies. The question arises as to how the division can be drawn between 
state agencies, which can be private entities and shall not enjoy state immunity, and 
which, at least in the given situation, act as agents for the State. It is difficult to suggest
918a clear-cut test in determining whether or not a legal entity is a state agency. The state 
courts may implement different legal principles in cases involving a state agency or 
state-owned commercial enterprise.219 In light of these considerations, it is not 
surprising that judges have favoured prescriptive public policy, with its bias in favour of 
forum law. Third, even if some judges do focus on the normative virtues or principles of 
public policy, the efficiency-centred public policy requires consistent application of 
efficiency principles across many states. Spontaneous coordination world-wide seems 
unlikely, and differentiation and experimentation at the state level may exist for the time 
being.
A balance between sovereignty and globalisation cannot be achieved by solely 
relying upon a traditionally state-centered governance regime without reflecting on the 
multiplicity of actors now engaged in international policymaking. Unregulated judicial 
competition or cooperation among states may not guarantee that the system which 
eventually prevails would be the most efficient. A governance regime at the global 
level serves a substantive policy goal to perfect international commercial arbitration. 
What if we have a global court modelled on a federal court in a federal country? Since a
218 Muellenger v New Brunswick Development Corporation [1971] All ER 593.
219 See Bank Markazi Iran v. The Federal Reserve Bank o f  New York, Award No. 595-823-3, para 75-76 
(holding that, even if  the Federal Reserve Bank o f New York were considered an entity controlled by the 
government of the US, it could, under some circumstances, invoke fo rce  majeure since it has its own 
legal personality distinct from the state).
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federal court is more detached from local interests and is less likely than state courts to 
te biased in favour of forum state law, theoretically it would help decrease local
990particularities and influences in international arbitral processes and promote 
efficiency-centred public policy in “federal diversity” cases. This proposition seems 
convincing in the context of cross-border arbitration.2211 Suggestions have been made for 
the formation of an international court for the enforcement of international arbitral
999awards applying truly international public policy.
A “federalism court” governance model raises several legitimacy concerns. First,
• 993there is a growing concern over the “policy space” available to sovereign countries. 
The empirical evidence and long-range historical records have shown that the policy 
space of sovereign countries is shrinking. Virtually all policy areas such as democracy, 
judicial reform, trade, industrial development, corporate governance, education and 
health care are now subject to the influence of the outside world economically and
994systematically dominated by institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and WTO. 
The dominance of western capitalist countries in the WTO, the IMF and probably the 
fature “federalism” court causes the suspicion of “neo-colonialism”. From a historical 
perspective, there has been a constant attempt to reduce the currently available policy 
space,225 and a “federalism court” regime may be logically characterised as part of such 
efforts. The experience of the World Bank and the IMF may persuasively indicate the 
likelihood of a “federalism court” expanding its initially fairly restricted mandate (i.e., 
with the focus on the enforcement of cross-border arbitral awards) which will threaten 
the sovereignty of national states. Like the result o f shrinking policy space in the 
economic realm, a “federalism court” may also have an enormous influence on a 
country’s ability to achieve judicial development, to the point of making the use of any 
meaningful policy for judicial construction impossible. Second, there is little prospect
220 Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Some Practical Questions concerning the 1958 New York Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards’ in United Nations (ed), Uniform 
Commercial Law in the Twenty-First Century, Proceedings o f  the Congress o f  the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, New York, 18-22 May 1992 (United Nations, New York 1995) 
219.
221 See Larry E. Ribstein, ‘Choosing Law By Contract’ (1993) 18 J Corp L 284-85 (finding that in the 
United States federal courts are more likely to enforce choice-of-law clauses than state courts).
222 Schwebel, op. cit. 115; H. M. Hotzmann, in Hunter, Martin, Marriott, Arthur and Veeder V.V. (eds), 
The Internationalisation o f  International Arbitration (The LCIA Centenary Conference, London 1995) 
109.
223 Kevin P. Gallagher, Putting Development First -  The Importance o f  Policy Space in the WTO and IFIs 
(Zed Press, New York and London 2005).
224 Ha-Joon Chang, ‘Why Developing Countries Need Tariffs -  How WTO NAMA Negotiations Could 
Deny Developing Countries’ Right to a Future’ available at 
http://www.marketradefair.com/en/assets/English/sctadp.pdf.
225 Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder -  Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (Anthem 
Press, London 2002).
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for comity among various jurisdictions in a “federalism” regime. Although it is in the 
interest of all nations to create an effective regulatory regime globally, the 
apprehensions of sovereign countries cannot be disregarded in imposing a “federalism” 
model. States are less bound to recognise the laws of other states than states in a federal 
country. This may suggest that enforcement of efficiency-centred public policy by a 
global court may be less effective than by the US Supreme Court. The federal court is as 
unlikely as the state courts to coordinate around general principles of public policy. The 
“federal court” may oblige an enforcing state to recognise another state’s law without 
preventing the affected state from applying more stringent or local public policy
99rules. Therefore, a state in a “federalism” regime may still resort to self-help to 
maintain a basic level of comity as the legal pressure on the defecting state is not that 
strong.
A “federalism” governance model may not be compatible to the modem 
international law, under which supranational institutions are not self-legitimating but 
derive the legitimacy from the constitutional structures of member states. The dilemma 
of the “federalism” governance has two limbs. First, it is critical to balance the 
sovereign prerogatives of member states and the overall legitimate interest of the 
institution, failure of which would underpin the functioning of the institution. Second, it 
is important to achieve the benefits of international cooperation without sacrificing 
legitimate concerns over the democracy in the decision-making process. It suffices to 
say that the federal-type of judicial resolution provides a new way of thinking -  a 
coordinative forum can marginally discipline local public policy at the state level. The 
state court can somehow be mandated to implement some basic norms or principles and 
non-discriminatory public policy, thereby adopting an even-handed system like the 
choice-maximising rules. Given the effect of a federal court in a real federal country,227 
the proposal for greater involvement of a “federal”-type of institution at the global level 
may have little chance of success.
226 See Michael Whincop and Mary Keyes, ‘The Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues in the 
Recognition of Foreign Judgments’ (1999) 23 Melb U L Rev 416,422.
227 There have been some doubts about the functioning o f a “federalism court”. In the US context, a 
federal court sitting in diversity cases holds diversity jurisdiction in low regard and even federal judges 
are likely to apply public policy followed in the state in which it is located. See Federalisation of Crimes: 
Chief Justice Rehnquist on Federalisation of Crimes, 33 Prosecutor 9, 15 (Mar-Apr 1999) (quoting Justice 
Rehnquist’s remark that federal diversity jurisdiction should be repealed). Klaxon Co v. Stentor Electric 
Manufacturing Co, 313 U.S. (1941) 487, 496 (holding that in diversity cases the federal court must decide 
conflict o f laws issues according to the prevailing law in the state in which it sits). State courts always 
could trump federal diversity precedents. See generally Henry J. Friendly, ‘The Historic Basis o f 
Diversity Jurisdiction’ (1928) 41 Harv L Rev 483 (summarising the history of diversity jurisdiction in 
order to set up a re-examination of the doctrine).
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4.2 Global Legislation
The formulation of normative public policy in a single jurisdiction may vary from one 
to the other. The French way of developing a doctrine of “international public policy”, 
for example, is dependent upon a series of decisions by the courts. The judicial 
decisions bring together those rules and principles that are considered to have normative 
status under all circumstances in the area of international legal relations.228 For obvious 
reasons, the ultimate decision on whether to adopt efficiency-centred public policy at 
the international level may be rested on legislatures rather than courts. First, the 
legislature is best situated to make factual and policy findings that are necessary to 
determine the value, propriety and model of the public policy regime. Second, 
legislatures can make the efficiency-centred public policy operate as default rules that 
give notice to the parties who can fashion or plan their behaviours accordingly. Third, 
legislatures can overrule explicit statutes by as many externalities as possible and 
minimises public choice difficulties inherent in the legislation-making process so as to 
effectively formulate efficiency-centred public policy. Fourth, embodying public policy 
in statutes promotes the efficiency-enhancing jurisdictional competition. When the 
burdens of the domestic legislation become too high, the burdened parties may
* ) ')Q
overcome compliance and coordination costs and organise in opposition to the law, 
which in turn limits wealth transfers.
Legislation of public policy at the global level is a harmonising process of 
national laws, by which states may not only develop local practices but also conform to 
model practices. This is more akin to the “co-evolution”, which assumes that a variety 
of diverse systems, with their own viability, may co-exist within an environment.230 
Given the impediments to state coordination and competition, “interventionist” rules 
such as public policy are arguably better to be governed by global legislation in order to 
promote the level of predictability in local practice. Global legislation could take several 
possible forms, i.e., mandatory unification measures or voluntary codes. International 
organisations can promulgate international conventions ensuring enforcement of 
contractual choice-of-forum or choice-of-applicable-law provisions as “the most 
important international commercial usage [... holding] the parties to their
228 Jean-Pierre Ancel, ‘French Judicial Attitudes Toward International Arbitration’ op. cit. 127.
229 See Gary Becker, ‘A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence’ (1983) 
98 Q J Econ 371, 372-73, 381-88.
230 Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Blackwell, Oxford 1993) 53.
231 See Larry E. Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi, ‘An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws’ (1996) 
25 J Legal Stud 168-69 (providing evidence of evolutionary efficiency concerning the demand for 
uniform statutory provisions and claiming that uniform laws that have the greatest net social benefit are 
also those adopted by the greatest number of states).
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agreements”.232 An international convention may simply adopt the principle of favour 
arbitrandum which forces the contracting states to take a pro-arbitration bias on the 
public policy issue in enforcing foreign arbitral awards. It seems acceptable to the 
judiciary that “an agreement to arbitrate ... should not be permitted to decline 
enforcement... on the basis of parochial views of their desirability or in a manner that 
would diminish the mutually binding nature of the agreements”.233 In other words, the 
arbitration agreement should become the foundation for interpreting or applying public 
policy. Uniform and narrowly defined treaties could minimise the level of judicial 
intervention and solve the forum shopping problem. For instance, if the law governing 
the agreement declares a dispute capable of being settled by arbitration, the court should 
declare its incompetence.
Global legislation may encounter the risk of losing state support according to the 
support-maximising theory of federalism.234 Accordingly, international legislatures 
should refrain from internationalising an area of law if they would lose more support 
than they would gain from legislating. This may occur if the global regulation would 
dissipate a substantial state capital investment in regulation,235 if economic, social, or 
political environments vary across states, or if controversial issues threaten to damage 
the political agenda, process and image of a state. When one state specialises in 
formulating valuable regulation, such as English commercial law and German civil law, 
the party choice may enhance the value of that asset but international legislation may 
weaken the national characteristics. When the environments vary, the choice- 
maximising approach enables each state to exercise its comparative regulatory 
advantage rather than substituting its own substantive policy. However, global 
legislation may not recognise the differentials between the states. Global legislation 
adopting a less intervening approach towards public policy may increase the likelihood 
of opposition from developing states as these states are not likely to see private parties’ 
completely escape from public policy. By contrast, global legislation adopting more 
restrictive public policy may ruin the developed states’ past attempts to adopt an
232 William Laurence Craig, William W. Park and Jan Paulsson, International Chamber o f  Commerce 
Arbitration (2nd edn Oceana Publications and ICC Publishing, New York 1998) 81.
233 760 F. Supp. 1036-1045 (1991); ‘United States District Court, Eastern District o f New York, 29 March, 
Meadows Indemnity Company Limited v. Baccala & Shoop Insurance Services, Inc. et al.’ (1992) XVII 
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers, Deventer & Boston) 686-95.
234 Jonathan R. Macey, ‘Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: 
Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism’ (1990) 76 Va L Rev 265, 267.
235 Ibid, 279 “Delaware’s dominant position in the market for corporate charters represents a valuable 
capital asset that generates revenues for Delaware corporations, corporate lawyers, investment bankers, 
and for the state itself. . . . These capital assets would be destroyed if  the federal government enacted a 
pervasive system of federal corporate law that pre-empted the field”.
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advanced level of public policy and eventually block the evolving path of developing 
more efficiency-centred public policy globally. These factors remind us that global 
legislation may have side-effects or defects. A uniform approach has to take account of 
varying economic, social or political status of the states. In reality, there is a chance that 
the global statute might gain support from various economic players, possibly including 
state governments. Global public policy-related statutes would serve the global interest 
of enhancing international trade, investment and other economic activities by removing 
local barriers. Foreign actors are more concerned about the risk of exposure to 
unfavourable state law or biased judicial treatment in a jurisdiction, i.e., insufficient 
recognition of party autonomy, restrictive public policy or local protectionism.236 State 
governments or economic lobbying groups favouring increased foreign trade and 
investment and fair legal and business environments are likely to endorse public policy 
adopted in and implemented by the global legislation which will minimise local 
protectionism and excessive judicial or administrative intervention.
The empirical reason to be skeptical about the prospect of efficiency-centred 
global public policy is the lack of any real example except the existence of some 
regional public policy. In EU, competition law is a matter of regional public policy,
7*^7order public communautaire, where the EU Commission serves as the guardian. The 
EU Commission's own administrative authority and manpower will conduct due 
investigation into a case to the extent that an arbitral tribunal is not capable of doing the 
same. The public policy nature of the EU competition law is reflected in the limited 
involvement of arbitration tribunals, which have jurisdiction to rule on EU competition 
matters only if the EU Commission does not have exclusive power. In other words, the 
tribunal can only settle private disputes inter partes 238 For instance, the tribunals and 
national courts cannot grant individual exemptions under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty 
since this is an exclusive power possessed by the EU Commission and the tribunals
7^ Qcannot even refer cases to the European Court of Justice. It was once held in Eco
236 This consideration has influenced the Court in civil procedure cases. See, for example, Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Columbia, SA v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418-19 (1983) (holding that the minimal activities of 
a foreign corporation within a state were insufficient for that state to assert general jurisdiction over the 
corporation); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co, 407 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1972) (holding that forum-selection 
clause should be upheld because of interest of preserving and expanding trade).
237 Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v. Benetton International N V  (European Court o f Justice; 1 June 1999). 
Also Christoph Liebscher, ‘European Public Policy After Eco Swiss’ (1999) 10(1) Am Rev Int’l Arb 81.
238 See E. Gaillard et al. (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard and Goldman On International Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, J. Savage 1999) 350.
239 The arbitral tribunal is not a “Court or Tribunal o f a Member State” in the sense o f Article 234 of EC 
Treaty. Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei Nordstern GmbH  v. Reederei M ond Hochseefischerei 
Nordstern AG&Co; Case 102/81 (European Court of Justice, 23 March 1982); Bulk Oil (Zug) v. Sun 
International Ltd. [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 655.
274
Swiss v. Benetton that a national Court must deny enforcement if the award violates 
Article 81, provided that its domestic procedures provide for annulment on grounds of 
public policy violation, which is the case in all member states to the New York 
Convention.240 Failure by the arbitral tribunal to make its decision in compliance with 
EU competition laws may constitute a public policy ground for a court to refuse 
enforcement of the award. EU member states have, to a significant extent, ceded their 
sovereignty to a supranational body, which resulted in a common policy regime, an 
essential component of economic integration and the creation of the single 
market.241 By contrast, nothing substantial has been achieved in unifying the public 
policy in civil and commercial laws after the World War II because of the dilemma 
between the harmonisation of law and sovereignty in the global governance. The threat 
of a loss of sovereignty generates the fear that international integration of public policy 
would prevent state governments from delivering preferred benefits to their citizens.242 
This indicates the difficulty of full reliance upon the global bodies to frame the public 
policy world-wide.
5. P u b l ic  P o l ic y , R u l e  o f  L a w  a n d  G l o b a l i s a t io n
Despite fruitful law and economics literature over the last three decades, economic 
analysis has made little inroad into one of the most perplexing legal areas - the 
rationales and rules of determining what kind of public policy applies to an interstate 
dispute. The critical issue is whether sovereign states shall accept uniform public policy 
rules while the compatibility of uniform public policy rules in different legal systems 
seems questionable. This section mainly discusses several macro theories even though 
their economic underpinnings have not been made explicit or are of little relevance at 
first glance. Legal rationality is discussed in Section 5.1 by reference to the theory of 
rights hypothesis which focuses on the concepts of rights and predictability. Political 
economic theory is important in that developed countries have different legal systems 
although they may share the same moral value in political institutions. The focus of 
Section 5.2 is on the market and globality according to the political economy theory. 
The situation is different in developing countries as the legal system in these countries
240 Case C -126/97 -  Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v Benettoon International N V  (European Court o f Justice, 
1 June 1999). Eco Swiss China Time Limited v Benetton International NV; case C -126/97, judgment o f 1 
June 1999. See Vincent Smith, ‘Arbitration in International Telecommunications: The Way Ahead?’ in 
Martin Odams De Zylva and Reziya Harrison (eds) International Commercial Arbitration -  Developing 
Rules fo r  the New Millennium  (Jordans, Bristol 2000) 193.
241 See Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2002 O.J. (C 325).
242 Eleanor M. Fox, ‘Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, and Sideways’ (2000) 75
NYU L Rev 1781, 1801.
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is largely developed through transplant, which is no longer popular in the 21st century. 
Therefore, the systematic question must be encountered as to whether uniform public 
policy can be introduced through transplant again, which is the topic in Section 5.3.
5.1 Legal Rationality, Rights Hypothesis and Predictability
An important school of thought in institutional economics is the Rights Hypothesis 
which claims that business development and economic growth require a legal order 
securing stable and predictable rights of contract and property and offering the security 
of enforcement. Without such legal order, the risks of a large number of otherwise 
beneficial transactions will far outweigh their expected return As a result trade, 
investment and business will neither occur nor succeed. The role of legal institutions in 
the economy, as Weber pointed out, is that: “the universal predominance of the market 
consociation requires ... a legal system the functioning of which is calculable in 
accordance with rational rules”.243 The law and development movement in the 1960s 
advanced the view that “modem law promotes the development of markets and hence 
economic growth” “through legal institutions such as contract and private property 
rights”.244 More recently, it has been asserted that “the inability of societies to develop 
effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of ... 
historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment.. .”245
5.1.1 The Idea of Rights
According to the Rights Hypothesis, inviolable property rights, enforceable contracts 
and adjudication are necessary for productive capitalism.246 The real concern in our 
context is whether the security of expectations and promises only comes from a well 
functioning legal system protecting contract and properties rights or a wise government 
that pmdently declines to exercise the power it has to interfere with the adjudication in
243 Max Rheinstein (ed), Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA 1954); Talcott Parsons (tr) Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f  
Capitalism (Allen and Unwin, London 1978) 25 (“Modem rational capitalism has need ... a calculable 
legal system and of administration in terms of formal rules”).
244 David M. Trubek, ‘Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study o f Law and Development’
(1982) 82 Yale L J 1 (criticising this conception); and David M. Trubek and Marc Galanter, ‘Scholars in 
Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States’ 
(1974) 4 Wise L Rev 1062.
245 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1990) 54.
246 Ibid. 35, and Douglass C. North & Robert P. Thomas, The Rise o f  the Western World: A New 
Economic History (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1973). Such proposition may not be 
empirically convincing because the enforcement through government coercion is not in fact the only 
effective mechanism available, one-shot deals are in existence between people who intend to remain 
strangers, and the business people sometimes resort to self-help.
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order to maximise its ultimate revenue from taxing the income stream. For all types of 
transactions except one-shot deals, it is possible in principle for other mechanisms to 
provide the needed security and protection. In reality, arbitration, together with other 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, is an effective replacement for, or 
supplement to, a formal legal system or adjudication even though such legal institution 
is autonomous and then is expensive to maintain.247 As the substantial literature on
J A Q
informal and social sanctions, repeated games, and self-enforcement mechanisms has 
suggested, this effectively means that the governmental intervention is not necessarily 
the only means to achieve economic development. Other quasi-government and non­
governmental agencies also play a role in adjusting the relations between parties and 
promoting security of expectations and enforcement. The New York Convention is “the 
most important ... attainment in promoting a more effective and universal rule of 
law” 249 As a legal institution, the New York Convention should also promote rights. 
The approach widely prevalent in major jurisdictions is the law of situs. The “rights” 
rationale underlying this approach has led to a set of rules delineating the territorial 
boundaries of lawmaking and enforcement authority. Under this approach, once an 
individual’s rights are vested at one time and place, that jurisdiction determines the 
extent of the rights. Therefore, courts in that jurisdiction are entitled to impose local 
public policy on the individuals and their disputes. This theory emphasises the territorial 
origin of the states’ political power to control the parties and the outcome of a dispute.
The cornerstone of modem arbitration law is the notion of party autonomy 
which is “rights” based with the aim to liberalise arbitration law from judicial restraints. 
The concept of party autonomy has substantially changed the relationship between 
courts and arbitration tribunals and the extent of judicial supervision of national courts 
and governments. As a result, more freedom has been granted to participants in the 
arbitral process. This freedom is extended, among other things, to the choice of 
arbitrators, the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, the choice of law governing the 
substance of dispute and arbitration proceedings, etc. The concept is embedded in the 
Geneva Protocol of 1923, the Geneva Convention of 1927, the New York Convention 
and the UNCITRAL Model Law. Article 2 of the Geneva Protocol of 1923 provided
247 See Simon Johnson, John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, ‘Courts and Relational Contracts’ (2002) 
18 J L E c o n & O r g  221,227.
248 See Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman, ‘A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law’ (1996) 109(8) 
Harv L Rev 1911; Clive Bull, ‘The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts’ (1987) 102 Q J Econ 
147; Lester G. Telser, ‘A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements’ (1980) 53 J Bus 27.
249 Stephen M. Schwebel, ‘A Celebration of the UN New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards’ (1996) 12(1) Arb Int’l 83, 84.
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that “the arbitral procedure, including the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, shall be 
governed by the will of the parties, and by the law of the country in whose territory the 
arbitration takes place”.
One of the prerequisites for recognition and enforcement of awards stipulated in 
Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 1927 was that the arbitral tribunal was 
“constituted in the manner agreed upon by the parties and in conformity with the law 
governing arbitral procedure”. The New York Convention also embodied the concept of 
party autonomy. For example, Article V(l)(d) provides that recognition and 
enforcement of an award may be refused if “the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, was not in 
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place”. One 
fundamental principle of the Model Law is to recognise the freedom of the parties
OCA
within minimal restriction. The autonomy of the parties is subject to public policy 
and applicable mandatory rules of national laws. Section 1 of the English Arbitration 
Act 1996 embodied the concept of party autonomy by providing that “the parties are 
free to agree how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are 
necessary in the public interest”. In furtherance of this concept, the Act grants the 
parties the freedom to design their arbitral framework by, inter alia, choosing the seat of 
arbitration, selecting their arbitrators and deciding the arbitral procedure.251 The support 
of party autonomy is to support arbitration, but not interfere with it.252 Therefore, the 
judicial intervention is limited to a restricted extent. For instance, in resorting to the 
irregularity, the English courts must be satisfied that such irregularity is of a kind which 
“has caused or will cause substantial injustice to the applicant”.253 The requirement of 
“substantial injustice” is aimed at reinforcing the autonomy of the arbitral process. The 
concept of party autonomy is highly respected by French courts in numerous cases 
involving international arbitration clauses whereby the existence and validity of a given 
arbitration clause is determined without referring to any municipal law.254
5.1.2 The Notion of Predictability
250 G. Hermann, ‘The Role of the Coruts under the UNCITRAL Model Law Script’ in Julian D.M. Lew 
(ed), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration (Centre for Commercial Law Studies, London 
1986) 173.
251 Sections 25 and 34 of the English Arbitration Act 1996.
252 Toby T. Landau, ‘Introductory Note - United Kingdom: Arbitration Act o f 1996’ (1997) 36(1) 
International Legal Materials 155, 159.
253 Section 68(2) o f the English Arbitration Act 1996.
254 Jean-Pierre Ancel, op. cit. 123.
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The “rights” theory actually owes nothing to the economic analysis of predictability, 
which may be a more constructive focus than the presence or absence of enforceable 
legal rights. Assuming that all other things are equal, it is more conducive to 
economic development to have predictability than not to have it since predictability has 
economic value and can further the economic development, inter alia, the enforcement 
of contract rights and the security of property rights even though predictability many not 
come from an autonomous legal system and a regime of rights. As a matter of fact, 
predictability is a critical factor in applying public policy in arbitration by courts. For 
instance, the court in Mitsubishi v. Soler considered, among other factors, “sensitivity to 
the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of 
dispute” when deciding to take a pro-arbitration stance.256 Similarly, the US Supreme 
Court placed weight on predictability, which is “essential to any international business 
transaction” when it had to decide whether to recognise an arbitration agreement in an 
anti-trust case.257 In practice, it is important to distinguish between predictability and 
rights. Activities in arbitration depend on predictability of matters in respect of which 
the disputing parties may have no legal rights. For example, the arbitration institution or 
panel will proceed with the arbitration proceeding step by step, which is a legal order 
that contains no rights in some aspects but operates in a predictable manner.
The inquiry into predictability touches upon the issue of predictability for whom? 
In theory, there must be predictability for private economic actors because economic 
development requires a market and a market requires private actors. This is so even 
though non-private actors such as government agencies are capable of fulfilling the role 
of private actors leading to flourishing markets and economic growth. What the market 
does require in order to have meaningful bargaining over prices is actors that are trying 
to buy low and sell high. Therefore, the rationale of the legal system shall not be merely 
interpreted from the government’s point of view. In our context, it appears convincing 
that the legal rationale shall be agreeable to the private actors in the marketplace. 
Obviously it is important in the 21st century that the government shows sufficient 
respect to the private actors’ choice of law and choice of dispute resolution to protect 
and enforce their own rights simply because that choice itself is rational from the 
perspective of private actors.
255 Modern critical social and legal theory does deny that law in Western societies is autonomous, rational, 
and determinate, and therefore challenges the central causal claim of the Rights Hypothesis. See Albert 
Chen, ‘Rational Law, Economic Development and the Case of China’ (1999) 8 Soc & L Stud 97. Critical 
theory does not deny that there is predictability in societies.
256 473 US 614 (1985).
257 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver 417 US 506 (1974).
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The analysis in this section has policy implications in addition to academic ones. 
Public policy is supposed to preserve a role for government regulation by prohibiting 
party choice of law or by making it contingent upon the satisfaction of procedural 
protections and protection of fairness. The legal rationality requires substantial 
improvement of “governance” and “the rule of law”. An effective and functioning legal 
system shall contain some basic components: (a) there is a set of rules which are known 
to the public in advance, (b) such rules are in force, (c) mechanisms exist to ensure the 
proper application of the rules and to allow for departure from them as needed, (d) 
conflicts in the application of the rules can be resolved through an independent judicial 
or arbitral body, and (e) there are clearly-made procedures for amending the rules when 
they no longer serve their purpose. The state shall devote its resources to creating a 
legal system that could fairly adjudicate contract disputes and enforce their decisions. 
However, without a better public policy by which the state can intervene in adjudication 
and rule of law, the sine qua non of economic development cannot be secured. This 
supports a better set of public policy rules that enhance ex ante predictability.
An efficiency-centred public policy attempts to minimise the sum of the costs 
that public policy decisions may entail. These include the extra litigation costs
96 0associated with legal uncertainty, the parties’ costs of predicting the applicable law at 
the time of relevant conduct, the social costs of inefficient laws and violation of basic 
public interests, and the lost benefits of evasion of or non-compliance with public policy 
rules through exit routes such as the choice of law and un-regulated behaviours. A 
principle-based public policy rule plus the contractual choice approach might effectively 
decrease some of these unnecessary costs because (a) a mechanism that facilitates 
individual choice has the potential to dilute the effect of inefficient law and to diminish 
the level of judicial intervention due to less application of local public policy rules; and 
(b) if courts always apply public policy principles on a necessity basis, their decisions
258 Ibrahim Shihata, ‘The World Bank and ‘Governance’ Issues in Its Borrowing Members’ in Ibrahim F.I. 
Shihata (ed), The World Bank in a Changing World Selected Essays and Lectures Vol.II (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 1991) Ch.2, cited in Frank K. Upham, ‘Speculations on Legal Informality: On Winn’s 
“Relational Practices and the Marginalisation of Law’” (1994) 28 Law & Soc’y Rev 233.
259 For a review of “rule o f law” rhetoric in policymaking circles concerned with economic development, 
see John K.M. Ohnesorge, ‘The Rule of Law, Economic Development, and the Developmental States of 
Northeast Asia; in Christoph Antons (ed), Law and Development in East and Southeast Asia (Routledge 
Curzon, London 2003) 91.
260 These costs are not a focus o f this Article but have been discussed in the legal and economic literature 
on litigation. See Louis Kaplow, ‘A Model of the Optimal Complexity o f Legal Rules’ (1995) 11 J L, 
Econ, & Org 150; Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis o f  Law  (4th edn Little, Brown 1992) 554-60 
(discussing how uncertainty affects decision to settle or to go to trial); Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A. 
Posner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking’ (1974) 3 J Legal Stud 257, 265 (positing that a 
clear legal rule will facilitate more settlements and diminish the need for litigation, which is generally a 
more costly method of settling disputes).
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would be simple and predictable ex post, and extra litigation costs will be reduced. In 
this regard, the courts in England are supposed to provide the parties with sufficient 
freedom in arbitration “subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public 
interest”. However, in terms of the predictability, public policy still causes 
uncertainty about the applicable law ex ante and would reduce beneficial interstate 
competition. A principle-based public policy rule should have a legitimate foundation 
and clear direction. A prevailing desire to promote the primacy of international 
arbitration can be a strong foundation of policy consideration to design public policy 
rules, which should adopt a pro-arbitration bias so as to respect the principles of 
international comity and party autonomy in enforcing arbitral awards. This direction 
will result in a narrow or restricted construction of public policy by courts.
5.2 Legal Order and Transplant
Montesquieu wrote in “L’Esprit des Lois” in 1748 that the political and civil laws 
should be tailored for each nation and that it would be a great coincidence should they 
fit other people equally well.262 Montesquieu argued that the spirit of each nation’s law 
closely reflects the type of government, geography and climate as well as religion, 
history and culture. Today, this Darwinian type of proposition may seem like an 
anachronism as people around the globe have by and large converged on the Western 
type of formal law or global law both for the political {i.e., constitutional) and civil laws. 
Historically, the existing formal legal order in a large number of countries was shaped 
by transplanting law that had evolved in several European countries in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.263 In the context of commercial arbitration, transplant is a 
common phenomenon. In defining the scope of public policy, a number of jurisdictions 
such as Australia, Zimbabwe, Bermuda, Singapore, Malta, India adopted a two-prong 
definition of public policy, that is, the making of the award being induced or effected by 
fraud or corruption; and a breach of the rules of natural justice, both of which originated 
from the Model Law.264 Even Western countries are transplanting norms and rules in 
regional or international conventions or model laws. For instance, the Model Law led to
261 Section 1(b) o f the UK Arbitration Act 1996.
262 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f Laws (1977) 30 (in Book 1 chapter 3) (stating that “law in general is 
human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the inhabitants o f the earth; the political and civil laws o f each 
nation ought to be only the particular cases in which this human reason is applied. They should be 
adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are made, as to render it very unlikely for those of 
one nation to be proper for another” .)
263 For example, the Japanese civil code (1898) was modeled on the German Civil Code of 1896, which 
came into force only in 1900.
264 Also see section 2.3 of this Chapter.
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a revolution in the practice of arbitration in England, 265 and has been entirely 
transplanted into arbitration laws in Australia, Canada and recently Japan.266 Yet, 
convergence has often been confined to the law on the books and the functioning and 
effectiveness of legal institutions continue to diverge substantially.
Under the transplant theory, countries that receive their legal order from other 
countries have to come to grips with a substantial mismatch between the pre-existing 
conditions and the imported legal order. The social, economic, cultural, political and 
institutional context often differs so remarkably between the origin and transplant 
countries that imported legal order may not be effectuated in the transplant country. 
Transplant countries are likely to suffer from the transplant effect, i.e., the mismatch 
between local conditions and institutions as well as the side-effect of transplanted law 
on the society. Transplant error is often in existence in transplanting arbitration laws. In 
arbitration laws of India and Pakistan, there is a “section 9(b)” problem relating to the 
provision dealing with the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in both countries. The 
effect of Section 9(b) is that in cases in which the governing law of the arbitration 
agreement is the law of India or Pakistan, awards made outside these territories are 
treated as domestic and thereby subject to the judicial review on the merits by the courts. 
As a result, an award rendered in such locations as Paris, London or New York will be 
subject to judicial control in India or Pakistan on arbitration as long as the substantive 
law of the dispute is the law of India or Pakistan. The problem originated from section 
6(b) of Part I of the English Arbitration (Foreign Awards) Act 1930,268 which was 
subsequently re-enacted in section 40(b) of Part II of the Arbitration Act 1950.269 
Section 40(b) was only concerned with the enforcement of awards pursuant to the 
Geneva Convention of 1927 and soon became a dead letter in England. However, when 
the 1930 Act was transplanted into over 30 Commonwealth countries, India and
265 Bruce Harris, Rowan Planterose and Jonathan Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996 -  A Commentary 
(Blackwell, Oxford 1996) 1.
266 Masatsugu Suzuki, ‘Japan’s New Arbitration Law’ (2005) Asian Disp Resol 18-19.
267 For inconsistencies between informal indigenous norms and Western formal law in Asia, see Carol A. 
G. Jones, ‘Capitalism, Globalisation and Rule of Law: An Alternative Trajectory of Legal Change in 
China’ (1994) 3 Social & Legal Studies 195; and Jane Kaufman Winn, ‘Relational Practices and the 
Marginalisation of Law: Informal Financial Practices of Small Businesses in Taiwan’ (1994) 28 L & 
Society Rev 193.
268 The draftsman o f Section 6(b) was inspired by the case of Spurrier v. La Cloche in 1902 [1902 AC 
446] in which the Privy Council gave effect to an English Scott v. Avery arbitration clause (1856 H.L. 
Cas. 811 making arbitration and an award a condition precedent to any resort to the courts) by setting 
aside a Jersey judgment on the merits and decided that the matter had to be referred to arbitration under 
the English Arbitration Act 1889. This case results in Section 6(b) which states that “nothing in Part o f 
this Act shall apply to any award made on an arbitration agreement governed by the law of England”.
269 This section now continues in force due to section 99 of the Arbitration Act 1996 in relation to 
“foreign” awards excluding New York Convention awards.
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Pakistan adopted this provision into section 9(b) of their then respective statutes. The 
effect of applying section 9(b) has been something of a disaster, that is, to treat foreign 
awards in the same way as domestic awards and to subject arbitration conducted outside 
India and Pakistan to the control of the national courts. From a jurisprudential 
perspective, the history of Section 9(b) is unfortunate because nothing in the Geneva 
Convention 1927 justified the original section 6(b) of the 1930 Act and there is no 
persuasive justification for construing section 6(b) and later section 40(b) in English 
Arbitration Acts and section 9(b) in arbitration laws of India and Pakistan. More 
surprisingly, the mis-transplanted section 9(b) was still in force in India and Pakistan 
governing the New York Convention awards until 1996 even though there was no trace 
of it in the English Arbitration Act 1975 due to the recommendation made by the Fifth 
Report by the Private International Law Committee to the Lord Chancellor in 1961 
concerning the accession of the United Kingdom to the New York Convention to 
remove section 40(b) of the 1950 Act.270 The side-effect or error of legal transplant 
suggests that the absolute or complete transplant of a legal order or norm into another 
country may not guarantee that the inherent features of the legal order will function 
effectively locally. Similarly, the arbitration principles or norms, which work well in 
some jurisdictions may not necessarily function in others. The risk exists to less 
intervening or restrictive pubic policy which may not be as functional in a developing 
country as in a developed country.
States that have developed their legal orders internally have a comparative 
advantage in creating effective legal institutions over countries on which a formal legal 
order was imposed externally. This proposition is empirically supported by the rejection 
of the earlier transplant practice under colonialism, and the recent attempts to use 
Western law as a tool to promote socioeconomic developments. This claim is also 
consistent with the notion that law is a cognitive institution in which laws that are 
compatible with the pre-existing social norms are more likely to be well received and 
therefore effectuated.271 Legal evolution theory ably explains why this comparative 
advantage exists in some countries. Where law evolves internally through a process of 
trial, error and correction, with the involvement of users of the law such as legal 
professionals and other interest groups, legal institutions tend to be more responsive to 
local conditions and adopt locally-tailored solutions. Legislature and judiciary can build 
on domestic knowledge and take full advantage of complementarities between new and
270 See the Fifth Report to the Lord Chancellor o f the Private International Law Committee, Parliamentary 
Papers Vol. 18, Cmnd. 1961 No. 1515, App 3, p. 23.
271 Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Social Norms and Social Roles’ (1996) 96 Colum L Rev 903, 925.
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old conditions as well as between new and old institutional arrangements. This is most
979explicit for case law, where new legal rules are generated from litigated cases. By 
contrast, where foreign law is transplanted, legal institutions become less responsive 
and legal evolution becomes external rather than internal. The functioning and legality 
of transplant is largely dependent upon the demand for law, which, in turn, results in 
more voluntary compliance with law and more willingness of a society to invest in the 
legal institutions necessary for upholding the legal order. Therefore, a good fit of 
foreign law with local conditions may not be just a lucky coincidence, but can be 
achieved by constructive adaptation. Attempts must be made to induce a self-sustaining 
demand for legal change, or in a Darwinian term, evolution. Internal legal evolution can 
improve the legality of the transplanted law by adopting more adaptive measures to 
localise the law and to match local conditions. This requires a more constructive 
borrowing and undoubtedly takes as much time as for the enactment of optimally 
designed laws. After two hundred years of “colonial” or external legal transplant, more 
patience with the internal legal evolution seems necessary. In this sense, an effective 
legal reform shall be a voluntary transplant which can improve the legal receptivity of 
transplanted law. A voluntary transplant requires a substantial adaptation of foreign 
legal order to the local context. Therefore, local conditions must be considered and 
workable modifications need to be made to transplanted rules or institutions. It is logical 
to conclude that an involuntary transplant of foreign or international public policy may 
not be compatible with local conditions of countries which have their own level of 
public intervention. The making of hard law at the international level may not constitute 
and result in a voluntary transplant.
6. H a r m o n is a t io n  o f  P u b l ic  P o l ic y  R u l e s  a n d  I n t e r n a t io n a l  L a w ­
m a k in g  P r o c e s s
Despite the fact that the regulation of international business has a framework of norms, 
principles and rules, the sheer force of the world economy has resulted in more and 
more commercial disputes among states and international commercial players. 
International arbitration and other alternative dispute settlement methods have proved 
effective in the global marketplace and have a considerable impact on the transaction 
costs and security of international business. International commercial arbitration, 
therefore, should be seen as a key device to structuring and maintaining the international 
markets and to guiding the transactional behaviours of international economic
272 See Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty - Rules and Order, Vol. 1, op. cit.
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players.273 Although there have been international and regional conventions facilitating 
the “arbitralisation” of commercial disputes, there are still problems facing arbitrators, 
arbitration institutions, arbitration panels and private parties involved in transnational 
commercial arbitration. It is imperative that the parties agree on the system of law 
applicable to their particular agreement to proceed with arbitration, as well as the law 
applicable to the actual process and to the merits of their dispute. This perspective is 
eclectic, in particular because of the “dynamic interaction between the will of the 
arbitrating parties and the interest of various national legal systems in ensuring justice 
and fairness of the arbitral process and its respect for vital and appropriate national 
interests”.274
Legal culture and history are legitimate and reasonable sources of differentiation 
in transnational commercial law. The hypothesis of a “culturally neutral, universal 
language of law” is theoretically possible but realistically difficult still. It has been 
argued that, paradoxically, legal integration has a disintegrating effect on law in that it 
distances human beings from formal law 276 and local conditions. Along with 
globalisation, the concept of floating or de-localised arbitration has become popular but 
received less enthusiastic response as even the previously enthusiastic transnationalist 
campaigners start to appreciate that international commercial arbitration is not wholly 
distinct from national arbitration laws.277 In other words, local characteristics are still in 
existence in the globalisation of law. There is no legislative or judicial authority 
empowered at the international level so far to provide “official” meaning for or to define 
the scope of public policy in the global body of law. The process for the emergence of a 
uniform public policy is different from the usual way in which the legal standard takes 
on the “official” or uniform legal meaning given the absence of a transnational 
legislative body. Whatever the degree of ascendency of global law or transnational 
commercial law is, the emergence of a uniform public policy in transnational arbitration
273 See Yves Dezlay and Bryant G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and 
the Construction o f  a Transnational Legal Order (University o f Chicago Press, Chicago and London 
1996) 7.
274 Okezie Chukwumerije, Choice o f  Law in International Commercial Arbitration (Quorum Books, 
Westport, Connecticut and London 1994) 15.
275 Peter Sack, ‘Law, Language and Culture: Verbal Acrobatics and Social Technology’ (1998) 41 J Legal 
Pluralism 15-35.
276 Thomas Wilhelmsson, ‘Legal Integration as Disintegration of National Law’ in Hanne Petersen & 
Henrik Zahle, Legal Polycentricity - Consequences o f  Pluralism in Law  (Dartmouth, Aldershot 1995) 139 
(“the further away from the individual citizen the legal instruments are created, the greater is the 
possibility that disintegration as alienation from law will occur”).
77 Jan Paulsson, ‘Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why it Matters’
(1983) 32 Int’l & Comp L Q 53; Frederick A. Mann, ‘England Rejects ‘Delocalised’ Contracts and 
Arbitration’ (1984) 33 Int’l & Comp L Q 193.
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is not a spontaneous process as law’s “naming of persons and types of transactions links 
private law systems closely to the culture of communities in which they evolve”.
There have always been hues and cries as to the necessity of harmonising 
national laws, inter alia, on public policy at the international level so that international 
commercial arbitration can be conducted in a more foreseeable and uniform manner 
worldwide. The persuasive response to this claim is same as the answer to the question 
whether a country shall be a member to the New York Convention. The substance and 
form of the New York Convention appeared to have passed two important tests. First, 
the New York Convention has been accepted by and adapted to different legal, political 
and economic systems. Second, the Convention continues to be effective even though 
the New York Convention has been in existence for around five decades. This is proven 
by the fact that the chapter on recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law was closely modelled on the provisions of the New York 
Convention, and that the solutions of the New York Convention have been incorporated 
into many national legislation and multilateral international treaties. Expanding the 
membership of the New York Convention enables commercial entities in one country to 
rely on the growing network of the regime for recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards. It is, therefore, in the interest of a country to be a member of the New York 
Convention and to adhere to the standards, principles and norms therein so that its 
interaction with the international business can be promoted.
The only reason that a country could conceivably be against adopting the New 
York Convention is to preserve for the legislative body and courts a degree of autonomy 
in dealing with foreign arbitral awards. However, this argument is superficial and 
should not be a decisive factor. There shall be more convincing counter-arguments in 
favour of being a member to the New York Convention. The privately-contracted 
adjudicators in international arbitration should be left to manage the legal construction 
of the public sphere without rigorous supervision by the courts. The judicial power of 
national courts should not be a great concern. In addition, participants in international 
business need reasonable confidence on the enforceability of an arbitral award 
regardless of the jurisdiction in which the assets are located and will be enforced against. 
Without such confidence, it will be more difficult to expand the trade, investment and 
business to non-traditional markets and to establish business ties with new partners in
278 Hugh Collins, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law’ (1994) 14 Oxford J Legal St 229.
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untested jurisdictions.279 Parties that have refused to comply with an award are often 
black-listed; on the other hand, a jurisdiction which adopts more non-enforcement 
grounds justified by the New York Convention will not be internationally respected. 
The adoption of the New York Convention does not mean that a country has signed a 
“carte blanche” compelling recognition and enforcement of foreign awards. Rather, the 
New York Convention offers reasonable leeway for non-enforcement of a foreign 
arbitral award. Foreign business partners are more willing to accept the place of 
arbitration in a country that is a party to the New York Convention. Therefore, the 
member States will enjoy an advantageous edge in the marketplace. By contrast, it is 
short-sighted for a country not to be part of the uniform regime and likely to be 
marginalised in international commercial circles.
Inherent in the international law-making process is the recognition of diversity 
as well as different levels of inception of uniform legal norms and standards. The 
genesis of the harmonisation of commercial law is the theory of sources of law.280 There 
are several layers of source of law in transnational commercial law. First, the United 
Nations reformed or at least recast the international laws with the weight of 
supranational sovereign rules. The United Nations has spawned a number of 
international, quasi-political and inter-govemmental economic organisations, which 
seek to achieve harmonisation in the legal field.281 The Vienna-based United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) has swiftly developed into the 
core agency of the UN legal services and has contributed decisively to legal 
harmonisation worldwide.282 The New York Convention is among the most successful 
unification instruments not only in the area of arbitration but in the entire field of 
international commercial law. Nevertheless, the Convention does not eliminate all
279 In addition to the legal system, foreign partners also tend to require a higher degree o f security, which 
may complicate contract negotiations and increase the costs of the transaction.
280 Oppetit, L’emergence de la lex mercatoria, in Bruno Oppetit, Droit et modemite 53 (1998).
281 Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, E-U  in International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement 
System (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1977) 5.
2 2 UNCITRAL’s most prominent contributions include the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, which has achieved world-wide success and recognition. U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.97/18, Annex I, English version reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 6264 (1987) and in 19 I.L.M. 668 
(1980), and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, U.N. Doc. A/31/17, para. 57 (1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 
701 (1976). Other products the UNCITRAL produced include the United Nations Convention on the 
Carriage o f Goods by Sea (1978), the Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of 
Goods (New York, 1974); Legal Guide on International Transactions (1992); UN Convention on the 
Liability o f Operators of Transport Terminals in International Trade, Model Law on Procurement of 
Goods, Construction and Services (1994); Legal Guide on Drawing Up International Contracts for the 
Construction of Industrial Works (1988); UN Convention on International Bills o f Exchange and 
International Promissory Notes (New York, 1988); Legal Guide on Electronic Funds Transfers (1987); 
Model Law on International Credit Transfers (1992); UN Convention on Independent Guarantees and 
Stand-by Letters of Credit (New York, 1995); Recommendation on the Legal Value of Computer Records 
(1985); Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996); Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997).
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obstacles including inappropriate level of judicial intervention, which calls for a new 
generation of international rules. Second, the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law,283 the Institute for the Unification of Private International Law (“UNIDROIT”),284 
and organisations of merchants such as the International Chamber of Commerce 
(“ICC”)285 formulate important rules and principles and become a strong force in the 
unification and harmonisation of international commercial law. UNIDROIT Principles 
and UNCITRAL Model Law and other soft law are being so aggressively transposed 
into national black letters as part of the scheme of rendering the uniform rules and 
standards globally. Participants in international arbitration are increasingly conscious 
about local obstacles. The most effective way for a country to assure all participants in 
arbitration about the quality of its law on international arbitration is perhaps to enact the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. The Model Law usefully extends the enforcement regime of 
the New York Convention to all international arbitral awards irrespective of the country 
where the award was made.
Along with the globalisation and international law-making process, the neo­
liberal dogma of free trade, investment and business would have resulted in a 
predominantly market-oriented political economy at the international level as well. 
Even arbitration has now become more market-oriented and has been in the process of 
marketisation. Nevertheless, there has been widespread discomfort with marketisation 
of everything including the legal order and public policy for various reasons. First, most 
countries are considerably less market-oriented than a truly laissez-faire economy so the 
level of administrative, legislative and judicial intervention varies with different degrees. 
Second, markets do not deal well with all public externalities, a combination of 
inadequate information, public process bias, and traditional economic externalities. The 
increasing integration of the world economy is more likely to intensify conflicts in 
international business, which impose pressures on each nation to conform to some kind 
of world standard for political economy286 such as a more tolerant and flexible judiciary, 
a more limited level of judicial review and more recognition of party autonomy of
283 The work of the Hague Conference includes the Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and 
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matter, November 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361 and the 
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, July 27, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 
2555.
284 UNIDROIT’s conventions include the Convention on International Financial Leasing, May 28, 1988, 
27 I.L.M. 931 and the Convention on International Factoring, May 28, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 943, as well as the 
Restatement-like Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1994).
285 Few sets o f international commercial rules are as widely used as the ICC Incoterms, ICC Pub. No. 460 
(1990) and the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, ICC Pub. No. 500 (1993).
286 “Political economy”, in a political sense, essentially reflects the dominant philosophy in each country
about the proper role of government in assuring general welfare and the way the dominant philosophy is 
institutionalised in the country’s economic and political structures.
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business players. In the long-run, such pressures may produce a much greater degree of 
convergence of legal order or legal system. Some types of “international standards” are 
necessary if the world arbitration community is going to be perceived as having a 
minimal level of fairness and justice. However, the convergence will not develop 
smoothly or quickly as the differences in political economy are rooted in history and are 
not amenable to change through rational discourse. If the reality of the difficulties of 
legal convergence in political economies is rightly observed, the challenge is to build a 
legal order that sufficiently satisfies justice and legitimacy based on radically different 
approaches to public policy and party autonomy in the commercial community. There 
are few options left so far. First, it is advisable to build up a supranational framework. 
With the fast growth of international business, some regulation of international 
arbitration in a systematic fashion in a centralised manner is truly preferred. Unlike the 
European Union, however, there are no political, regulatory or judicial bodies at the 
centre of international political and legal systems that have any real resemblance to the 
sovereign organs of a true state. This may suggest that there is not a centralised legal 
order to maintain desirable markets. The question then is how and how much power can 
and must be transferred from national governing bodies to a regional or international 
body in order to make markets workable. Second, in addition to a uniform legal order, 
voluntary regulation is also a possibility. It is possible that greater convergence will be 
achieved through a spontaneous and internal process of constructing the legal order 
even though this will not be an easy, smooth, or quick process.
7 . C o n c l u s i v e  S u m m a r y
The vulnerable process of international arbitration is under pressure for change. The 
pressures arise from diverse sources: the contemporary cross-border commercial 
environment, the acceleration of cross-cultural influences, globalisation, the growing 
experimentation with less formal and rigid dispute resolution mechanisms, the more 
supportive judicial attitudes towards commercial arbitration, more respect demanded by 
the business community from the courts to party autonomy, less judicial and 
government intervention, and finally, the consumer demand for a faster, more efficient 
and less expensive arbitration process. Innovations like judicialisation of certain 
procedures, expansion of mechanisms for obtaining evidence and information, 
imposition of case-management techniques, commitment to less formal processes, 
adoption of less intervening public policy and narrower scope of judicial review are 
clearly responsive to these pressures. It seems that continued pressures from arbitrating
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parties, arbitral institutions and courts will effect an alteration to many aspects of 
international commercial arbitration.
There is a pressing need for a clear thinking of modernity, locality, nationality, 
intemationality and globality. The twentieth century experienced an important change, 
that is, the dilution, the dissipation, and, in some extreme cases, the disappearance of 
state power. The “delocalised” arbitration is free from the procedural safeguards 
traditionally imposed by those national legal systems. This shift in the locus of authority 
reflects a widespread popular realisation but a critical controversy that the collective 
public responsibility of the state does not fully substitute on a broad basis for individual 
responsibility privately exercised. So far a three-tiered global system, consisting of 
private adjudication under agreed rules, supported by national regulations necessary to 
ensure its integrity, and an international exercise or non-exercise of state power to the 
extent required to guarantee enforcement of arbitral awards, has been set up. The 
dilution of the state power strengthens the mechanism whereby parties of different 
nationalities agree to mandatory arbitration of disputes between them pursuant to a 
particular set of arbitration rules. Statutes in major industrial jurisdictions have been 
modernised so as to minimise state or judicial intervention in the arbitral process, while 
offering judicial review under a “small” umbrella of public policy to the extent merely 
necessary to ensure the integrity of the process by which the arbitral tribunal arrived at 
its award. These evolving trends, however, have not been fully reflected in the global 
legislation of international commercial arbitration. The New York Convention only 
deals with arbitration proceedings indirectly (by providing principles which must not be 
violated) or partially (by dealing with some aspects of the validity of the arbitration 
agreement). The Model Law and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are of a contractual 
nature and, as a result, their good functioning depends on the mandatory procedural 
legislation in individual states governing the case. In any event, none of the New York 
Convention, Model Law and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules deals with the judicial 
intervention such as the public policy and due process at a mandatory level or in a more 
functional manner.
Under the label of globality, there are undeniably strong pressures toward 
harmonisation and homogenisation of legal orders, systems or norms such as public 
policy as significant differences in local law stand as impediments to international 
business and dispute resolution. The attempt to harmonise the substantive law in cross- 
border litigation has been made for a while. In the context of international commercial 
arbitration, such attempt has not been substantially made on several critically important
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issues such as the law on public policy. The needs of modem day arbitration mandate 
that states moderate and harmonise their traditionally parochial views of public policy 
relating to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. In this regard, the French 
approach to distinguish domestic and international public policy has been regarded as 
an innovative approach and has been gradually recognised by more states. However, 
this approach is over pragmatic but lacks practical guidance. The principle-based and 
efficiency-centred normative public policy, which supports the presumption in favour of 
enforcement of contractual choice among the parties, shall be able to compensate for 
such defects. Where the parties cannot contract explicitly, public policy shall allow the 
parties to determine, at a low cost and ex ante, that the given conduct will trigger the 
application of the law of a specific state. The parties may be able to plan and structure 
their behaviour so as to avoid laws ill-suited to their affairs. Moreover, party autonomy 
and the contractual choice mechanism shall minimise the costs of contracting for 
efficient laws or avoiding inefficient ones. In the absence of an explicit contract, courts 
should apply the state law that the parties most likely would have selected had they 
contracted explicitly before their legal dispute arose.287 Assuming that the parties would 
typically prefer to be governed by the law that maximises their joint welfare,288 they 
would be expected to choose the law of the state with the comparative regulatory 
advantage. In order to preserve the parties’ rights and ex ante predictability, 
comparative regulatory advantage should be employed not as a general standard but 
rather as a criterion for developing specific and predictable rules.
The attractiveness of normative public policy rests with its ability to provide for 
reasonable and predictable standards of commercial practice and an acceptable 
benchmark for judicial intervention. Ideally, normative public policy law and practice 
can be legalised in statutes at an international level. Given the weakness of international 
hard law, such normative public policy may be coded in soft law but with more 
mandatory flavour. It has been suggested that a detailed list of non-arbitrable matters be 
elaborated in a model law type of legal document. Given the considerable difficulties in 
reaching a worldwide consensus on an exhaustive list in a new multilateral treaty, a 
non-exhaustive list may be proposed to states for domestic adoption or implementation 
by a model law or a supplementary protocol to the model law. States are then 
“compelled” to list thereafter any other issues deemed necessary according to local
287 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis o f  Law  (5th edn Aspen Publishers, Inc., New York 1998) 
646.
288 Ibid.
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9RQlaws. The advantage of this approach is that it is able to channel “local information” 
to outsiders and to channel “outside information” to the local context thereby 
“compelling” states not to over-widen the scope of non-arbitrable matters. The legal 
norms or standards in soft law will be adeptly transplanted into other countries 
especially a large number of developing countries which are not willing to transplant 
foreign legal norms into their local legal order in a dramatic and mechanical manner. 
Once legal norms contained in soft law are locally accepted, they may become the 
foundational elements of harmonised public policy in international commercial 
arbitration.
289 Gerold Herrmann, ‘Does the World Need Additional Uniform Legislation on Arbitration?’ (1999) 15(3) 
Arb Int’l 219.
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CHAPTER 6 NEO-NEW YORK CONVENTION
-  A PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION
This chapter summarises the whole dissertation, which essentially, consists of the study 
of four dilemmas in the New York Convention, two research methodologies adopted 
and one core question relating to the globalised world in the 21st century. The title of 
this dissertation, “Beyond the New York Convention”, has two limbs. First, although 
the dissertation touches upon four dilemmas in the New York Convention, the scope of 
the dissertation is indeed beyond the traditional topics in commercial arbitration and 
extends to some theoretical topics in globalisation such as judicial competition and 
international governance, which are not traditionally linked to the New York 
Convention. Second, consistent with the topics covered in this dissertation, the 
analytical methods adopted are also beyond traditional methodologies such as case 
studies and positivist approaches.
1. F o u r  D il e m m a s  o f  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  C o n v e n t io n
1.1 Dilemma o f the Past, Present and Future o f  the New York Convention
The New York Convention is a product of evolution with two primary objectives, i.e., 
greater enforceability of arbitral awards and greater uniformity of enforcement practice. 
These objectives are actually the two primary objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1923 
on Arbitration Clauses in Commercial Matters and the 1927 Geneva Convention on the 
Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards.1 The New York Convention achieved these two 
objectives largely through the simplification of enforcement proceedings, in particular 
by abolishing the cumbersome double exequatur procedure required under the 
provisions of its predecessor being the 1927 Geneva Convention, and by setting out 
certain exclusive grounds in Article V by which signatory states could refuse to enforce
•j
an award. In Darwinian terminology, the New York Convention inherited, through a 
“natural selection process”, core memetic codes from two previous generations’ 
“organism” and evolved into a higher level of “organism” by transmitting codes and 
information from the environment into the “gene” and adapting itself into a new
1 See Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
2 Article V enumerates an exclusive list of grounds on which recognition or enforcement of a foreign 
arbitral award may be withheld: (1) incapacity of the parties to agree to arbitrate or other invalidity of the 
arbitration agreement; (2) inability to present a party’s case during the arbitration proceedings; (3) award 
exceeding the scope of the submission to arbitration; (4) irregularities in the composition and procedure 
of the arbitral tribunal; (5) award not binding, set aside or suspended at the situs o f the arbitration; (6) 
non-arbitrability of the subject matter of the dispute; and (7) award contravening public policy. See 
Article V o f the New York Convention.
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environment. Ultimately, the New York Convention provides a more stable legal regime 
under which arbitration can prosper for the next several decades. However, according to 
Darwinian legal theory, change is a universal characteristic of the world and law is a 
cognitive institution. Therefore, the New York Convention should not be a close-ended 
regime. Rather, it should be part of the evolving universal change which needs to 
respond to external forces and possess features that are co-evolving with the 
surroundings. As almost 60 years have passed since its birth, some adjustments to new 
developments, legal, technological, political and economic, must be made to the New 
York Convention.
1.2 Dilemma of Tensions between Rendition and Enforcing Forums
The purposes of the New York Convention are to preserve expectations of both 
contracting states of rendition and enforcement and private parties and also to minimise 
forum shopping.3 Unfortunately, however, the pursuit of these goals often encounters 
difficulties in practice since the enforcement of awards ultimately relies upon the 
implementation of uniform standards by contracting states of the New York Convention. 
A compelling issue is how the court in the enforcement forum should deal with an 
arbitral award which has been set aside by the court in the country of rendition. The 
plain language of Article V, in its use of the term “may”, seems to show the 
discretionary character of the defenses to enforcement of awards available under that 
Article. This discretion stands in stark contrast to Article III, which in setting out the 
Convention’s central obligation, provides that courts of “each contracting state shall 
recognise... and enforce” foreign arbitral awards. Taken together, the interplay between 
the two Articles illustrates that a decision to enforce an award despite an Article V(l)(e) 
defense such as annulment of the award in the country of rendition would be not only 
permissible under the Convention, but would accord with its pro-enforcement goals.4 
Nonetheless, it has been argued that no matter what the technical wording of Article 
V(l)(e), an enforcing court should always defer to the judgment of a court at the situs, 
and that Article V(l)(e) could never really be construed to permit enforcement of an
3 See Hamid G. Gharavi, ‘Chromalloy: Another View’ (1997) 12 Mealey’s Int’l Arb. Rep. 21, 21-22 
(noting parties may purposely try to arbitrate in forum where arbitral awards can be more easily 
overturned under local law).
4 See Gary H. Sampliner, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards After Annulment in Their Country of 
Origin’ (1996) 11 Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep 22, 23 (“As one indication of the ‘pro-enforcement bias’... [the 
Convention’s] authors knew to use the mandatory ‘shall’ language in the articles contemplating 
enforcement of awards, while not using such language in the article that sets forth defenses to 
enforcement”.)
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award under such circumstances.5 The New York Convention is therefore characterised 
by fundamental underlying tensions between the roles of the courts of the enforcing 
forum versus those of the situs. The cases of Hilmarton and Chromalloy are two good 
examples illustrating such a chaotic dilemma. Yet there are strong arguments for vesting 
in the courts of the situs or of the enforcement the primary competence to review 
arbitral awards. Obviously, the flexibility and vagueness provided by the New York 
Convention on a myriad of potential defenses to enforcement possibly leads to a loss of 
a significant measure of uniformity6 and potential chaos in practice. Without uniform 
guidance and being bound by the treaty, individual contracting states could slow the 
development of international standards by adopting and implementing domestic laws 
that mainly protect local interests and which vary considerably from international 
norms.7
1.3 Dilemma o f Hard Law, Soft Law and Lex Mercatoria
The New York Convention can be understood as a nod towards greater enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards at the expense of a degree of uniformity, given the manner in 
which it effectively imports domestic norms into the operation of an international legal 
instrument. Although most countries have made great efforts to adhere to the uniform 
standards laid out in Article V, the tension between diversity in enforcement practice 
on the one hand and uniformity on the other, however, still exists. It is not the ambition 
of the New York Convention to converge the discrepancies of substantive and 
procedural arbitration law and practice in state signatories, in particular, between 
common law and civil law jurisdictions as well as between developed and developing 
states. Accordingly, even with the growth of international commercial arbitration, local 
practices, such as those in existence in common and civil law systems as well as in
5 See Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘New York Convention of 1958 Consolidated Commentary Cases 
Reported in Vol. XVII (1992) -  XIX (1994)’ (1994) 19 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law
6  Taxation Publisher, Deventer/ Boston 1995) 475, 590-93 (arguing that Article V (l)(e) automatically 
invests setting aside o f award with extraterritorial effect, precluding enforcement elsewhere).
6 See Chapter 3 o f this dissertation.
7 For example, the Egyptian law of arbitration at the heart o f the Chromalloy case included “two uniquely 
Egyptian” grounds for annulment of awards, including “if the arbitral award fails to apply the law agreed 
by the parties to the subject matter o f the dispute” and “if nullity occurs in the arbitral award, or if  the 
arbitral proceedings are tainted by nullity affecting the award”. Jan Paulsson, ‘Rediscovering the New 
York Convention: Further Reflections on Chromalloy’ (1997) 12(4) Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep 20.
8 For example, Article 36(1) o f the UNCITRAL Model Law, see Report o f the U.N. Comm, on Int’l 
Trade L., U.N. GAOR 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 92, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985), from which a number 
o f national arbitration laws have been derived, is almost an exact replica o f Article V o f the New York 
Convention. See Kenneth T. Ungar, ‘The Enforcement o f Arbitral Awards Under UNCITRAL’s Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration’ (1987) 25 Colum J Transnat’l L 717, 732-34, 743-53 
(noting similarity between rules laid down in Article 36 and New York Convention).
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developed and developing jurisdictions are unlikely to converge because the “change 
can be better characterised as incremental adaptation rather than the wholesale adoption 
or replacement of the ... system”. 9 As far as the applicable law in commercial 
arbitration is concerned, lex mercatoria has become more popular and is used to denote 
a new approach or standard in favour of the application of non-national legal standards 
rather than the use of standards stemming from a particular national legal system. The 
concept of lex mercatoria is compatible with the trend of delocalisation of commercial 
arbitration and the self-regulation character of international commercial arbitration.10 
Although the arbitral awards based on lex mercatoria are statistically rare, they are 
invariably recognised and enforced by national courts.11 The study of lex mercatoria 
inevitably needs to touch upon the jurisprudential tension between hard law and soft law. 
Hard rules and associated sanctions often cause hesitancy and decrease of the likelihood 
of an agreement among states. By contrast, soft law such as voluntary codes of conduct, 
non-binding recommendations, and informal agreements on cooperation promotes a 
common arbitration approach. The reliance on soft law as a tool to harmonise 
international arbitration law and practice allows for policy experimentation and more 
deference to party autonomy in arbitration, and further permits flexibility and
19adaptability of law to local circumstances.
1.4 Dilemma of Public Policy and Party Autonomy
The New York Convention has its roots in Article III which provides that courts of 
“each contracting state shall recognise... and enforce” foreign arbitral awards thereby 
protecting party autonomy. The introduction of harmonising measures in the field of 
arbitration law is essentially ancillary to the principle of party autonomy. On the other 
hand, Article V, in particular, the non-arbitrability and public policy provisions, has 
created some tensions with the principle of party autonomy because non-arbitrability 
and public policy exceptions provide courts in the country of enforcement with some 
leeway in enforcing arbitral awards and have created the possibility for the enforcing 
courts to effectively import domestic norms into the operation of the New York
9 S. Vitols, S Casper, D. Soskice and S. Woolcock, Corporate Governance in Large British and German 
Companies: Comparative Institutional Advantage or Competing fo r  Best Practice? (Anglo-German 
Foundation for the Study o f Industrial Society, London 1997 ISBN 1-900834-10-3) 36.
10 See AAA International Rules Art 28; ICC Art 17; LCIA Art 22.3; Stockholm Art 24. Also see the 
traditional UNCITRAL Rules Article 33.
11 See Chapter 4 o f this dissertation.
12 See Brian Portnoy, ‘Constructing Competition: Antitrust and the Political Foundations of Global 
Capitalism’ 35 (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University o f Chicago 2000, on file with the 
University o f Chicago) cited in Anu Piilola, ‘Assessing Theories o f Global Governance: A Case Study of 
International Antitrust Regulation’ (2003) 39 Stan J Int’l L 207, 222 note 75.
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Convention. A more controversial aspect of the New York Convention is Article VII, 
which has been often regarded as a “more favorable right” rule calling for the 
application of a state’s domestic law if such law provides more liberal grounds for 
enforcement than under the New York Convention.13 This allows the party seeking 
enforcement to choose a more favourable body of law to its dispute.14 The New York 
Convention therefore represents a minimum standard from which state signatories 
cannot derogate but are allowed to retain existing liberal norms or take further unilateral 
steps to facilitate enforcement. The deeper tension is then a potential conflict between 
Articles VII and V(2) because the former is where judicial competence to evaluate 
awards lies and the latter should control in the event of conflict. The state-centred and 
non-harmonising public policy exception of the New York Convention does not seem to 
be compatible with the general “pro-enforcement bias” of the New York Convention.15 
Given the lack of a clear guidance, the public policy rule of the New York Convention 
represents a withdrawal from the core objective of upholding party autonomy in 
commercial arbitration and achieving uniformity of practice among state signatories.16
2. Two “ N e w ” T h e o r ie s
Two main research methodologies are adopted and their technical aspects and 
application to the New York Convention have been thoroughly discussed in this 
dissertation. They are “innovative” in the sense that they have been rarely used in the 
study of the New York Convention and international commercial arbitration, most 
questions of which are practical and procedural in nature. These methodologies also 
have significant jurisprudential value to the core question of the entire dissertation at the 
macro-level study.
2.1 Game Theory and Judicial Competition
13 See Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention o f  1958: Towards a Uniform 
Judicial Interpretation (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, the Netherlands 1981) 88 & n.225; see also 
Jan Paulsson, ‘Rediscovering the New York Convention: Further Reflections on Chromalloy’ (1997) 
Mealey’s Int’l Arb Rep 20 (noting Article VII provides that “national rules or indeed other treaties shall 
be given preference if  they are more favourable to enforcement”); Jan Paulsson, ‘Problems in 
Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards’ (1995) 6 World Arb & Mediation Rep 77 (noting that Article 
VII allows domestic forum to apply its own arbitration law if  that law is more pro-enforcement than under 
the Convention).
14 See Albert Jan van den Berg, op. cit. 84 (arguing that language must pertain only to party seeking 
enforcement in order to avoid result “wholly inconsistent with the pro-enforcement bias o f the 
Convention and the aim o f the [more favorable right] provision itse lf’).
15 The Second Circuit in Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de I'Industrie du 
Papier 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
16 See Chapter 5 o f this dissertation.
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The dynamics among states can be explained by reference to the game theory, the focus 
of which is the self-interests, reputation and competition of various players in repeated 
transactions.17 The theory supports the view that judicial competition and cooperation 
are in co-existence and can lead to credible commitments. Competing or cooperating 
states are subject to peer pressure and are conscious of the reputation and self-interest 
which would be endangered by the breaking of commitments. The players in the 
gaming setting have a stronger incentive in the upkeep of their reputations in the 
community. As a result, a federal or centralised convention and governance regime (or a 
“pool” in an economics sense) facilitates the emergence of shared expectations and 
concerns, development of behavioural standards and eventually a “race to the top”. 
Although the existence of many international organisations across a large number of 
fields have demonstrated their valuable function in international policymaking, an 
effective international governance regime does not necessarily require a full scale of 
institutionalisation, which does not guarantee the efficiency of global governance.18 The 
game theory demonstrates a reliable theoretical model of the global economic order and 
provides the necessary level of flexibility and benefits to the existing institution-based 
governing regime. The potential and strength of a new governance regime depends on 
its ability to define common goals as well as the state actors’ good faith, internal 
cohesion, mutual trust and the ability to reach consensus.
2,2 Darwinian Theory and Evolution of Law
According to Darwinian theory, history or environment matters because both determine 
the way in which institutions can change or evolve and efficiency is not necessarily a 
decisive factor. In international commercial arbitration, the New York Convention itself 
is a product of the Darwinian development and indicates the interdependence among the 
meme, legal norm and social environment and are key factors in the social evolution. 
The significance of Darwinian theory is reflected in its supplementary function to the 
game theory. In real life it is rare that the competitive or co-operative setting is achieved 
instantaneously as the players are not necessarily rational and aware of the payoff 
functions of other players. The question is whether the equilibrium can persist in an 
increasingly competitive global market. Arguably, as markets globalise and market 
players (including individuals, corporations and states which are subject to very
17 Giandomenico Majone, ‘International Regulatory Cooperation: A Neo-Institutionalist Approach’ in 
George A. Bermann et al. (eds), Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Legal Problems and Political 
Prospects (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) 136, 138 (citing John Milgrom & Paul Roberts, 
Economics, Organisation and Management (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs 1992) 138-143).
18 Ibid. 136.
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different governance systems) are compelled to compete head to head (in product, 
labour and capital markets), a Darwinian struggle becomes possible, out of which, in 
theory, the most efficient norm should emerge dominant. Indeed, it has been predicted 
that such a competition implies an “end to history” for some laws.19 A relevant but 
newer proposition is the “path dependency dissertation” that explains the path of the 
convergence and further postulates that institutions evolve along path-dependent 
trajectories, which are heavily shaped by initial starting points and pre-existing 
conditions.20 In employing such a methodology to measure the degree of legal change, 
“there is a strong tendency towards convergence of formal legal rules as the result of 
extensive legal reforms”, and “law reform has been primarily responsive to economic 
change rather than initiating or leading it”.21 Darwinian theory is a strong jurisprudential 
tool to confirm the necessity and the way of reforming the New York Convention. For 
instance, for the sake of consistency, a revision of the New York Convention to solve
the discrepancy of national laws in precautionary remedies in enforcement of foreign
00arbitral awards is not feasible since this would substantially change the memetic code 
of the New York Convention.
3 . O n e  C o r e  Q u e s t io n  -  I m p r o v in g  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  C o n v e n t io n  in  t h e  
G l o b a l i s e d  W o r l d  in  t h e  2 1 st C e n t u r y  
We are currently witnessing an increase in all forms of international commercial 
transactions and a pro-free-trade resurgence at different levels in the world. The global 
commerce has expanded with flourishing multinational corporations, sophisticated 
electronics and data processing systems and the dramatically increasing volume of 
trans-national transactions. In this connection, it is now common practice for businesses 
to cross their national borders to enter foreign markets. Although the pressure from 
different types of protectionist interests at the international level is still considerable, 
progress has been made towards globalisation. Trade relations and capital investments 
are now being “rationalised” in a new international economic order.
19 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure o f  Corporate Law (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1991) 4-15; and Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, ‘The End of 
History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 Geo L J 439.
20 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and 
Governance’ (1997) 52 Stan L Rev 127; Amir N. Licht, ‘The Mother o f All Path Dependencies: Toward a 
Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems’ (2001) 26 Del J Corp L 147.
21 Katharina Pistor, Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies’ 
(Eur. Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., Working Paper No. 49/2000, 2000), available at 
http://www.ebrd.com/english/region/workingp/wp49.pdf.
22 Bernardo M. Cremades, ‘Is Exclusion of Concurrent Courts’ Jurisdiction over Conservative Measures 
to be Introduced through a Revision of the New York Convention?’ (1989) 6(3) J Int’l Arb, 105, 111.
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The worldwide liberalisation is being influenced by a number of virtually 
universal trends: deregulation or re-regulation aimed at promoting enhanced 
competition; increased competitive pressures among different market players; and 
efforts of state authorities to coordinate, harmonise and strengthen the rule of law and 
legal system. Along with liberalisation, the absolute authority of the sovereign is 
constrained by law but the legal system furthers the decentralisation of power in society, 
which makes possible private law-making and the growth of self-regulatory bodies such 
as arbitration institutions.
Due to the globalisation and economic liberalisation and integration, it is harder 
for any contracting state to manage and regulate a more dynamic, market-driven and 
international economic order alone. The global governance can exist in different modes 
but the state governments must face the dilemma of balancing national interests with 
international obligations, and of complying with international obligations without 
compromising national sovereignty. The game theory assumes that the behaviour and 
self-interest of the state is best mediated by the market, which ensures both individual 
interests and general economic welfare. The judicial competition, as well as the market 
competition, liberates the self-interest of individual states while at the same time 
constraining its misuse. The neo-liberal global governance now makes better use of 
“soft law” in pursuit of cooperation and voluntary convergence rather than coercion. In 
modem time, the global governance regime created through norms of reciprocity, trust 
and consensus is superior to a regime advancing the mle of law through regulatory 
imperialism and mandatory sanctions.
Most laws remain predominantly national. The conventional way to deal with 
international legal issues such as enforcement of foreign arbitral awards set aside by the 
court in the country of rendition is to rely on a unilateral application of national laws, 
which often causes trouble and tension. There is an ongoing debate over whether there 
is a need to have an international regime that could better respond to the new economic 
environment, increased cross-border business activity, and the integration of markets. 
An effective trans-national regime is viewed as a useful tool to reduce transaction costs, 
increase efficiency and cultivate legal predictability and certainty. Achieving 
convergence by compelling nations to harmonise their policies and rules with a 
common vision can lead to successful public policies and effective global governance.
23 Cf. Giandomenico Majone, ‘International Regulatory Cooperation: A Neo-Institutionalist Approach’ in 
George A. Bermann et al. (eds) Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Legal Problems and Political 
Prospects (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) 130 (arguing that “where such mutual trust is not 
forthcoming, regulatory cooperation may have to be supported by formal institutions and centralised
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Nevertheless, the establishment of an international regime may hinder any positive 
attempts to internalise the regulatory convergence. To expand bilateral and regional 
cooperative arrangements is a possibility. The establishment of unified supranational 
rules is a more controversial approach, which lacks sufficient support in the real 
world.24 It is hard to find a satisfactory equilibrium. An alternative solution would be 
the harmonisation of national laws.
Harmonisation of law in early days gave way to more flexible approaches which 
placed greater stress on member states’ autonomy. For instance, in the process of 
harmonising corporate law in Europe, harmonising measures appeared in different ways 
and were reflected in the first, second, third and fourth generation directives. The early 
generation directives are more prescriptive but the direction of more recent generation 
directives is to lay down basic standards in the form of a set of options which essentially 
represented the predominant approaches in operation in various member states.25 The 
third generation directives reflected the “new approach” to harmonisation with the 
initiation of the single market program. The “new approach” establishes a principle that 
the community intervention should be limited to the harmonisation of essential 
requirements. At that point, the decentralising approach is applied and a range of 
regulatory issues are explicitly left with the member states.26 The fourth-generation 
measures are even less detailed and closer to a “framework” model, which favours 
general principles or standards other than the rigid prescriptive rules.27
The harmonisation approach in the new generation is indeed a reflexive one. The 
essence of the approach is to base the effect of the regulatory harmonisation (or 
intervention in some sense) on the “second order effects” on the part of member states 
other than on direct prescriptive or intervening rules. The rationale of this reflexive 
harmonising approach is to recognise the need to underpin autonomous processes of 
adjustment in the context of economic regulation and the infeasibility to impose any
procedures” although it is noted that agreements often lack credibility when the level o f implementation is 
uncertain and the importance of trust-building.)
24 See Joel I. Klein, ‘Time For A Global Competition Initiative?’ a paper presented at the E.C. Merger 
Control 10th Anniversary Conference in Brussels (September 14, 2000), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/6486.htm The United States has opposed this approach most 
notably, yet U.S. leaders have more recently recognised that some measures on the international level are 
inevitable. Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, and Sideways, (2000) 
75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1781, 1803.
25 See generally Charlotte Villiers, European Company Law: Towards Democracy? (Aldershot, 
Dartmouth 1998).
26 K Armstrong and S Bulmer, The Governance o f  the European Single Market (Manchester University 
Press: Manchester 1998) 152.
27 A good example is the draft Thirteenth Directive on Takeover Bids, the general principles of which are 
implemented through local-level action by self-regulatory bodies such as the City Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers, a professional association in finance sector in the UK.
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specific distributive outcomes. The theory effectively encourages the coupling of 
external regulation with self-regulatory processes. If this approach is implemented in 
practice, the legislation shall devolve or confer rule-making powers to self-regulatory 
processes. Relevant to our discussion, the objective of reflexive harmonisation is 
therefore not to substitute for state-level regulation. The transnational standards would 
not operate as monopolistic regulators to occupy the field but would be used to promote 
diverse and local-level approaches to regulate problems. The technique adopted to 
achieve this mode is to set basic standards as a “floor of rights”, which would help rule 
out certain factors associated with the “race to the bottom” and allow member states to 
develop their own standards. Thus, the “floor of rights” prevents “downwards” 
derogations. Eventually, the reflexive harmonisation operates to push individual states 
to enter into a “race to the top” by competing to withdraw protective standards.
4. How t o  R e f o r m  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  C o n v e n t io n ?
The New York Convention is “the most important international treaty relating to
n o
international commercial arbitration”, and “the most effective instance of international 
legislation in the entire history of commercial law”. 29 However, the New York 
Convention is “now beginning to show its age”.30 Besides, the New York Convention 
causes some striking conflicts in international arbitration resulting from inherent 
vagueness and simplicity of some provisions, inadequacies in legislative enactment in 
contracting states and deficiencies in the application of the provisions by national 
courts.31
The New York Convention only covers the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements and arbitral awards and leaves many theoretical and practical issues in 
arbitration untouched. Unharmonised national practices may make the functioning of 
international commercial arbitration overly burdensome or even impossible. In this 
sense, harmonisation should aim for the virtual unification of national arbitration laws. 
For instance, as discussed in Chapter 2, some scholars suggest a wholesale change to 
the “writing requirement” in the New York Convention in national arbitration laws.32 
The harmonisation of national arbitration laws may represent a good chance of
28 Alan Redfem and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration, (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 1999) 67.
29 Stephen Schwebel, ‘A Celebration of the United Nations -  New York Convention’ (1996) 12 Arb Int’l 
823.
30 Alan Redfem and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration, op cit.
31 Michael Kerr, ‘Concord and Conflict in International Arbitration’ (1997) 13(2) Arb Int’l 121, 141.
32 Michael Marks Cohen, ‘Arbitration “Agreement in Writing”: Notes in the Margin of the Sixth Goff 
Lecture’ (1997) 13(3) Arb Int’l 273.
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capturing beneficial aspects of regulatory competition, in terms of evolutionary 
adaptation, within the framework of globalisation. In fact, many aspects of international 
commercial arbitration still lie within the sphere of competence of national laws. The 
method of a wholesale change to national arbitration reflects such reality.
The aim of harmonisation is not to eliminate the autonomy and diversity of 
national legal systems. The diversity is a bonus to the development and evolution of law. 
Co-evolution based on diversity at the level of national legal systems, coupled with the 
transplanting of transnational norms, is more likely to be a path of future development 
than the type of convergence around a single, dominant regime which appears in other 
harmonising processes of substantive norms. In this sense, the proposal to amend 
Article VII of the New York Convention, a so-called stumbling block to encourage 
states to bypass Article V and to invoke their own laws,33 to the effect of restricting the 
scope and removing the part of the more favourable provision, is not a sensible one. 
Instead of “damaging the process of international arbitration which the New York 
Convention itself has done so much to foster”, 34 Article VII actually provides 
contracting states with a certain level of flexibility to diversify the practice and “race to 
the top” so that other states may follow a better lead. Article VII actually recognises the 
importance of diversity and helps steer the process of evolutionary adaptation of rules at 
the state level.
The model for legal harmonisation can be based on a reflective harmonising 
approach. Arbitration-related legislation is essentially comprised of two layers: basic 
political choices which can be articulated as broad, but sufficiently precise, framework 
rules; and detailed technical measures, which conform with and implement the 
objectives of the framework rules. A multi-layer approach on the basis of this duality 
can be explored. For instance, principles, or basic political choices, can be adopted in a 
framework (in the form of treaties or conventions) in accordance with normal treaty 
legislative procedures. The New York Convention has achieved the purpose of this 
layer of harmonisation. Next to the conventions and treaties is the model law 
recommended by international organisations which would play a supplementary role. 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration has been put in 
place to supplement the New York Convention. A significant number of bilateral 
treaties and regional conventions with provisions on the enforcement of awards is also a 
very important source of law in this regard. By contrast, detailed technical measures
33 Roy Goode, ‘The Role of the Lex Loci Arbitri in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2001) 17(1) 
Arb Int’l 39.
34 Ibid.
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would be adopted by arbitration institutions or national legislation or court precedents in 
a delegated legislative manner. The substance of these detailed measures would 
conform to the principles set out in the convention or the rules recommended in the 
model law.
The hard law approach to revise the New York Convention could not be 
seriously entertained due to the practical difficulties.35 In response to the proposal to 
revise the New York Convention addressing the court intervention in arbitral 
proceedings, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, which took 
over the legislative function of the New York Convention from the United Nations 
economic and Social Council and initiated the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, was against the idea to negotiate 
an additional protocol.36 Instead, the UNCITRAL adopted a model law approach. 
Special considerations were given to the difficulty in obtaining ratification by a 
sufficient number of countries, the failure of which would be counterproductive and 
harm the cause of aiding harmonisation of arbitration law and practice.37 The impact of 
the Model Law has been significant in certain areas, such as the harmonisation of 
arbitration proceedings, simplification of the enforcement procedures and harmonisation 
of enforcement standards. The Model Law presents to national legislators around the 
world a sample of a statute which accommodates the need for modem arbitration. The 
model law technique, as compared to the treaty approach, has proven to be effective not 
only in terms of the speed of implementation but also in terms of the level of 
harmonisation.38 The significant influence of die Model Law is reflected in the entire 
adoption by some major trading states such as Canada and Australia and, more often, 
partial revisions to existing national arbitration statutes. Deviations from the Model Law 
text have, as a general rule, rarely been made. Nevertheless, the continuing divergence 
between the “insider systems”, which stress the judicial attitudes towards party 
autonomy in arbitration and judicial systems in the home jurisdiction, and “outsider 
systems”, which place a strong emphasis on the uniform enforcement standards and 
judicial systems in other enforcement jurisdictions, is reflected in the failure of the
35 Michael Kerr, ‘Concord and Conflict in International Arbitration’ op cit. at 143.
36 Jacques Werner, ‘Should the New York Convention be Revised to Provide for Court Intervention in 
Arbitral Proceedings?’ (1989) 6(3) J Int’l Arb 113, 114, 118 (stating that the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade weighed the pros and cons of extending the New York Convention to the conduct 
o f the arbitral proceedings proposed by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee in 1977 and 
outweighed such proposal.)
37 Ibid.
38 Gerold Herrmann, ‘The UNCITRAL Arbitration Law: A Good Model o f A Model Law’ (1998) 
Uniform L Rev 483.
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member states to reach agreement on a number of key proposals, in the very early 
beginning, and then on some tricky practical issues such as the enforcement of annulled 
arbitral awards and application of lex mercatoria and public policy in practice. The 
Model Law, together with the New York Convention, falls a long way short of 
establishing a systematic code relating to the uniformity in international commercial 
arbitration. According to our analysis in the gaming strategy, a centralised or federal- 
type governing system is advisable to be put in place. A strong proposal has been made 
to create an International Court for Resolving Disputes on Enforceability of Arbitral 
Awards or an International Court of Arbitral Awards.39 Although the functions of these 
“supranational” bodies have not been clearly outlined by their proponents, in the game 
theory, they are supposed to play a governing and supervisory role in harmonising 
enforcement practices by contracting states to the New York Convention. This is so 
because the procedural scheme for enforcement of awards is not regulated by the New 
York Convention and needs special attention and oversight. At the regional level, such 
functions may be first tested by some existing regional judicial bodies, for example, the 
European Court of Justice, according to existing regional conventions such as the 
Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters.40 In addition, in order to enhance the correct implementation, 
progressive interpretation and gradual liberalisation of convention provisions by 
national courts, it has been advocated that a new interpretative text of the New York 
Convention should be produced in the form of UNCITRAL Guidelines41 or a Model 
Law Supplement,42 which can improve the implementation, interpretation and 
application of the New York Convention. This proposal takes into account both “soft 
law” and new harmonisation theories and fully makes use of both “instrumentalist” and 
“deregulatory” sides of the judicial harmonising trend in the 21st centuiy. The emphasis 
of the instrumentalism lies in the self-regulation of social and legal systems and
39 Stephen Schwebel, ‘The Creation and Operation of an International Court o f Arbitral Awards’ and 
Howard Holtzmann, ‘A Task for the 21st Century: Creating a New International Court for Resolving 
Disputes on the enforceability of Arbitral Awards’ in Martin Hunter, Arthur Marriott and V. V. Veeder 
(eds) The Internationalisation o f  International Arbitration: The LCIA Centenary Conference (2nd edn 
Graham &Trotman/M. Nijhoff, London/Boston 1995) 115 and 109 respectively.
40 Dominique T. Hascher, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitration Awards and the Brussels 
Convention’ (1996) 12(3) Arb Int’l 265.
41 Michael Kerr, ‘Concord and Conflict in International Arbitration’ op cit. at 142-43.
42 Gerold Herrmann, ‘Does the World Need Additional Uniform Legislation on Arbitration?’ (1999) 15(3) 
Arb Int’l 213.
305
resistance of external regulatory interference whilst the deregulatory theory tries to 
diminish, if not remove, the external regulatory controls.43
Beyond the New York Convention, it is anticipated that a new generation of 
“soft” law or “supranational” harmonising body in international commercial arbitration 
will appear in due course.
43 Simon Deakin and Alan Hughes, ‘Economic Efficiency and the Proceduralisation of Company Law’ 
(1999) 3 Company, Financial and Insolvency Law Review 169-189. Also see Ruth Adler (tr), Gunther 
Teubner and Anne Bankowska, Law as an Autopoietic System (Blackwell, Oxford 1993).
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